Land Claims and Resistance to the Management of Harvester Activities in Nunavut

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(Received 26 June 2007; accepted in revised form 1 February 2008)

ABSTRACT. In 1976, Inuit leaders in what is now Nunavut began the long process that led to a comprehensive land claim to regain control of their lives and land. Previously, they had seen their economic, social, political, educational, and belief systems diminished and the people disempowered by the imposition of Western systems, structures, and practices. To reverse the existing relations, Inuit leaders had to call upon the ideologies and institutions of the dominant society—a process greatly misunderstood by Inuit harvesters and others within the communities. The disconnect between Inuit harvesters’ expectations of the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement (NLCA) and the realities experienced in the communities have made ocean resource management a site of growing resistance in the North. Common misconceptions were that the Nunavut Government would be an Inuit government and that land-claim “compensation” would involve per capita distributions and injections of cash into the hunters and trappers’ organizations. Instead, communities were expected to abide by the decisions of the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board—a tripartite joint-management arrangement between the federal and territorial governments and Inuit organizations—and to cooperate with the increasing demands from government departments and science researchers for local information and participation. The community response to these impositions was to obscure the gaze of inquiring governments and outsiders through creative acts of resistance. To mediate the situation, increased involvement from federal and territorial resource managers in terms of support, capacity building, information exchange, and federal/territorial/community relationship building is encouraged.

Key words: Nunavut, Inuit, coastal communities, ocean management, resistance

INTRODUCTION

Comaroff and Comaroff (1991:15) say that “the essence of colonization inheres less in political overrule than in seizing and transforming ‘others’ by the very act of conceptualizing, inscribing, and interacting with them on terms not of their choosing; in making them into the pliant objects and silenced subjects of our scripts and scenarios.” However, the dominant society never totally succeeds in removing the vitality from indigenous systems. Instead, pre-existing systems...
constantly spring up, challenging and remaking the dominant power relations. This transformation may be done in open defiance, through imaginative feats of cultural subversion, or through a quiet, brooding resistance (Scott, 1985, 1990; Kulchyski, 1992).

This paper contextualizes and discusses some of the situations, government policies, and Inuit perceptions of their land claim that influence the current resistance to ocean co-management within the Kivalliq (formerly Keewatin) region of Nunavut.

Thomas Suluk is a beneficiary of the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) and a lifelong resident of Arviat, Nunavut. He spent more than 17 years involved in land claims. During that time, he served as an interpreter for the Nunavut project, interpreting complex concepts such as “land claims” and “aboriginal rights” to the communities and reinterpreting community responses back to government. He was also a chief land-claim negotiator for the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada; the member of Parliament instrumental in the division of the Northwest Territories; an executive in the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut, charged with setting up the future government of Nunavut; and a trustee for the Nunavut Trust. Much of this paper is a firsthand account of his experiences during the land-claim process and as a current resident living under the NLCA.

Sherrie Blakney, a PhD candidate at the University of Manitoba, did her doctoral research on Inuit well-being and its connection to the land. During 2004, Blakney lived with traditional Inuit harvesters in Arviat, participating in hunting, fishing, trapping, and inland excursions and conversing with members of the local hunters and trappers’ organization. In the following years, she worked with Inuit leaders, land-claim organizations, and the federal government to mediate tensions and strengthen federal/Inuit working relations. Today, both authors are with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Central and Arctic Region, working to strengthen Inuit involvement in decision making for ocean management.

The first sections, including the vignettes, are outcomes of Blakney’s doctoral work, while the sections beginning with “The NLCA—Reversing Existing Relations” are outcomes of Suluk’s involvement with land claims and politics and as a resident of Nunavut. The final section, “Legacy of Non-Integrated Management…” combines the work and reflections of both authors.

BACKGROUND TO RESISTANCE: THE SOCIOCULTURAL HISTORY OF KIVALLIQ (KEEWATIN)

In 1921, Prime Minister Arthur Meighen advised his colleagues that the Government of Canada’s policy toward the Inuit should be to “…leave them alone. They are in a latitude where no-one will ever bother them.” But Charles Stewart, the minister of the Interior, disagreed: “I am not asking that the Eskimos be…made wards of the government, nor is my desire…to make them dependent on the people of Canada for a livelihood. But white men are going amongst them; the missionaries are beginning to require education for their children…” (Duffy, 1988:6).

