“Errors Exposed”

Inuit Relocations to the High Arctic, 1953–1960

Shelagh D. Grant
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Further Reading on the High Arctic Relocations

About the Editor
In 1990, I was approached by the Hon. David Crombie and Ron Doering who were visiting Trent University, and asked if I would be interested in writing a paper for the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) about the relocation of Inuit families to the High Arctic in 1953-1958. Having published a book in 1988 on the subject of northern sovereignty issues arising during and following World War Two, I was intrigued and tentatively agreed pending a review of available information and accessibility of pertinent archival documents.

The High Arctic Relocation projects in 1953-1956 first attracted public attention in 1982, when John Amagoalik, Chair of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, requested financial assistance from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) to cover costs of new homes and transportation for 16 families wishing to return to their former home in northern Quebec. Further studies were requested, but aside from a small contribution toward transportation costs, the government refused to offer an apology, claiming there was no wrongdoing by the department.

Then in 1990, the subject gained widespread publicity in newspapers and on television, after the Hon. Tom Siddon, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) rejected the recommendations of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, that had called for a formal apology, recognition of the Inuit contribution in protecting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, and further compensation for the relocated families.

In response, Siddon commissioned another study, this time with the Hickling Corporation, a private consulting firm. The report was prepared within the required 150 days to respond to the standing committee, written by a political science professor who reportedly had never stepped foot in the Canadian Arctic, let alone the High Arctic. As might be expected, the consultant’s report rejected the findings of the standing committee, claiming that there had been no wrong doing by the department and that sovereignty was never a “primary” motive for the relocation.\(^1\) If there had ever been any doubt whether I would write the paper for CARC, this was a challenge I could not ignore.

After months of archival research in Ottawa, as well as review of secondary sources, maps and photographs, I submitted my paper to CARC, titled “A Case of Compounded Error: The Inuit Resettlement Project 1953, and the Government Response, 1990.”\(^2\) Although the paper was much longer than anticipated, CARC agreed to publish it, along with photographs and 140 endnotes. My conclusions clearly explained that while the selection of Inuit from northern Quebec was motivated by economic concerns, the primary rationale for selection of the 1953 resettlement sites was based entirely on concerns for Arctic sovereignty.

A special launch of the CARC publication took place in Ottawa, and much to my astonishment, a portion of my interview appeared on the CBC National News. All of a sudden, I had become the new “Bête Noire” for DIAND, who found it less politically sensitive to hurl criticism at a female historian than at the Inuit.

The issue did not quietly disappear as DIAND had hoped, and instead prompted yet another study,

\(^1\) Magnus Gunther, “Assessment of the factual basis of certain allegations made before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs concerning the relocation of Inukjuak Inuit in the 1950s” for the Hickling Corporation under contact with DIAND, 19 November 1990. (personal copy)

this time by the Canadian Human Rights Commission who submitted their report in December 1992, that largely supported the standing committee’s findings and recommendations.

The subject also became a matter of special interest for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) which conducted hearings on the subject in April and June 1993 to allow the Inuit, RCMP officers, government officials and researchers like myself to tell their story. As background for the 20 minutes I was allowed to speak at the June hearings, I prepared a written submission, with a detailed chronology and copies of archival documents referenced in the text. This was revised and resubmitted in August 1993 to erase typos and grammatical errors.

For reasons I prefer not to disclose, I decided not to pursue further publication of my research and writing. Instead, with their agreement, I worked behind the scenes with the research team employed by the Royal Commission, supplying more sources and copies of archival documents at their request. Preferring to remain anonymous, I advised that there was no need to credit my assistance or written submission.

The strategy of letting the evidence speak for itself was successful. In essence, I had removed myself—DIAND’s “Bête Noire”—from the scene to let the RCAP and others have a free hand at finding the proof. As a result, the RCAP’s research team had no problem finding evidence to support Inuit claims that sovereignty played a major part in the relocations and that the participants had been promised a return home if desired. Hence, the former mantra—that they could find no evidence—was no longer credible.

The Royal Commission’s special report on the High Arctic Relocation in 1994 was clearly a vindication of the Inuit testimonies and those who had supported their cause. In a “Summary of the Commission’s Conclusions,” co-authors René Dussault and George Erasmus addressed the issues under 42 separate points, which highlighted the wrongdoing by the government in terms of executing a plan that caused unnecessary hardship for the relocated families and their refusal to honour the promise of return home.³

My revised submission to the RCAP was self-published in two, coil-bound volumes. The first provided a narrative of events and my conclusions based on my research. The second volume included a chronology of events with references, and copies of key archival documents. These two volumes, revised in August 1993, were at one time available as part of the Royal Commission’s papers, with a copy deposited in the reference section of Trent University’s library (but since removed).

In this abridged version of my submission, I have deleted the original “Summary” to avoid repetition and have added a few paragraphs to the “Conclusion.” Because of its importance, reference to the RCAP’s special report on the relocations will appear here as a postscript, along with the resolution of the dispute that achieved closure with an official apology by the government. As well, a trust fund was set up to cover costs of transportation and construction of new homes for those wishing to return permanently to Inukjuak, and for visits to family remaining in the High Arctic.

When a student recently reported that he was unable to find my submission and collection of documents among the RCAP’s papers, I accepted Whitney Lackenbauer’s offer to publish an abridged version for the Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security series. In addition

to the new “Foreword” and a “Postscript,” the original “Summary” was deleted, and additional editing removed repetition and poor grammar. Since I had no research, editorial, or secretarial assistance, any errors are mine and mine alone.

Please note that I did not change the references which were accurate at the time. As a result, you will find temporary accession numbers for files that were just released when I conducted my research. You will also note that the adjective form of Arctic appears in lower case, which was acceptable in the 1990s.

After further discussion, we decided that this e-book publication should begin with a shortened version of my CARC paper “A Case of Compounded Error” as it provided a more detailed account of the hardships encountered during the early years and a clearer history of the Arctic sovereignty issues. The end portion of this article was deleted since the reports by the Hickling Corporation were fully covered in the submission. Otherwise, we have undertaken only minor editing to remove the errata noted at time of publication. References also remain in the format used at the time.

On re-reading the text and the documents, I realize that I would write a much different paper now that the government has resolved the outstanding issues to the satisfaction of the relocated Inuit. For present day scholars, the most important items are the documents—some are still missing, but they are sufficient to provide inspiration and the basis for further research. Dozens of others are found in the footnotes. The documents alone offer critical insight into relationships between Ottawa-based administrators and those in the field, and into how accuracy becomes lost or distorted in written reports and memos. Please note that these were my working documents, with added annotations by me. Times have changed and scholars will wish to revisit the event from a 21st century perspective. I look forward to some interesting reading.

Passage of time heals most wounds. With subsequent government actions, compensation and official apologies, it is hoped that the relocated Inuit can now look back with pride for their contribution in protecting Canadian sovereignty and furthering development of the High Arctic.

Shelagh D. Grant, 1 October 2016

Monument in Grise Fiord sculpted by Looty Pijamini “in memory of Inuit landed here in 1953 & 1955, and those who came after.” The accompany plaque notes: “They came to these desolate shores to pursue the Government’s promise of a more prosperous life. They endured and overcame great hardship, and dedicated their lives to Canada’s sovereignty in these lands and waters.” Photo by Tim Rast, courtesy of Elfshot.
Inuit woman and three children in winter clothes, Resolute Bay, NWT, March 1956. Gar Lunney / National Film Board of Canada. Photothèque / Library and Archives Canada / Item K-3963

Shelagh D. Grant

Background to the Government Decision

In 1953, the Government of Canada announced plans to resettle Inuit from areas of dwindling food resources to the High Arctic where game and fur animals were reported in abundant supply. To assist them, government trading stores were set up and operated under the supervision of the RCMP. In August of that year, seven families from the Inukjuak (Port Harrison) area in northern Quebec and three families from Pond Inlet were resettled in communities at Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island and at Grise Fiord, near the Craig Harbour police post on Ellesmere Island. Plans for a third settlement at the Alexandra Fiord RCMP post in the Bache Peninsula area were delayed due to ice conditions, and later cancelled.

In addition to the above, three “special constables,” all from Pond Inlet, were assigned to the posts. Although overall responsibility for “Eskimo” affairs rested with the Department of Resources and Development, the RCMP officers were charged with overseeing Inuit physical and economic welfare. New families from Inukjuak joined the settlements over the next three years, bringing the overall total to 17, excluding those assigned to the police posts.

Despite the construction of new wooden homes, a co-operative store, and federal day school, as well as the provision of electricity, there appeared to be signs of growing restlessness among the Inuit of Grise Fiord. By the 1970s, a number of residents had expressed the desire to visit Inukjuak to reunite with family and friends; several wished to return permanently. In some cases, expenses for the trip were covered by the Inuit themselves; in other instances, assistance was provided by the RCMP or Makivik Corporation of Quebec.

In 1982, John Amagoalik, President of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) requested financial assistance from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) to cover the cost of homes and transportation for 16 families wishing to return to Inukjuak. According to Inuit spokesmen, payments to date have amounted to only $200,000, compared with the government’s statement that it has paid approximately $250,000 to Inuit families and an additional $570,000 to the Quebec government for construction of new homes.

In the spring of 1990, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs heard witnesses and received evidence on the case. On 19 June, the committee recommended that the Government officially recognize the role of these Inuit in protecting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, that a formal apology be given, and that compensation be paid for their service to Canada and “the wrongdoing inflicted upon them.” The Government of Canada was required to table a formal response within 150 days.

In preparing its response, DIAND hired a consulting firm, the Hickling Corporation, to

Author’s Note: Research was conducted without compensation or influence from parties in the debate. This study was based on archival documents and did not include interviews of those involved. The author wishes to express her sincere appreciation to Keith Lowther (Concordia University) and Jamie Benidickson (University of Ottawa) for their helpful comments and advice, and to Trent University colleague Peter Kulchyski for his generous assistance in helping locate several sources. Thanks are due also to Andrew Orkin of McGill University for his comments and opinions related to the implications of experimentation. This article originally appeared in Northern Perspectives 19/1 (Spring 1991): 3-29, and is reproduced (with minor corrections) with the permission of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC).
conduct an “independent” study into the allegations as they affected the department. Using this study as a basis for the government’s response to the Standing Committee’s recommendations, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Tom Siddon announced on 19 November that an additional $150,000 would be set aside to cover any further costs of relocation. However, as the report found no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the department and concluded that sovereignty was not the primary reason for the original resettlement at Grise Fiord, there would be no apology and no recognition of the Inuit contribution to the maintenance of Canada’s arctic sovereignty.

The Case for Reconsideration

As the review of archival records shows, the initial phase of the resettlement project was carried out as an ‘experiment’, ill-conceived and poorly planned. There is clear evidence of unwarranted hardships endured by the Inuit during the early years at Grise Fiord. Moreover, documents confirm that concern for sovereignty was the primary motive for the government’s choice of the Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay locations in the 1953 resettlement project.

Unfortunately, Inuit attempts to assign responsibility and request compensation for past actions appear to have elicited an even more defensive reaction from the current government, perhaps in the belief that they were being unfairly attacked. Yet the official response, as it stands, has only served to cast doubt on the integrity of those most influential in making “the project” a qualified, if only short-term, success: the Inuit involved, the local RCMP, and the reorganized Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources which acquired the project as a legacy.

Inuit Policy in Transition

The relationship between the various agencies involved in the 1953 resettlement project was complex, and complicated further by the absence of an official government policy on Inuit affairs. The history of Inuit policy may explain the situation in the 1950s, but it cannot fully justify government action or inaction.

Since the time of first contact with Europeans, the Inuit proved themselves exceptionally willing to offer assistance. As a result, their former nomadic existence was altered greatly as they drifted toward non-native communities of whalers, fur traders, missions, police posts, and, later, military establishments. Most often, the Inuit provided specific services as boatmen, guides, or sled drivers and goods such as winter clothing or furs. During the Second World War, they inevitably congregated around the U.S. air bases. Curious, eager to help, but untrained, they looked for casual labour or someone who might buy their furs and handcrafts. As expected, infectious diseases spread rapidly. And as wildlife resources became scarce around the bases, the Inuit became more and more dependent upon handouts or government welfare assistance to survive. No longer isolated from public view, the onus was now on the government to assume the responsibility once delegated to the churches, police, and private enterprise.

In 1950, responsibility for Inuit affairs was removed from the jurisdiction of the Northwest Territories Council and placed under the Department of Resources and Development. The RCMP retained supervisory responsibility for Inuit welfare in the field, while the department’s Northern Administration and Lands Branch was given overall responsibility for administration, planning, and policy.

In the hope of developing a consensus, representatives from all agencies involved in Inuit affairs met for a two-day conference at Ottawa in May 1952. The agenda reflected growing concerns about disease, loss of initiative, dwindling food and fur resources, and the disintegrating social matrix which had preserved Inuit culture for centuries. No one, it appeared, had a solution acceptable to all. Yet there were three basic facts upon which most everyone seemed to agree: that the fur trade could no longer fully support the Inuit, that improved education and retraining were required
for meaningful employment in the new socioeconomic environment, and that greatly expanded health services were urgently required throughout the Arctic. As a first step, those present agreed to the establishment of a Special Committee on Eskimo Affairs, comprised of representatives from the various agencies directly concerned with the Inuit: the northern administration, the RCMP, the churches, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and National Health and Welfare.1

The committee met for the first time in October 1952. Among the items discussed with respect to the “improvement of the Eskimo economy” was a proposal from the director of the northern administration to resettle Inuit families at Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine (Alexandra Fiord). The idea was not original, but this was the first time it had been presented to an official gathering. The committee considered the proposal as a means of “assisting natives to move from over-populated areas to places where they could more readily obtain a living,” but agreed only that Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine “should be investigated as possible localities.” No other comments were recorded in the minutes,2 nor is there any record that the committee was consulted or even informed of further details, nor any mention at the second meeting in May, long after the projects had been approved.3 A careful search of the relevant files produced no evidence that the High Arctic resettlement project complied with any official government policy, or was approved by any formal committee which might have kept minutes of their meetings.

On 16 March 1953, a request for approval and funding was submitted for “Assisted Eskimo Projects” by the director of the northern administration. The original document is located in the deputy minister’s files.4

The “Cape Herschel Project” (Alexandra Fiord) was fully detailed, with reference to the presence of Greenlanders (requiring policing of the area) and to the plan to “move in” Canadian Inuit where there were presently none and “establish them in the native way of life.” The “Craig Harbour Project” was described simply as “similar.” The “Resolute Bay Project” had a quite different motive: “an experiment to work out a method by which Eskimos may be trained to replace white employees in the north without the Eskimo children losing touch with the native way of life.” The motive sounded reasonable, except for the explanation that “all could be employed on menial jobs but, except in summer, we prefer at least part of the group to hunt and trap after the native way.” Had the director consulted the RCAF, he would have discovered the illogical reasoning in the proposal. Only “in summer”, at the peak of the supply missions, would there be “menial jobs” available for all.

That summer, there were a number of bizarre crosscurrents which would raise doubts about the process and timing of the projects. In July, the Northwest Territories Council recommended that contact between the Inuit and non-Inuit be controlled to prevent the spread of disease that might occur from the proposed expansion of military activities in the North. Not having the power to pass such legislation, council referred the issue to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND), an advisory and coordinating committee composed of representatives from military and civilian agencies engaged in northern operations. The chairman of the ACND immediately referred the question to the new administration subcommittee, chaired by the commissioner of the RCMP. At its first meeting, on 24 August 1953, the subcommittee

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1 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, pt 2. Summary of proceedings of a conference on Eskimo Affairs, 19-20 May 1952. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent records are located at the LAC (formerly the National Archives of Canada).
2 Ibid., Minutes of the first meeting of the Special Committee on Eskimo Affairs, 16 October 1952.
3 Ibid.
recommended that the matter fall under the jurisdiction of the Special Committee on Eskimo Affairs. Of particular importance was the comment by the chairman that “until the general policy question had been settled, it would be unwise for the Sub-Committee to recommend any new legislation for regulating the movement of people in the north.” The referral to the Eskimo Affairs Committee was approved at the September ACND meeting, with the request that the committee make recommendations and refer them back to the administration sub-committee.  

A year later, the Ministry of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources finally issued a detailed policy paper on “Eskimo Affairs” with a strong emphasis on education, health, and new economic programs. Resettlement was mentioned, but as only one of many ideas to be considered. Although there was considerable discussion about expanding the project to other sites in the Arctic, the whole concept of relocation came under severe scrutiny in 1958 following the Lake Ennadai disaster in which severe starvation resulted from an unsuccessful attempt at resettlement in the Keewatin district of the Northwest Territories. As a result, there was no expansion of the arctic projects as originally planned.

Meanwhile, the department began to implement their official policy by providing more schools, medical facilities, wooden homes, and community centres. New people were added to the administration, and new programs introduced to aid the Inuit economy. There were improvements in communications; northern field officers were assigned; and more funds were directed to social and economic programs. For the first time, there seemed to be evidence of progress despite the continuing problem of meeting the needs of those caught in a vortex of change.

The Sovereignty Issue

Historical Concerns

Throughout history, “sovereignty concerns” of nation-states have extended far beyond the process of establishing legal title or ownership. Once sovereign claims are recognized, there remains a responsibility to maintain “effective occupation” by continued evidence of jurisdiction and control. During the post-war years, Canadian concerns over arctic sovereignty involved perceived or potential threats to authority over the arctic lands, sea, and ice. A “threat” to national sovereignty may be direct, as in the case of foreigners refusing to recognize the authority of a sovereign nation; but it may also be manifest in the benign activities of foreigners acting without permission of a nation-state, or by actions which violate the laws of that state. In this respect, the role of the RCMP in the Arctic was vital in ensuring that everyone, Canadians and non-Canadians, complied with national laws regarding customs, immigration, exploration, fishery licences and hunting regulations.

There is also a more insidious de facto loss of sovereignty, whereby a nation-state can no longer exert full control over its territory (usually as a result of bilateral agreements), or simply a “perceived” loss of sovereignty (for example, when U.S. military and civilians greatly outnumbered Canadian citizens in the northern territories during the Second World War). To counter such threats, joint defence agreements were negotiated to assign “control” to a Canadian officer, or to incorporate a statement that the activity or circumstance did not
impinge on Canada’s sovereign rights—a practice sometimes referred to as “paper sovereignty.”

Concern for arctic sovereignty initially arose in 1880 when the arctic islands were transferred from Great Britain to Canada, ostensibly “to prevent the United States from claiming them.”

U.S. whalers wintering over posed the next threat, but perhaps more serious was the claim of the Danish explorer, Knud Rasmussen, that Greenland Eskimos had a right to hunt on Ellesmere Island because it was a “No Man’s Land.” Subsequent attempts to declare and enforce sovereign rights are well known: the Eastern Arctic Patrol, raising the flag on remote arctic islands, public declarations, establishing RCMP posts, arduous sled patrols, issuing licences to explorers, and enforcing game laws. The first formal challenge was settled in 1930 when Canada’s title over the entire archipelago was formally recognized by Norway—after payment of $67,000 to Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup for his discovery of three major islands west of Ellesmere. At that point, the federal government’s Northern Advisory Board formally announced that Canada’s title was secure.

Still, various government actions continued to reflect concerns, despite public assurances to the contrary. In 1934, for example, 22 Cape Dorset Inuit were relocated to Dundas Harbour where there was reported to be better hunting and trapping. They were assisted by families from Pangnirtung and Pond Inlet, and a Hudson’s Bay Company trader. All were promised that they could return in two years if not satisfied with conditions.

In a number of respects, the Dundas Harbour case is remarkably similar to the Grise Fiord resettlement less than 20 years later. In a news article entitled “Occupy Arctic Isles to Insure Canadian Claims,” James Montagnes writes:

In addition to the placing of the Eskimos in new regions where game is more abundant and work more regular, there is the angle of occupation of the country, now that aerial routes, mineral developments, and other reasons make possible the claims of other countries to part of Canada’s Arctic, which now reaches to the North Pole. To forestall any such future claims, the Dominion is occupying the Arctic islands to within nearly 700 miles of the North Pole.

Two years later, conditions proved unsatisfactory, and the Inuit from Pangnirtung were transported home. The remainder were taken to Arctic Bay for a year, then on to Fort Ross where they stayed until the post closed in 1947; in the end, they were settled at Spence Bay.

If the 1934 “experiment in acclimatization”, as it was then called, ended in failure, why was it attempted again only seven years later? Certainly a desire to strengthen claims to uninhabited lands was part of the reason, but there were two additional concerns in the 1950s which directly influenced the decision. One explains the Resolute Bay resettlement, the other the Grise Fiord and Alexandra Fiord plans.

**Sovereignty and the Greenlanders**

Following the Norwegian challenge in 1930, the Canadian government was particularly concerned that other discoveries might lead to further claims, unless the area was regularly patrolled, visited by

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8 Quoted in Gordon W. Smith, *Territorial Sovereignty in the Canadian North: A Historical Outline of the Problem*, Report for the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1963), 5.


10 RG 85, vol. 347, file 200-2, “Minutes of the Northern Advisory Board.”


12 Ibid., 59-61.
Canadian scientific expeditions, and/or occupied by Canadian Inuit. Similarly, it was believed that the police posts at Craig Harbour and on the Bache Peninsula of Ellesmere Island were sufficient evidence of “effective occupation”, to prevent further denials of ownership from the Greenlanders or Danes. However, consistency of application was not a hallmark of arctic policy: the police regularly hired Greenlanders as sled drivers and general assistants at the two posts. Familiar with the patrol routes and wildlife resources, it was only natural that they continued to fish and hunt in the area after the Bache post closed. The consequences would surface 20 years later.

Although government concerns about Greenland centred on political developments after the United States had assumed responsibility for its defence, the RCMP remained alert to possible local violations of sovereignty. Greenlanders continued their sporadic hunting expeditions to Ellesmere. Upon learning of a new trading post opening at nearby Etah, Inspector Henry Larsen notified authorities and recommended that Danish authorities might assist in halting the Greenlanders’ travels in northern Ellesmere. The next year, the expedition to Ellesmere by the French explorer, J. Malaurie, with 11 Greenland guides, 9 sleds, and 110 dogs, aroused the attention of External Affairs. Claiming he was on a scientific mission to “study the food situation of the Eskimos in the Bache Peninsula”, Malaurie notified Canadian authorities after the fact, expressing innocence of any wrongdoing. By his understanding, the Greenlanders had permission to use the island “at any time they desired.” When coupled with knowledge of the new trading post, the purpose of the scientific mission became suspect. In addition to the sovereignty aspect, RCMP Inspector Larsen was now concerned that wildlife resources would be depleted.

Free movement by Greenlanders into Canada had been authorized by the Department of External Affairs and formalized in an “Exchange of Notes” in 1949, but limits had been imposed: a Greenlander must be a “bona fide non-immigrant and in possession of a valid national passport with a valid visa obtained from competent Canadian diplomatic and consular authorities in Denmark.” Even then they were not permitted to hunt “without obtaining a license...if eligible”-an impossible regulation to enforce on nomadic Greenlanders requiring game for survival.

Then, in January 1952, it was reported that the Greenlanders were now wintering over in the Bache region, and that the Danes had requested permission to set up a geodetic station on the east coast of Ellesmere for mapping purposes. The Governor of North Greenland only increased uneasiness when he reported that another trading post would be opened at Thule Kanak just south of Etah. He also remarked that it was unlikely Danish officials in Godhavn could control where Greenlanders hunted. These new developments were compounded by word from Craig Harbour that three Greenlanders had travelled overland to the weather station at Eureka, while another dozen or so remained encamped at Bache. In response, Larsen urged that the police post at Bache be reopened and that several families of Canadian Inuit be encouraged to settle there. The

13 RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7-5, Inspector Larsen to the Commissioner, 7 November 1951.
14 RG 85, vol. 304, file 1009-5 [2a] see correspondence, 1941 through 1946; and Intelligence Report on Greenland, nd.
15 RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7-5, Larsen to Peacock, 7 November 1951, and correspondence from the Canadian Embassy in Paris to External Affairs. 16 October 1951.
16 Ibid., Buchard to Wright, 17 January 1952; and Sinclair to Peacock, 26 January 1952.
18 Ibid., various copies internal External Affairs correspondence and to officials of Resources and Development, 1951-1953.
19 Ibid., memo to file, Resources and Development, October 1952.
Greenlanders’ presence suggested that there would be ample wildlife and game.\(^{20}\)

A report prepared that summer by James Cantley of the Eastern Arctic Patrol expanded on the idea. Noting that Inuit from Pond Inlet were already attached to the post at Craig Harbour, he suggested that more families might be “moved over...to live permanently.” Apparently he had already consulted with the RCMP and had obtained their agreement to co-operate as long as “arrangements could be made to have the necessary supplies available” for trading purposes. He also suggested that if a similar arrangement could be made in the Cape Sabine (Bache) area, possibly six or eight families could be placed there, perhaps from the “overpopulated northern Quebec areas.” This report, along with Larsen’s, is the genesis of the Inukjuak resettlement plan. Although both make reference to implications for Canadian sovereignty, Cantley is explicit in identifying the Greenland threat:

> The occupation of the island by Canadian Eskimos will remove any excuse Greenlanders may presently have for crossing over and hunting there. Using Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine as starting points, consideration might then be given to the possibility of finding employment for natives at Eureka and Alert, under the supervision of the Police, during the summer months.\(^{21}\)

Not only is the wording comparable to the rationale described in the application for funding, but it clearly identifies the resettlement plans as a means of maintaining sovereignty by strengthening “effective occupation.”

Discussion of the Greenlanders’ presence and the possible transfer of Canadian Inuit to the region continued over the winter, but it was not until March 1953 that the Craig Harbour and Alexandra Fiord projects were submitted for approval to the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development.\(^{22}\) That same month, an RCMP report to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development again confirms the sovereignty motive for the Cape Herschel (Alexandra Fiord) project.

> ...it is hoped by setting up a detachment at Cape Herschel to not only encourage the move of Canadian Eskimos into that part of Ellesmere Island, but to prevent or control the movement of Greenland natives on hunting excursions into Canadian territory.\(^{23}\)

After approving funds for the projects, the deputy minister then notified the under-secretary of state to inform him of the pending arrival of Canadian Inuit to the Bache region and to request that the Danish authorities be contacted to assist in the removal of the Greenlanders “before any difficulties may arise through the intermingling of the two groups.” The Danish authorities were notified in due course.\(^{24}\) However, by the time the police arrived, the Greenlanders had already departed. Charles Ritchie of External Affairs was informed that the problem had been resolved.\(^{25}\)

Meanwhile, an embarrassing contradiction of policy surfaced when the northern administration reamed that the Defence Research Board had

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\(^{20}\) Ibid., Larsen to the Commissioner, 14 October 1952.


\(^{22}\) RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1 pt 2, “Assisted Eskimo Projects,” 16 March 1953, Cunningham, Director of Northern Administration and Lands Branch, to Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, Gen. Hugh Young.


\(^{24}\) RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7-5, Young to Wilgress, 2 April 1953, Allard to Canadian Minister in Copenhagen, 29 May 1953.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., see notation on Allard to Copenhagen, 29 May 1953; Young to Ritchie, 23 October 1953.

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applied for a Scientists and Explorers licence for studies on Ellesmere, with plans to hire Thule Greenlanders and their dog-sleds. To the suggestion that Canadian Inuit might be hired instead, the chairman replied that the Greenlanders were more experienced and familiar with the field study group. Furthermore, he claimed that the Royal Canadian Air Force did not like to carry dogs but that the United States Air Force flying out of Thule was much more accommodating.26

As it happened, the plans for Alexandra Fiord near Cape Herschel were modified when the C.C.S. d’Iberville was unable to reach the post owing to ice conditions in September 1953. The three families from Pond Inlet and Inukjuak returned to Craig Harbour where they stayed until the next summer. By 1954, the RCMP at Alexandra reported that food supplies were exceptionally scarce; as a result only one family (originally from Pond Inlet) would be sent north, bringing to two the total number employed at the post.27 By 1956, game and fur resources were reported to have improved greatly, to the point that four families could be supported. Despite the fact that five Greenlanders families arrived from Etah that summer,28 the original plan to resettle southern Inuit there was abandoned. Apparently, certain influential members of the newly reorganized Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources (DNANR) did not consider the Greenland issue as threatening to sovereignty as others had.29 As a result, the Alexandra Fiord police post continued to be staffed by two “special constables” and their families until its closure in 1963. Craig Harbour, meanwhile, acquired the extra families and trading supplies originally destined for Alexandra Fiord. As the Hickling report suggests, the RCMP indeed participated “in the exercise of sovereignty”, but the role of the Inuit was not incidental as was claimed. Priorities simply appeared to have changed after the project was underway.