In fact, Europeans and their descendants had been going among Inuit and altering their livelihood for quite some time (Birke-Smith, 1933; Van Stone and Oswald, 1959). From the 14th century onward, Inuit lives were influenced by explorers, whalers, traders, missionaries, and government administrators. Families were encouraged to alter their subsistence harvesting strategies and focus on nontraditional furs and marine products for European and southern markets. Traditional settlement practices were altered as Inuit were relocated nearer to trapping areas favourable to supplying European product demands. Trading posts established nearby to provide Inuit with firearms, mechanical equipment, and supplies created a dependency on trade goods (Brody, 1975, 2000; Damas, 2002).

Canada was becoming concerned about the growing dependency of Inuit on the imported goods and rudimentary health care offered at the trading posts and feared that epidemics would increase as Inuit clustered around these centres (Damas, 2002). Thus, until the 1950s, Canada’s policy toward the Inuit was to disperse and relocate them and keep them self-sufficient on the land. Some family groups in the Keewatin were relocated as many as three times in “acts of social reform” to keep Inuit from clustering around the posts and inland weather stations (Marcus, 1995).

When family allowances came into existence in 1944, northern administrators feared that Inuit would stop hunting because the allowances often represented more cash than a family’s entire annual income from trapping (Damas, 2002). Family allowances were therefore given out only when food supplies were scarce. Yet children still became major sources of income and were often adopted by older childless couples with limited means of support, altering Inuit family and social structures (Guemple, 1979; Tester and Kulchyski, 1994).

During the 1950s, centralization became inevitable. Caribou populations receded, the fox pelt market collapsed, and inland trading posts closed, causing severe hardship for Keewatin Inuit, who increasingly gathered around the coastal posts for relief, family allowances, and pensions. Although many families were attracted to the education, health, and social programs, subsidized housing, wage employment, and the opportunity for gradual acquisition of urban goods (Brody, 1975; Damas, 2002), other family groups were compelled by government to move to coastal areas for relief and monitoring.

Government hoped that if they divided the inland families and dispersed them among the coastal families, the inland Inuit would learn different subsistence strategies and quickly adapt to their new setting. But southern intervention did not have the positive outcomes that were expected. Inland Inuit were expected to fish, hunt, and trap in an unfamiliar area and to adhere to unfamiliar trapping, fishing, and hunting regulations (Bankes, 2005; Kulchyski and Tester, 2007). The removal of some traditional leaders led to despondency, and social disruption ensued because
With the settling of the Nunavut claim, government and southern universities assumed that, given time to make necessary adjustments to the new administration, the Inuit would be willing to work out resource-management issues. So why then, after 15 years, is there still such resistance to the co-management regimes set up under the claim? Why are so many older Inuit at the community level discontent with their hard-won governmental structures?

Vignette I: The Nunavut Wildlife Harvest Study and the “Occasional Hunters”

In accordance with the NLCA, the Nunavut Wildlife Harvest Study (NWHS) was conducted throughout Nunavut between June 1996 and May 2001 to determine baseline harvesting data and basic needs of the communities. The NWHS study designers were experienced northern researchers and anticipated the possibility of “strategic bias”: hunters could purposely under-report kills because of a misunderstanding of the study purpose and a fear that results would be used to limit harvesting; a tendency for Inuit hunters to under-report since they do not like to brag; and a reluctance to report some species since historically they have been illegal to hunt…Exaggeration of harvests was thought to be very unlikely and was assumed not to have occurred” (Priest and Usher, 2004:7). To alleviate possible stress associated with reporting harvests, participation was voluntary, and the confidentiality of the individual hunters was assured. Local fieldworkers categorized hunters according to their activity: intensive hunters regularly and repeatedly engaged in nearly all types of hunting activities throughout the year; active hunters regularly engaged in a limited number of harvesting activities during the year; and occasional hunters participated in hunting activities irregularly, usually on day trips or weekend outings (Priest and Usher, 2004:26). In some communities, such as Arviat and Rankin Inlet, occasional hunters were not surveyed because of the sheer number of hunters in this category (Tables 1 and 2), and study designers were led to believe that this omission would not adversely affect the outcome of the study. However, Inuit fieldworkers and hunters who know the harvesting dynamics well did not tell the study designers that many of those classified as “occasional hunters” were mid- to upper-level government workers who had the means to obtain high-powered boats, skidoos, all-terrain vehicles, and rifles. Armed with new equipment, it was not uncommon for “occasional hunters” to harvest 8 to 10 belugas on a Saturday or an evening after work. On the other hand, intensive hunters usually represented the poor Inuit who had limited access to cash income, good equipment, and fuel. Although they hunted regularly, their harvesting capacity was small.