Sovereignty and Canadianization

The “Canadianization” policy was first adopted by Cabinet in 1943-44 when the government decided to reimburse the U.S. government for all construction costs of U.S. military installations on Canadian soil.30 Another potentially serious challenge to arctic sovereignty occurred in 1946 when it was learned that the United States Air Coordinating Committee had suggested claiming any undiscovered islands for construction of arctic weather stations. Older histories do not refer to this incident, precisely because there was no public knowledge of the document until 1980, when it appeared in the Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12. Since then, three published works make reference to its significance.31

In the immediate postwar years, the concern to protect sovereign claims was intense, particularly in the Privy Council Office and Department of External Affairs. Until such time as sovereignty was

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26 Ibid., Cantley to Young, 18 April 1953 and Solandt to Young, 29 April 1953.
27 RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-1, RCMP reports from Alexandra Fiord; and file TA 500-8-1-5 from Craig Harbour, 1953-1954.
28 Ibid., report sent on to Director of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch, from Inspector Fitzsimmons, 21 August 1956.
assured beyond all reasonable doubt, the accepted policy was to avoid public statements which might create an opportunity for direct challenge. In addition, some believed that public assertion of Canada’s claims would only imply doubts as to their validity.32 Numerous legal and political assessments followed, but all had a very restricted distribution—“Top Secret”, “Confidential”, or “Classified.” Comments ranged from concern that while “sovereignty over these regions have not heretofore been seriously challenged, they are at the best somewhat tenuous and weak”33 to legal advice that it was “particularly important that the most northerly islands be occupied.”34

While the debate continued in Ottawa, USAF Intelligence was studying the possibility of claiming uninhabited regions in Grantland (northern Ellesmere), and on Prince Patrick and Melville Islands, on the legal premise that “sovereignty cannot be claimed without a degree of effective occupation, colonization, and use.” In apparent recognition that RCMP patrols might be sufficient evidence of “effective occupation”, Melville Island was eliminated from the list, and Banks Island added. In the end, it was decided that this strategy would only be implemented should Canada refuse to co-operate in a time of crisis. Instead, the intelligence report suggested that Canada be assured “that the United States has no intention, now or in future, of claiming sovereignty over any section of the Canadian Arctic.”35

Canada’s counter-strategy to a potential threat was to use the joint defence agreements from 1947 onward to gain evidence of U.S. acceptance of Canada’s sovereign title. At the same time, it became government policy to promote the “Canadianization” of all U.S. military operations by assuming responsibility for air bases and weather stations; utilizing the RCAF for mapping, reconnaissance, and rescue and supply missions; promoting Canadian arctic scientific expeditions; and encouraging the use of Canadian goods and personnel by U.S. contractors.36 It was also critical to keep the extent of U.S. military operations from the media to prevent public criticism. As a result, the Canadian government applied strict censorship rules to all arctic military activities.37 Thus, although statements such as “Canada was secure in her claims over the Arctic Islands...” were public reassurances, they did not signify any lack of continued concern about strengthening arctic sovereignty.

In 1948-49, there was minor concern when three new islands were discovered in the Foxe Basin, and again when it was learned that the “Canadianization” plan to take over military bases and weather stations had proceeded more slowly than expected. These and other events prompted the creation of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND) to “advise government on questions of policy relating to civilian and military undertakings in northern Canada and to provide for effective coordination of all government activities in that area.”38

33 Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol.12, 913.
37 Ibid., vol. 12, file Correspondence, 1954. as explained in Wight to Dr. John Hannah, 27 August 1954 and McNaughton to Wight, 19 August 1954; also LAC, RG 24, acc 83-84/167, vol. 4480, file 1225-P1-39, Revision of the Forrestal Directive. 25 January 1951; and RG 2/18, vol. 235, file S-100-6, meeting and related correspondence, 10 September 1952.
38 RG 2/18, vol. 57, file A-25-5 correspondence; also RG 85, vol. 300, file 1009-3-1 for the Minutes of the
At the first five meetings, sovereignty concerns appeared to dominate the discussion, prompting numerous policy directives, such as encouraging the U.S. military services “to utilize Canadians in contract work,” recommending full control over communication and supply lines, and urging the RCAF to play a more active role in the operation of remote air bases. There were also construction and transportation sub-committees to deal with co-ordination of northern activities. Then, abruptly, the committee ceased to meet. There were a number of possible reasons: retirement of its chairman, Soviet detonation of an atomic test bomb, the outbreak of the Korean War, or perhaps the tighter security and censorship regulations now in force. Not until the fall of 1952 were there serious efforts to restore the meetings.

In December 1952, Under-Secretary of State Dana Wilgress wrote to his minister, the Hon. Lester B. Pearson, suggesting that in light of new U.S. defence plans, the government might wish to “re-Canadianize” the Arctic under the direction of the ACND and that consideration be given to the adoption of a “vigorous Canadian policy in all arctic services.” The following month, the secretary to the Cabinet wrote to the minister of citizenship and immigration, requesting some form of customs and immigration control in the Arctic:

> For some time there has been a tendency for foreign visitors, notably U.S. citizens, to regard the Arctic as a no-man’s land. No legal objections to the exercise of Canadian sovereignty have been raised, but there is often an underlying assumption that in the Arctic the laws and rules of Canada, or indeed of any country, do not apply.

Although Cabinet and External Affairs pressed for action, it was apparent that military representatives did not share the same concern about protecting arctic sovereignty. According to one report, the attitude stemmed from budget limitations and a new defence policy which made overseas NATO commitments a priority over “such intangibles as sovereignty or autonomy at home.”

By Cabinet approval, the ACND was reconvened on 16 February 1953, on the premise that “policy in the Arctic warranted prompt and serious examination and should be kept under constant periodic review.” The Prime Minister also made it known that he attached “urgent priority” to the issues under review. The reporting structure of the committee was changed from its earlier format, with its secretariat now placed under the Ministry of Resources and Development. At the same time, the department was vested with the sole responsibility for co-ordinating government activities in the two northern territories.

During the opening discussion, Secretary to the Cabinet Jack Pickersgill suggested that the most important issue to be addressed was “a seeming encroachment upon Canadian sovereignty.” Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Charles Foulkes quickly denied the assertion, but Pickersgill urged that steps be taken “to ensure that civilian activities in the North were predominantly Canadian.” Frustrated by lack of action in taking over the joint weather stations, he finally asked, “What was at the root of the problem of Canada not taking the initiative—personnel, salary limitations, the priority on departmental estimates for the

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The challenge was to increase Canadian participation with limited manpower, technical expertise, and funds.

As events unfolded, the “urgency” had less to do with the current situation than with the potential threat posed by plans now on the table. The United States North East Air Command had already increased its military and civilian personnel at the leased bases in Labrador and Newfoundland from approximately 3500 in March 1949 to more than 10,500 by September 1952. For the next six months, U.S. defence proposals seemed to dominate the discussion. For example, at the May and June meetings the U.S. request for expanded facilities at the Frobisher air base was debated at great length, focusing on questions of sovereign authority and control, even with regard to Inuit employment. Some U.S. generals believed Canadian reluctance to give quick approvals stemmed from politicians’ fear of “public criticism.” While this is an oversimplification, it is also true that public sensitivity to arctic sovereignty caused the government to demand strict confidentiality and censorship regulations for reasons that had little to do with national security. It was also the reason why sovereignty concerns were central to government discussions about the Arctic, but rarely mentioned in public unless there was a pending threat.

The Canadianization policy had a direct effect on the planned resettlement projects. At Resolute Bay, there were still “joint” Canadian-U.S. weather and radio stations, although the RCAF had taken over operation of the airfield in 1951. At this point, Canadians comprised a majority of the on-site personnel. Two years later the situation threatened to change with the announcement of plans for a new radar station at Resolute. With the proposed construction of a massive radar network, the traffic through Resolute would increase enormously. Four days after the February ACND meeting and the debate over Canadianization, the deputy minister of Resources and Development wrote the commissioner of the RCMP to request the reopening of the post so Inuit could be employed at the weather station. At the next ACND meeting, on 16 March, External Affairs distributed a report showing U.S. plans to construct a GCI radar station in the vicinity of Resolute. It was hardly coincidental that on the same day, the director of the northern administration would revise his request for funding the resettlement projects to include Resolute. At the same time, the RCMP suddenly changed their report to Cabinet to include the reopening of the Resolute post. The sequence of events suggests that Canadianization discussions at the two ACND meetings were not coincidental.

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47 MG 30 E 133, Series V, vol. 294, file ACND - to 1953 Minutes of the 9th and 10th meetings, including attached document ND-51.
50 RG 85, access. 89-90/233, vol. 3, file Report to Cabinet, 1953, Sec. 18, Department of External Affairs Report, page 2. This report was distributed to members of the ACND for discussion at the 7th meeting held on 16 March 1953. (MG 30 E 133, Series V, vol. 294, file ACND to 1953, vol. 1).
51 RG 22 vol. 254, file 40-8-1 pt 2, Memorandum for the Deputy Minister, 16 March 1953.
52 The RCMP report submitted to the ACND membership on March 16th omits reference to opening any detachment at Resolute or at Sachs Harbour on Banks Island (MG 30 E 133, vol. 294, file “1st Report March 1953-”). The report appearing in the folder for Cabinet bears the date of March 31st and includes Resolute and Sachs (RG 85, acc 89-90/233, vol. 3, file “Report to Cabinet on Activities in Northern Canada”).
meetings had a direct influence on these decisions, verified by the fact that the deputy minister of Resources and Development chaired the meetings and the director of the northern administration was in attendance. Although there was no mention of the projects in the minutes of the meeting, it merely indicates the decision was internal to the department, with agreement by the RCMP to cooperate, but without discussion or approval by the ACND.

Sovereignty a Primary Motive?

The Hickling report assumes that the ACND was the likely body to inform Cabinet of any sovereignty concerns. According to the minutes, it was quite the reverse. Virtually all of the concern came from Cabinet and External Affairs. On the other hand, the secretary of the ACND was asked to write numerous reports on the status of arctic sovereignty (about one a year from 1953 to 1962). In 1958, for instance, he wrote that “Canadian title appears secure provided adequate steps are taken to maintain Canadian activities there and, in pace with increasing international interest in the Arctic, to augment these activities to provide evidence of continuing effective occupation.”53 Of greater relevance is the 1956 report on sovereignty and Ellesmere Island. Included is a list of Canadian activities since 1950 that implied “effective occupation” and exertion of authority. Among the items were:

- Six families of Eskimo colonists were landed at Craig Harbour in August, 1953
- In August, 1953 an R.C.M.P. detachment was opened at Alexandra Fiord
- Seven Eskimo took up residence in August, 1953 at Alexandra Fiord54

These references confirm that Inuit settlement was considered an important factor in maintaining sovereign control over Ellesmeme.

In the case of Grise Fiord and the aborted plans for Alexandra Fiord, concern for sovereignty was unquestionably the primary motive behind the initial idea and the selection of the site. The reason for Resolute being added to the original plans was directly related to the “Canadianization” discussions at the ACND meeting. Again the concern for maintaining sovereignty determined the time and place. Without that motive, there would be no perceived benefit to relocate southern Inuit to such a distant and alien environment. There would have been no experiment, no hardship, and no expensive costs in returning the Inuit to their traditional homelands. Concern for sovereignty was the primary motive in determining when and where resettlement should occur. The failure of the current federal government to recognize that fact seems inconceivable—an attempt to rewrite history. What has complicated the issue is the second motive involved, which was of little significance in determining time or place, but of primary importance in defining who would participate and what form the projects would take.

The Great High Arctic Resettlement Experiment

A pioneer experiment to determine if Eskimos can be induced to live on the northern islands which, relics indicate, once supported a native population.

*Director, Northern Administration, 16 March 1953*

The experiment we are making this year is to transfer a few families from Port Harrison and Pond Inlet to Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island and Craig Harbour and Cape Herschel, on Ellesmere Island. The primary object is to find out how Eskimos from

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54 Ibid., file ACND—1956, “Canadian Sovereignty in Ellesmere Island,” memo dated 13 January 1956
overpopulated southern areas can adapt themselves to conditions in the high Arctic where there is at present no Eskimo population.

Acting Deputy Minister,
Department of Resources and Development, August 1953

Of particular interest is the transfer of Eskimo from areas where food resources are depleted to regions further north where game is believed to be more plentiful. This experiment is being carried out by the Department of Northern Affairs and supervised by the R.C.M.P. detachments at Resolute, Craig Harbour, and Alexandra Fiord.

RCMP Report to Cabinet, March 1954

Originating from an idea to expand Inuit settlement into the relatively uninhabited areas of eastern Ellesmere Island, three High Arctic resettlement projects evolved into what some have charged were “human experiments” or tests of adaptability and adjustment. References similar to the above appear in a variety of correspondence, minutes, memos, and reports throughout 1953 and on into the next spring, indicating that the above statements were not one individual’s interpretation or an unfortunate choice of words.55 In another instance the term “transplant” was used,56 as if people were plants which could be moved to areas of better soil, or for aesthetic purposes. The analogy is perhaps too close to the truth, considering the projects’ dual objectives of providing more food and creating an illusion of a Canadian-occupied Arctic.

For the most part, the term “experiment” was employed in the context of a “pilot study”, (i.e., to see if the Inuit from northern Quebec would be agreeable to leave their traditional lands in return for more abundant food and fur in the High Arctic). If successful, then other resettlements were planned for subsequent years. Significantly, the word “experiment” was similarly used to describe other projects, such as the relocation of Inulijuak Inuit to the Richmond Gulf area.57 In this context, a pilot study might have been considered relatively benign if the Inuit had fully understood the terms, if there had been no undue risk of injury or death, if they were free to return whenever they wished, and if the project was planned for the benefit of the Inuit. However, even if the first three criteria were met, and it could be proven that the “experiment” had been designed initially for other purposes—such as to strengthen sovereignty claims—then the Inuit involved should have been compensated for their efforts. To date, there appears to be no other justification for the current government’s sudden refusal to acknowledge the sovereignty issue.

Publicly, the projects were promoted as opportunities, yet the northern administration placed the onus on the Inuit to adapt to the new environment, and delegated responsibility for their well-being to the RCMP. In this respect, the police were equal participants in the experiment, often having to rely on their own ingenuity to ensure the safety and well-being of the Inuit. They were under explicit directions prepared by the administration that “every effort should be made to keep the


56 RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1 pt 4, minutes of meeting, 10 August 1953.
Eskimos self-supporting and independent.”58 By March 1954, the reference to “the experiment” virtually disappeared from written documents, abruptly and without explanation. While there is no evidence of willful wrongdoing or malicious intent, the nature of the arrangements indicated apparent ignorance of responsibilities as set out in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

As participants in the experiment, the Inuit probably faced less risk to their physical health than would have been the case had they remained in Inukjuak. Contact with non-natives at Resolute unfortunately increased the incidence of infectious diseases, but at Grise Fiord, there were few evacuees during the first five years. In fact, the Inuit state of health was remarked upon by health officials as quite extraordinary compared with other communities.59 Medical advice was available by radio contact with Frobisher Bay, and mercy flights available from Thule in the case of an emergency, a distance no greater than from Inukjuak to Churchill. Fortunately for both the government and the Inuit, the efforts of the RCMP during the first years prevented any serious misfortune. Unfortunately, there were other flaws in the “experiment”—some serious, others less so. Together, the plans and preparations were not acceptable, even when measured by the standards of the 1950s.

Terms and Conditions

Once the location had been decided for sovereignty-related reasons, the explanations for the Inuit resettlements focused more on the benefits of improved wildlife resources for Inuit from over-populated regions in the south. Aside from the RCMP, it is unlikely that any department would list a budget item under “sovereignty.” Similarly, to have spent money on transportation to resettle Pond Inlet or Inukjuak Inuit would have been irresponsible considering the more urgent health and welfare needs of Inuit throughout the Arctic. The ability to fund arctic resettlement would require a legitimate reason showing distinct benefits to the Inuit. The meagre food and fur supplies, overpopulation, and minimal opportunities for casual employment at Inukjuak provided an excellent opportunity. While there were dramatic increases in expenditures on health and education in the northern territories under direction of Deputy Minister Hugh Keenleyside from 1947 to 1950, for the next three years the budget was virtually frozen owing to military priorities related to the Korean War.60 It was not until 1954, and the threat of an increased U.S. presence in the Arctic, that Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent again loosened the purse strings. In the final analysis, the projects should not have been implemented without full financial support for accommodation, equipment, and resident field officers. This occurred later, but in the first years, the RCMP provided the manpower, and the Inuit themselves were forced to fund the experiment through contributions to the Eskimo Loan Fund by way of profits from fur sales and store purchases. Did the benefits to the Inuit outweigh the risks? Those questions can only be answered by the Inuit themselves. The only clue in archival documents was a report from Grise Fiord in December 1954, stating that the Inukjuak Inuit had stated: they were “very happy to remain in this area.”

They also advised if sometime in the future they had to leave Craig Harbour due to the detachment closing down they would like to go elsewhere in the areas such as Dundas Harbour or Resolute Bay, rather than return to Port Harrison. Craig Harbour and


60 Grant, Sovereignty or Security? 203:Table 4.
surrounding county is their Garden of Eden.\footnote{RG 18, acc. 85-86/48, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-5. Report dated December 31, 1954, item 12.}

The report went on to say that the Pond Inlet families wished to return in a year or so to visit aging parents and relatives, and that both the Pond Inlet and Inukjuak Inuit had requested that their relatives be allowed to join them. While this would appear to disagree with current allegations, one must also remember that the Inuit men were the spokesmen and doubtless still excited with their successes in hunting and trapping.

Officials claim the Inuit were willing volunteers; children of the “volunteers” now claim their parents were not. The onus was on the department to ensure that all “volunteers” fully understood the terms. Given all the problems involved in comprehension of the unknown, language difficulties, and authority figures, it would be unlikely, if not impossible, to ensure reasonable understanding. If officials had considered the ethics involved, they did not record them on paper for posterity. Those are questions for which answers must be sought in oral histories, not archival records. The only indication of serious concern came from Alex Stevenson, one of the originators of the idea (1950). Arriving at Inukjuak long before the departure date, he sought reassurance that the Inuit fully understood the situation. He was only able to find “two hunters”, but was satisfied that they were fully cognizant of the details.\footnote{RG 85, vol. 1207, file 201-1-8, pt 3. Report by A. Stevenson, June/July 1953.} Significantly, there is no mention of questioning women or children.

The four objectives outlined on the original submission for funding provides some clues as to the expectations of the officials in Ottawa who set out the terms and conditions of the projects.

- Relief of population pressure in distressed areas.
- A pioneer experiment to determine if Eskimos can be induced to live on the northern islands, which, relics indicate, once supported a native population.
- An experiment to work out a method by which Eskimos may be trained to replace white employees in the north without the Eskimo children losing touch with the native way of life.
- If these projects warrant it, more natives can be moved north both to these pioneer points and to other points to be selected later.\footnote{RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, pt 2, “Assisted Eskimo Projects,” 16 March 1953.}

The first point merely gives a legitimate reason for funding. The last point verifies that the unwritten “sovereignty” objective was still the underlying rationale for the “experiment.” Various references throughout department files mention expansion to Eureka, Alert, and possibly Prince Patrick and Isachsen if successful. Significantly, these were all joint Canadian-U.S. weather stations.

The second and third points are key to understanding the different expectations for Grise Fiord and Alexandra Fiord, compared with Resolute. The idea of returning to a “native way of life” is a romantic fantasy at best, or a “form of apartheid” at worst.\footnote{Jenness, 93.} The use of the word “pioneer” suggests preparing the way, a settler breaking new ground, and stands as a curious contradiction to the concept of returning to a traditional life at the site of relics from a past settlement. (The fact that these failed to survive seems to have eluded the planners.) The most significant word is “induced”—a word suggesting that the move would be against one’s will or inclination.

The third point had intriguing possibilities, if the participants had been trained in advance and provided with clothing, food, and housing, equivalent to that of the non-natives they were to replace. The notions were idealistic, part of a
frontier mentality perhaps, but creative thought seemed to end before the ink dried on the paper. Had the department assumed greater responsibility for pre-preparation in terms of outfitting and education, then the “experiment” might have been justified. As circumstances evolved, the department had neither the manpower, the funds, nor apparently the wisdom to have embarked upon such an adventure.

In terms of solving a socioeconomic problem, there were many other possibilities already underway. Other resettlement projects included funded transfers to Banks Island, the Sleeper Islands, the King George Islands, and the Richmond Gulf area, all in reasonable proximity to Inuit homelands. There were other economic measures recommended that summer, such as a government trading post at Herschel Island, boat building at Lake Harbour, organized hunts in Ungava Bay, construction of a workshop at Akivik, repair of native boats at Tuktoyaktuk, and manufacture of clothing for resale. Projects under study included reindeer herding, sale of handicrafts, and collection and sale of eiderdown.65

The opportunity for permanent employment at Churchill came a few months later. However, none left the Inuit to fend for themselves in an alien environment such as Grise Fiord and in a manner similar to a survival test.

The paternalism prevalent in the 1950s may explain why the Inuit were not offered a choice of destination, even though there were two distinctly different opportunities. Yet even here there is confusion. When the Inukjuak Inuit were interviewed, the destination was to be either Craig Harbour or Alexandra Fiord. Several families were interviewed at Kuujjuaq (Fort Chimo) for employment at Resolute. In the latter case, RCMP Inspector Larsen warned against sending them unless proper wooden homes were made available, comparable to those used at the former U.S. air base. Earlier, an RCMP officer had been sent to investigate conditions at Resolute and reported that accommodations would have to be built for the Inuit.66 As a result, those from Kuujjuaq would eventually be offered employment at Churchill, while the Inuit from Inukjuak would arrive at Resolute with used tents. This also explains why only 10 of the planned complement of 15 families participated in the initial experiment.

Inuit Freedom and the RCMP

The limitations on Inuit freedom during the first years were only partly due to geography. Department directives and policy were equally (if not more) prohibitive. Restrictions were most noticeable at Resolute where the department insisted that Inuit should not be allowed “white man’s food” from the base, lest they become used to it, and that they should be prevented from visiting the base or the garbage dump. Restrictions were also indirect, as in the case of supplies sold at the store. The department even admitted that those ordered for the first year were only basic staples and that if the Inuit earned more than expected from fur sales, they should “set aside savings.” Instructions to the police covered the possibility that store goods might run out, stating that “each family should be allowed to purchase only what they may reasonably require for their current needs.” There were other restrictions placed on the Inuit. Even at Resolute and at Grise Fiord, there were strict orders that the Inuit camp must be set up “away from the settlement.” Ironically, in the same directive sent to both locations, the experiment was defined as a test “to determine [if the Inuit] can adapt themselves to conditions.”67 In essence, the Inuit were forced to adapt to the regulations defined by the department. Fortunately, the police, who had no power to change them, at times circumvented the illogical rules through their own initiative.

66 Ibid., file 40-8-1 pt 3, Nicholson to Young, with message from Larsen, 6 May 1953; also report Kearney, 22 January 1953.
67 RG 85, vol. 1070, 251-4 pt 1. Memorandum to R.C.M.P detachments (nd).
Once the Inuit set foot on the boat, they were locked into a controlled experiment over which they had no means of escape for two years (according to their understanding). This was one fact even the police could not change, although it was reported that at least one constable arranged for passage on an RCMP plane to take Inuit home to visit sick relatives.\(^6^8\) Any permanent move had to be approved by the department. However, in 1958, three young men from Grise Fiord travelled by dog sled to Resolute (with police support and approval) to look for wives. The successful sled journey also set a precedent that backfired when three or more families subsequently requested to move to Resolute upon hearing about the employment and social amenities offered at the base. The police, out of genuine fear of overpopulating the area and destroying the wildlife resources, attempted to discourage them from going, but stated that they were not prepared to prevent them from doing so.\(^6^9\) In this regard, the experiment proved that the majority of Inuit did not prefer long-term isolation from white communities or the more primitive life of their ancestors.

If the department had to rely on the RCMP for manpower, they also had to rely on the Inuit to fund the experiment. The means of circumventing the lack of funds was essentially to have the Inuit pay for the store and its operations out of the community’s trapping successes. This occurred in two ways: first from the purchase of high-mark-up goods, and, second, through net profits acquired by the department after sale of furs at the auction. In this respect, both the police and the Inuit, the “human participants” in the experiment, were exploited by the department whose actual contribution to the project was relatively small in comparison. The grave injustice in 1990 was the government’s implication that the Inuit were not telling the truth, and the inference that, if there were to be any blame assigned, it should fall on the shoulders of the RCMP.

The natural question is why the police should accept the terms of the agreement. The answer, as comical as it may sound, was “duty.” Not only were the police responsible for the well-being of the Inuit in the field, but they were also officially responsible for upholding and reinforcing sovereignty in the Arctic. Obliged by both a political and moral imperative inherent in the objectives of the projects, they were also caught in the dilemma of a third mandate: to prevent the exploitation of Inuit by non-natives.\(^7^0\) During the first five years of the experiment, the local police did make a serious attempt to make recommendations and suggest changes in policy. By the time they worked through the channels of command, up in the RCMP establishment and down through the departmental bureaucracy, they were usually either lost, disregarded, or, if necessary, disclaimed.

The department’s dependency on the police was clear at the outset, according to a letter sent the commissioner requesting that the RCMP reopen the post at Resolute Bay:

> It would be possible to establish these small settlements only with your co-operation, as there is no one else at these places who could assist these people in adjusting themselves to new conditions.... We could not consider placing Eskimos at Resolute Bay unless we had someone to look after them and direct their activities.\(^7^1\)

Curiously, there are no records of any discussion about measures to avoid undue hardship. It was simply left to the discretion of the police in the field who had no input into the ordering of supplies for the first year, no flexibility in the

\(^{68}\) Personal information related to the author by the constable himself.

\(^{69}\) RG 18 acc 85-86/048 vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-14, memo Jenkins to OC "G" Division, 4 January 1960.


\(^{71}\) RG 22 vol. 254, file 40-8-1 pt 3. Young to Nicholson, 20 February 1953.
operation of the government stores, and no say in the means or timing of transportation. They did have input in ordering supplies for subsequent years, but there were many occasions when requests were ignored or shipments “lost” en route.

Of all directly involved in 1953, there was one official, Alex Stevenson, who apparently tried to ensure proper preparations were in order. However, his primary responsibility was in the field, and he had no part in the ordering of store supplies. He did express serious concerns about morale during the long, dark winters, based on his previous experience with the Cape Dorset migration, and urged adequate supplies of stone and ivory for carving. When at Inukjuak in June 1953, he also gave explicit instructions to the local constable to supply out of relief whatever clothing and equipment was necessary “until such time that the supplies at their destination can be opened up.” There is no proof that this actually occurred. More importantly, there was no record of co-ordination or communication between the official who ordered the supplies and the police who were directly responsible for distributing them. Thus, the local constables in charge of Grise Fiord had no instructions (unless delivered verbally) until they were hand-delivered with the arrival of the supplies and the Inuit. Although there appeared to be a particularly good rapport between officials and the RCMP in Ottawa, many memos and reports reflect differences of opinion between those in the field and those behind desks in Ottawa.

There may be another underlying factor involved, arising from apparent tension between the police and certain members of the northern administration over the monopoly position of the Hudson’s Bay Company and the responsibility for distribution of family allowances and relief. In 1951, James Cantley, an officer in the Arctic Services Division, suggested transferring all responsibility for issuing family allowances, relief, and old age allowances to the Hudson’s Bay Company. RCMP methods of distribution, he claimed, had contributed to loss of initiative among Inuit and growing dependency on relief and family allowances. Inspector Larsen of the RCMP, on the other hand, advocated establishment of a Crown Trading Company to overcome what he believed was exploitation by private enterprise. Neither suggestion was acted upon. However, it should be noted that the official who denounced the RCMP was also the same individual who ordered the first year’s supplies for the High Arctic trading posts.

In 1953 there was open revolt against departmental policy at Frobisher Bay, when a police constable created a trust account system to deal with cash wages paid to the Inuit by the USAF, then used his own money to set up a trading store to provide an alternative to the Hudson’s Bay Company. Cantley was particularly indignant and demanded a review of all RCMP involvement:

Despite the agreement reached by the Committee on Eskimo Affairs that Eskimo Trade should be left to private enterprise... the R.C.M. Police have continued to openly express themselves as unalterably opposed to the Hudson’s Bay Company being allowed to continue in the Arctic, and to advocate the establishment of a government trading organization or Eskimo cooperatives....Their feeling seems to be that they are at least equally responsible as this Department for Eskimo welfare and that they are not obliged to follow

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75 RG 22 vol. 254 file 40-8-1 pt 2 Memo for the Commissioner of the NWT from the Director of the Northern Administration, 22 November 1951.
the lead of Resources and Development unless it is in line with their own ideas.76

Under new leadership, department policy eventually changed, and the constable in question was reimbursed and praised for his efforts. The angry memo is only significant in that its date roughly coincided with the author’s ordering of supplies for the arctic projects. As detailed later, the supervisory role of the RCMP was often made doubly difficult by seemingly unreasonable directives and inadequate supplies and equipment. It is purely speculative, but one must question whether there was a hidden experiment involved (in at least one individual’s mind) which would test the ability of the RCMP to carry out their operation of the government stores as effectively as the Hudson’s Bay Company.

The RCMP memos and reports77 provided unexpected insight into the process and expectations of the experiments, and often reflected more concern about the Inuit than appeared in the correspondence of the northern administration. The annual reports prepared by the police on “Eskimo conditions” were essentially progress reports which included names and disk numbers, productivity, assessment of self-reliance and initiative, physical and mental status, condition of their clothing and homes, and whether they wished to return home. These reports also indicate what the department wanted to know about police involvement (e.g., Did they encourage the Inuit to save? Did they promote self-reliance? Did they keep costs at a minimum? Did they protect the resources of the area from over-hunting?).

The Resolute Bay reports and related correspondence reveal an inflexible list of “do not”, related to fraternizing, offering gifts or handouts, allowing the Inuit to loiter, giving them “white man’s” food, allowing off-season hunting, assisting them in building their homes, or permitting the Inuit near the garbage dump. The last complaint evoked a restrained, “tongue-in-cheek” reply from the constable in charge, who noted that many foxes were caught in traps set at the garbage dump, that the Inuit stoves were supplied from scrap wood from the dump, and that the building used as a church and school, and for the preparation of skins, had been constructed from discarded packing cases. The inquiry about a CBC television broadcast which showed the Inuit at the RCAF base receiving gifts at a Christmas party elicited similar reaction. Constable Gibson replied that the television crew had found the lighting so poor in the “jerry-rigged” building at the native camp that they had invited the Inuit to the base. Gifts were handed out, worth a total of $45 and paid for out of the constable’s own pocket.78 It would appear that the supervisors of the “experiment” were not to influence the results by violating the rules laid down by the director.

Criticisms and Denials

Most visitors to Resolute during the first year were critical of the northern administration’s policies. Arriving shortly after the Inuit, Gordon W. Stead, Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Finance, and his regular representative at the meetings of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, made the following observation:

Where Military camps and Eskimo villages are adjacent, the Eskimos tend to be turned into “camp followers.” The different moral bases of the two societies tend to exercise a harmful influence on both; junior members of the Armed Forces attempt to get a corner on the output of handicrafts and so forth. The ad hoc approach that presently passes for policy falls between the two stools. The reasons for moving

70 RG 85, vol. 693, file 1009-10/69, J. Cantley to Fraser, 19 May 1953.
77 RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-14, reports and memos from November 1953 to December 1954.
78 Ibid.
this family are grounded in an attempt to keep the Eskimo in his native state and to preserve that culture as primitive as it is. However, by moving the Eskimos to an area where they come into intimate contact with White men destroys the basis of this reasoning while leaving them untrained to cope with the problems presented by this contact.\textsuperscript{79}

Stead also pointed to the inadequacy of current policies and even suggested that the existing membership of the Committee on Eskimo Affairs did not have the ability or training to come up with the necessary solutions. He advised the government to concentrate on retraining programs, new schools, and greatly expanded health services rather than on resettlement schemes.

Stead was not alone in his doubts about the project. The northern affairs officer who accompanied him thought the Inuit would become “camp fringe dwellers, combing refuse dumps and looking for handouts”, and stated that he did not believe the experiment would work.\textsuperscript{80} A member of the ACND secretariat visiting two months later complained about poor planning and preparation.\textsuperscript{81} The commanding officer of the RCAF Air Transport Command argued that the proposal “had not been discussed at the proper levels nor has the plan been formalized in a way that would guarantee some success.”\textsuperscript{82} The deputy minister of national defence, C.M. Drury, agreed, stating that problems “might have been avoided if this department had been represented at some of your preliminary discussions on this experiment.”\textsuperscript{83}

Six months later, he claimed the Inuit at Resolute had “become, more or less, wards of the RCAF detachment.” Although the northern administrators protested that he had been misinformed, they apparently took note of his suggestion that a representative of the administration be posted to the base “for the purpose of administering and directing the Eskimos involved in the experiment.”\textsuperscript{84} Shortly thereafter, northern service officers were appointed to several of the communities.

Considering the criticism, one might ask why the projects were not suspended and the Inuit returned home after conditions appeared to improve in northern Quebec. Part of the problem was financial. Transport to Ellesmere and Cornwallis was only feasible because the supply ship stopped at Inukjuak en route. It did not return south via Hudson Bay. Added to the embarrassment of admitting error or failure, the cost of a boat or plane charter was likely prohibitive unless declared an emergency. As a result, the administration acceded to requests to have relatives and friends join them in hopes the Inuit would choose to remain. Costs were taken out of the Eskimo Loan Fund and repaid by the Inuit through the government trading stores. There would have been no method of recovering the costs of a return trip home once the government trading posts were shut down.

With the creation of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources in 1954, the whole concept of resettlement came under debate and study, especially in regard to assessment of wildlife resources. Cancellation of the Alexandra Fiord project in 1956, and withdrawal of plans for Alert, Eureka, Mould Bay, and Isachsen indicated that High Arctic resettlement was no longer favored. Plans proposed for a settlement at Dundas Harbour and the reopening of the RCMP post were also abandoned. In this instance, one official

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid., report by Sivertz to the deputy minister, 23 September 1953.
\item \textsuperscript{81} RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1 pt 4, C. J. Marshall, 9 November 1953.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid., A/C Ripley to Chief of Air Staff, 6 July 1953.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid., Drury to Young, 30 July 1953.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid., Drury to Robertson, 5 Feb 1954.
\end{itemize}
expressed relief; evidently the USAF had already indicated its intention to use Devon Island for photo-flash bombing practice that summer.85

Considering the multiple objectives used to explain the projects, there appear to be unwritten motives as well: a solution to rising relief costs, utilization of the sovereignty issue to create a political imperative obliging the RCMP to provide supervision, and the designation of the project as a “test” or “experiment” to avoid long-term and heavy financial commitment. Added together, the motive underlying all three was to resolve a difficult problem with minimum expense or effort by the department. On two counts they succeeded in achieving their objective; the third backfired with a reverberation lasting more than 25 years.

**Bureaucratic Blunders**

Relying upon RCMP reports to assess the wildlife resources was likely a reasonable approach in the case of Craig Harbour, where the police were already familiar with the terrain and the migration patterns of wildlife. Initially, there was no shortage of food or fur, and it was interesting to note that the Inukjuak hunters claimed they had never before seen caribou.86 The plan to send a similar group to Alexandra Fiord some 250 miles to the north, with the two police constables arriving almost simultaneously to set up their post, was quite a different matter. The assumption that there would be an abundance of food, based on the existence of previous Greenlander camps, did not take into consideration the amount of wildlife already depleted or the reasons for the Greenlanders’ departure. Whether by good luck or good fortune, ice conditions prevented the Inuit families from reaching the isolated post as planned. Subsequent scouting by police officers failed to locate any source of food until spring, and it was two years before they reported that the area could support three or four Inuit families.87 A possible disaster had been averted, not through the wisdom of the project’s planners, but by ice conditions in September.

A major factor contributing to the problems encountered in 1953 was possibly the limited time

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86 RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-I-I, manuscript by Constable A. C. Fryer, “Rehabilitation Program of Eskimo at Craig Harbour,” 2.
allowed for preparation. The first senior-level request for co-operation from the RCMP was written on 20 February, four days after the plea by the secretary of the Cabinet to “Canadianize” all civilian activities in the Arctic. The three projects were submitted on 16 March and approved early the next month. At that time, the deputy minister wrote External Affairs to inform them of the continued presence of Greenlanders on Ellesmere, and suggested that the Danish government be asked to help remove them before arrival of the Canadian Inuit. The first messages sent to police detachments at Inukjuak, Kuujjuaq, and Pond Inlet seeking interested volunteers were dated 18 April. The first reply was received from the Kuujjuaq post eight days later. As of 13 May, however, there was no report from Inukjuak or Pond Inlet, nor was there any idea of numbers or the state of Inuit equipment and health. In a reply to the RCMP commissioner, the deputy minister of Resources and Development suggested that “when we have received replies from detachments at Port Harrison [Inukjuak] and Pond Inlet, we can then go more fully into the whole matter and decide from which areas we should draw for the initial experiment.”

Without any knowledge of who, how many, or the state of their equipment, the supply order was placed on 15 May. The orders were identical for the three posts, with only the ammunition order held back pending reports on the type of guns owned by the Inuit. Here, undoubtedly, was the crux of the problem. Reports verifying the number of Inuit volunteers from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet were sent on 23 May, arriving on 26 May, but no changes were made to meet the needs of the southern Inuit.

From the telegram detailing the family numbers and their equipment, it was immediately apparent that those from Inukjuak had grossly inadequate equipment compared with those from Pond Inlet. One tent was to be shared by two families, for a total of six adults and three children. Another hunter who arrived with a wife and child had no sled and only three dogs. The prospects for survival appeared dismal. Freight requirements and transportation costs were estimated at $6000. Under separate arrangements, the RCMP would hire three families from Pond Inlet for permanent employment at their posts.

Aside from the last-minute shipping orders, other problems emerged. From the beginning, it was assumed that the RCAF and the weather station at Resolute would offer employment opportunities, but it was not until 15 June that the deputy minister got around to writing his counterparts in Transport and National Defence to inquire about possibilities. On 27 July, after the Inuit were already on board ship, a reply from the weather service indicated that employment opportunities with the Department of Transport were very unlikely since plans were afoot to move the meteorological facilities onto the air base. The reply from C.M. Drury, Deputy Minister of National Defence, was more discouraging. Drury claimed his officers at Air Force Headquarters shared serious concerns about the whole proposal.

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90 RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7-5, Young to Wilgress, 2 April 1953.
91 RG 22 vol. 254, file 40-8-1, pt 3. Larsen to Fort Chimo, Port Harrison, and Pond Inlet, 18 April 1953.
92 Ibid., Young to Nicholson, 13 May 1953.
94 Ibid., telegram from “G” division to Cunningham, 23 May 1953. Cunningham had originally assumed there were four families from Pond Inlet. This was corrected to three by Larsen, memo 10 June 1953.
95 Ibid., Larsen to the Director of the Northern Administration, 23 May 1953.
96 RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, pt 3. Young to Lessard, 8 June 1953.
97 Ibid., Young to Lessard, and Young to Drury, 15 June 1953.
98 Ibid., Cowley to Young, 27 July 1953.
believing that “the experiment will result in hardship on the Eskimo families concerned and that the RCAF will likely be faced with the problem of tendering care for which they are unprepared.” Aware that the Inuit were already en route, he still urged that a meeting be called “as quickly as possible” to discuss the matter.99 The formal instructions to the local RCMP were immediately amended to delete all reference to employment at Resolute.100

Attached to Drury’s letter was a long and very thoughtful memo from the commanding officer to his chief of air staff. The air officer’s criticism was harsh, and delivered in hope of further consultation before going ahead with the project. Unaware he was too late, he stated he was “very much against the proposed program”, and outlined plans which might be taken for the benefit of the Inuit and, ultimately, the RCAF. He suggested that proper schooling be made available in both basics and skills, that proper housing be erected for single workers and families, and that “proper food and clothing should be provided for the whole family. A situation such as at Frobisher where the working Eskimo eats white man’s food and on the sly takes the left-over home to his family is not acceptable.” Emphasizing that he did not wish to hinder programs to help the Inuit, he felt that current practices only made the situation worse and would cost “hundreds and thousands of dollars on medical attention, mercy missions and transportation to help them,” unless the project were properly planned and executed.101

The consequences were as the air commander predicted. According to the constable in charge of the interviews, there had not been adequate time to interview the families in Inukjuak. Moreover, the best candidates were already out hunting.102

While Stevenson had instructed that clothing and supplies for the trip be supplied out of relief rations and distributed aboard ship, no record was found confirming this was done. There was supposedly a $5000 appreciation for expenses of the transfer,103 but there are no details as to how it was spent, if it was spent, or whether it was merely applied to freight expenses or food costs on the boat. One fact is clear: the Inuit from Inukjuak arrived with inadequate clothing and equipment for life in the High Arctic.

The supply order for Resolute also promoted criticism, this time by Alex Stevenson, a northern affairs officer. He was particularly incensed at the quality of the supplies received, and the longer list of goods which did not arrive. There were costly items, such as 95 pounds of butter at $1 a pound, and only 124 pounds of lard at 25 cents. Other absurdities included:

- 24 pairs of men’s work pants size 36-38 [for 4 slim men]
- 12 pairs of boy’s pants for 2 boys
- 5 lbs. of putty [for boats they did not have]
- 200 gals. of gas [but no engine or vehicle to use it]
- 12 pairs of braces for 4 men

The “missing” list was more revealing: no rifles; no oil lamps or wash tubs; no cotton drill, denim, or duffel cloth for making parkas; no stone or ivory for carving; no tent material for repairs or lumber; and no medical supplies. When shown the “snow knives” sent, the Inuit had laughed. Some articles had been ordered, then mysteriously disappeared, representing an estimated $2000 out of a total of $5000. The official also found the prices to be unduly inflated and the quality of some goods inferior.104
When the new deputy minister of Northern Affairs asked the director to explain the shortages and the high mark-up of goods, the reply in late January 1954 was defensive and indignant. He claimed that some items, such as the lumber, had been wrongly billed to Craig Harbour and delivered there, but police reports contain no communication to this effect. Their cable requesting lumber for tent frames and floors would appear to confirm that the wood had never arrived. With regard to the mark-up of 25 per cent, this was declared necessary to “provide a small profit being made on local sales.” An earlier assessment had been prepared by the head of arctic services, but apparently not forwarded to the deputy minister. This was a long memo, which claimed the order was standard for all posts. His arguments were even less convincing. As an example, his reply to the omission of wash tubs was that Inuit did not wash in winter. Perhaps even more revealing was the justification of the mark-up policy. He claimed there was only a 10 per cent mark-up on staple necessities, but a 40 per cent mark-up on all luxury goods to discourage the Inuit from purchasing them.

Admittedly, freight problems might be expected, but the officials responsible should have had sufficient knowledge of probable delays, site conditions, and shipping problems, and should have taken steps to avoid such incidents. In any “experiment”, one would have expected that the utmost care would be taken to supply the best equipment and suitable clothing. As a result of the haste and bureaucratic bumbling, the ill-conceived plan was off to a very dubious start.

### Unnecessary Hardships

Hardships began when the Inuit boarded the *C.D. Howe*. Although the woman who gave birth en route likely had better medical care than she would have received at Inukjuak, it was a long and cramped existence for the next five to six weeks. Special “native quarters” were set aside for the Inuit and their dogs. The patrol officials ate a full course noon day meal at a cost of 80 cents charged to the department; the Inuit were fed “4 hard tack biscuits with paper cups of tea” for 40 cents. Even the movies shown displayed complete insensitivity, as in the example of a railroad building epic with the Indians as villains and “all unattractive characters that got shot up or beaten.”

Tired from the long boat trip, they were expected to set up camp and find food for themselves and their hungry dogs. There was little time to cache meat supplies before winter set in, or to trap furs for credit at the store. As a result, one constable urged that in future, “the men at least should be flown to Resolute from Churchill to shorten the lengthy trip.” RCAF North Stars, he noted, “flew in weekly during the summer.” The officials in Ottawa who planned the projects appeared to have had little knowledge about the Inuit state of health, the condition of their clothes and equipment, or the necessities required for survival in their new environment. The local police, on the other hand, appeared to have had no advance knowledge that the officials would be so uninformed. Nor did they have the authority to insist on changes of policy or plans. Their instructions were detailed, even with respect to the

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107 For birth on board ship, see RG 18, 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-14, Cunningham to Larsen, 23 October 1953.
109 Ibid., Sivertz to the director, 27 August 1954.
sale of goods. All “relief” would have to be fully justified and every penny accounted for.\footnote{RG 85, vol. 1070, file 251-4 pt 1. "Memorandum to R.C.M.P. Detachments regarding Operations at Eskimo Settlements at Craig Harbour, Cape Herschel and Resolute Bay."} When police sent telegrams ordering more supplies, only those considered a dire emergency would arrive before the annual visit of the supply ship. Unless life threatening, requests from remote Craig Harbour could be ignored; it was more difficult at Resolute where the RCAF could report to their superiors.

At Resolute, no sooner had they arrived on the beach, but the ship departed, leaving the lone constable and his charges to move the supplies up to the base. The Inuit set up their tents on the beach and searched the base garbage dump for scraps of wood to heat their wood stoves. There was no available boat transport, nor would there be until next summer when a new propeller arrived for the police boat. The report of a visiting official speaks for itself:

In addition to the four Eskimo homes there is a small wooden building which the Eskimo built from old packing crates under the guidance of Constable Gibson. This will be used as a workshop, school, church, and as a place to dry skins. At the moment the families are living in tents banked with snow....

No site had been previously chosen for the Eskimo settlement, no quarters had been arranged for Constable Gibson and no storage space had been provided for the supplies for the Eskimo store. The Eskimo tents were in very bad condition, but no new tents or repair material were sent to Resolute.

Constable Gibson has had to ask for quarters for himself, storage space for his supplies, transportation for the supplies from the beach to the storehouse, and building material for the wooden building which was put up at the Eskimo settlement. He is now attempting to borrow a rifle from the R.C.A.F. so that one of the Eskimos can continue to hunt. If there is any accident or sickness he must immediately ask the R.C.A.F. station for medical supplies.\footnote{RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1 pt 4, report by C. J. Marshall on Eskimo Settlement at Resolute, 9 November 1953, 1-8.}

The official claimed that if the “experiment is successful, it will be owing primarily to good luck and to the resourcefulness of Constable Gibson.”

Reports spanning the next three years would agree with this view. As expected, the constable initially took the Inuit out on hunting trips to scout the area, but he also helped them set up camp, checked all families every other day, and taught school during the long, dark winter months.\footnote{Ibid., Report 29 December, 1954.} For his efforts, Gibson was continually defending himself against suggestions that he might be fraternizing with the Inuit and maybe even allowing them white man’s food on hunting trips.\footnote{RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-14, reports and correspondence, June/July 1954, Gibson to Larsen, Larsen to Cunningham, Cantley to Larsen; also Sivertz to Gibson, 28 December 1954 and Gibson to Larsen 29 December 1954.} It would appear that the police could supervise and report, but they were not to show compassion or friendship lest it encourage laziness.

The isolation at Grise Fiord created a different physical and psychological experience. Moreover, there were no visitors to report on conditions until the arrival of the supply boat a year later. The situation can only be measured through the wires.
and memos from the Craig Harbour detachment. Here, and in a later report, the Inukjuak Inuit on arrival were described as dispirited and in poor health, inadequately clothed, their tents and equipment in poor repair, their dogs too few in number and weak. Fortunately, the constable in charge was experienced with Inuit customs and language, familiar with the area, and better prepared for the Inuit arrival. Meat was distributed from the police cache; store food equipment, and gasoline were supplies from relief rations; and telegrams dispatched to order caribou skins to make proper winter clothing for the hunters. The administration sent reindeer skins which are considered far too stiff for clothing.

The police were also given explicit instructions to locate the camp at a distance from the police post, and to take precautions against depleting the area’s resources. Before transporting the families, their dogs, and equipment to a site 40 miles away, the police took the hunters on several scouting expeditions to secure food and caribou skins, and to instruct them on basic conservation measures. They also provided the Inuit with basic rations from the store, and loaned them an old trap boat and motor. Gas was supplied out of “destitute.” Once they were settled, the police returned to their post and waited.

While harsh and seemingly cruel, the strategy to promote independence appeared to have succeeded. A month later, the Inuit returned to the police post to trade furs and ivory carvings for store rations. They appeared in good health and had exceeded all expectations in hunting and trapping. On their return, however, they were delayed by bad weather and lost some supplies when a sled slipped through the ice. The men, women, and children at Grise Fiord somehow survived the winter, but not without unnecessary hardship. The snow was not adequate to build snow houses as planned, but it was RCMP headquarters that responded to the urgent telegram and sent buffalo skins to place on top of the tents for extra protection. The police also supplied old magazines to line the interior walls for further insulation.

As December approached, the police realized that the women and children had inadequate clothing for the arctic winter. They cabled for more caribou skins. Requests were also cabled for soapstone to help relieve morale problems during the long winter without sun, and for scrap lumber to build tent frames and floors. The skins were dropped later in the new year, but the soapstone would have to await the summer supply ship. The lumber was issued next summer from supplies which had been stored for the Alexandra post store, and the cost apparently applied against the account of the Grise Harbour store. Despite the adverse living conditions, only one Inuk complained about the site and the fact that he could not see in his tent during the winter. He alone was the one who had refused to answer when asked whether he wished to remain, stating he would decide in the summer. He died later that year, apparently from a heart attack.

Throughout the period there were signs of frequent tension between the northern administration and the local police, mostly related to the department’s policy of minimal expenditure. This was particularly evident in the case of the loaned police boat. Initially, one junior official

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115 Ibid., file TA 500-8-1-5, telegrams and reports, September through December 24, 1953, Sargent to Larsen; also manuscript by A.C. Fryer, nd.
116 RG 85, vol. 1070, file 251-4 pt 1, "Memo to RCMP Detachments."
117 RG 18, acc 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-5, Manuscript by Const. A. C. Fryer, "Rehabilitation Program of Eskimo at Craig Harbour."
118 Ibid., 1953 Year End report, A.C. Fryer manuscript (nd), Brakefield-Moore to Cunningham, January 1954.
119 Ibid., yearly reports for 1953 and 1954, plus telegrams and monthly reports from September through to 24 December 1953.
120 Ibid., file TA 500-8-1-1 Goldsmith to Craig Harbour Detachment, copy to Alexandra Fiord, 22 February 1954.
121 Ibid., TA 500-8-1-5, Reports December 1953 and 1954, and Fryer manuscript, op. cit.
suggested the department might purchase a boat for the Inuit. This suggestion was soon reversed, however, with instructions that the Inuit should be encouraged to pay for a whale boat at a cost of $1,500. The police offered their boat for the paltry sum of $75, and noted that it might be earned out of wages for assisting the police patrols or unloading supplies. At one point, the constable suggested the police simply donate their used boat. The department remained firm. There were to be no hand-outs.\(^\text{122}\)

Over the next two years, the Inuit at both Grise Fjord and Resolute seemed to prosper. That they did so was a tribute to their patience, endurance, and excellent hunting skills, and to the efforts of the police in facilitating the transition. For both communities, it was not simply a matter of adjusting to a new physical environment, but to a new socioeconomic situation as well. If the northern administration, in all their wisdom, believed that the “new life” was truly a “better life,” they might have provided more assistance—out of humanity and compassion, if nothing else.

**Financial Irregularities**

The first query about government policy concerning wages came from the Resolute police in 1954. Inspector Larsen followed this up with a letter to the director, questioning the refusal to pay wages owed to the Inuit by the RCAF and DOT “either in cash or goods from the Eskimo trading store.” At present, suggested Larsen, “the whole of their wages goes to your Department to help pay off the Eskimo Traders’ loan account.” At present, suggested Larsen, “the whole of their wages goes to your Department to help pay off the Eskimo Traders’ loan account.” Instead, he contended, each Inuit should be paid individually for their labour.\(^\text{123}\) This problem was soon corrected when the police simply applied individual credits on the store ledger, instead of forwarding the accounts to the administration.

Years passed before it was admitted that the creation and practices of the government stores had come about under “unusual circumstances.”\(^\text{124}\)

In one instance, it was reported that the Inuit refused wages. The constable at Grise Fjord related how the Inuit from Inukjuak had not requested payment for helping unload cargo from the supply ship, but had “told the member in charge they did not want and were not looking for payment as they were being helped and treated fairly all the time. They advised they would rather return favour for favour rather than receive payments for small jobs done.”\(^\text{125}\) There are, of course, no Inuit records to verify this account.

The Resolute constable had a different complaint which focused on the high mark-up on store goods. He argued that the Inuit should not be required to fund the government trading post which already received ample profits from fur sales. The department disagreed, claiming that any departure from existing policy would put them in unfair competition with the Hudson’s Bay Company.\(^\text{126}\) There were other criticisms. Each trapper was credited with a fixed price for his furs, regardless of the value received at the annual fur auction. All profits supposedly were added to the Eskimo Loan Fund which was used to purchase supplies for government stores. Long after the initial loan had been repaid, however, the Inuit of Grise Fjord continued to add to the growing credit in the fund through fur profits and high mark-ups.\(^\text{127}\)

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122 Ibid., Sivertz to Larsen, 14 April 1954, and 2 February 1955; then Sargent to Larsen, 21 February 1955; and Larsen to Director of Northern Administration, 7 June 1955.
123 Ibid., file TA 500-8-1-14, Larsen to Cunningham, 2 June 1954.
124 Ibid., Fraser to the Officer in Charge, Resolute Bay, 15 July 1960.
126 Ibid. file TA 500-8-1-14, Larsen to Cunningham, 13 May 1953; Cunningham to Larsen, 14 June 1954. Also RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1 pt 4, Marshall to Rowley, 9 November 1953; Cunningham to Robertson, 25 January 1954; Cunningham to Robertson, 11 March 1954.
127 RG 18, acc 86-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-5, “Eskimo Loan Fund Trading Stores - Grise Fjord and
The Grise Fiord detachment persisted in arguing that the Inuit were not receiving full value for their pelts compared to the price obtained at the fur auctions. One study showed that in the 1958-59 season, the Inuit were paid a total of $6140 for their fox pelts based on the fixed price set by the northern administration. These same pelts were resold for $17,953.65 providing the department with close to a 200 per cent profit. To make it worse, the set price per pelt was between $10 and $15 less than that paid by the Hudson’s Bay Company. This practice finally ended in 1960, when government stores were fumed into Inuit-owned co-operatives. Meanwhile, the Inuit at Resolute and Grise prospered despite the apparent injustices—a tribute to their ability as hunters and trappers.

Promises and Expectations

The charge that the terms of the project had not been clearly explained is virtually impossible to prove by historical documents, but as the Hickling report concluded, there is ample evidence that the Inuit were told they could return after two or three years if they wished. There were many reports that the Inuit wanted to return for a visit, but not permanently. In the words of one constable:

They do however from time to time express their desire to return to friends and relations at Port Harrison. They wish only to return to Harrison for one year. The writer believes they were promised by the Department they could return at the end of a given time.

There is no question a return guarantee was given, but archival documents are less clear to what extent the Inuit were actively discouraged from resuming. Milton Freeman in his study on Grise Fiord claims that “subsequent efforts to return by members of both groups [Pond Inlet and Inukjuak] were officially opposed.” Others, including Professor Peter Kulchyski, who is currently working on a more comprehensive study of resettlement policy, confirmed this opinion.

Perhaps of greater significance is the fact that there was no easy means of returning to Inukjuak. According to a constable at Grise Fiord from 1955-1959, the Inuit from northern Quebec were essentially travelling on a “one-way ticket.” While the annual supply ships stopped at Inukjuak, then Churchill, before heading to the High Arctic, the homeward trip bypassed the entire Hudson Bay region on its way to Montreal. Thus the return of even one family with their dogs and equipment would have necessitated a plane charter from Resolute to Churchill where other arrangements would be required to reach Inukjuak. Presumably, the cost could not be justified unless the project itself was considered a complete failure. There is no indication that the department had ever considered the logistics of the promised return when planning the project.

Apparent in most requests to return to Inukjuak was the desire to be near friends and relatives—in

Resolute Bay”; also Fraser to Resolute detachment, 15 July 1960; and Fraser to Sivertz, 13 July 1960.


131 Peter Kulchyski of Trent University and Frank Tester of the University of British Columbia are currently researching the subject of all native resettlement, and claim that they have found ample evidence of that the Inuit were actively discouraged from returning home. This view is also stated by Keith Lowther, op cit., referring to testimony given at a Special Joint Committee Hearing in 1986: Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada’s International Relations, No. 60, 23 April 1986, p. 81.

132 Comments to the author by former RCMP Constable Robert Pilot who was attached to the Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord posts from 1955-1959.
other words, “homesickness”, a malady affecting most immigrants the world over. The Inuit people may have been traditionally “nomadic”, yet by custom, they inevitably resumed to their home base after two or three years. From all accounts, the RCMP appeared particularly sympathetic and helped by writing letters, arranging for telephone calls, and making special arrangements to visit the sick or aging family members. Still, the limited earnings from fur sales and the meagre wages paid at Resolute were not adequate to fund regular visits home.

Of more serious concern was the charge by both Freeman and Richard Diubaldo that at least one individual appeared to have been pressured to relocate.