Vignette II: Co-management and the Communities

Under the NLCA, all marine and wildlife co-management decisions are the responsibility of the Nunavut Wild-
life Management Board (NWMB), and the NWMB requires community hunters and trappers’ organizations (HTOs) to record their annual beluga harvests and maintain those records for two years. The records are collected annually by a visiting federal fisheries officer. Although cooperation of the HTOs is expected, they are not obligated to carry out the NWMB decisions. Thus, the collection of harvesting data from some communities is consistently problematic and is often based on after-the-fact guesstimates. For example, a federal fisheries officer who went to collect harvesting data from the Arviat HTO in November 2003 was met instead by a Government of Nunavut wildlife officer (a local Inuk), who told her there were no harvesting records. Instead he said he would make a list of possible hunters who might have participated in the beluga hunt. The Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) officer was told the numbers could not be verified because hunters had unlisted phone numbers, and that she could not see the community freezer because it had been cleaned out and the muktuk had been moved to individual home freezers. The wildlife officer estimated that 200 – 300 belugas had been harvested that summer, an increase of 50%, in anticipation of a proposed deal with northern Quebec to buy muktuk from Arviat hunters (Nelson, 2002). The fisheries officer then met with representatives of the HTO, who claimed they were unaware of any requirement to maintain harvest records. They stated that the HTO had no harvest estimate and no records, but they agreed to collect data for the 2004 harvest. However, in 2004, HTO representatives informed the fisheries officer directly that they refused to collect and maintain records or report harvests (B. Guptil, DFO Rankin Inlet, pers. comm., 2005).

**THE NLCA—REVERSING EXISTING RELATIONS**

Inuit were living a nomadic lifestyle until formal education for Inuit children and other attractions of permanent settlements began to end this mode of living in the 1950s. Until the early 1960s, Inuit had no accurate picture of world history, of how North America was colonized, or how the Canadian federation came to be. They knew nothing about the gradual addition of new provinces. Neither were they aware that, in reality, they had first been “owned” by the Hudson’s Bay Company, which eventually sold its holdings—people included—to the new Dominion of Canada. Most Inuit were not aware that two world wars had taken place and that Canada and other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arviat</th>
<th>Rankin Inlet</th>
<th>Repulse Bay</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hunters surveyed</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
community to ascertain what should be included in their land claim. The communities’ input had to be interpreted into tangible proposals and, because the governments also had to understand them, southern consultants and researchers had to be hired to render these proposals into “governmental” language. Thereafter, the government’s replies had to be re-interpreted back to the ITC board, which then deferred its decision to accept or reject until it had consulted with the communities, a very time-consuming process. In the absence of mass communication in the North, Inuit did not know about the enormous amount of work initiated by southern university researchers in support of land claims.

However, for Inuit living in what would become Nunavut, time stood still. Canada’s free entry system for prospectors and the increasing patchwork of mining claims on Inuit traditional lands made ITC insist that there be no economic development until the land claims were settled. Social issues were put on hold. As a result of this stance, the Inuvialuit and the Inuit of northern Quebec went their separate ways.

COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES

NLCA and the Government of Nunavut

When the NLCA was settled (1993) and Nunavut became a territory (1999), a minimum of accurate printed information on what had happened at the political level was available in the communities. Inuit society and culture are based on oral transmission: continuous face-to-face consultations were required before the older generations could begin to grasp the relevance of territorial and federal politics. But after the land claim was settled, consultations ceased and the misunderstandings grew. Most of the population had no experience with the principles of comprehensive Western agreements. Many people thought Nunavut to have an ad hoc Inuit government, but closer scrutiny revealed that it was really a recognized Canadian model similar to Alberta and Saskatchewan. In a conversation with T. Suluk, Ahiarmiut Elder Job Mounik (of Farley Mowat’s [1959] The Desperate People) protested that this so-called “Inuit” government was really a carbon copy of the old Government of the NWT—that there was so much bureaucratic red tape, no one in its departments could answer any of his questions, but kept referring him to other departments. Never mind that he was now being told that in Inuktitut! “Why then,” he asked, “is the Government of Nunavut being referred to as an Inuit government?” (conversation between T. Suluk and J. Mounik, December 2005).

No matter how much the two agreements incorporated within the NLCA were distinguished (i.e., the land claim for Inuit beneficiaries and the Nunavut Agreement that created the Nunavut Territory and its public government), the older Inuit mind was unable to digest it. Only the passage of time could resolve this distinction, so Inuit leaders accepted that the “Inuit government” would exist in name only. Nunavut’s constitution is still the same as the previous Northwest Territories Act. It should therefore come as no surprise that all the formal structures, procedures, and practices of the NWT and Yukon territorial legislatures are also seen in the Nunavut legislature, but with Inuit trappings (e.g., Inuktitut names for Crown Corporations). The creation of Nunavut was merely an adjustment in the federal administration of the Arctic. The three principal parties to the agreement saw it as an alternative to the earlier calls by northern people for an “Inuit government,” and after the transition things remained stubbornly the same.

NLCA and Compensation

To many Inuit, attaining government status meant being handed the keys to Canada’s financial coffers, along with the ability to make edicts, a practice Canada does not encourage (although it could have been useful for a time to give older Inuit a sense of what governance means). Discussions by Inuit leaders on how to distribute the land-claim money centred on several options: (1) splitting the capital compensation amount three ways, according to the number of people in each region of Nunavut. The compensation money would be distributed to the Regional Inuit Associations (RIAs), which would have the responsibility of setting up their own regional corporations; (2) distributing the compensation to the RIAs and dividing it further for the individual communities according to their population size; (3) setting aside agreed amounts for regional or local administration and leaving the decision on investment versus per capita distribution to the communities. Under this scenario, each region would set its own timetable and budgets and formulate its own administrative structures; or (4) hiring financial experts to invest the money and maximize the financial returns, while funding the three regional associations and their regional corporations with modest annual amounts ($500000 – $1 000 000), NTI and its regional affiliated organizations would share most of the generated income. As Inuit leaders considered the ability of communities to manage moderately large amounts of money, they decided that Nunavut Inuit had not attained sufficient competency in large financial matters. Basic formal education had arrived—sporadically—only in the 1960s, and most Inuit had not yet grasped Western concepts of budgeting, money management, and financial accountability. Having considered the alternatives, Inuit leaders decided to follow the fourth option and direct the financial proceeds to a Nunavut investment corporation, the Nunavut Trust Inc.

To ordinary Inuit, the very word “compensation” in relation to the NLCA is misleading because there were no per capita distributions, but only a few programs targeted to specific Inuit groups, such as elders, hunters, or students going on to higher education in the provinces. To make matters worse, Nunavut Trust Inc. has been chiding the
three regions of Nunavut for “excessive spending” through these programs and “eroding” the $580 million yearly federal transfer (Younger-Lewis, 2004, 2005a). Thus, increasing the pressure to conform to non-Inuit financial management priorities will keep the compensation forever out of reach of the ordinary Inuk, for whose benefit the land claim was designed.