The Experiment in Retrospect

Despite the hardships experienced on arrival, the Inuit hunters appeared pleased with the abundance of game and fur animals in the first few years. Several accounts refer to their pride in accomplishment, high morale, increased self reliance, and signs of planning for the future. Without the help and intervention of the local RCMP, their fate might have been quite different. The supervisory role of the police fostered an attitude which might be considered patronizing by today’s standards, but one which often reflected a deep affection and empathy for the Inuit. Especially at Grise Fiord, the experimental nature of the project encouraged a symbiotic relationship between the police and the Inuit in which the success of one party was predicated on the success of the other. As part of their assignment, the police were responsible for preventing “material exploitation of the Eskimos by Whites.” Some police took their mandate seriously, even if it meant defending the rights of the Inuit against the policies and practices of the northern administration. There were other concerns as well. Both the RCAF and the Canadian Weather Service had suggested advanced training to prepare the Inuit for meaningful employment. The U.S. had a different view. In describing possible employment at Resolute, the U.S. Weather Bureau suggested that the Inuit might prove very useful “for carrying out arduous chores such as hauling ice, pumping water, handling fuel drums, cleaning up the station areas, assisting with cargo and supply caching, assisting in lighting temporary runway flares for landing aircraft....” This would be especially useful, according to the chief of the bureau, to relieve the skilled and higher-paid staff for more important work.

Conflicting purposes often stalemated innovative plans and ideas to involve the Inuit in northern development. The ACND was successful in coordinating transportation and public works projects, but in reviewing the minutes of meetings from 1953 through 1956, it was readily apparent that the military plans had high priority around which other departments were required to adjust their schedules. Many good ideas came forward for discussion in northern affairs, but there was relatively little action compared with what was required.

In 1958, R.A.J. Phillips suggested that resettlement “without the aid of resource studies was a risky procedure”, and he urged caution. “Owing to past disasters, settlements in areas of poor or no

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133 Freeman, op cit. and Richard Diubaldo, The Government of Canada and the Inuit, 1900-1967. (Ottawa: DIAND, 1985) 120. Diubaldo cites documents in RG 85, vol. 1070, file 251-4/2, a volume which was declared “restricted from public access” when first requested by the writer.


135 RG 85, vol. 1070, file 251-4 pt 1, Chief of U.S. Weather Bureau to Thomson, 6 August 1953.
communication or transportation must be avoided.\textsuperscript{136} Attitudes in the department were maturing, with more progressive views replacing the traditional paternalism. Had there been no military activities in the Arctic, the situation might have been more manageable. As it happened, rapidly changing circumstances and subsequent demands only made a complicated problem virtually impossible.

It was much later, after hundreds of thousands of dollars had been expended for health and education facilities, that agitation to return to northern Quebec began to mount. According to some sources, the increase in requests coincided with the announced James Bay hydroelectric project. Although the “experiment” had proved the Inuit could adapt and become successful hunters and trappers in the High Arctic, it also proved that isolated subsistence living was not favoured over the long term. Abundant fur and game, employment opportunities, elaborate facilities, and increased social services could not compensate for permanent isolation from family and homelands. In this respect, the experiment proved that the Inuit were no different than other transient workers from the South. Since southern non-natives received free housing, transportation allowances, and special northern bonuses to lure them north, one might have expected that equal consideration be given to the indigenous peoples.

Most disappointing in the management of Inuit affairs in the 1950s was the number of excellent suggestions which were ignored, most because of cost, but some only because of their source. One of particular interest was made by Constable Gibson:

> Rather than increase the population for the time being a rotation programme could be brought into effect by letting those who wish return to Port Harrison and have them replaced at Resolute by other keen and interested settlers. This rotation would not need to be compulsory. In picking new settlers one should keep in mind the ability and age of the persons transported to Resolute Bay.\textsuperscript{137}

Had this suggestion been considered seriously, Inuit from northern Quebec might have retained their initial good feelings about their “second home” as a special place for rejuvenation during their lifetime. This plan would also have provided proof of the government’s sincerity and good will, and that the promises of return were genuine.

When it appeared that the Inuit wished to remain permanently, the government supplied services and facilities equivalent or better than those available to Inuit communities elsewhere. They failed, however, to consider what special bonuses and concessions would be required to keep them there over a longer term, or what new responsibilities in self-government might be required to reinforce the self-reliance and pride of accomplishment that began in 1953.

History books a century from now may look upon the “experiment” in quite different terms—not as a judgement of Inuit adaptability, but as a measurement of government competence and understanding. In this respect, Ottawa’s refusal to accept the facts of the past as truth will stand out as hypocrisy in its finest hour. So far, the present government appears to have compounded errors made 37 years ago by attempting to rewrite history and thus avoid granting rightful respect and honour to those who most deserve it.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., file 251-4 pt 4. Minutes of Eskimo Affairs meeting, 28 November 1958.

\textsuperscript{137} RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-14, Report dated, 14 November 1956.
1. **INTRODUCTION**

**Background**

In 1953, seven families from the Inukjuak area in northern Quebec and three families from Pond Inlet were relocated to sites on Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands where there were no existing Inuit settlements. By their understanding, they had agreed to go on the condition that the government would arrange for their return if so desired, as long as they remained for two years.

Although requests to return home were initially discouraged, then denied, several families managed to return to Pond Inlet on their own during the late 1960s and early 1970s; another three families were reportedly assisted by the Makivik Corporation representing the Inuit of northern Quebec.

Some cynics suggested that the relocated Inuit only wanted to return home to share in anticipated benefits from the James Bay Agreement. They failed to realize that until Makivik was established by the agreement, there was no effective means to exert political pressure for assistance. Nor did officials recognize the degree to which homesickness played a part in their growing anger and despair, especially among women and children. Even fewer understood that in Inuit...
culture, banishment for life was reserved as punishment for only the most serious crimes.³

Not surprisingly, the police would report that increasing dissatisfaction set in after further immigration of friends and family was halted in 1958, reportedly because of uncertainty whether wildlife resources would support a larger community.⁴ New evidence now shows that the Hudson’s Bay Company had also requested a halt of the migrations because it was feared that Inukjuak was being depleted of its best hunters.⁵

When pressured by Makivik for financial assistance to return additional families, a government official responded in 1982 by claiming there was nothing on the record that a promise of return had been made.⁶ This statement was made in spite of a previous reference to the promise in a 1977 report by Alex Stevenson who had been directly involved in the relocation projects.⁷ Perhaps coincidental, but the government denial of any record of the promise came only months after Stevenson’s death.

Thus in 1984, another study was commissioned by the government to determine if a promise had been made and, if so, whether it should be honoured 30 years later. Finding no conclusive proof in the department’s own records, Marc Hammond took the initiative to locate a former police officer who had been at Pond Inlet in 1953 and was surprised to discover that, contrary to statements by the former RCMP constable at Port Harrison, this officer clearly recalled the telegraphed instructions to include a promise of return in the terms of agreement.⁸ Mr. Hammond also argued the promise should still be honoured:

“that the Inuit experiment was not an unqualified success and that the Inuit had grounds to call in the promise I am convinced was made. Apparently, they have tried to do so repeatedly since 1956 and not only after thirty years. No one seems to have listened.”⁹

In light of Stevenson’s report and the later discovery of the telegrams sent by Inspector Larsen, one wonders why the Hammond report was considered necessary.¹⁰

There are other incidents of “memory loss,” even in Stevenson’s report. Although twice mentioning the sovereignty purpose in conjunction with the expected economic benefits, Stevenson could not recall whether the Pond Inlet families were transported aboard the CGS C.D. Howe or the

³ LAC RG 85, vol. 1127, file 201-1-8 pt. 3. Eastern Arctic Patrol Report, northern section, Alex Stevenson, OIC. Fall 1951.
⁵ NWT Archives, N 92-023, Stevenson Papers, (unsorted). Director of the Northern Administration to Inspector Larsen, 7 May 1958.
⁸ Marc M. Hammond, “Report of Findings on an Alleged Promise of Government to Finance the Return of Inuit at Resolute and Grise Fiord to their Original Homes at Port Harrison (Inukjuak) and Pond Inlet,” Indian and Northern Affairs Contract No. 84-099, 3 August 1984.
⁹ Ibid., p. 18.
¹⁰ LAC, RG 85, vol. 1072, file 252-3/1, 14 April 1953. The Larsen telegrams with instructions to the Port Harrison, Fort Chimo, and Pond Inlet detachments were found in this file containing information about supplies carried aboard the Eastern Arctic Patrol Ship.
CGS *d’Iberville*, even though he was listed as the officer in charge of the northern section of the Eastern Arctic Patrol that summer. This would be only the first of many confused “recollections” by former government officials.

Because of the number of important documents missing from the department records, or in some cases improperly filed, researchers had great difficulty piecing together the full story behind the Inuit relocations. As Alex Stevenson reported when writing his report in 1977,

> The files of the present Department of Indian and Northern Affairs seem depleted of these details. With all the reorganization, I guess files go astray or are destroyed. It is sad that as we live through an era, so many people are not conscious that it is history in the making no matter how seemingly uneventful the events may be. Someday researchers may wish to fill in the gaps and I hope my small contribution will be useful.

With key documents eventually uncovered in personal papers or in the records of other departments, there are now more details to explain the reasons for the relocations, the initial criticisms encountered, the problems arising during the first seven years, and how the administration responded to those problems.

The Hammond Report resulted in the government’s agreement in 1987 to return 22 Inuit to Inukjuak and to provide money to the Quebec government for construction of ten new homes. In 1988, however, the government refused any further discussion about compensation for personal property losses, for economic and social adjustments, for travel costs to visit families remaining in the High Arctic, for Makivik’s negotiation costs, or for compensation of $10 million to establish a Heritage Trust Fund for the original 19 families and their descendants. Underlying these demands was growing anger that the government refused to believe their stories. In essence they were now defending their integrity.

After several Inuit testified before the Parliamentary Standing Committee in 1990, their claims were supported by the committee’s recommendations for a solemn apology, for recognition of their contribution to arctic sovereignty and consideration of compensation. In response, DIAND promptly commissioned yet another study, this time conducted by the Hickling Corporation. This study supported the government’s position, claiming that sovereignty was not a primary motive and that there was no wrong doing on the part of government. This brought angry protests and denials from the Inuit and their supporters.

In response to Inuit requests, the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) agreed to study the issue. In July 1991, it was announced that Prof. Daniel Soberman, former Dean of Law at Queen’s University, would head the investigation. His report issued in January 1992 concluded that sovereignty was a material concern in the relocations and that the federal government had failed to meet its fiduciary responsibility “of care and diligence in carrying out the relocation” and in returning the Inuit when requested. Given

12 *Arctic Circular*, volume VI no. 5, page 60.
13 NWT Archives, N92-023, (unsorted). In a letter to N.A. MacPherson, Alex Stevenson lamented the apparent gaps in the records on the relocation projects, 13 January 1982.
14 The Hickling Report, September 1990, “Assessment of the factual basis of certain allegations made before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs concerning the relocation of Inukjuak Inuit families in the 1950s,” by Magnus Gunther, and the minister’s tabled response to parliament, 19 November 1990.
15 Daniel Soberman, “Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission on the Complaints of the Inuit people relocated from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet, to
the time allotted for its completion, this was a well-researched and thoughtfully written report which should have provided the basis for negotiation of an honourable settlement.

Apparently this was not what DIAND officials had in mind. Having already commissioned yet another consultants’ report to respond to Soberman’s Report and advise the government accordingly. Meanwhile, the Standing Parliamentary Committee on Aboriginal Affairs once again called for an apology, for recognition of the Inuit contribution to arctic sovereignty, and for consideration of further compensation.

The study commissioned by DIAND in August 1991 was initially designed to investigate the sources cited in a study by the author and those in a Master’s thesis by Alan Marcus, allegedly to determine if the government position should be altered. The terms of reference were later expanded to include the CHRC study and other reports. The harshly critical report claimed that sovereignty concerns played no significant part in the relocations and that there had been no wrong doing which required an apology.

This time, the minister’s response to parliament on 20 November 1992, stated that the government had already acknowledged there were problems during the first year, but no apology would be forthcoming because the intent had been “humane.” While he agreed to consider in part the recommendations of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, he nevertheless claimed to have relied upon the commissioned report by Magnus Gunther for “historical detail.”

Instead of providing the “final word” as intended, the report created further insult when it rejected the oral testimony of the Inuit as “recollections of youth,” but accepted the opinions of former officials and RCMP officers. As stated in a press release by the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC):

The ‘Gunther Report’ is vicious and insulting. Gunther boasts that he consulted over 9,000 government documents, but there is no indication that he ever interviewed or consulted a single Inuk. It is aimed not at getting at the facts but at discrediting those who are trying to do that. In the opening pages Gunther dismisses the need to take the testimony of the Inuit who lived the events seriously. Can anyone seriously believe that the testimony of the human beings who were the subjects of this experiment is irrelevant, and that it is only the views and records of the RCMP and DIAND that matter?

Gunther then proceeds with 400 pages of selective quotation and attempted character assassination.

Followed by 20 pages of typed “ERRATA” and 5 pages of a new “Addendum” which he claimed would be incorporated into a “second edition.”
The intent appears to be to put a chill over the academics who have become involved in this issue over the years, and who have researched and written books and articles which substantiate the exiles’ claims—in other words, criticize the department and your competence and honesty will be publicly questioned.21

As a result, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) was asked to hold public hearings to allow the Inuit to relate their experiences.

Following a special evaluation report by Roger Tassé and Mary Simon,22 the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Affairs announced on 23 February 1993 that it would hold special hearings in early April to allow the relocated Inuit to relate their experiences, and again in late June for the researchers to explain their findings. Diverting from its original agenda, the Commission also agreed to hear testimony from former officials and other non-Inuit, who were directly or indirectly involved in the relocations.

The initial purpose of my submission was to provide background for a verbal presentation to the Royal Commission, in hopes of bringing to their attention, and to the attention of the people of Canada, the existence of concrete evidence which contradicts some of the basic premises underlying the current government’s refusal to consider an apology or further compensation. The longer term objective is aimed at encouraging a just and honourable settlement, agreeable to all parties concerned, but based on complete and accurate information. It was anticipated that other independent researchers would have reports based on their studies and the perspective of diverse academic backgrounds.23 When considered together, surely a more objective reconstruction of the past can point to an honourable means of resolving this conflict.

While many issues have been considered in terms of violation of human rights, this submission will not make recommendations on this aspect since the author has no legal expertise in this field. The objective here is not to suggest specifics of what should or should not be done, but to show evidence pertinent to the outstanding issues for the Commission’s consideration when writing their report.

The findings in this report are based on current archival research, backed by 15 years study of arctic history and related government policy. Recent research on the Inuit relocations was conducted without influence or financial compensation by either party in the debate. Initially, I was inspired by academic curiosity as to why there was such a discrepancy between Inuit claims and the government position (and admittedly fuelled by my ongoing research into arctic sovereignty). More recent research focused on why my findings and those of other independent scholars so profoundly disagreed with those of the government researchers.

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21 “Notes for Comments, by Rosemarie Kuptana, President of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada on release of the federal government’s ‘Response to the Recommendations of the Second Report of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs on the Relocation of the Inukjuak Inuit to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay’,” 26 November 1992. In the terms of his contract (applied for by the ITC under the Access to Information Act), Prof. Gunther was required to interview former officials and RCMP, but no Inuit. Initially, it was also understood that his report would be confidential.

22 Co-chairs of the RCAP. Among their many achievements, Mr. Tassé served as Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General of Canada (1977-1985) and Ms. Simon is past President of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference.

23 Perhaps an oversight, but a number of respected academics were not invited to testify, even though they had published on the subject.
After re-examining my own work for any errors in interpretation or emphasis, I then began to study previous government reports with special attention to what methodologies were employed and what sources were utilized. In terms of historical analysis, even the “illogical” tends to have a rational origin.

Because of my understanding of the importance of oral history in Inuit culture, I accepted the accounts of their experiences as valid. Even reports written by first hand observers should be considered secondary compared to the oral testimony of those who lived a shared experience, isolated by barriers of language and culture, and living at a distance from their “supervisors.” The “truth” of their statements can be judged by the collective consistency of the stories told at the April hearings of the Royal Commission. The only discrepancies I found were in their attempts to understand “why” the government had acted in the way it did.

Reasons for the growing alienation of the Inuit require closer examination and more thoughtful consideration. Equally important are the reasons for the increasing number of discrepancies between the findings of government studies and those of independent academic researchers. In this regard, methodology became a primary consideration in this study.

2. METHODOLOGY

Any discussion of methodology and interpretation raises the question about the overall usefulness of archival research. Since the primary focus of my current study was to determine why the government reports differed so greatly from my own findings, the most obvious source for answers would be in government records or among the personal papers of those directly involved in the relocations. Inuit testimony was important to understand “what” happened to them, but only government officials and the police knew “why.”

At the outset, I wish to make it clear that any form of research must be based on accurate fact and balanced interpretation. Bias is inherent in everyone, but if care is exercised at the outset to start with questions rather than assumptions, then bias should be minimized.

Loyalties, however, create uncommon pressures. While it might be natural to acquire empathy and opinions while reading written records, the expectations of friends and/or employers can create just as many biases as personal resentments or preconceived ideas. Academics under contract to government departments might claim independence and the right to differ, but they also recognize that future work depends on meeting the expectations of those who pay them. In this respect, it would seem that the most objective research will be conducted at arm’s length from influence by any one directly or indirectly involved in the issue.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission study is one example of an “arm’s length” inquiry, but so are the papers of academic researchers who have no vested interest in either party in the debate. In the event that a researcher’s only employer is his or her university, then there is an expectation of accuracy and professionalism. This can be an expensive proposition unless there are other resources besides an academic’s salary to fund such research. Contract work for government departments is lucrative, but it does not encourage critical appraisal of official actions.

Choice of Sources

The decision to rely on archival sources proved wise in the long run, but the absence of memos and reports referenced in existing documents was a continual source of frustration. Another obstacle was the number of government files still closed to public access, including RCMP files on arctic sovereignty and certain records belonging to the ACND secretariat. There was also an inordinate delay in acquiring a microfilm copy of the
Northwest Territories Council Minutes through inter-library loan (arriving a month after the June hearings).

There were other idiosyncrasies which required patience and stubborn persistence. In February 1993, for instance, a northern administration file which had been open to researchers two years ago was unexplainably, classified as “restricted.” Perhaps a coincidence, but this particular file had contained Inspector Larsen’s telegrams to his detachment officers with instructions for the enlistment of volunteers and a covering memo to the northern administration explaining his reasons for the apparently unauthorized inclusion of a promise of return. Even more curious was the fact that this file in was titled “Hospitalization of Eskimos,” raising the possibility that the telegrams and other material may have been improperly filed.

This same file also contained copies of telegrams by the Director of the Northern Administration that the 1992 DIAND study claimed were similar to the Larsen telegrams but sent out earlier to the detachments. On examination, this second set were clearly marked “draft wires”, which contained quite different instructions and sent to the RCMP Commissioner as possible examples. Furthermore, comparison of the two sets of telegrams revealed a decided difference of opinion which raised the possibility that the administration had never intended to send the more experienced Inuit from the former USAF air base at Chimo to Resolute Bay.

Government denials of any problems, along with missing records and distorted evaluation of the existing records served to create confusion for researchers, politicians, and the public at large. These factors were indirectly responsible for the government’s failure to negotiate a just and honourable settlement, acceptable to all parties involved.

Since the planning, execution, and continued support of the projects were the overall responsibility of the Arctic Services Division of the Northern Administration, reporting to the Deputy Minister or Resources and Development, it is among these files that one expected to find the most relevant evidence. Yet because of missing reports and memos, the RCMP detachment records and those of “G” Division proved unexpectedly valuable. Memos between inspectors and the commissioner not only showed differences of opinion from those of the administration, but also their lack of authority to change department policy or directives.

Because of the multiple issues involved, it was apparent that Northern Affairs records would cover only part of the story. Other records filled in the gaps, such as the Northwest Territories Council Minutes and those of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, as well as those of the Privy Council Office, External Affairs, and even National Defence.

Equally important were private collections, such as the A.G.L. McNaughton and Lester B. Pearson papers. Both provided background information on the role played by arctic sovereignty concerns in Canadian-American defence relations during the 1950s. Although of more peripheral importance,

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24 Since these telegrams had already been cited by three other researchers, I was able to acquire copies of the same with the cooperation of the staff at the National Archives of Canada. LAC, RG 85, vol. 1072, file 252-3/4. 14 April 1953, Insp. Larsen to Port Harrison, Fort Chimo, and Pond Inlet; also covering letter of the same date to the Director of the Northern Administration.

25 Ibid. Cunningham to Commissioner Nicholson, 8 April 1953, with two attached “draft wires” for purposes of detailing instructions to the detachments at Port Harrison and Pond Inlet.

26 There was no Inuit policy approved until 1954, and even then there was little means to observe from Ottawa whether policy guidelines were being followed. The Inuit relocations were designed, initiated, and maintained at the Arctic Services level and it is here that the more valuable records are found.
research at the National Archives in Washington also provided background to understanding some of the concerns and pressures arising from the 1947 mutual defence agreement.

The Ministry of the Interior records, on the other hand, were helpful in tracing the origins of the “sensitivity” that senior statesmen attached to Ellesmere and other uninhabited islands. Such concerns related more to a potential political problem rather than a legal one, and complicated by the United States refusal to recognize any country’s claim to sovereign title over “unoccupied islands.” This would in turn explain the degree of concern for any potential de facto loss of sovereignty at military installations located in otherwise unoccupied Arctic Islands.

Until recently, the lack of concrete evidence on some issues continued to pose a dilemma for serious academic researchers, and compounded by “official” explanations. Over time, new evidence began to piece together a quite different picture. After reviewing the numerous government studies conducted on Inuit relocations during the 1960s and 1970s, it was also apparent that some of the information in these reports had not been utilized in later DIAND studies. At the same time, it was quite possible that senior officials may have had minimal access to many details about the relocations, because of the remote locations, language barriers and the natural reticence of “junior” officials to alert their superiors to problems that had no financially affordable solutions.

Or perhaps senior officials simply did not read the field reports? This would appear to be the case with former Deputy Minister R. Gordon Robertson, who claimed at the June hearings that he was not aware of any hardship or requests to return home, despite having received a report in 1958 about hunger, cold, shortages of supplies and Inuit requests to return following a winter of hardship at Grise Fiord in 1957-1958. More disconcerting was to find only the first and last pages of this report in the administration’s files, each lacking the crucial 9 pages of original text. This suggests deliberate removal of crucial evidence. The question is when, by whom, and why?

The problem of “missing evidence” was partly resolved by the acquisition of the Alex Stevenson Papers by the Northwest Territories Archives. These records contain copies of many memos and reports which seemed to have “disappeared” from Ottawa files. Ironically, the statement by Stevenson in 1982, that many department files had been “depleted,” “mixed-up” or perhaps “destroyed,” is now verified by the contents of his own personal papers, when compared to the lack of evidence found in administration files. His remarks that “someday researchers may wish to fill in the gaps and I hope my small contribution will be useful,” now seems much more than a prophetic coincidence.

Some of the new evidence also gives strong support to Inuit testimonies. Conversely, the same evidence appears to contradict recent statements by former officials. In my opinion, it is time to

27 “A Matter of Perspective....” by S. Grant. A separate report reviewing some of the previous research conducted on Inuit relocations and Inuit policy was sent to the Royal Commission under separate cover.

29 Ibid., Alex Stevenson, “High Arctic Relocation” for Indian and Northern Affairs, Ottawa, 1977. Also letter from Stevenson to Mr. N. J. MacPherson, 13 January 1982. (Appended here.)
30 Regretfully, respected individuals such as Bent Sivertz, former Chief of Arctic Services were apparently convinced that the Inuit accounts were inaccurate and felt responsible to speak out on behalf of those who had worked for them. (See News North, 7 June 1993 and the Ottawa Citizen, 31 May 1993.) Yet his own report in 1953 was harshly critical of the Resolute Project. LAC, RG 22, vol. 176, file 40-2-20/3. See reports dated 23 September 1953 and 27 August 1954.
dispense with “opinions” and “recollections” and rely more on the written record of the government. It is even more important to “de-personalize” the debate, and focus only on government responsibility rather than individual fault or blame.

Unfortunately, the 1992 study commissioned by DIAND further confused an already complex issue with irrelevant generalities and flawed interpretation, in some instances derived from lack of knowledge and understanding about the history of arctic sovereignty and its relation to Canadian-American defence agreements since 1940. In one instance, the consultant’s failure to identify the significance of the 1950 MacDonald Report and why it had been placed under strict secrecy led to his belief that this document constituted proof that there was no reason for government concern. These factors and others suggest that the department may have expected too much from their consultants.

My decision to avoid any interviews was based on past experience. The subject of Inuit relocations in general is understandably charged with emotion when the credibility of individuals has been questioned. In personal interviews with those directly involved, I believed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid unconscious absorption of such emotions whether from Inuit or former officials. To interview only Inuit, or only former officials or police, would have encouraged a one-sided bias. To interview both sides would simply repeat the research conducted by a scholar for his Master’s thesis.

While believing various Inuit accounts to be a truthful narrative of their own experience, I also accepted the statements of former officials, police, or their witnesses to be their perceptions of what they thought had happened to the Inuit and with the presumption that they probably knew “why.” In this latter respect, (and if memory had not failed them) it was assumed that current statements would likely be verified by their own written records.

To avoid confusion and bias, I read the transcripts of the Parliamentary Standing Committee after my research in 1990-1991; and the draft transcripts from the April hearings before the Royal Commission, after my rough draft had been written for this submission. But I did read them, and very carefully. While one did not expect to find verification of Inuit testimony in government records, I found few contradictions (the latter in newspapers or in one instance, an article appearing in the RCMP Quarterly.)

With hopes of avoiding further “personalization” of the issues, this line of inquiry looked at the possibility of weaknesses in the government system of approvals and process. In the early 1950s, it was clearly found to be lacking in policy directives and in the appropriate checks and balances to protect government agencies against “human error.”

Format

This brings me to the unconventional format of this submission. Initially, I had intended to submit a comprehensive study which would place the issues in a historical context. This had to be set aside momentarily because of new evidence uncovered less than two weeks before the June hearings, that required serious reconsideration and a major revision. As a consequence, it seemed more
appropriate to act as “investigator” at the hearings, rather than analyst, essayist, judge or jury.

At the moment, there seem to be far too many opinions, too many experts, and far too many conflicting viewpoints—all based on minimal understanding of factual information. As a consequence, my report will focus on only four areas of contention.

This subject has proven particularly difficult to research, and even more difficult to write because of the complexities of the multiple issues involved. Everyone will have their own interpretation of emphasis and importance based on their experience and understanding, thus my reasons for providing as much documentation as possible. Restricted access and missing documents only served to befuddle and confuse. It is time to share resources and compare notes. The text of the submission is a synopsis of my findings and conclusions.

As a final note on methodology and primary research, an experienced historian does not attempt to estimate how much one has read or how many files or documents they have reviewed. Archival research is tedious work and must be accompanied by extensive reading of secondary sources. Even then, one is not judged on “effort,” but on quality that earns respect among academic peers.

In the end, however, no professional historian expects to find all the evidence or to have written the last word. Every generation rewrote its own history based on new interests and new evidence. Historians, particularly, expect their students will be their severest critics, and so they should.

3. THE ISSUES

The questions in the Royal Commission’s outline were particularly thoughtful and reflective of the many considerations involved in this case. The intention here is to try and simplify some of the complexities, and at the same time to focus on the areas of my expertise. To this purpose, I have consolidated the issues into four basic areas:

A. Origins and Objectives of Inuit Relocation Policies
B. Concept and Design of the Projects,
C. Government Actions and Response 1953-1960
D. Failure to Come to an Agreement

Additional notes on the origins and nature of arctic sovereignty concerns have been integrated into the section on “Origins and Objectives,” to provide a broader historical context. The annotated chronology will provide more complete details on specific issues, although it may be missing some key documents after 1954. Copies of most archival documents referenced in the footnotes are duplicated in chronological order.

A. ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES OF INUIT RELOCATION POLICIES

Perhaps the most debated and contentious issue is whether the relocations were motivated by “humane intentions” or “concerns about arctic sovereignty.” In order to resolve the issue, it might be helpful to reconsider whether these terms are relevant to the debate. Most researchers concur that there is no evidence of malicious or evil “intent” to physically or emotionally harm the Inuit participants, but that fact does not address the consequences of the “intentions.” Motivations, alone, may not be an appropriate measurement of government responsibility. Instead, one should consider if errors in judgement, ineffective checks and balances on the approval process, poor communications, or unexpected circumstances are justifiable reasons to deny responsibility.

To determine if “intentions” contributed to the physical and emotional problems encountered by the Inuit, one must first examine the origins and
objectives of previous Inuit relocation policies and their adaption to circumstances in the 1950s, before determining whether “policy,” lack of policy, or disregard for policy guidelines were relevant to this case.

The current government claims that the Inuit were relocated primarily to improve their economic circumstances, whereas the Inuit believe that sovereignty concerns had motivated the relocations. My own contention has been that potential economic benefits and potential sovereignty benefits were both major factors in the decision to relocate Quebec Inuit to Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands. To repeat for the sake of emphasis and clarity, sovereignty-related concerns were primary influences on the choice of sites and probably the timing; economic concerns were primary influences on the selection of Inukjuak Inuit as ‘volunteers’ and the overall design of the projects.

The two motives or influences are inter-dependent, because without one, or the other, the relocations would likely have had a much different impact on the lives of the Quebec Inuit. For example, had there been no sovereignty concerns, it would have been more practical and economical to have encouraged dispersal of the Quebec Inuit to the outer islands, or to sites on Baffin Island as suggested by Hudson’s Bay Company officials. On the other hand, if there had been minimal welfare costs in northern Quebec, then the RCMP proposal to move over a few families from North Baffin to help in protecting sovereignty interests would have been preferable and less costly. Because the two motivations or purposes are inter-dependent, they should not be considered separately or in terms of priority.

 Origins of Arctic Sovereignty Concerns

Britain’s “imperfect title” has been widely acknowledged, but few have considered the nature of the “imperfections” and how they relate to later sovereignty concerns. The traditional source used by many historians is the 1905 report by Dr. W.F. King, the Chief Astronomer, who claimed:

Canada’s title to the northern islands is derived from Great Britain. Great Britain’s title rests upon acts of discovery and possession. These Acts were never, prior to the transfer to Canada, ratified by state authority, or confirmed by exercise of jurisdiction, etc. Canada’s assumption of authority in 1895 may not have full international force. The conclusion from the foregoing seems to be that Canada’s title to some at least of the northern islands is imperfect. It may possibly be best perfected by exercise of jurisdiction where any settlements exist.  

A map prepared for the Ministry of the Interior in 1904 clarified the nature of these “imperfections.” Apparently, the Greely expedition had declared discovery claims in the Lake Hazen and Mt. Arthur area of Ellesmere Island in 1881-1882, where the expedition had established a U.S. weather station during the First International Polar Year expedition. Other American claims in the Archipelago included locations near the mouth of Lady Franklin Bay on Ellesmere (Hayes, 1861) and at the head of Frobisher Bay (C.F. Hall)

35 LAC, RG 85, vol. 1129, file 252-3/2A. Correspondence between Hudson’s Bay Company officials, Nicols to Cheshire, 3 December 1951, report the need for more trappers in the North Baffin area; see also the recommendations in the northern section of the 1952 Eastern Arctic Patrol Report that the Arctic Bay area could easily sustain 40 more Inuit families, RG 22, vol. 176, file 40-2-20/3; and report of the southern section of the Eastern Arctic Patrol for 1952, R.G. Johnston, OIC. confirming that this proposal was being considered, RG 85, vol. 1207 file 201-1-8/3.

36 LAC, RG 15, vol. 1, file “Arctic Islands Reports” As quoted in a report on Canadian title to the Arctic Islands, by J.R. Harkin, 1920.
There is no record of the U.S. government officially accepting those claims.

The significance of this map would be minimized by later legal opinion which rejected the value of any discovery claims if not followed by “effective” or “real occupation” of the area, as opposed to “fictitious occupation” such as raising the flag and placing cairns in uninhabited regions.38

**Origins of the Inuit Relocation Policy**

The first written recommendation of moving Inuit to the High Arctic described a clear “dual purpose,” of reinforcing arctic sovereignty and providing better food and fur resources for the Inuit. The proposal was put forward in 1920, by J.B. Harkin for the Ministry of the Interior.

New concerns about Canada’s title had arisen in 1920 because of an alleged report that the Danish explorer Knud Rasmussen had publicly stated that Ellesmere Island was a “No-Man’s Land.” Upon reviewing Dr. King’s report (noted above), ministry officials considered whether Ellesmere Island was important enough to warrant the effort to maintain “effective occupation.” A report by J.B. Harkin suggested it was, based on potential value of wild life and mineral resources, public sensitivities about arctic sovereignty, possible application of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States, and future use for commercial aviation.

The basis of arctic sovereignty concerns expressed in 1920 would relate indirectly to those of the 1950s. Based on legal studies, Harkin reported that:

1. to establish an annual Eastern Arctic Patrol
2. to set up two or three police posts on Ellesmere Island.
3. to be followed by probably transferring Inuit to Ellesmere Island,
4. to encourage the Hudson’s Bay Company or other traders to open more northerly posts.40

The report was accepted with the recommendation that immediate action be taken. Although the proposal to transfer Inuit would be deferred (likely because of cost), the concept of Inuit relocation to reinforce arctic sovereignty was clearly established as a policy recommendation.

While the primary objective at that time was to protect Canada’s sovereignty interests in the uninhabited arctic islands, particularly Ellesmere, the Inuit recommended for relocation were selected because they were likely to gain economic benefit. Mr. Harkin suggested Inuit from Fullerton Harbour (on the west side of Hudson Bay), an area of declining resources and large population resulting from the 19th century

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37 Ibid., file “Maps.” Map was prepared for the Ministry of the Interior by James White, 1904.
38 Ibid., Based on Oppenheim’s treatise on International law, the quotations are found in a confidential memo from the Advisory Technical Board to the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior, 13 October 1920.
40 Ibid.
whaling activities. Thus the first reference to government policy on Inuit relocation would have a “dual purpose” of sovereignty and economic benefit.

A follow-up assessment for J.B. Harkin confirmed that according to British Admiralty charts, the Americans had prior discovery claims on the northeast coast of Ellesmere Island extending from Cape Isabella northward to the mouth of the Lincoln Sea. As a result, it was considered especially important to establish “factual evidence” of “effective occupation” by establishing police detachments on Ellesmere and other uninhabited islands of the Archipelago.

In 1922, the Eastern Arctic Patrol made its first voyage of what would become a yearly event. Also during the 1920s, police posts were established at Port Burwell at that time in northern Labrador, at Craig Harbour and Bache Peninsula on Ellesmere Island, at Pond Inlet, Pangnirtung and Lake Harbour on Baffin Island, and at Dundas Harbour on Devon Island.

Similarly in 1926, the Arctic Islands Game Preserve was established partly as a means of preserving wildlife from indiscriminate hunting by foreigners, but also as a means of creating a vehicle for the exercise of authority, which could then be added to the evidence that the Canada was “effectively occupying” the entire Arctic Archipelago through administration and assertion of its laws and regulations:

> By Order-in-Council, an Arctic Islands Preserve was created in July 1926, by which it was decreed that trading companies must secure the consent and approval of the Commissioner of the North West Territories before establishing trading posts anywhere in that area. The creation of this preserve and its appearance on our maps serves to notify the world that the area between the 60th and 141st meridians right up to the Pole is under Canadian sovereignty.

As a result, any references the RCMP or External Affairs might make (in unclassified memos or reports) about “concerns” over the inability to halt illegal hunting on Ellesmere were referring to the “sovereignty” implications. This was often used in diplomatic correspondence or in official statements, as a means of avoiding mention that there might be potential problems in maintaining arctic sovereignty.

**First Inuit Relocation to the High Arctic**

Several requests were made by the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) to open posts in the southern arctic regions, but if it involved move of Inuit, it must be considered beneficial to their best interests. Thus from 1920, onward, the Inuit, the RCMP and the continuance of a thriving fur trade were considered integral in maintaining factual evidence of “effective occupation.”

In the first half of the twentieth century, the government depended a great deal on the presence of both church missions and the HBC to effect a “presence” of effective occupation in the sparsely populated regions of the Arctic. Moreover, the ability of the RCMP to assert authority also depended on the acceptance of that authority by the Inuit. Administering “effective control” was a tenuous exercise at the best, and continually beset by unexpected difficulties.

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42 LAC, RG 15, vol. 1, file “Arctic Islands Reports/2” Correspondence to A.G. Doughty from the map archivist at the Public Archives, November 1921.

One particular item discussed at a Northwest Territories Council meeting would have direct relevance to events and concerns in 1934 and again in the 1950s. In December 1933, RCMP Commissioner MacBrien reported that

“...in the past it had been found difficult to get Canadian Eskimos to go to the posts north of Baffin Island. Snow conditions are quite different for travelling. In addition they are not much use to the Police, particularly on Ellesmere Island. As a consequence it has been the usual practice to secure the Eskimos for these posts from Greenland. At the present time there are at Craig some Canadian Eskimos who want to go back to Baffin Island next year...”

In response, the Officer in Charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol agreed, saying that “for years considerable difficulty arose in getting natives to go even to Dundas Harbour. The Baffin Islanders do not mind travelling so long as they can visit friends...but he thought it might be possible to train the Baffin Islanders to go farther north.”

The hiring of Greenlanders was not taken lightly. Even in the 1930s, arrangements for their wages and transportation were all conducted through the diplomatic offices of External Affairs.

When the Hudson’s Bay Company requested permission to open a new post in the Eastern Arctic in 1934, the NWT Council selected the location and approved the first “official” relocation of Inuit to the High Arctic. In this instance, Inuit families from Cape Dorset on Southern Baffin Island (considered a heavily populated area), accompanied a Hudson’s Bay Company trader and Inuit from North Baffin, to Devon Island where the RCMP post had been closed as a consequence of budget restraints during the Depression years.

Alex Stevenson, who had been a Hudson’s Bay trader in the Eastern Arctic at that time, described the dual purpose of this relocation in a report to the government:

Prior to this 1934 move, the High Arctic had been uninhabited by Inuit People for centuries, although prehistoric sites indicated past occupation.... Meanwhile the economic conditions of the Inuit in certain areas of the Eastern Arctic were deteriorating and the Government relief accounts were increasing. There had been a ban on opening more trading posts within the Arctic Islands Reserve. Two HBC posts had been opened briefly [Arctic Bay on North Baffin and Port Leopold on Northern Somerset, both 1926].... In light of the regulations governing the Arctic Island’s Game Preserve, these were closed in 1928. The HBC had asked for permission to reopen these. The Department of the Interior in weighing the request suggested using the former R.C.M.P. buildings. This would serve the dual purpose of sovereign rights in the Arctic Archipelago by greater occupation than one or two R.C.M.P. detachments but also Inuit from selected poor hunting and trapping areas might reap the benefit of the available wild life.

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45 Ibid.
Stevenson also referred to a promise of returning these Inuit, which appears to have been fulfilled as far as the Pangnirtung Inuit were concerned, but not the Cape Dorset families who were reported by Inspector Larsen in 1942 as urgently requesting to be returned home.48

More significant is the fact that Alex Stevenson and James Cantley (who was a HBC Supervisor of the Eastern Arctic during the 1930s), were both employed in the department’s Arctic Services Division in the 1950s and both directly involved in the 1953 Inuit relocations. Cantley, however, was the person in charge of the relocation planning and preparations:49 Stevenson was the Officer in Charge of both the southern and northern portions of the Eastern Arctic Patrol in 1953.

Since both Stevenson and Cantley would report the same dual purpose in their recommendations to move Inuit to Ellesmere Island (respectively in the 1950 and 1952 Eastern Arctic Patrol Reports) indicating that there was unquestionably a strong continuity of “dual purpose” in government policy considerations. Equally significant is the fact that Stevenson would repeat the explanation of “dual purpose” twice in his 1977 report on the 1953 relocations, first with reference to the initial establishment and second, with reference to the reasons for continuation of Grise Fiord.50

50 Op. Cit., Stevenson Report, “Inuit Relocation—High Arctic.” This report emphasizes the “volunteer” aspect of the project, perhaps a result of Prof. Milton Freeman’s published paper in 1969 that spoke of coercion. The “volunteer” aspect was also emphasized in replies to letters of inquiry that Stevenson wrote for the department. Copies appear in his personal papers, NWT Archives, N92-023 (unsorted).

Inuit Employment during the Second World War

During the war years, the “dual purpose” concept also arose in discussions concerning Inuit employment at the American military bases as a means of protecting arctic sovereignty. When there were serious concerns expressed in 1943 about a potential de facto loss of sovereignty because of the massive influx of American personnel for construction of airfields and weather stations,51 some believed Inuit employment was one means of increasing Canadian participation in the more remote regions.

As one example, in lectures (1944 and 1945) given at the RCAF Staff College, Diamond Jenness would suggest two means of strengthening Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic:

There can be no doubt that Canada would immensely strengthen her claim to sovereignty over the uninhabited islands in her Arctic sector if she established either Eskimo settlements or scientific research stations on those islands that are most readily accessible by sea or by air. I say Eskimo settlements, not settlements of white men, because no ordinary white man is content to make his home and raise his family in a land where the usual amenities of civilized life can find no place, and where medical, educational, and other facilities are either non-existent or totally inadequate.52

While Dr. Jenness has been criticized for “racist” comments by some academics, the reference to “no ordinary white man” simply reflected his well-known admiration for the Inuit and their ability to have survived in the harsh arctic climate.

‘Canadianization’ Policy and Inuit Employment

After media coverage in 1943 and subsequent reaction about possible loss of sovereign control, public pressure forced the government to “purchase” all permanent facilities built by the United States military in northern Canada as a means of preventing American expectation of “postwar benefit.” Concerns again surfaced with the increasing number of United States military activities following the mutual defence agreement in 1947, and the establishment of “joint” arctic weather stations at Eureka on Ellesmere Island and Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island (followed by three more on uninhabited islands of the Arctic Archipelago). Yet officials were also cautious about reporting such concerns because of “public sensitivities.”

Following the announcement of the 1947 mutual defence agreement, Cabinet recommended “Canadianization” of various United States defence operations in northern Canada to ensure that “sovereignty interests” were protected. Subsequent takeovers were to be coordinated with civilian activities under the watchful eye of the newly created Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND), which reported directly to Cabinet through the Privy Council Office.

At the first meeting of the ACND in February 1948, the chairman outlined the purpose of the committee with particular reference to the need to coordinate all military activities.

The defence aspect was important, in particular the relationships with the United States involved. It was apparent that developments in this sphere would be mostly of a joint character and every effort should be made to provide for the maximum possible Canadian effort, particularly in respect of operating personnel. Only in this way could Canada retain control and a reasonable degree of independence.

Two reports were introduced for discussion at the meeting, both noting potential problems related to arctic sovereignty: “Northern and Arctic Projects,” and “U.S. Military Activities in Canada.” The chairman then asked whether, ...arising from these reports, any fields for study or particular activities suggested themselves. He had in mind subjects such as wild-life conservation, studies of native populations, etc. In particular, it would be useful if departments such as the Department of Transport could give consideration to the suitability for employment of native

53 Grant, Sovereignty or Security? Chapter 5.
54 Ibid., pp. 170-187; and 212-218.
55 Ibid., pp.223-230.
56 LAC, MG 30-E 133, Series V, vol. 294, file “ACND to 1953.” Minutes for 2 February 1948, page 1. Subsequent discussion concentrated on possible “Canadian efforts” that might be initiated. The weather stations at Resolute and Eureka on Ellesmere Island, and those planned for Alert (on Ellesmere Island) and on Melville, Banks, Prince Patrick and Isachsen Islands, were considered particularly important because of their location on otherwise uninhabited islands. Moreover, these same locations had been singled out for “possible takeover” should Canada refuse to cooperate, See 1946 USAAF Intelligence Report. National Archives (Washington) RG 59, PJBD series, vol. 10, file “Correspondence— 1946,” from the Office of the PC/S Intelligence, USAAF, 29 October 1946
peoples inhabiting these northern areas.\footnote{Minutes of the 2 February 1948 meeting of the ACND, \textit{op. cit.}, page 5. This reference did not suggest relocating Inuit, just employment of local residents.}

Although it was suggested that one of the reports might be inaccurate, Lester Pearson as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed “shock,” claiming that while he did not believe that the United States was operating in any “clandestine fashion... the Canadian effort in the north should be on as large a scale as practicable in order to minimize dependence on U.S. assistance.”\footnote{Ibid., page 6. The “maximum Canadian effort” was discussed at subsequent ACND meetings (1948-1949) in regard to taking over American operations. At the 9 March 1949 meeting of the ACND, there is specific reference to the “Cabinet directive of 1947 in respect of the taking over of airfields and weather stations from the U.S. by 1950.” Minutes, p. 8.}

Items discussed at the ACND meetings were coordinated with discussions at the NWT Council meetings, with ACND extracts sent to the Council’s secretary for reference. On 17 March 1948, there were reported discussions at the Council meeting about the employment of Inuit for construction at northern defence bases,\footnote{NWT Archives, G79-042/GC001/14. NWT Council Minutes, 17 March 1948.} with more specific proposals about wages, living quarters, etc., discussed at the April meeting, i.e. Inuit were not to be hired during a period when they were “laying up food supplies,” but if hired in the winter, the RCAF were expected to supply them with appropriate accommodation.\footnote{Ibid., file GC0001/15. NWT Council Minutes for 23 April 1948.}

\textbf{Inuit Relocation and Canadianization}

Meanwhile, discussions continued about the possibilities of Inuit employment and their future role in the developments taking place in the arctic regions. Initially, suggested actions related to Inuit welfare had concentrated on providing adequate health and education. The prospect of increased U.S. military activities and potential mineral exploitation raised more discussion about how the Inuit might participate more fully in new developments related to the Canadianization initiatives.

Describing the expanding indigenous populations that had occurred in Greenland and Alaska (with the assumption that a similar trend might happen in Canada because of improved health care), Dr. Diamond Jenness proposed a comprehensive plan based on the Greenland model:

\begin{quote}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Staff the administrative and scientific stations in the Arctic
\item Exploit the local resources of minerals, furs and fish
\item Supply all local surface transportation
\item Colonize those areas, now uninhabited, in which it may be advisable to establish permanent settlements in order to assert and vindicate Canadian sovereignty.
\end{enumerate}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
An adequate educational program for the Eskimos will probably require the establishment of two or three special training schools equipped with lathes and other machines, one perhaps at Tuktuyaktok [sic] in the Mackenzie Delta, a second at Churchill, and a third in Frobisher Bay. These schools will cost a considerable sum of money, and for five or more years may seem to yield little or no returns. At the end of five years, however, or
\end{quote}
very soon afterwards, they should be producing the following results:-

(a) Training enough Eskimos to replace most of the white staff in the weather and loran stations. (Such weather stations as Eureka Sound carries a staff of seven white men, whose salaries alone amount to more than $30,000 yearly. The cost of their salaries and maintenance could be reduced 75% by replacing five of them with Eskimo, without any loss of efficiency.)

(b) Equipping the Eskimos with, or helping them to obtain and operate, enough shallow-draft motor vessels in good condition that they could undertake all sea transport throughout the Canadian Arctic, as they already do in Greenland, and, to some extent, in Alaska also. The government would then be responsible for the surface carriage of passengers and freight only to a few entrepôt ports within the Arctic such as Tuktuyaktok,[sic] Churchill and perhaps Pond’s Inlet.61

This proposal is particularly important, not only because of the expressed sovereignty purpose, but because the “economic benefits” would accrue to both the Inuit and the government.

Dr. Jenness’s proposal was presented to the Transportation Sub-Committee of the ACND for discussion. Another memo supported the idea that the “Eskimo might be trained to build and operate small ships” and also suggested they might participate in air craft maintenance and repair.62

In January 1949, the Canadian Meterological Committee of the Joint Arctic Weather Stations (JAWS) discussed the proposal to introduce a “permanent Eskimo population” on Banks Island in advance of setting up a new weather station, recommended by the United States Weather Bureau. It was also suggested that Canadians alone should be responsible for this station.63

In the summer of 1949, briefing sessions for Canadian observers on the U.S. re-supply mission for the weather stations would receive two preparatory lectures on arctic sovereignty: one on legal and political aspects (including relations with the United States and Greenland) and another on factual evidence.64

Declining Fur Prices and Inuit Economy

In 1949, however, other circumstances arose which resulted in serious discussion concerning the future


62 See NWT Archives, G79-042/GC001/14. NWT Council Minutes, 17 March 1948. Also Minutes of the September and October 4, 1948 meetings of the ACND Transportation Sub-Committee. A second report, “Flying Requirements for Health and Educational Establishments in N.W.T.” dated August 1948 was presented for discussion at the September meeting of the ACND. Reports of the sub-committee were also presented at the March 1949 ACND meeting, and again at the December 1949 meeting. Both spoke of problems finding qualified Canadian personnel to meet Cabinet directives by 1950. It was also recommended that the RCAF should be responsible for the arctic airfields rather than the DOT. See LAC, RG 85, vol. 300, file 1009-3/1. Minutes for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th meetings of the ACND.

63 LAC, RG 25, acc. 86-87/157, vol. 8, file 703-40 pt. 4. At the ACND meeting in January 1950, it was reported that it had been agreed that the Banks Island station would be a Canadian initiative rather than one of the jointly operated stations.

64 LAC, RG 85, vol. 302, file 1009-5/1. The titles of these lectures are listed in the “Briefing Sessions” for June 1949 but so far, no actual copies have been found.
of the Inuit economy. The price of fox pelts dropped dramatically causing severe hardship for those families depending upon trapping for revenue, a problem which seemed especially severe for the mainland Inuit. This in turn resulted in families congregating around the posts apparently relying upon Family Allowance credits and welfare assistance.

While some cynics suggested that these social benefits had encouraged idleness, a 1950 report from the RCMP detachment at Port Harrison argued that the Inuit were not lazy but only frightened of hunger. Instead of welfare assistance, the police constable recommended a form of subsidization to counter-balance the periods of low fur prices.\(^5\)

There were numerous discussions at the NWT Council during 1949, which included suggestions of more wildlife studies to fully utilize resources and consideration of relocating Inuit.\(^6\) In October 1949, it was decided to hire a “competent business man experienced in the fur trade” to investigate the feasibility of government owned or cooperative stores in areas not covered by private fur traders; subsidization of prices; government takeover of all trading practices; and other means of improving the Inuit economy.\(^6\)

Mr. James Cantley, veteran fur trader would be hired to fill the position. His reports issued in the spring and fall of 1951 were commonly referred to as the “Cantley reports.” They were somewhat pessimistic about the future of a fur trade economy and suggested other alternatives such as boat building and an expanded handcraft industry. He made no mention of Inuit relocation in these reports. He did believe the fur trade should be left in the hands of private enterprise and firmly rejected the NWT Council proposal of setting up government trading stores which eventually could be turned into cooperatives. Nor did he support Council’s suggestion of subsidies to counter the dramatic fluctuations in fur prices.\(^6\)

He also proposed that the Hudson’s Bay Company should have full responsibility for distribution of welfare assistance and family allowances, and not the RCMP as currently the case. These proposals directly opposed those of RCMP Inspector Henry Larsen who had recommended setting up a Crown trading company along the lines of the Danish operation in Greenland, in the belief that some fur traders had unmercifully exploited the Inuit.\(^6\)

This difference of opinion would create tension between the RCMP and the northern


\(^6\) Department of Resources and Development, Annual Report for year ending March 31, 1950, (government printer, 1950) included discussion of wildlife studies and the possibility of Inuit relocations (page 12). The Annual Report for the next year emphasized the need for a flexible, long-term social and economic policy for the Inuit, including “continued consideration” of opening up new areas for Inuit habitation (page 80).
administration on other matters, including the terms of the Inuit relocations. Yet once legislative authority for Inuit Affairs passed from the NWT Council to the Department of Resources and Development in 1950, the RCMP lost their power to have any direct influence over future Inuit policy. Although they were still responsible for the welfare of the Inuit in a supervisory capacity in the field, the RCMP were now obligated to follow the instructions issued by the northern administration.

With years of firsthand experience patrolling the Arctic in the *St. Roch*, Inspector Larsen would often voice his criticism in private reports to the Commissioner. In 1952, for instance, he was reported to have suggested that a number of northern affairs officials “are ex-traders and still think and act as such.”

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**Significance of the MacDonald Report on Arctic Sovereignty**

At the June 1948 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, it was announced that Vilhjalmur Stefansson had requested an article on Canadian sovereignty for his *Arctic Encyclopedia*. For purposes of publication, it was decided that a report by an outside authority would be more appropriate than an internal document. As a result, Dean Vincent MacDonald of Dalhousie University Law School was requested to write a report based on material provided by External Affairs and the Department of Mines and Resources.

In February 1950, Dean MacDonald submitted his report on “Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic” to the Chairman of the ACND, noting in the “Preface” that his only instructions had been to “present the Canadian case ‘in its most effective and persuasive form’.” Instead of submitting it to Stefansson for publication, however, the chairman of the ACND restricted distribution to only a few copies for very senior officials. In his words, “We have had to classify it because of certain references in it,” specifically those related to “new discoveries.”

Indeed, there is no doubt that the argument of discovery, if applied by Canada to islands hitherto unknown and eventually discovered by Canada, say, west of Ellesmere Island, would be dangerous, and might open the way for foreign discoveries in the future, of unknown territories located in the zone which Canada now considers as Canadian. Moreover, it might possibly give rise to foreign claims based on past discoveries. The recent incidents pertaining to the discovery of the Sverdrup Islands should be a vivid reminder of the potential danger of foreign discoveries and of foreign claims based thereon which may arise in respect of areas within the Canadian Arctic and which may not be so capable of solution.

Contrary to the claim in the 1992 DIAND study, the MacDonald Report did not allay government fears. The effect was quite the reverse. As a result,

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71 LAC, MG 30 E 133, series V, vol. 294, file “ACND 1948.” Minutes of the 1 June 1948 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development. All minutes and special reports are found in the A.G.L. McNaughton papers since he was a permanent member of the ACND as co-Chair of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

72 LAC, MG 30 E 133, series V, vol. 294, file “Arctic Sovereignty” See “Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic,” by Dean Vincent MacDonald and especially the covering letter by Dr. Keenleyside to Gen. McNaughton, 25 February 1950.

73 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
its distribution was limited to only a very few government officials.

Given the history of the American discovery claims on Ellesmere Island, MacDonald’s concluding remarks and his own “underlining” were particularly significant:

In sum, however, it appears that considerations of policy should lead to the maintenance of Canada’s title upon the ground of Effective Occupation alone as the chief and most satisfactory ground of reliance, to which the other doctrines discussed are merely supplementary.74

Copies of the report were marked “Secret Guard” and sent only to regular members of the ACND and four others.75

More Sovereignty Concerns, Proposed Solutions, and Need for Secrecy

Secrecy was of particular importance, not just for security measures, but also because of public sensitivity about any perceived threat to arctic sovereignty. Concerned lest detailed accounts of American activities in the Canadian Arctic might arouse media attention, additional censorship measures were requested by the government in an attempt to restrict or at least minimize United States publicity.76 American officials, on the other hand, were aware of Canadian “sensitivities” and presumed that this was the reason for the Canadian government’s hesitancy in granting approval of new defence initiatives.77

In most cases, the usual means of identifying a “sovereignty concern,” in unclassified memos or reports was to refer to the “problem” without actually mentioning the word “sovereignty.”78 For instance, Inspector Larsen recommended re-opening RCMP detachments on Ellesmere Island because of the Greenlander hunting expeditions. He made no mention that they contravened the Arctic Islands Game Preserve regulations but instead expressed concern for preservation of the musk-ox.79 There was no need to mention the word “sovereignty.” The police commissioner knew full well that the inability to control foreign hunting would imply a loss of sovereign authority.

74 Ibid., “Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic,” by Dean Vincent MacDonald. A copy of the covering letter, title page, preface, introduction, pages 5-6 for the “discovery claims” reference, and the “conclusion” of the report appear in Appendix. The full 39 page report will be sent to the Commission’s research staff for reference. The reasons for restricted distribution were explained to me by Dr. Keenleyside in 1981.

75 A list of the regular members who received copies is found in the “Chronology in Appendix A, under the 2 February 1948 ACND meeting. The only others receiving a copy would be the Commissioner of the RCMP, the Chairman of the DRB, Chief of Naval Staff, and the Secretary of the Inter-departmental Committee on Territorial Waters. See covering letter by H.L. Keenleyside to General McNaughton, 25 February 1950.


77 National Archives (Washington), RG 59, PJBD Series, vol. 5, file “MCC” See memos and attachment, Mr. W.L. Wight to Mr. Merchant and Mr. Raynor, July 8 and 22, 1953, “Difficulty in obtaining Canadian agreement to future defense planning with the U.S.”


79 LAC, RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7[5]. Memo by Inspector Larsen, 10 October 1950 and commenting on report by Insp. Lee, 11 September 1950. It was also significant to note that these comments appear in report titled: “Joint U.S. Scientific Expedition to Establish Weather and Other Stations in the Canadian Arctic, 1950” which connects the Greenlander concerns with the joint weather stations.
For the same reasons, any official statements about Inuit relocations would refer to the “economic” benefits rather than sovereignty reasons. This does not denote any “primacy” of purpose, since the two motives affected two different aspects of the relocation: sovereignty concerns were related to site selection and economic concerns to the choice of participants.

Nevertheless, a few memos by more junior officials would mention possible sovereignty benefits, almost as an afterthought, but carefully worded to avoid any suggestion of serious concern. This was clearly evident in the 1950 Eastern Arctic Patrol Report:

There is no doubt that country produce is plentiful in the aforementioned regions and the Baffin Island Eskimos could easily live off the country. In this regard I understand that there is evidence that the Greenland Eskimos are hunting on Ellesmere Island and vicinity. Why not give our natives a chance to cover this country and also if it is considered necessary help improve the position regarding sovereignty rights.80

As might be expected, there was never mention of economic benefits for the government as a result of lesser need for welfare payments.