**NLCA and Co-Management Regimes**

One of the main purposes of the NLCA was to provide a buffer zone between Inuit and the outside world, but while the claim was being negotiated, the formation of the Government of Nunavut was not yet a given. Therefore, it was decided that land-use and resource-management decisions would be made by joint-management bodies, known as Institutions of Public Government (IPGs), consisting of equal representation from designated Inuit organizations, the territorial government, and the federal government. The NWMB was the first joint-management body created to serve as a buffer between the government (federal and territorial) and the original generation of Inuit hunters. However, efforts to integrate northern and southern principles on these boards met with questionable success. For example, recent attempts by the NWMB to impose tough new restrictions on hunters in the communities reveal that the former decisions, guidelines, and regulations were ineffective (Younger-Lewis, 2005b). As the NWMB attempts to impose strict quotas on hunting certain caribou herds and muskoxen and regulate the type of ammunition and the use of dogs, NTI says that the NWMB proposals violate the land-claim agreement (Thompson, 2006). Similar difficulties exist with other IPG boards. A management review of the Nunavut Planning Commission (NPC) said that “much of the policy material has been developed by outsiders without meaningful internal input, and consequently does not reflect the NPC needs or culture,” and noted that many recommendations made by the participants in IPG workshops were “inconsistent with the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement, and suggest a serious lack of familiarity with the land claims environment” (Aarluk Consulting Inc., 2005:19, 21).

**Regional Wildlife Organizations (RWOs) and HTOs**

While the land claim was being negotiated, the RWOs were put in place to await expected injections of cash from either the new Government of Nunavut (GN) or NTI, as had happened with the regional community corporations. A closer look at the NLCA document would have revealed that the federal government had made no financial commitment to fund either the RWOs or the HTOs and, because these are not part of the GN’s public government structure, but considered Inuit-only organizations, the GN Department of Environment chose not to integrate them. Thus, when the two organizations were overlooked, their status went into limbo, and the staff was not held accountable for the limited funding received from the NWMB (see Greer, 2006). Only recently has NTI created a wildlife secretariat to oversee the financial affairs of the RWOs and HTOs, but without any formal government funding, the wildlife secretariat could also turn out to be a meaningless gesture. Thus, Inuit in the communities concluded that, in return for exclusion of the HTOs from the official federal or territorial administration, they had been given the right to harvest in all of Nunavut and northern coastal Manitoba without the intrusive scrutiny of the federal and provincial governments.

The capacity difficulties faced by HTOs and RWOs are recounted by Blakney (2005): because of underfunding, the salaried positions are poorly paid, and highly qualified people quickly move elsewhere, leaving only members who are undereducated for the tasks at hand. A language barrier is often used as a tool to keep government and academic researchers at a distance. On the other hand, HTO members often feel that their advice, when given, is not taken seriously, and that the southern researchers lack the ability to understand *Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit* (IQ, Inuit traditional knowledge) and the importance of what is being said. They resent being asked to do what they consider to be menial technical or administrative tasks. The sentiment toward southern researchers and federal departments often voiced by members is, “Let them come here and do their own counting and record keeping.” Blakney and Suluk (2006a) exposed irregularities in the tabulation and reporting of harvesting records by local hunters. An example is the differences between the numbers (the Arviat HTO and other Kivalliq HTOs) submitted to the DFO and those sent to the NWHS (Table 3).

**LEGACY OF NON-INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTION FOR GOVERNMENT**

Most HTOs are composed of harvesters from the older generations, who find resource management threatening. Unfortunate historical incidents and governmental policies of the past are their primary points of reference when dealing with the federal government and southern researchers. Their perception of the federal government and science researchers is that these people are coming to number, regulate, restrict, impose quotas, and take away Inuit control over their livelihoods. Most older Inuit eschew involvement with researchers. As a result of the recent romanticization of Inuit elders by many southern and European academics and the subsequent hounding of them by science researchers wishing to exploit profitable pieces of Inuit knowledge, access to elders is often carefully controlled. At times, IQ is strategically created and filtered through politically astute interpreters to keep researchers and government at a distance. More than a few science researchers have experienced lost or inappropriately gathered samples, skewed reporting, misleading or evasive responses to inquiries, escalating costs for less and less work, and research results suppressed.
TABLE 3. Comparison of annual beluga harvesting data submitted by Arviat to Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) and to the Nunavut Wildlife Harvest Study (NWHS) (includes estimate of strategic bias; see Priest and Usher, 2004:7). The NWHS did not cover the years indicated by dashes (–).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DFO</th>
<th>NWHS</th>
<th>NWHS strategic bias ±</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>157</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>76</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>No report (see text)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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</table>

within the communities (see e.g., Anonymous, 2005; Minogue, 2005).