Changes in Leadership and Priorities

The outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 (coupled with the announcement that the USSR had successfully tested its first atomic bomb) brought new fears and different priority considerations. Further budget increases for proposed arctic health and education measures were frozen. The leadership would also change with Dr. Keenleyside’s resignation in October 1950 to take up a permanent staff position with the United Nations.81

Because of the Korean War, the ACND did not meet between 1950 and 1952. According to the Under-Secretary of State, Norman Robertson, previous financial commitments to arctic defence had “made further agreements impossible,” thus it did not seem useful to recall the committee.82

During that period, fear of a third world war with possible deployment of nuclear weapons was of far greater concern than maintaining Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Pressure for “Canadianization” also eased. As one example, the U.S. request to survey Resolute Bay for expansion of the airstrip and other facilities was approved in

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81 Dr. Keenleyside, formerly of External Affairs, had been appointed Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources in 1947 to oversee new developments in the Arctic and recommend reforms. In this capacity he was also Commissioner of the Northwest Territories Council and Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development.

82 LAC, MG 30 E 133, Series V, vol. 294, file, “Canadian Sovereignty;” and also RG 25, acc. 90-91/109, vol. 58, file 50197-40/1. See memo, 16 October 1951 by Norman Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet to the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development. Included was the attached memo for General Young’s consideration, titled “United States Activities in Northern Canada.” (ACND document ND-33) Included among the projected activities were expansions of facilities at Frobisher Bay, new radar stations for the Labrador coast, approval to survey Ellesmere and Coburg Islands for new radar stations, and reference to an Order in Council (PC 3484, 8 August 1951) that the DOT could permit-the U.S. government to establish and operate radio communications stations at military bases and weather stations, with permission to employ non-Canadians. This was an obvious reversal of the Canadianization initiative.
August 1950 by the Under-Secretary and without prior consultation or consent of Cabinet.

It was not surprising then, that the suggestion of creating an Inuit settlement in the vicinity of the Eureka weather station on Ellesmere Island would be rejected for budgetary reasons. Yet a memo by the head of the Arctic Division confirmed that the joint arctic weather station sites were still under consideration as locations “requiring” new Inuit colonies.

In the case in point (Eureka) I do not think we should stress any immediate requirement for Eskimos. In any mass movement of Eskimos we shall use more accessible areas first. However, if these Arctic weather stations prove to be a continuing project we may find it advisable to place one or two Eskimo families at certain stations. In such an event a knowledge of the local wild life of the land and the sea would be most valuable.

From this memo, it was clear that considerations to relocate Inuit on Ellesmere were based on the continuing U.S. presence at the joint weather stations rather than on the presence of wildlife resources. The plan to move Inuit to more accessible areas first, however, is consistent with the decision to select Resolute and Craig Harbour as initial sites of the “experiment” in 1953. While the Eureka area was considered more important because of prior American “discovery claims,” it did not have guaranteed ship access because of ice conditions and was frequently supplied by air.

The RCMP had somewhat different concerns related to their ability to administer control over the northern regions of Ellesmere Island. Because of Greenlanders’ travels in 1950, Inspector Larsen suggested moving Inuit from North Baffin over to Ellesmere Island (if willing) in conjunction with his recommendation to reopen the Craig Harbour and Bache Peninsula police detachments. Although discussed in the context of wildlife conservation, any failure to assert the regulations of the Arctic Islands Game Preserve constituted factual evidence that the RCMP were not able to maintain effective occupation.

Similarly, without Inuit assistance to guide them and look after the sled dogs, the police would be unable to carry out long distance patrols. Considering the difficulties in hiring Canadian Inuit, it seemed reasonable to encourage more Inuit settlements to serve as a future source for RCMP special constables. Certainly, the police could no longer hire Greenlanders as they had in the past.

Mention of possible sovereignty concerns in connection with Inuit relocations were far fewer after 1950, with emphasis now on economic benefits for the Inuit. In 1952, for example, Inspector Larsen suggested moving “good Eskimos” to Ellesmere Island in connection with trading post was opened at Etah, arguing that even with re-opening the post at Craig Harbour, the police would not be able to control the illegal hunting.

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83 LAC, RG 85, vol. 2085, file 20996/3. J.W. Burton (Canadian observer on the 1950 U.S. Supply Mission) to J.G. Wright, Chief of the Arctic Division, 13 October, 1950, suggesting that wildlife studies be carried out in the vicinity of Eureka, “considering it will be necessary in the very near future to move a number of the Eskimos from their presently poor productive hunting grounds [sic] to more favourable locations, it is considered that the Eureka area should be considered.”
84 Ibid. Reply to Mr. Wright, 21 October 1950.
85 Ibid.
86 LAC, RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7[5]. Summary report titled: “Joint U.S. Scientific Expedition to Establish Weather and Other Stations in the Canadian Arctic, 1950,” by the RCMP Commissioner, based on reports by Inspectors Lee and Larsen, 11 Sept. and 11 Oct. 1950, respectively, and who note the presence of Greenlanders hunting on Ellesmere. Again, in 7 November 1951, Larsen expressed fear that Ellesmere resources would be depleted if a new Danish owned trading post was opened at Etah, arguing that even with re-opening the post at Craig Harbour, the police would not be able to control the illegal hunting.
his plans to open a detachment near the Bache Peninsula to replace Craig Harbour. He again referred to the Greenlander problem. In his words:

Therefore, if we could get a Detachment established here, we should, in addition to the two native families employed permanently by the Police, endeavour to recruit three or four good Eskimo families from the Pond Inlet area to be transported up there for the purpose of trapping, hunting, etc. and thereby in a general way improve their economic circumstances.87

The sovereignty aspect of his concerns seems evident in his next paragraph which notes the presence of U.S. personnel at Eureka and Alert “with considerable staffs,” and the suggestion that from the Cape Sabine area, “two good men could carry out the necessary patrols to both these Weather Stations in the connection with the enforcement of the Game Regulations and other matters.”

As mentioned above, previous difficulty in hiring Canadian Inuit to work in the far northern detachments likely prompted Larsen’s idea of encouraging Inuit from North Baffin to establish new communities on Ellesmere. In this manner, a source of experienced guides would be more readily available to assist the RCMP and hopefully more content to remain.

The 1952 Eskimo Affairs Conference

When Larsen’s proposal was forwarded to the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, he asked that the recommendations be deferred pending discussion at the May 1952 Eskimo Affairs Conference, noting that “we have been considering, for some time, the feasibility of transferring Eskimos to Arctic islands from other over-populated areas. There is no doubt that they could quickly adapt themselves to the changed conditions...”88

It was now apparent that the deputy minister was considering combining the RCMP recommendations with the administration’s plan of moving Inuit northward to areas of better wildlife resources in order to relieve welfare costs. As discussions progressed, the two objectives (economic benefits and sovereignty) would become combined into one project, with the sites on Ellesmere chosen for relocation of Inuit from allegedly over-populated areas of northern Quebec.

How the government planned to benefit from the Inuit relocation project was clearly explained by one administrator when he wrote:

The N.W.T. Administration which is responsible for Eskimo affairs was anxious to eliminate large scale relief among the Eskimo on the mainland, and all efforts were in consequence directed towards their rehabilitation to the Arctic Islands.89

Some reports, memos or submissions would refer generally to “economic benefits,” while others made specific reference to the advantages of moving Inuit from overpopulated areas to those with better wildlife resources. In both cases, the


economic gains would benefit both the government and the Inuit.

Referring back to Insp. Larsen’s proposal, the reference to sovereignty considerations on the “Agenda” of the May 1952 Conference on Eskimo Affairs was of particular significance. Under the heading, “Policy on Employment of Eskimos,” the first three items listed were general policy objectives, then followed by:

(d) Exploration of the possibilities of finding permanent employment in the Arctic for the average Eskimo who could be trained in any particular field:
(i) as Canadian citizens or as a branch of the Armed Services to occupy and patrol the Arctic for the purpose of sovereignty and security;
(ii) as labourers and mechanics at Arctic settlements, radio meteorological stations, air fields, etc.;
(iii) as a branch of the Armed Services to occupy and patrol the Arctic for the purpose of sovereignty and security;
(iv) as labourers and mechanics at Arctic settlements, radio meteorological stations, air fields, etc.;
(v) as labourers and mechanics at Arctic settlements, radio meteorological stations, air fields, etc.;
(vi) as labourers and mechanics at Arctic settlements, radio meteorological stations, air fields, etc.;
(vii) as labourers and mechanics at Arctic settlements, radio meteorological stations, air fields, etc.;
(viii) transfer of groups to underpopulated areas.90

In the “Summary of Proceedings,” it was stated that “consideration was also given to the possibility of extending the employment of natives in such organizations as the Canadian Ranger Force and at northern meteorological stations.”91 The sovereignty benefits implied here, relate to the description of this item on the Agenda.

Unfortunately, the caution in expressing concerns greatly minimized use of the word “sovereignty,” leading to flawed analysis by the consultant hired by DIAND in 1992. In their report, it was argued that because the word “sovereignty” was mentioned only twice in discussion at the Eskimo Affairs Conference with regard to moving Inuit to Ellesmere Island, it showed that the RCMP were far more worried about the conservation of wildlife.92 Apparently there was no understanding about the practice of referring only to “a particular problem,” rather describing in full its implications on arctic sovereignty.

Greenlanders Arrive at Eureka Weather Station

In October 1952, James Cantley, writing in the 1952 Eastern Arctic Patrol (northern section), reported the arrival of Greenlanders at Eureka, the joint weather station on the western shores of Ellesmere Island, and their claim to being camped permanently in the area of the Bache Peninsula. To deter these hunting expeditions, Cantley recommended that

...there is no reason why more [Canadian] Eskimos should not be moved over to Ellesmere Island to live permanently. This was suggested to Inspector Larsen and he expressed his willingness to have the Police detachment co-operate with the Department provided arrangements could be made to have the necessary supplies made available.93

It was also clear that the initial plan to relocate the Craig Harbour RCMP detachment to the Bache Peninsula was now changed to allow two separate posts on Ellesmere Island. The reason for the change was likely the United States plans to build a

91 Ibid., “Summary of Proceedings.”
92 M. Gunther, “The 1953 Relocations of the Inuksuak Inuit to the High Arctic A Documentary Analysis and Evaluation,” under contract to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, August 1992. (see page 28, item 8; also pages 20, xi; 21, xii; 24, xvi; as other examples)
93 LAC, RG 85, vol. 1207, file 201-1-8/3. “1952 Eastern Arctic Patrol Report” (Northern Section) by James Cantley, OIC (undated but obviously written after October 13 when the Greenlanders were first reported to have arrived at the Eureka weather station.)
CGI radar station on Coburg Island near Craig Harbour.94

Cantley’s concept of “moving over” Inuit families fitted with Larsen’s proposal to relocate Inuit from North Baffin as discussed with Alex Stevenson in 1950 (described above), and with his recommendations to the Commissioner (February 1952),95 except for that fact that there was no mention of “if they willing.” Larsen’s recommendations usually mentioned “if they were willing” but made no reference to moving Inuit from Northern Quebec. Instead, Cantley suggested a settlement of 6-8 families, “probably drawn from one or other of the over-populated northern Quebec areas.” Hence, the two concepts were tied into one offering both sovereignty and economic benefits. Explaining the sovereignty rationale, Cantley adds that “the occupation of the island by Canadian Eskimos will remove any excuse Greenlanders may presently have for crossing over and hunting there.”96

A note to clarify the issue: neither the RCMP nor the department believed that the Greenlanders in themselves constituted any threat to Canadian sovereignty. But when it was reported that they had travelled to the joint weather station at Eureka, on the western shores of Ellesmere Island, and stated to the American personnel that they were living on the northeast shore of Ellesmere Island, then their presence constituted factual evidence that Canada was unable to exert her authority in enforcing customs laws and game regulations. As such, this provided visual proof to the American weathermen that Canada was not maintaining “effective occupation.” Complicating matters was the fact that the U.S. State Department was on record as claiming the United States did not recognize sovereignty claims over uninhabited islands.

It should also be noted, that while advised to do so by the RCMP Commissioner, the Deputy Minister did not report the problem of the Greenlander hunting expeditions to External Affairs until next April.97 At that time, the relocation project was already approved. With the potential problem apparently solved, the diplomatic service was only concerned that the Danish authorities were notified and in agreement that the Greenlander migrations should be discouraged.

References to Sovereignty Concerns

Although “public sensitivity” about arctic sovereignty affected the wording of public statements and unclassified reports, senior officials occasionally reported “concerns” in classified reports as a matter of public record to show that responsible action had been taken to protect Canada’s interests (such as Cabinet Minutes.)

Since the political arm of government is responsible to the electorate, it was expected that Cabinet would discuss sovereignty concerns more forthrightly to obtain a consensus agreement on what action should be taken. This is reflected in a rather detailed discussion recorded in the Cabinet

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94 LAC, RG 85, acc.89-90/167, vol. 3, file “Report to Cabinet 1953,” from DEA, p. 2. This report was distributed to members of the ACND for discussion at its meeting on 16 March 1953. See copy of minutes in LAC, MG 30 E 133, vol. 294, file ACND to 1953, pt. 1.


97 LAC, RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7/5, Young to Wilgress, 2 April 1953, requesting assistance from the Danish Government to discourage Greenlanders from hunting on Ellesmere Island. There is no specific reference to “sovereignty” concerns, but the Deputy Minister stated that “I may add that Canadian Eskimos are already residing at Craig Harbour, and that we intend to transfer others to places in Ellesmere Island during the coming year.”
Conclusions for 22 January 1953, which focused on the possibility of a *de facto* loss of sovereignty if new defence proposals involved a massive influx of American personnel.

According to Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Relations, “If Canadian claims to territory in the Arctic rested on discovery and continuous occupation, Canadian claims to some relatively unexplored areas might be questioned in the future.” Pearson was particularly concerned about the “*de facto* exercise of U.S. sovereignty,... [and] that an increase in U.S. activity in the Arctic would present risks of misunderstandings.” He also warned of increased U.S. activities, involving expansion of radar and airfields in the high Arctic.98

Prime Minister St. Laurent supported these observations, warning that “it was within the realm of the possible that, in years to come, U.S. developments might be just about the only form of human activity in the vast wastelands of the Canadian Arctic. This is the matter which must be met.”99

In addition to defence-related concerns, the possibility of “new economic developments” also arose when two American oil companies requested permission to explore for oil on Cornwallis and adjacent islands. The request was deferred by Cabinet pending further “investigation.” The possibility of American participation in future oil development would also require Canadian initiatives to prevent what some have described as a “*de facto*” loss of “economic sovereignty.” Subsequent leaks to the press about the possibility of arctic oil, however, would cause one official to exclaim “I thought the project was secret!”100

The role of the ACND in the “Canadianization” initiative was described in detail in a memo from the Under-Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

...the Canadian Government at the end of the last war embarked on a vigorous programme intended to “re-Canadianize” the Arctic. It was carried out under the aegis of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development and included the take-over from the USAF a number of wartime air fields, weather stations and communications facilities....101

By 1953, the joint arctic weather stations at Resolute, Eureka, Alert, Isachsen, and Mould Bay on Prince Patrick Island, were targeted as special concerns.

The reasons for the particular sensitivity attached to the joint weather stations was described by the newly appointed Secretary of the ACND in a later report:

One of the most sensitive Canadian areas for the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty is the Arctic Archipelago, where the main installations are the five weather stations. For effective occupation, permanent Canadian installations are highly desirable. Joint stations, in which another nation plays an equal part, do not provide the type of sole occupation that is desirable to demonstrate our sovereignty. It is known that doubts have been

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99 Ibid.
100 LAC, RG 25, acc. 90-91/104, vol. 58, file 50297-40 pt. l. 1 April 1953, memorandum for Mr. Wershof, (External Affairs) from Defence Liaison, K.W.
expressed as to the validity of our title in the archipelago.

As a longer term proposition, attention should be given to the possibility of training selected Eskimos to take over a part of the work. To the extent that this could be accomplished a permanent saving of manpower problems in the extreme north might be achieved.  

In this case, Inuit employment at these stations was justified in terms of sovereignty and economic advantages to the government, with benefits for the Inuit implied but not a primary consideration.

**Canadianization, Inuit Employment, and the ACND**

The “secret/classified” Minutes of the ACND meeting on 16 February 1953, provides only a brief description of Cabinet’s concern about possible “U.S. encroachment on sovereignty” (compared to the lengthy Cabinet discussion), but then is followed by requests for information and advice on what initiatives might be considered in advance of an anticipated increase of American activity and personnel.

When discussing what possible actions might be taken to increase Canadian civilian participation, the RCMP Commissioner asked “if any thought had been given to the potential of the inhabitants of the North—training, development or adaptabilities, and so forth.” The Deputy Minister replied that he felt that “use could be made of the Eskimo” and referred to his department’s “training program.”

During a period of serious concerns about arctic sovereignty, as in the spring of 1953, one would expect only a very oblique reference to any potential problem in a public document. This is best illustrated in the “unclassified” funding submissions for the 1953 “Assisted Eskimo Projects,” which described the Ellesmere Island proposals in terms of benefiting the Inuit but noting as an aside that “Greenlanders have from time to time been hunting on Canadian territory....There are no Canadian Eskimos in the region and it is planned to move in five Eskimo families from over populated depressed areas and establish them in the native way of life....” Similarly, for the Resolute Bay project, the submission describes “a settlement where there are four different organizations, each with its own senior officer and many transient visitors.”

The March 1953 ACND meeting was largely devoted to discussion of reorganization of the Committee and the proposed new radar chain, but the April meeting again refers to the subject of Inuit employment at the military bases. The new terms of reference under discussion for the new Administration Sub-Committee included the mandate “to recommend measures which would contribute to the maintenance of sovereignty,” and “to study questions arising from the employment of natives, both Eskimo and Indians, and to examine the desirability of recommending arranged movements with a view to bettering their conditions.” This would indicate that any

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103 LAC, MG 30 E 133 series V, file ACND to December 1953, vol. 1. Minutes of the 16 February 1953 meeting of the ACND.

104 Ibid. According to other sources (notably the research of Robert Carney), the “training programme” was still in the planning stages at this time.

105 LAC, RG 224 vol. 254, file 40-8-1/3. “Assisted Eskimo Projects,” 16 March 1953, signed by Col. Cunningham as Director of the Northern Administration and stamped “approved by Deputy Minister.”
movement of Inuit for Canadianization purposes must also provide them with economic benefit.106

The April ACND Minutes also recorded the suggestion that "selected Eskimos might be found who could be trained to man such stations as Padloping Island" with direct reference to the Deputy Minister's comments on Inuit employment at the February meeting. In this regard, the Committee requested that “the Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch,... enquire into the possibility of providing Eskimos who, when suitably trained, could man radio stations in the Canadian North.”107

Otherwise, the focus of the April meeting was on the resupply missions, with the Transportation Sub-Committee stating “that it was necessary to show the flag in high Arctic waters and, as a first step, had recommended that Canada undertake the supply of Resolute in 1954,” with the aim of “taking over the entire resupply operation in the Canadian North.”108 This would entail a need for casual labour at the Resolute base to help off-load the ships. As it happened, helping with the supply mission eventually became the mainstay of “part-time” employment for the Inuit at Resolute. The May meeting of the ACND covered a number of important issues. Under “Business Arising,” the Director “reported on the Eskimo training programme,” and suggested that “Three Eskimo were ready for training for technical employment in stations in the North. Approximately thirty-nine others, in due course, could be considered as good prospects. This source of labour could be utilized by Transport at a number of outposts.”109

In hindsight, the Director’s comments are curious since the vocational program, which was expected to start in 1951, apparently had not. According to Prof. R.G. Carney, the only “vocational training” consisted of a budget for $100 for tools allocated to only a few of the larger schools in the Mackenzie District. The first “vocational school” in the Eastern Arctic was opened at Frobisher Bay in 1969.110 It is possible, however, that the director was referring to the weather station planned for Banks Island in the western Arctic.

By the date of this meeting, 11 May 1953, the northern administration was already on the record as being reluctant to consider sending Inuit from Fort Chimo to Resolute and instead suggested Inuit from Port Harrison as they had originally intended. By now, both the Director of the Northern Administration and the Deputy Minister of the department had written to the RCMP to explain why the five Inuit families from Fort Chimo would not be appropriate volunteers since they were unaccustomed to living in snow houses.111

According to the telegrams sent to the detachments by Inspector Larsen, this would mean only three families could be sent to Resolute Bay since two families each would be needed for the two settlements on Ellesmere Island.112 Although expressed in vague terms, in my view, this still implies relocating Quebec Inuit to Resolute Bay for purposes of implementing the Canadianization initiative.

106 LAC, MG 30 E 133, vol. 294, file “ACND to 1953 vol. I” See Minutes of the 13 April 1953 meeting of the ACND, at item III.
107 Ibid., Minutes of the 13 April Meeting of the ACND See Item IV at #31 and 32.
108 LAC, MG 30 E 133, vol. 294, file “ACND to 1953 vol. I” See Minutes of the 13 April 1953 meeting of the ACND, Item II.
109 Ibid., Minutes of the 11 May 1953 Meeting of the ACND.
111 LAC, RG 22 vol. 254, file 40-8-1/3. See memos of May 7 and May 8 1953.
112 LAC, RG 85, vol. 1972, file 252-3/4. Telegrams 14 April 1953, sent by Inspector Larsen to the police detachments requested only 7 families from Port Harrison. The RCMP had already agreed to open the Resolute detachment for what they believed was an Inuit settlement of previously trained truck drivers and heavy machine operators.
At the same meeting the “Terms of Reference” for the new Secretariat were introduced, with the proposed “Canadianization” initiatives and expectations of utilizing Inuit labour clearly spelled out in the mandate:

2. To examine all defence projects and, wherever Canadian participation is considered insufficient, to so advise the Deputy Minister.

3. To prepare a long-range program for the development of the resources of Northern Canada, and to make recommendations to the Deputy Minister as to specific areas and resources the development of which might be considered either in conjunction with projects primarily intended for other purposes or as independent projects.

5. To recommend to the Deputy Minister measures to ensure the availability of appropriate personnel for northern projects by:
   (a) Utilizing as much as possible the services of Eskimos, and
   (b) Recruiting Canadians from the Provinces for service in the north.

It would appear from this document that employment of Inuit was considered central to the “Canadianization” initiative.\(^ {113}\)

Also at the May meeting, serious concern was expressed about the U.S. takeover of the Frobisher air base, apparently without Cabinet approval or advance knowledge, and it was agreed that representatives would approach the Americans in charge to ensure that they would continue to employ Canadian Inuit.

More importantly, at the same meeting a map was distributed for discussion, which showed the expected increase of Americans in the Eastern Arctic that summer. This map showed rough bar lines to indicate that the general location of the proposed radar chain would pass just north of Resolute Bay across to Craig Harbour. The covering letter gave further details for the following year, noting that if all proposals were undertaken, it was estimated that there would be 1200 additional American personnel permanently stationed in the high Arctic islands.\(^ {115}\)

At that time, there were only 72 Americans and an estimated 140 Canadians in the area, although the map showed an expected increase of 300 U.S. personnel at both Eureka and Alert that summer. As it happened, the proposed U.S. construction to expand airfield facilities at these stations was deferred because of costs. Nor were the proposed GCI stations on Ellesmere and Coburg Islands scheduled to be constructed that summer and it appeared unlikely they would be necessary if the DEW Line radar chain was built instead. Regardless, the GCI radar proposal still appeared as “projected United States activities” on the 1954 report for Cabinet prepared by External Affairs.\(^ {116}\)

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\(^ {113}\) LAC, MG 30 E 133, Series V, vol. 294, file ACND to 1953, vol. 1. Minutes of the 11 May 1953 meeting (Item II) with a separate document outlining the terms of reference of the Secretariat.

\(^ {114}\) The 1992 DIAND study maintained that there was only a single reference to employment of Inuit at the ACND meetings that spring, referring to the department’s “plan for education of the Eskimos.” It seems the author ignored the April and May meetings.


\(^ {116}\) Copy of this document is appended here.
As a verification of why the Inukjuak Inuit were sent to Resolute rather than to Baffin Island or the outer islands in Hudson Bay, I refer to the department’s own 1954 report to Cabinet included in the above “Government Activities in the North” and compiled by Graham Rowley as the newly appointed Secretary of the ACND. Under the heading of “Eskimo Affairs” the first item describes plans for expansion of existing Inuit community at Resolute Bay:

Transfers of Eskimos to more favourable hunting grounds—
Additional families will be transferred at an approximate cost of $1,000 from Port Harrison to Resolute Bay to meet the demand for casual labour during airlifts and during the summer resupply. Possible employment also includes assistance to the Geological Survey and the Meteorological Division.117

Although plans to move more Inuit would be deferred for another year, the explanation for their transfer is consistent with the “Canadianization” objective of taking over responsibility for all air and sea supply missions and at the same time reducing the numbers of United States military.

Denoting a “dual purpose,” the economic benefit to the Inuit is implied in the title, i.e. “to more favourable hunting grounds.” Thus I will argue that for Resolute, as well as Grise Fiord, there were dual motives of providing both economic and sovereignty benefits in the 1950s relocations to the high Arctic. Contrary to the claims in DIAND studies, however, the economic benefits were expected to accrue to both the Inuit and the government. The latter not only hoped to reduce welfare payments, but hiring Inuit for menial labour would be less costly than the wages expected by the Canadian Armed Forces or southern civilians.

Reorganization of the Department

The seriousness with which the Prime Minister St. Laurent treated the sovereignty question is reflected in his proposal in the fall of 1953, concerning reorganization and name change of the former Department of Resources and Development. In a confidential Cabinet Document, the reasons are defined in quite different terms than the public statement of purpose, i.e. to give more recognition to Canada’s increased interest in her north. Instead, Cabinet was advised that:

Since the present Act was passed the importance of the north has greatly increased. In particular, the growing United States interest in air defence in the north has made it more important for Canada to take measures that will make clear and effectively maintain Canadian sovereignty throughout the entire area, including the Arctic Islands, and that will further the development of the north generally. In view of these circumstances it is desirable to indicate more specifically by legislation the extent of Canadian government interest in that area.118

Prime Minister St. Laurent also directed that the new Act should “give a legislative statement of Canadian sovereignty over the entire Archipelago.”

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117 LAC, MG 26 N1, vol. 18, file “Arctic.” L.B. Pearson Papers. Marked Secret, “Government Activities in the North.” In the covering memo, it was stated that the report covered “activities during the past calendar year, and plans for the present year.” It was prepared by the ACND Secretariat from information supplied by the various agencies concerned, and signed G.W. Rowley, 26 April 1954.

118 LAC, RG 2, vol. 1894, file C-20-5, file 201-250. Cabinet Document No. 250-53. Presented to Cabinet on 26 October 1953 to propose reorganization of the department and renaming it the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources.
In spite of evidence to the contrary, DIAND studies maintained that there was no statement or evidence to support the claim that sovereignty concerns influenced the Inuit relocation to Resolute Bay. Perhaps when still considered an “experiment” to see if the Inuit could adapt to the harsh climate, it would be inappropriate to make any suggestion that they were relocated for sovereignty reasons. By 1960, however, there seemed to be no hesitation to mention the sovereignty objectives when it was thought the Inuit would agree to remain at the two high arctic locations.

In the fall of 1960, for example, two memos make specific reference to the sovereignty purpose. The first suggests that the Director of the Northern Administration believed that the Grise Fiord settlement should be retained for “sovereignty purposes,” despite problems of supply, but that “it should not be duplicated at other isolated locations.” At first glance, this may seem inconsistent with the fact that there had been a formal agreement between Denmark and Canada to allow the Greenlanders to hunt in Canadian territory as long as they abided by Canadian hunting regulations. The agreement, however, did not solve the RCMP’s problem of ensuring that capable Canadian Inuit were available to assist at the Ellesmere police posts in patrolling the northern sections of the island to ensure Canadian regulations were followed.

If sovereignty implications were considered important enough to consider investment in schools, homes, and other public services at Grise Fiord, then it would be understandable that the Inuit might question whether the reluctance to honour the promise of return was also related to sovereignty concerns. In this context, the second memo, a report submitted on the feasibility of other relocations to the high Arctic is particularly significant.

Noting that the only other sites under consideration by the Director were those of the joint weather stations at Eureka, Mould Bay, and Isachsen, this report made three direct references to the importance of sovereignty considerations in the planning of future Inuit settlements in the high Arctic.

Although the Eskimos at Grise Fiord have not had the opportunities of employment, they have, however, obtained a good livelihood from the country and this community also serves as a distinctly useful purpose in confirming, in a tangible manner, Canada’s sovereignty over this vast region of the Arctic.

Some years ago, the D.O.T. gave tentative approval to considering employment of Eskimos at weather stations all over the Arctic, provided of course they had certain qualifications. No further action has been taken in this regard. No doubt the employment of Eskimos, particularly in the High Arctic, within the range of their capabilities would be a distinct advantage to D.O.T. and render a service to weather stations, and again the matter of sovereignty would be another aspect of such employment.