The NWHS completed by the NWMB was understood by many Inuit to contain sufficient information upon which governments could make management decisions. However, governments require ongoing monitoring and continuous creation of simplified numerical data to control and govern populations and make them “legible” (knowable to outsiders through records; Scott, 1998)—a fact that has escaped the attention and understanding of most Inuit. It therefore comes as no surprise that among Inuit, hunters, a lack of interest in reporting harvest kills is a prevailing view.

The community harvesters’ negative views are encouraged by radio reports regarding the ongoing failure of the federal and territorial governments and NTI to communicate with each other. In 2005, former Chief Justice Thomas Berger (Berger, 2005) chided both the NTI and the federal government for their lack of mutual respect and understanding of the original aims when they negotiated a comprehensive agreement. More recently, Inuit heard of the sudden dissolution of the DFO-led integrated management working group for Hudson Bay and the redirection of all its financial, human, and technical resources to the Beaufort area (Blakney, 2005). Although most Inuit did not understand the complexity of these events, what they did understand was that the government had abandoned them and diverted its resources elsewhere.

It may seem to those less familiar with the dynamics of northern communities that we are calling into question the validity of the NWHS, which we consider to be a truly momentous work. Or, it may seem that, like Howard and Widdowson (1999), we are challenging the value and use of IQ in management decision making, or advocating a crackdown on management abuses, or taking a tough stand against the hunters. We want to make it very clear that we are not advocating these measures. Harsh policies, tough regulations, stiff penalties, dismissal of IQ, imposition of southern knowledge systems, and the disempowerment of local people through bureaucratic and financial stranglehold are precisely what generated current conditions within coastal communities. A more stringent application of those policies and penalties will not lessen the resentment or resistance of the older generations of harvesters and elders, but only encourage more creative ways of amplifying their resistance. On the other hand, unsupervised funding payouts to independent and unaccountable organizations will not foster better financial management or capacity building in the communities.

What is relevant to lessening northern resistance and building capacity in the communities is revealed by T. Suluk’s comments (above) on the original thoughts and purpose behind the comprehensive land claim, i.e., that the last of the Inuit nomads wanted Canada to recognize their cultural need to feel free (from external domination, regulation, monitoring, surveillance, and policy makers) and to have the option of retaining their land-based harvesting lifestyle, while learning the skills necessary to bring economic development and prosperity to the North and allowing their children to become integrated into Western society. Those needs, according to many Inuit, were only marginally realized through the land claim.

Western concepts of ocean resource management (perhaps more appropriately worded as the management of harvesters who use ocean resources) and research concerns about global warming are still relatively new to the Arctic regions of Canada. It was only 35 to 40 years ago that Canadian Inuit began to understand how events happening in faraway places could affect their region. Since that time, Inuit have had to learn a second language, pick and choose among different knowledge systems (Blakney and Suluk, 2006b) and practices, try them out, and then implement them. It has taken many years of trial and error by Inuit leaders to determine which management models to adopt, and then to promote those ideas to the people in a language and concepts they trust and understand. What the Inuit harvesters in Nunavut communities need now is neither withdrawal or abandonment by governments nor isolation from their land-claim organization, but the power of self-determination and resource decision making, and access to human, financial, technical, and cultural resources to provide a comprehensive knowledge base on which to make their decisions. This goal can be accomplished only through integrated management planning on a consistent and long-term basis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was supported by Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, ArcticNet, the Ocean Management Research Network, the University of Manitoba, and the James Gordon Fletcher PhD Fellowship for Research in Aboriginal Issues. We thank the many Nunavummiut and Inuit organizations, including NTI, Nunavut Inuit Wildlife Secretariat, Kivalliq Wildlife Board and HTOs, and individuals from the GN
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