One important factor to always keep in mind is that the Eskimos at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord are an invaluable human resource in the northern economic development

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119 NWT Archives, N92-023, Alex Stevenson Papers, (unsorted). "Confidential to Mr. Stevenson from C.M. Bolger," Administrator of the Arctic, 4 October 1960. Mr. Bolger cites the comment made by the Director, B. Sivertz.

120 LAC, RG 22, vol. 545, file ACND 1957. See memo to the Under-Secretary of State from the Deputy Minister, 11 July 1957, and other related correspondence in this file.
taking place on Cornwallis Island and the adjacent islands, and that other groups at several other points in this vast region might develop a similar importance. Then again, as already mentioned, the occupation of these northern islands by Canada’s first Arctic citizens only enhances our claims to sovereignty of these regions.121

The report also makes reference to the “oil companies now operating in the Arctic,” as well as seasonal stevedoring operations and construction projects at Resolute.

The same “dual purpose” motive described here would be repeated in Alex Stevenson’s 1977 report to the government,122 which had been requested in light of rumours that Makivik would be asking for assistance in returning more families to Inuksuk. Since Milton Freeman’s study on Grise Fiord (first published in 1971) referred to reports of “coercion,”123 Stevenson’s report understandably stressed the “volunteer” aspect of the project, along with reports of contentment and economic success. In 1977, the “sovereignty” purpose seemed to be “common knowledge” and apparently not denied by the government until the Inuit requested an apology and due recognition.124

**General Assessment**

In overall assessment of motives behind Inuit relocations, it is apparent that the “dual purpose” was not consistent with every case. Prior to DEW Line construction, the sovereignty motive related only to the movement of Inuit northward to the sparsely inhabited (“sovereignty sensitive”) regions. Relocation of Quebec Inuit to nearby islands were of economic benefit to everyone, including the Hudson’s Bay Company, but were not motivated by sovereignty concerns. With the beginning of new radar construction, as with the joint arctic weather stations and the air base at Frobisher Bay (Iqaluit), Inuit employment would have both economic and sovereignty benefits.

At the same time, however, sovereignty concerns only related to a potential *de facto* loss of authority. While Inuit relocations were only a very small part of proposed measures to comply with the Cabinet policy of “Canadianization” (1948 and 1953), they would clearly result in unnecessary hardships for the participants. It should also be noted that Inuit employment was considered an economic benefit because it offered lower labour costs.

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121 NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, (unsorted). Report to the Director, 15 November 1960. Although sent to the Director under the signature of the Arctic Administrator, Mr. C.M. Bolger, the draft copies identify Alex Stevenson as the author.

122 Ibid., “Inuit Relocation—High Arctic” dated November 1977 with covering letter to Gunther Abrahamson, 22 November 1977. Stevenson first describes the sovereignty concerns as a result of the proposed increase in American activities in the high Arctic (page 1) and again as the reason for continuing Grise Fiord (page 4). He also notes the promise of return on page 4.


124 In 1983, for instance, the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs presented a position paper to the Inuit Circumpolar Conference stating that “to further entrench the sovereignty claim, the government relocated Inuit people from northern Quebec to the Arctic Islands.” (cited in the Simon/Tasse report, *op. cit.*, page 19) In 1986, the official photographer accompanying the Inuit to Ellesmere in 1953 also claimed that the objective of the relocation was to “help establish Canadian sovereignty on Ellesmere Island.” Wilfred Doucette, “The Post Office That Never Was,” in *Postal History Society of Canada Journal*, No. 46, 1986.

124 NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, (unsorted). Report to the Director, 15 November 1960. Although sent to the Director under the signature of the Arctic Administrator, Mr. C.M. Bolger, the draft copies identify Alex Stevenson as the author.
Local relocations offered only potential economic benefits, sometimes considered as a means of reducing welfare costs, but usually explained in terms of the material benefits for the Inuit. In some cases, it was also apparent that the commercial interests of the Hudson’s Bay Company were a major influence on these relocations.125

In the 1953 High Arctic relocations, however, both sovereignty and economic benefits combined to create a dual purpose for establishing new Inuit communities. In the case of Grise Fiord, the sovereignty purpose was to show “factual evidence” of “effective occupation.” In the case of Resolute Bay, the sovereignty benefit was considered a means to implement the Cabinet’s “Canadianization” directive. Perceived sovereignty benefits dictated the site of the relocations; whereas economic benefits for both the government and the Inuit determined who would be selected as volunteers. As such, they both should be considered as “primary” or major influences and not prioritized as primary and secondary.

**B. CONCEPT AND DESIGN OF THE PROJECTS**

Perhaps I have over-stated my case that sovereignty and economic benefits were inter-dependent motives influencing the 1953 relocations, yet understanding the political interplay involved in that duality may allow us to view the issue of responsibility from a more realistic vantage point—not in terms of black or white, right or wrong—but of mistakes, human errors—and of the failure in the government system to protect against such mistakes. In the tradition of western democracy, “government” is ultimately accountable for those mistakes and not the individuals who made them.

With motives and influences now identified, the next step is to examine the basic concept which led to the design of the projects. In terms of “responsibility,” however, it is critical to first understand “why” the system of government failed to protect the interests of the Inuit participants.

**Lack of an Official Inuit Policy 1950-1953**

Motives, influences, and objectives are important factors in explaining how a concept or idea evolved into action. They are equally useful in assessing whether government actions were consistent with policy guidelines. From 1950 through to 1954, however, there was no officially approved Inuit policy, and why Diamond Jenness, in his book *Eskimo Administration II: Canada*, would so aptly name the chapter covering this period, “Steering without a Compass.”126 Without policy guidelines, a government must rely on an effective system of checks and balances to reduce the potential for human error in judgment. In 1953, the system in place proved ineffective.

Prior to 1950, the Northwest Territories Council was responsible for legislating policy for Inuit affairs whereas the administration responsibility rested with the Department of Mines and Resources. The NWT Council was appointed but with members representing diverse interests in the north, including commercial, military, RCMP, and External Affairs. Medical and educational officers made frequent presentations to the Council, as did the churches and the Hudson’s Bay Company.

Specific issues were debated separately at Council meetings, which offered a forum for discussion prior to approval of policy decisions. Although various policies had been adopted for health and education reforms, there had been no attempt to

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125 LAC, RG 85, vol. 1072, file 252-3/4. This was also the case in 1953 according to the extracts from a letter by the welfare teacher at Port Harrison, 16 March 1953.

devise an overall policy for Inuit affairs. The relatively open forum for a debate tended to serve as an efficient “check” on questionable administration proposals.

There were many conflicting opinions about appropriate handling of Inuit affairs and because of “special interest” conflicts, it was thought that transfer of legislative authority to the new Department of Resources and Development in 1950 would make the decision-making process more efficient and effective. Yet because of the nature of the large department, this transfer inadvertently led to a centralizing of advisory power among a few individuals in the Arctic Services Division of the Northern Administration Branch, all either veteran administrators or with first hand arctic experience.

The absence of a clearly defined Inuit policy was one of the reasons for setting up the Eskimo Affairs Conference in May 1952. Yet contrary to the 1992 DIAND study’s claim, the May 1952 Eskimo Affairs Conference was not a policy making body, nor was it intended to be. Its only purpose was to act as a forum for discussion. Representatives at the conference, however, demanded more.

The conference was attended by over 50 individuals, representing 14 different government and non-government agencies involved in Inuit affairs. One delegate from each group was allowed a few minutes to state an opinion on each agenda item.127 The press release issued by the department following the conference claimed that there was general agreement that “Eskimos should be encouraged and helped to live off the land and to follow their traditional way of life.”128 According to the “Summary of Proceedings,” however, there was no unanimous consent on any issue other than the request that a permanent committee be established to discuss the issues and act in an advisory capacity to develop a general policy on Inuit affairs.129

Of special interest was the note in the press release that there was a lengthy discussion about government trading stores operating in areas where “private enterprise” found it uneconomical, but “unanimous agreement could not be reached.” There was no mention of Inuit relocations in the press release, but there were references to the problem of Inuit relying too much on government aid. Some of the remedies suggested to stabilize the Inuit economy included fur subsidies, an increase in RCMP posts to extend supervision of the Inuit, and the setting up of a trust fund to help regulate Inuit income.130

The proposed “Eskimo Affairs Committee” would include representatives from the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches, the Hudson’s Bay Company, the RCMP, Health and Welfare, the Northern Administration, and chaired by the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development. According to the press release, the purpose of the Committee was to “recommend action on the problems of Canada’s Eskimo population which have been sharply aggravated by the expansion of development in the Far North, by the fur market, high prices of trade goods and transportation costs.”131

Without a formal Inuit policy to provide guidelines, this committee should have provided the necessary “checks and balances” to the system setting up of a permanent Eskimo Affairs Committee and a sub-committee on education.129 LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, volume 2, file D 1512-1-2-4-Q-27. “Summary of Proceedings” of the May 1952 Eskimo Affairs Conference.


131 Ibid.
to ensure that government actions were in the best interests of the Inuit peoples. In the important planning and final approval stages of the relocation projects, however, the committee was by-passed. Since many of the inherent problems in these projects might have been averted with appropriate consultation, they can be attributed to a failure of government process, thus clearly a government responsibility.

As a result of the conference, the RCMP agreed to prepare a paper on the possibility of establishing government stores in the Arctic. According to Supt. Peacock’s understanding (he was present), the primary objective of the proposal was to replace the Hudson’s Bay Company with government stores—a quite different goal than stated in the press release:

During the Conference on Eskimo Affairs held last May a suggestion was put forward by the Force that to assist the Eskimos in alleviating their present unfavourable economic condition, a Government trading organization be established to replace private trading companies in the Arctic. The ultimate objective would be that these Government trading posts would be turned into co-operatives as the Eskimos advance sufficiently to be able to operate them.  

The superintendent then compiled a list of the areas which had reported general problems of destitution or starvation to identify the sensitive locations. Among the selected reports was one in 1949 for the Inukjuak area, but evidently there were no further reports of any serious problems from that detachment after 1949, (the 1949 report recommended fur subsidies and the introduction of a reindeer herd as possible solutions to the problem).

A report that I could not find in government files, but was quoted in the Hammond Report (1984), claimed that Insp. Larsen had suggested moving “needy” Inuit to Devon and Ellesmere Island and referred directly to his concerns about the Greenlander migrations. At this point, the administration seemed only interested in moving Quebec Inuit to Baffin Island, based on the advice of Hudson’s Bay Company officials who believed the Arctic Bay area would support up to 40 more families.

Before the 1952 Eastern Arctic Patrol Report was written and 2 days before the first meeting of the Eskimo Affairs Committee on 16 October 1952, the northern administration received news that three Greenlanders had arrived at the weather station at Eureka on the west coast of Ellesmere Island. Yet the minutes of the first Eskimo Affairs Committee meeting covered discussion of “the Transfer of Eskimos” in one short paragraph:


135 Ibid, James Cantley OIC, no date but written after mid-October since it reports on the news received by the department on 14 October concerning the Greenlanders arrival at Eureka. The wording of this section under Craig Harbour, suggests that this passage might have been inserted after other sections of the report had been written.

136 LAC, RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7/5. Telegrams and memos to the director of the northern administration from the RCMP and Canadian Meteorological Service relate the arrival of three Greenlanders at Eureka on 13 October 1952. According to various stamps dating arrival, most messages were received from 14-16 October.
Consideration was given to the possibility of assisting natives to move from over-populated areas to places where they could more readily obtain a living. It was agreed that Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine on Ellesmere Island should be investigated as possible localities where Eskimos could be placed under the care of the R.C.M. Police detachments and arrangements made to enable them to obtain necessary supplies through the loan fund.\(^{137}\)

There was no suggestion that the Inuit might come from northern Quebec, or that Resolute Bay might be considered as another possible location. Under the item of “Eskimo Employment,” however, it was suggested that wages be held back to reduce the need for welfare assistance should employment be terminated.

In terms of the “origins” of an Inuit policy, there appear to be only “objectives” and “situations” discussed prior to August 1953.\(^{138}\) Later references to “three point policies” seem to have been created retrospectively.\(^{139}\) It seems that the rationale given for funding the projects was created to fit the occasion and then claimed later to be department policy. There was no official ministerial approval and no approved guidelines to follow. Instead, initial criticism of the Resolute project would result in demands that a general policy on Inuit Affairs be set down and approved, before any legislation could be introduced for “regulating the movement of people in the north.”\(^{140}\)

One of the best descriptions of the situation in 1953 appears in a “position” paper on the need for an official policy:

> The long-term policy is presumably to make the Eskimos full citizens of Canada with rights, responsibilities, and a standard of living comparable to those of the white population. In the past few years a number of measures have been taken in order to assist the Eskimo. They have however, been done piecemeal, and at times they have appeared to be mutually inconsistent. Our first need is the preparation of a written policy outlining the objectives of the government, and the methods it is proposed to adopt to achieve them.\(^{141}\)

It is also important to note that the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, would insist that the writing of a formal policy must include active consultation and participation of the Eskimo Affairs Committee.\(^{142}\)


\(^{138}\) LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/2. “Assisted Eskimo Projects,” 16 March 1953. The objectives are stated here as four points, but appear to be combined into three at the 10 August 1953 ad hoc meeting with the RCAF and DOT, and described only as “situations now have to be dealt with.” See also file 40-8-1/4. Minutes of Eskimo Affairs Committee Meeting, 10 August 1953. Later references to “policy” suggest that Inuit policy was created out of the rationale that developed for relocation projects, rather than vice versa.

\(^{139}\) See reference to the three point “programs” in D. Jenness, *Eskimo Administration II: Canada*, p. 93, which the consultant’s report suggested was “policy.”


\(^{141}\) LAC, RG 22, vol. 544, file. ACND 1953/1” No date or signature, but appears in the ACND secretariat files.

\(^{142}\) LAC, MG 30 E 133, Series V, vol. 294, “ACND 1953/1” Minutes of the 16 September 1953 meeting of the ACND.
**Attitudes versus Authority**

Former government officials have suggested on more than one occasion that the high arctic relocations should be judged according to the “attitudes of the times.” Yet, when examining the many proposals and discussions on the Inuit economy in the years leading up to 1953, it was apparent that the “attitudes” were exceptionally diverse and often quite contradictory. Most of the proposals discussed in the late 1940s were long term strategies aimed at preparing the Inuit for full participation in the future development of the Canadian Arctic. Some individuals were skeptical; others were optimistic. Most “opinions” expressed after 1950 focused on short term solutions to the rising welfare costs.

When budget priorities changed in 1950, attitudes remained just as diverse. The major difference was a shift in power. With the transfer in 1950 of legislative authority for Inuit affairs from the Northwest Territories Council to the Department, the “arctic experts and veteran administrators” in the northern administration gained unprecedented power because of their experience relative to that of their superiors. Without any official Inuit policy to lay down guidelines and, until 1952, no open forum for consultation or approval, there were insufficient checks and balances in the system to guard against autocracy or human frailties. This is not a criticism of individuals, but of the process of government.

Previously, the RCMP had a strong influence on policy through the appointment of the Commissioner to the Northwest Territories Council. As expected, the loss of that influence would create tensions as long as the RCMP were responsible for the welfare of the Inuit in the field, but expected to follow the directives of the northern administration in carrying out that responsibility.

By 1951, there were profound differences of opinion expressed by Inspector Henry Larsen, the “arctic expert” of the RCMP, and James Cantley, of Arctic Services. In partial answer to the falling fur prices and their impact on the Inuit economy, Larsen had proposed the government take over the fur trade industry by creating a Crown Trading Company with the view to eventually turning the stores into cooperatives. Cantley disagreed, believing that the fur trade should be left to private enterprise. He also recommended the HBC take over all responsibility for social welfare distribution from the RCMP. Different perspectives were also evident in relocation proposals. Larsen suggested “moving over” Inuit from North Baffin. The administration talked of a “transplant.”

The grand design that Cantley had envisioned saw a northward migration of Inuit solving the problems of declining food and fur resources on the mainland, and likely gaining official support by fulfilling a sovereignty purpose as well. Hopes of delegating responsibility to private enterprise, however, ended when the Hudson’s Bay Company refused to consider opening a post on Ellesmere Island, claiming instead that they needed more trappers in the north Baffin area.

Inspector Larsen’s proposals for managing Inuit affairs were far more complex and detailed. They also would have necessitated legislative changes to give legal authority to act on their behalf as wards of the state. In hopes of bringing the plight of the Inuit peoples to the attention of government and the Canadian public at large, RCMP Commissioner Nicholson suggested a Royal Commission investigation. The Deputy Minister of Resources and Development disagreed.

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143 LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/2. Memo from the Director of the Northern Administration to the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, 22 November 1951.

144 LAC, RG 85, vol. 1129, file 252-3/2A. Nicols to Chesshire, 3 December 1951.

145 LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D-1512-2-3 Q 27. See various reports to the Commissioner by Insp. Larsen, ie. 29 February 1952, 2 May 1952, 22 September 1952: see also various Annual Inspection
Potential problems were inherent once Larsen’s proposals were combined with James Cantley’s strategy of moving Inuit northward from the over-populated mainland. Aside from combining two concepts into one project, there was also the question of divided authority.

Confidentially to his commissioner, Larsen would voice his concerns about future policies and the attitudes of the administration. As reported by a colleague, his “criticism directed against the N.W.T. Officials is that a number of them are extraders and still act as such.” Under the existing system, Larsen may have had the authority to advise but without power to affect change or veto.

The differences of opinion between these two individuals were reflective of the opposing views of other interests: the churches, the Hudson’s Bay Company, medical officers, and the RCAF. There was clearly no consensus on Inuit affairs in the early 1950s.

In 1953, for instance, Insp. Larsen was criticized for acting without approval when he allowed the Frobisher detachment to open a quasi-trading operation and banking service to accept wages paid for Inuit employment at the USAF base. In Cantley’s opinion, this created unfair competition for the Hudson’s Bay Company as the Inuit now could order from the mail-order catalogues. Angrily, he claimed that the RCMP had refused to accept the administration’s policy and authority, and that perhaps the “time has come when the whole problem of Eskimo administration should be carefully reviewed again.”

Inspector Larsen’s insertion of the “promise of a return” in the telegrammed instructions to the detachments in 1953 was an example of another attempt to override the administration’s authority. (It was self-evident from the administration’s instructions that the Arctic Services had not intended to offer such a promise.) As a result, the promise would be modified, with Stevenson reporting in June that the Inuit had agreed to stay for two years “at least” before considering a return home.

The cross-purposes created more uncertainty and confusion when the projects were described as “experiments” that required no “special arrangements” and apparently no major financial investment until it was assured the Inuit would agree to remain. In many respects, the design of the projects was just as Jenness described it, a means of removing the Inuit to isolated regions where they were expected “to support themselves without becoming a drag-chain on the rest of Canada—a form of apartheid, the creation of a Canadian Bantustan.”

Discussions at earlier ACND meetings had centred on plans to introduce vocational training schools, perhaps misleading the reconvened committee into believing that the “training program” referred to by the deputy minister at the February ACND meeting was already functioning. Few seemed aware that the department’s budget had been frozen in 1950 and allocations re-directed. Certainly nobody was advised that the new

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146 LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, file D 1512-2-4-Q27. As quoted from a memo from Insp. Peacock to the Commissioner, 27 September 1952. Peacock is commenting on Larsen’s report of 22 September 1953.
150 Jenness, *Eskimo Administration II*, 93-94. Perhaps as a rebuttal to his criticisms, after Dr. Jenness’s death, some former officials suggested that Jenness was a “racist.”
relocation proposals were designed to save money rather than spending it. Had there been prior consultation with the RCAF and Transport, the relocation plans for Resolute would likely have been deferred pending reconsideration.

The decision to add Resolute Bay to the plan made the projects more visible and open to criticism. As a consequence, government efforts after 1960 would be directed toward restructuring the former cost saving projects into something the Canadian conscience might be proud of. Between 1953 and 1960, however, the “experiments” seemed to be caught in an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty as to their future. In 1955, for example, one police constable reported he wanted the Inuit to acquire “as much good equipment as possible in as short a time as possible,” since the Inuit camps might be “closed due to game conditions or a desire of the natives to return to thier [sic] respective home lands.”

Diversity of views can mean strength if there is a forum for consensus decisions. In this case, it was expected the Eskimo Affairs Committee would serve that purpose, but it was by-passed. The diversity factor also contributed to conflicting descriptions of circumstances and events, which in turn created confusing records of what really happened. Inuit participants were caught in the cross-current.

Amidst the confusion and misunderstandings, critical appraisals began to point to a basic error in the design of Resolute project, i.e. the attempt to combine the concept of an independent hunter and trapper with the modern employment opportunities offered at the military base.

**Criticisms of the Resolute Bay Relocation**

At the June hearings of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, several former officials stated that current criticism unfairly judged government actions and policies of the 1950s from the perspective of the 1990s. Yet there were a number of internal criticisms in the 1950s which were equally representative of “opinion of the times,” that identified flaws in design of the projects. Later criticism will be examined to identify any subsequent government actions which might be considered questionable or inappropriate.

The first suggestion of disapproval appears in the minutes of the Northwest Territories Council Meetings in June 1953, when it was suggested that there should be some means of controlling contact between military personnel and the Inuit, who they believed would not be prepared for close association with the non-natives at the military bases. Having no legislative authority over Inuit affairs after transfer of responsibility to Resources and Development in June 1950, the Council referred the matter to the Administration Sub-Committee of the ACND.

The conclusion of the Administration Sub-Committee was that before any further consideration of this issue, “there was a need for a clearly defined government policy toward the Eskimo.” The full ACND would be asked where the responsibility for such a policy resided. As discussed at the September 1953 meeting, the question of formulating a policy was referred back to the department in consultation with the Eskimo

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152 NWT Archives, GCNT 1/1-19, “Votes and Proceedings,” The Council of the Northwest Territories, Fourth Session, June 25-30, 1953. On 27 June 1950, by Order in Council, P.C. 3153, “duties, powers and functions... relating to the affairs of the race of aborigines, commonly referred to as Eskimos” were transferred to the Minister of Resources and Development.

153 LAC, MG 30 E 133, Series V, box 294, file ACND to 1953, vol. See “Extracts from the Administrative Sub-Committee meeting, 24 August 1953.”
Affairs Committee. A new policy would be formulated and approved the next year. At that time, relocation of Inuit was only one possibility of many suggested reforms for improving the Inuit economy.

In the summer of 1953, the RCAF also took exception to the design of the project, and criticized the department for planning to send untrained Inuit to Resolute. To argue the case, A/C Ripley wrote a harshly critical letter to his commanding officer which was passed on to the department by the Deputy Minister of National Defence. Ripley claimed that the proposal to send “a few Eskimo families” to Resolute Bay was “viewed with considerable misgivings,” and that it “was not discussed at the proper levels nor had the plan been formalized in a way that would guarantee some success.” From his understanding, the RCAF and DOT were expected to train the Inuit and give them “useful jobs.” He claimed that there was no accommodation available for the RCMP or the Inuit, and argued that

…if Eskimo families are to be sent there, these should be trained...and housed in properly constructed homes. Proper food and clothing should be provided for the whole family. A situation such as at Frobisher where the working Eskimo eats white man’s food and on the sly takes the left-over home to his family is not acceptable.

Commander Ripley also maintained that the Inuit should receive proper schooling and training in useful trades before being sent to Resolute where there were no medical services “other than the simplest first aid.”

Deputy Minister of National Defence, C.M. Drury, added his comments when forwarding the letter to Deputy Minister Young, saying that the same concern “is shared by the staff officers at Air Force Headquarters,” and that this “might have been avoided if this department had been represented at some of your preliminary discussions on this experiment.” Although realizing the Inuit had already departed, Drury suggested that an interdepartmental meeting be held as soon as possible to discuss the issues.

As a result, the Director of the Northern Administration called an “Ad hoc” meeting on 10 August 1953 to explain that the relocations were only designed as “experiments” and the department had not intended to ask anyone to make “special arrangements”—until they were certain the Inuit could “adapt.” It was at this meeting that Bent Sivertz, as special assistant to the deputy minister, would make the oft quoted statement:

…the Canadian government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the north as possible and it appeared that in many cases the Eskimo were the only people capable of doing this.

Apparently, the critics were expected to accept a “sovereignty” concern as just reason to accept the

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154 Ibid. The full discussion and consideration would be set out in ACND document ND-63 and considered at the September ACND meeting. See Minutes.
questionable conditions under which the Inuit were being sent to Resolute Bay.

The question of whether there were adequate wildlife resources to support the Inuit community was also raised, with James Cantley replying that “No one could say for sure that this was the case and consequently, the experiment was being staged.”160 To stage an experiment to see if the Inuit could survive seems unconscionable. Failure to conduct a proper survey in advance might reduce financial costs for the department, but it also raises the “risk factor.” The Inuit, on the other hand, were advised there were bountiful supplies.

Other criticism arose that summer, mostly directed at the Resolute project. The first visitors were on an inspection tour for the ACND, namely Dr. Gordon Stead of the Department of Finance and Bent Sivertz, representing the Department of Resources and Development. Arriving shortly after the Inuit, both men were harshly critical of the concept and design of the project and believed much more should have been provided in terms of education and health services, proper homes, and advanced training to prepare themselves for contact with the military community at Resolute.161 Sivertz claimed simply that the concept of retaining traditional style living and finding casual employment, “will not work.”162

As part of his instructions from the ACND, Stead was asked to consider the “policy problems of the Department of Resources and Development.” Although specific policies were not identified, there was only one “policy” he would report on: “Eskimo Policy.” He was particularly critical of the concept of relocating Inuit and argued that

The reasons for moving this family are grounded in an attempt to keep the Eskimo in his native state and to preserve that culture as primitive as it is. However, by moving the Eskimos to an area where they come into intimate contact with White men destroys the basis of this reasoning while leaving them untrained to cope with the problems presented by this contact.163

His solution was to retrain the Inuit in the arts, technology and medical science to jump start them into the 21st century, but at the same time retaining all that is treasured in their cultural roots.

But Stead also touched on something far more critical to the legal and moral questions facing us today, when he wrote about the general issue of “Eskimo policy”:

This question is not only a problem in itself, but also has a bearing on the sovereignty issue. Our lack of suitable action on behalf of our Eskimos has already been raised on more than one occasion in the United Nations. It seems to me that our sovereignty can certainly be regarded as in jeopardy if we do not carry out the somewhat basic function of adequately training the aboriginal population so as to fit them for participation in the life of a modern state.164

Clearly, he recognized one of the criteria involved in maintaining “effective occupation,” i.e. of providing the inhabitants of the claimed territory with access to the basic services (such as health care and education) as provided elsewhere in the country. The administration apparently ignored this aspect and justified their actions by claiming

160 Ibid.
162 Ibid., Sivertz Report.
163 Ibid., Stead Report, p. 6.
164 Ibid., Stead Report.
the projects were only “experiments” to see if the Inuit could adapt.

The sovereignty question again arises in Stead’s concluding comments. In discussing the need to centralize the population in convenient locations to provide the necessary services, he noted that

A general development along the lines suggested above may well denude certain islands of their civilian population. This is most likely to occur only if the major military bases are closed down in the future and, of course, if this happens the pressure of the sovereignty question will be relaxed. 165

This last comment suggests the sovereignty reason may be only temporary, but there was no suggestion of returning the Inuit to their homelands.

Gordon Stead saw the problem in much the same light as Diamond Jenness did in 1964, when he described the policy of isolating Inuit in remote arctic settlements as creating “a form of apartheid,” not unlike the earlier creation of Indian reservations.” Stead maintained that:

Although the legal status is different there are some points of resemblance with the Indian questions. Certainly the two will be associated in the minds of Parliament and the public. We should take into account the best modern thinking about Indians, though not necessarily practice in this regard.166

Stead’s comments suggest the presence of “forward thinking” along the same lines as Diamond Jenness,167 but apparently absent among those in the northern administration or the department responsible for Inuit affairs.

Another report, this time for the new Secretary of the ACND, was submitted by his assistant, Mr. C.J. Marshall, after visiting Resolute Bay in the fall of 1953. His report was derived primarily from the comments made by the RCMP constable about insufficient preparation and inadequate supplies.168

The individual responsible for the supply order responded in detail, listing item by item as to why some articles were ordered and others were not, with an apparent note of irritation implying that perhaps Marshall’s lack of experience was responsible for the criticism. One comment, however, suggests that his response was illogical. On the matter of missing wash tubs, he claimed that “Inuit did not wash in winter.”169 Probably true, but surely the Inuit were not expected to wait until late August of the next year (when the supply ship would arrive) to wash themselves and their clothing? And if so, then why order 200 bars of laundry soap a year earlier?

In February 1954, the Deputy Minister of National Defence would again write his counterpart at the newly named Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, this time to complain that the Inuit at Resolute were becoming “more or less wards of the RCAF” and warned that they would be unable to accept “any responsibility for the care, welfare and administration of Eskimos.”170 The Director of the Northern Administration replied that Mr. Drury had been misled, that the RCAF had only been asked to provide supplies that were “short-landed last

165 Ibid., Stead Report.
166 Ibid.

167 Jenness, pp. 93-94.
170 LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/4 Memo from C.M. Drury to Mr. Robertson, 2 February 1954.
summer” and that otherwise the DOT had provided accommodation for the RCMP officer and room for the government store.  

Although internal criticisms are valuable in understanding some of the problems and attitudes of the times, even more revealing were the external criticisms and how they were answered. Official statements and replies to letters of inquiry in 1954 spoke optimistically of “success,” as reflected in the headline in the Montreal Gazette, 26 October 1954—“New Homes for Eskimos Said a Success.” (Likely based on a press release, as there were no photographs of the buffalo skin covered tents or shacks made out of packing cases.) Similarly, the administration’s replies to letters of inquiry told of the benefits the Inuit would derive and how relocations would solve the destitution in overcrowded areas.

Criticism about the government’s neglect of the Inuit had been ongoing for a decade and may have created undue sensitivity among the veteran administrators. Newspaper and magazine articles had already taken the northern administration to task about the plight of the Inuit, especially after public exposure as a result of American military activities in the Arctic during the Second World War. The northern affairs officers replied politely, but internal memos suggested they thought the criticism was unfair, a result of ignorance about arctic conditions.

While criticism seemed to inspire “positive responses,” when examined closely, they seemed to be little more than “expectations” described as “realities.” As such, they appeared to take on a life of their own in creating a “mythology of success” in public statements, reports, and press releases. These official statements would be repeated 40 years later as “proof” that the Inuit were happy, had achieved great economic success, and suffered no hardships.

Problems at Grise Fiord

Perhaps because the Grise Fiord community was removed from the mainstream of military activity, their problems were not readily visible to the outside world. RCMP detachment reports, however, point out various problems which pointed to failings in the planning and preparation. The police had reopened the detachment at Craig Harbour, but to ensure the Inuit did not become dependent on them, they were settled on the beach at Grise Fiord, over 40 miles from the post.

Because of poor hunting and a shortage of supplies, the project started out badly with the police requesting an emergency drop of buffalo hides to insulate their summer tents, and clothing skins to outfit the hunters for the harsh winters. As a conservation measure (considered necessary to preserve the herd), the Inuit were instructed to limit their kill of caribou to one a year per family—hardly sufficient to clothe the hunters, let alone their family. Later that fall, the police reported that some children had no winter clothing and requested a second drop of clothing skins. The administration agreed, but said they would arrive sometime that winter.

171 Ibid., the Director to the Deputy Minister, 18 February 1954.
172 NWT Archives, Stevenson Papers, N92-023. File contains copies of newspaper articles and numerous letters of inquiry and his replies on behalf of the administration.
173 Ibid., Stevenson himself answered many of the letters of inquiry, i.e. from the Scott Polar Institute in Cambridge, from a Time-Life correspondent, and even from Australia. One letter in particular dated 15 December 1950, from the Director to Prof. Honigmann of New York University, requested that if he published his study of the project, it would be preferable if you omitted the names of government officials.”
174 LAC, RG 18, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-5. Report from Craig Harbour RCMP Detachment on “Eskimo Conditions... period ending December 31st, 1953.”
Even with the family from Pond Inlet who were to help the southern Inuit adapt to the harsh environment, the Inuit from Inukjuak experienced untold hardship and despair. Requests to return home were denied and instead the northern administration offered to bring a few additional families to join them in hopes that they would be more content to stay.

Three years later, the RCMP moved their detachment nearer to the Inuit settlement at Grise Fiord, and again reported a shortage of caribou skins, noting that few had been obtained locally and the store supplies had been depleted.  

It was also reported that a Pond Inlet family wished to return home, but by the time they had gathered their belongings, the annual supply boat had left the harbour. This points to another serious flaw in design of the relocations. Because the supply ship stopped at Pond Inlet on its return voyage, families from North Baffin could easily be returned home. Unfortunately, those from Inukjuak could not, because the supply ship did not re-enter Hudson Bay on its return voyage, but went directly to Montreal. The cost of a special charter arrangement to return the Inukjuak Inuit would have been considered prohibitive unless an emergency.

The cold and hunger experienced by the Inuit families during their first winter at Grise Fiord raised little concern in Ottawa. Being out of sight from casual observers, there was less opportunity of arousing criticism. Nor was there an opportunity to gain part time employment to compensate for the shortage of supplies. Yet the two communities were viewed as one as far as Ottawa’s instructions and budget priorities.

Rehabilitation Measures

Some officials believed the rising welfare costs were a consequence of the Family Allowance credits, which encouraged Inuit families to congregate around the posts rather than spending more time on the land, hunting and trapping. Some believed the credits were directly responsible for the Inuit becoming lazy, unwilling to work to purchase new equipment and increasingly looking for free handouts. Others claimed that the low fur prices had made it hardly worthwhile to continue trapping.  

The issue was discussed at length at the NWT Council meetings, in police reports, and at the Eskimo Affairs Conference in May 1952. Many solutions were offered, (including dispensing with the Family Allowances entirely), but there was no general agreement. A number suggested that trapping could be made more attractive by offering subsidies to stabilize the fluctuating fur prices.

The northern administration adopted a hard line approach, but one consistent with their attempt to reduce costs. Accordingly, the high Arctic Relocation projects would include “rehabilitation” measures to encourage the Inuit to become more self-reliant, more productive, and less reliant on the police or store supplies. The police were given written and verbal instructions as to how the rehabilitative measures were to be carried out.

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175 Ibid., “Eskimo Conditions... year ending December 31, 1956.”
176 Ibid.
177 LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, file D 1512-2-4-Q27. Memo from Larsen to the Commissioner on the subject of family allowances, 29 February 1952.
178 The discussions were so numerous and extensive that referencing is impossible. The best examples are found in the Eastern Arctic Patrol Reports from 1950-1953, and in various reports found in police files, such as RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D-1512-2-4-Q27 and RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-13, report on “Condition of Eskimo,” 24 April 1950.
179 Alan Marcus, Relocating Eden, 98. Marcus argues that the “rehabilitation measures” were derived from the early 19th century belief in Britain, that “if relief was abolished, the poor would become more self-reliant.”
The police were also advised that “every effort should be made … to keep the Eskimos self-supporting and independent.” Free handouts were to be avoided and the Inuit were to be prohibited from visiting the dump at Resolute in search of food and white man’s castoffs.

Thus instead of dwelling on problems, the detachment reports from Craig Harbour outlined the progress on rehabilitation by listing the amount of furs and carvings sold to the store, the amount of savings various individuals had accumulated, the amount of equipment acquired, their willingness to use skin clothing rather than store bought articles, and their ability to obtain sufficient country food for themselves and their dogs.

At Resolute, there had to be adjustments to the opportunity of part time employment. The administration suggested that wages should be at prevailing rates of non-natives, but qualified “with due consideration being given to the comparative ability of the Eskimos to perform the duties assigned to them.” Even then, the amount of work available would be controlled by the RCMP to provide ample time to hunt and fish (and make “repairs” to their own living quarters), to ensure they would not become dependent upon store food and clothing.

One summer, the RCAF wanted to employ all the natives for construction work, but the police constable disagreed, explaining that “hunting had to be carried out,” especially since three Inuit were already employed in guiding, two for Mines and Technical Surveys, ostensibly for oil exploration. In a memo, the police officer described how he explained the situation to the Inuit:

The writer explained in full the repairs and hunting that had to be done during the next two months by the natives living at Resolute Bay. They were also encouraged by the work they had done in the past to make this project a credit to them, that it was a combined effort that required everyone to work together to build a community that would not be dependent upon the white man. The writer then told the natives of the proposed plan to have them work at the air base from time to time during the coming summer. That this was a good opportunity for them but would require even more of them than hitherto had been given. They all agreed to work to the best of their ability.

The plan to wean the Inuit away from dependency upon store bought food also influenced the type of food supplies ordered. For the first year, they comprised of mainly “staples” to encourage a more concerted effort in hunting and fishing. As well, luxury items at the store were marked up 40% to discourage their purchase. Even in later years, the store supplies were said to be meagre and

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180 LAC, RG 85, vol. 1070, file 251-4/1. “Memorandum to R.C.M.P Detachments regarding operations at Eskimo Settlements at Craig Harbour, Cape Herschel, and Resolute Bay.” (No date but apparently to be hand delivered on arrival of the Inuit).

181 For example, read the detachment reports (1953-1960) for Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord and Resolute. LAC, vol. 55, acc. 85-86/048, files TA 500-8-1-5 and TA 400-8-1-14 respectively.

182 Ibid., Note that this is from a draft copy, the same as the final except the paragraph about wage employment was removed after the 10 August 1953 meeting with representatives of Transport and the RCAF. At that time, it was reported that there would be no employment available for that year.


184 Ibid.

The location of the Inuit camps was also determined by the administration’s rehabilitation policy. At Resolute, the camp was located about 2 miles from the weather station and about 6 miles from the military base. At Craig Harbour, the camp was situated at Grise Fiord over 40 miles from the police post, totally isolated by long inlet. As reported by the RCMP:

The above named camping spot was picked for several reasons. It was thought best to have the natives away from CRAIG HARBOUR at least by one days sled travel. Being encamped at CRAIG HARBOUR might have given these natives the tendency to look for handouts when not absolutely necessary.187

The distant location of the camp at Grise Fiord often posed serious problems for the Inuit. A week after being settled at their new camp, for instance, several arrived at the post to obtain medicine for a “flu” that had afflicted the entire camp. Assistance was apparently supplied, but they were also told not to return until they had furs to trade. On the return trip to their camp, they lost some of their supplies while attempting to negotiate between the ice and rough water.188

The distance between their camp and the detachment at Craig Harbour created more hardships for the Inuit, than at Resolute, especially during periods of food and fuel shortages. This would be particularly hard on the women and children, some of whom had been accustomed to winter living in close proximity to the mission, trading post, a school and nursing station. For them, the first winter must have been terrifying. Three years would pass before the police were allowed to move the detachment closer to the Inuit camp.

The Inuit were never informed that these rehabilitation measures were part of the relocation projects, nor would they be described to the general public, who might question their legality. Although the Supreme Court of Canada in 1939 had declared they were to be considered the same as Indians, thus a federal responsibility, there was no legislation introduced to enact this decision which would have made them wards of the state. The fact that they were full Canadian citizens and, as such, had full rights and privileges was acknowledged by senior officials at the time,189 but ignored by those responsible for creating the design of these experiments.

The intent to “force” self-reliance by denying assistance was not always supported by the RCMP. In one instance, the RCMP detachment suggested that boats should be supplied to the Inuit at Grise Fiord. When this was rejected, they offered to donate the small police boat already on loan to the Inuit. The reply was that “while we appreciate the necessity for these people to have sufficient boats, we would prefer to see them purchase them out of their own funds.”190

Instead, the administration suggested the Inuit should collectively purchase one of the whale boats from the government subsidized boat building operation at Lake Harbour (costing $1,500 and not available until 1956 or later), and that the Inuit should pay for the boat over two or three

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186 Personal information, and noted on several of the “G” Division annual inspection reports, one by Henry Larsen 1958, and others.
188 Ibid.
years from “proceeds from their furs and family allowances, etc.” Instead, the police chose not to follow instructions and sold their boat to an Inuk for $75, advising the administration after the fact.\textsuperscript{191} Three Inuit would later join together to purchase one of the larger Lake Harbour boats, but the police reported that it was found to be unsatisfactory for the waters in the area.\textsuperscript{192} (In this case, the Inuit could not be criticized for wasting their hard earned money.)

The effort to encourage saving for the purchase of equipment and boats was likely wise, but underpaying the Inuit for their furs or failing to record wages or fur credits was not an appropriate measure to discourage wasteful spending. Shortages at Resolute would only encourage trips to the dump for food, firewood, and other discards. At Grise Fiord there was only hunger and cold. The “rehabilitation” measures may have originated with “good” intentions, but they were also a means of avoiding unnecessary expenditures with no provision to return the Inuit home should the experiment fail.

\textbf{Basic Flaws in the Concept and Design}

At the root of flawed design of the projects was the expectation that the local police constables who were experienced with the Inuit and arctic conditions, would be willing to carry out the administration’s instructions without questions or complaints. Not only were they responsible for the welfare of the relocated Inuit, but they were expected to assume the role of the fur trader, health officer and construction supervisor, as well as be able to fulfill their duties of law enforcement and assertion of sovereign authority in the region.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., see correspondence between the Director and Insp. Fitzsimmons, 2 February, 4 March, and 30 March 1955.

\textsuperscript{192} LAC, RG 85, vol. 1072, file 252-3/4. Special Report on Grise Fiord, 1958. Police comments on the unsuitability of the boat was reported by R.A. Gould, as officer in charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol.

Ottawa officials seemed slow to respond to police requests for assistance. Distance and centralization of accounting procedures also resulted in failure to assign credits for furs and wages. When problems were reported, the memos of inquiry passed from the director to the police inspector, inferring that the problem lay with the local detachment. The inspector would then pass these comments on to the detachment, requesting an explanation. Except for the annual arrival of the supply ship, at Grise Fiord the police were the Inuit only contact with figures of authority, hence they believed that the police were responsible for their hardships.

There is no doubt in my mind that the High Arctic relocation projects were planned in haste without appropriate consultation or approval with other agencies involved. Considering the extent of criticism directed at the Resolute project, it is likely the proposal would have been deferred for further consideration had the RCAF or DOT been consulted in advance. It also seems reasonable that experienced truck drivers and heavy machine operators from the abandoned USAF air base at Fort Chimo would have been preferred candidates. In the absence of any training program for the Inuit, the ACND may also have been misled as to the potential qualifications of Inuit available for employment at the military facilities.\textsuperscript{193} Clearly lacking was adequate communication of accurate information.

The shortages of food supplies as well as sufficient equipment, appropriate accommodation, and proper clothing, suggest there had been inadequate time for preparation. Nor was there any discussion as to how the Inuit might be returned home if requested, or what kind of permanent structures and services would be required if the projects proved to be a success.

\textsuperscript{193} NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers (unsorted). Memo to the Director, 15 November 1960, “Relocation of Eskimo Groups in the High Arctic,” page 3. In this report, it was stated that a proposal for a vocational training program had been forwarded to the director of the northern administration but there had been no reply.
According to the original submission for funding, it was also apparent that aside from the government’s payment of $200 per family for their voyage on the *C.D. Howe*, the Inuit were to pay for freight charges for the store supplies, for any improvements to their living accommodation, and for any new equipment which might be needed because of a different style of hunting and fishing required in the high arctic environment.

By comparison, a number of other projects under consideration at that time were funded by direct budget estimates or relief funds. Of special note were the financial arrangements for outfitting other Inukjuak families who were sent to the Sleeper Islands, King George Islands, and the Richmond Gulf. All were outfitted out of “Relief” amounting to almost $5000 over a two year period. Those destined for Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands were expected to pay their own way, even though it was only an “experiment,” an arrangement that was of far greater “benefit” to the government than the Inuit.

In pilot projects or experiments, volunteers are not expected to pay for their participation—either in terms of hardships or financial support. But again, these projects were designed with the object of saving money, not spending it—either in the short or longer term.

**C. ACTIONS AND RESPONSE BY THE GOVERNMENT**

When attempting to assess government responsibility, there was apparent confusion regarding definitions of “success” or “failure.” While the government weighted economic success over social benefits, no one verified how the “reported” economic benefit to the Inuit compared to similar advantages for the government. The number of furs traded was only one side of the equation; how much the Inuit were paid for those furs would determine whether the Inuit ever received full value for their efforts. When it was discovered that profits from the fur sales were apparently returned to the Eskimo Loan Fund rather than credited to the community stores, the police raised further questions and uncovered additional irregularities concerning the payment of wages and fur credits. The budget limitations set on the amount of goods supplied to the store as part of the “rehabilitation” measures also brought to light the inequities of the government’s Loan Fund.

**Funding Priorities**

With reorganization of the department and the announced increase in budget in 1954, one might have expected there would be changes made in the financial support of the relocation projects. Apparently, so did the Director of the Northern Administration. In March 1954, he ignored the suggestion that changes should be made to the operation of the Eskimo Loan Fund, and instead prepared a detailed analysis of the potential increase in government funding for the Inuit relocation projects. To cover projected expenses over the next two to three years, he recommended increasing the amount available from the fund to cover costs of store supplies and transportation from $50,000 to $250,000 which included $10,000 for construction of permanent buildings at Resolute.

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195 LAC, RG 18/acc. 85-86/048/55/TA 500-8-1-5. 20 April 1960, RCMP memo from Cst. Warner to Sgt. Coombs, reporting on the “considerable difference in the amount of money the Eskimos receive for furs and the re-sale value outside.” Grise Fiord’s fur credits to the Inuit amounted to a total of $6140 in 1958-59. These same furs netted the department $17,953.65 or about a 200% profit to the department.

196 LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/4. Cunningham to Robertson, 11 March 1954. For construction of similar dwellings at Churchill and Frobisher, the money allocated was considerably more: $60,000 for each, with
The deputy minister, however, rejected the proposed budget, saying that it was “too big an increase at this stage,” and reduced the total amount to $100,000 (or $50,000 a year) to meet immediate needs. Of that amount it seems that only about $10,000-15,000 would be allocated to replenish the stores at Grise Fiord and Resolute. By the following year, it was hoped these costs would come from fur sales and store profits.197

The priorities of the reorganized department are best understood by examining where the reported budget increases were targeted. In the report to Cabinet for 1954, as an example, it was anticipated that more families might be sent to Resolute that year, for a total cost to the department of about $1000. (presumably for five families and still estimated at $200. per family). There were other reported expenses under “Eskimo Affairs,” such as $3,500 for the boat building project at Lake Harbour, a $1000 grant to study the eiderdown industry in Iceland, a grant of $500 for whaling equipment for the Banks Island Inuit, $5000 for four boats for Inuit in the Great Whale River area and Belcher Islands, and $10,000 each for salaries for northern service officers with an undetermined amount for buildings to house them.198

By comparison, the costs of the Northwest Territories administration were extensive. As only a few examples, there was an estimate of $100,000 for four new houses for the administration, a lookout tower and building for $5,000, and another $100,000 for “employees of the liquor

no reasons stated for the difference. Either the buildings were to be inferior at Resolute, or the administration did not anticipate full employment or further transfers of Inuit.

197 Ibid., Reply from Robertson, 22 March 1954, attached to original memo.

Wages and Fur Credits
At Resolute, problems were reported concerning payment of Inuit wages. In a memo to the

staff” at Yellowknife. Highway construction and maintenance in the Yukon would cost over $250,000 and the federal government announced it was lending $1,000,000 to the City of Whitehorse for sewer and water construction.199 These figures seem self-explanatory. Significantly, there was no mention of cost estimates for expenses of facilities and staff in Ottawa.

Continuing Problems with Process
After reorganization of the Department in 1954, the northern administration still tended to go its own way without regard for the newly approved policy which endorsed the role of the Eskimo Affairs Committee as a forum for consultation and consensus approval. This was evident in a 1956 memo to the Director of the Northern Administration, in which it was argued that “policy advisors” were causing problems because of their “special interests.” Suggesting that it might be “preferable to make our own decisions rather than make recommendations to the Committee,” the Chief of Arctic Services reported that the most effective means to avoid having to follow “advice,” was to submit a report for comment, then promise to take note of it.

“This is the attitude I have instructed our Northern Service Officers to adopt in their dealings in the field with missionaries and traders, so that we always reserve our position, and our right and duty to act independently of their wishes, and possibly on some occasions against their interests which may not be public or general.”200

Wages and Fur Credits
At Resolute, problems were reported concerning payment of Inuit wages. In a memo to the
Director, Inspector Larsen claimed he was uncertain as to what was happening to the wages earned by the Inuit, but that it appeared that “Amagooolik [sic] and his wife do not actually receive their wages either in cash or in goods from the Eskimo trading store but that the whole of their wages goes to your Department to help pay off the Eskimo Traders’ Loan account.” Instead, he argued Inuit should receive individual credits for their work.

In 1956, Larsen would again inquire about how wages were credited. On his inspection tour that summer, he noted that:

Most of them (Inuit) demanded to know how their accounts stood and stated that they wished to purchase suitable boats etc. as had been promised them by the Department. Several of the Natives had good accounts with the Department Native Loan Fund. All money earned by working for the R.C.A.F. is paid by cheque right into the Department in Ottawa. This might or might not be a good idea as most Natives like to see the proceeds of his [sic] labours. Anyway Mr. Jackson promised he would look into the matter.

There was no reply on record. The next year, however, it was reported that no fur credits had been assigned to any of the hunters at Resolute for 1956 and part of 1957.

The “irregularities”, according to the administration, were a result of “accounting practices.” In July 1958, detailed instructions were sent to the officer in charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol to ensure proper records were kept at the two government stores. The memo clearly identified Resolute as having “difficulty in carrying out simple procedures” but did not define the nature of the problems or whether the Inuit were to be compensated for any shortfalls.

The “private” sale of furs was of special concern. Although recognizing that it was inevitable at Resolute, it was to be discouraged if possible since the best furs were usually sold to the Americans, thus reducing “the average value of the shipment when they are put up for auction.” Moreover, it was suggested that “furs are among the few assets we get to cut down on the loan.”

Inuit Accommodation

In terms of housing, reports of “construction” were sometimes misleading. In 1957, for instance, it was reported that the houses built out of packing cases were now insulated and painted, and that three “new” houses were added that year. It was with apparent pride and accomplishment that the police officer reported that “there was no cost involved whatsoever in the construction of these three houses. All the material was obtained gratis from the air force dump.”

That same year, construction had been scheduled to start on three “department” buildings. Because the Inuit had been employed elsewhere and were now busy improving their own homes, construction had been delayed. In order to

201 LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8114. Memo from Larsen to the Director, appended here, 2 June 1954.
203 NWT Archives, Stevenson Papers, N92-023, (unsorted). 4 June 1957, Phillips to Insp. Fitzsimmons, regarding a RCMP telegram, that the Inuit at Resolute had not been credited for their fur catches for 1956 or 1957. Ottawa claimed to have no record of individual sales and suggested that the police officer at Resolute search for a list.
complete construction, it was suggested that they might be required to pay the Inuit for their work. These buildings included a community centre, government store and warehouse.206

By comparison, the housing conditions at Grise Fiord were dismal. Although the winterized tents covered in buffalo skins had been replaced by “permanent” structures after the RCMP detachment had been moved from Craig Harbour to Grise Fiord in 1956, there was no description of their construction. In 1958, however, the officer in charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol described them in detail along with inherent problems. Apparently left-over lumber from the new police detachment had been used as frames, then covered by sod, with the result that “they were very damp in the spring and resulted in an epidemic of colds each year.”207

Response to a Supply Crisis

In several instances, the government’s response to shortage of supplies seems to suggest lack of concern for the Inuit. In the summer of 1956, for example, the annual supplies did not arrive at Resolute. Inspector Larsen reported the profound disappointment among the Inuit, who had ordered boats and equipment.

In the meantime another year will have passed without boats for the Natives, nor did any supplies for their store arrive on the cargo ship. Arrangements will now have to be made between Northern Affairs and the R.C.A.F. to fly all the supplies to Resolute. It could plainly be seen that the Natives, especially the good hunters were very disappointed.208

Apparently, the administration had placed the supply order too late to meet the ship’s loading deadline.209 Yet instead of making arrangements to air freight the 18 tons of supplies, (claimed to be “vital to the welfare of the Eskimos”), there was a six month delay, because chartering a private aircraft was considered too costly.

According to a series of memos, the administration appeared to be primarily concerned about keeping within budget and hoped that the RCAF would agree to transport the supplies without cost. Finally in late January of the next year, Air Transport agreed to take one ton of emergency supplies for the sum of $194. This was a great saving to the department compared to the estimated cost of over $6,000 for a private charter. The needs of the Inuit did not appear to be a high priority.210

Measles Epidemic

In the summer of 1957, a case of measles was reported on the C.D. Howe supply ship. As a result, all Inuit aboard were off-loaded at Resolute and set up in an emergency camp. In short order, the permanent Inuit residents were also infected. Although there were no reported deaths, there appeared to be a reluctance on the part of Ottawa officials to request assistance from the RCAF and DOT to supply emergency food, water, and clothing. One report suggested that it might be “inhumane” to leave the off-loaded Inuit at

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206 Ibid., Director to Insp. Fitzsimmons, 26 July 1957.
209 NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, memo from the Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs to the Deputy Minister of National Defence, 27 September 1956.
210 NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, See memos from Arctic Services, the Director, and even the Deputy Minister stretching from September 1956 to January, 1957.
Resolute until the next year’s supply ship arrived and recommended they be air-lifted to their original destinations once the epidemic had subsided. For those destined for Grise Fiord, however, it was decided they could wait another year.\textsuperscript{211}

\textbf{Cold, Hunger, and Requests to Return}

There were other reports which briefly mentioned problems, mostly related to shortages of food or clothing. One, in particular, gave a clear picture of the situation at Grise Fiord. Written by the officer in charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol for 1958, the report told of a conversation with the Inuk in charge of the store. Thomassie had apparently approached the northern affairs officer about food and fuel shortages over the previous winter, and claimed he wished to return home. The RCMP Constables at Grise Fiord concurred, saying that when the annual boat arrived all the Inuit at Grise Fiord had wanted to leave because of shortage of food. The report went on to explain that

\begin{quote}
Thomassie claimed there had never been enough tea, coal oil, tobacco, flour, sugar, milk, 30-30 ammunition, and duck for their tents at the store. He said that the store ran out of food, heating and hunting supplies, the Eskimos did not like leaving the camp to go on hunts, because of the hardship caused to their wives and children by the food shortages, and because of the cold in their houses.....\textsuperscript{212}
\end{quote}

While there is no explanation as to why the Inuit had agreed to stay in 1957, it would be difficult if informed that family and friends were arriving on the supply boat.

Mr. Gould also reported a prior conversation with two Inuit who were temporarily residing at Resolute, part of the group off-loaded from the \textit{C.D. Howe} because of a measles outbreak the previous summer. Because they had been originally assigned to Grise Fiord, they were told they must leave at once. They protested, saying they knew there was not enough food supplies at Grise Fiord, implying that conditions were better at Resolute. (Ostensibly the employment opportunities and access to “leftovers” from the base would be perceived as advantages.) The northern affairs officer believed “the problem was a serious one because it not only affected the Eskimos at Grise Fiord but also the reputation of the Mounted Police.” (One wonders if the problem would not have been considered “serious” if the police had not been blamed?)

\begin{quote}
...Corporal Sargent said that when the boat time had come around this year all of the Eskimos had talked to him about leaving Grise Fiord because of the food shortages. He tried to explain the intricacies of the Loan [Fund] but this was difficult to explain to a fairly primitive people such as the Eskimos.\textsuperscript{213}
\end{quote}

Mr. Gould said that he “tried to explain to Thomassie, currently the Inuk in charge of the store, about the Loan Fund, claiming “that it was not the police who were at fault, but that there was only a limited amount of money available in Ottawa to buy food and when this was used up no

\begin{quote}
Gould. Strangely, this report was also found in an Ottawa file, but the pages 2 through 5 were missing.\textsuperscript{215}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{211} NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers (unsorted). Memorandum for Mr. Phillips, re “Situation at Resolute Bay:— Confidential” by F.J. Neville, Welfare officer, 28 August 1957. This is the only detailed report I could find about this incident. The Grise Fiord RCMP detachment report for 1958 confirmed the arrival of Inuit families from Port Harrison that year, by way of Resolute.

\textsuperscript{212} NWT Archives, N 92 - 023, Stevenson Papers, Eastern Arctic Patrol Report; special report on Grise Fiord, dated 27 August, 1958 and written by R.I.

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
more food could be bought.” It seems incomprehensible that the Inuit were expected to believe that the government did not have enough money to supply adequate food for a few Inuit who had volunteered to be participants in an “experiment.” There were 41 Inuit living at Grise Fiord that winter.

Since at least one former member of the administration claimed at the RCAP hearings in June, that there had been no requests to return, nor complaints of cold and hunger, this report seems particularly important. Considering that the crucial pages were missing from the administration’s file copy, one wonders when? who? and most of all, why? There is no question that the absence of records encouraged confusion and contradictions, perhaps dating back to the 1950s.

Excess Profits and the Eskimo Loan Fund

Over the years, there were a number of suggestions that the government should consider changing the trading practices and the Eskimo Loan Fund system. In 1956, for instance, Bishop Marsh recommended that the Inuit should be allowed to order their own supplies and decide on their own what they should or should not purchase. This suggestion was ridiculed by the Chief of Arctic Services, claiming the idea was “pedagogically unsound.” He did promise, however, to do something about the store system as soon as he had enough staff to look into the matter. Even then, it would take more than suggestions, “reports of hunger” or “requests to leave” to move the administration to make major changes.

Finally, in the spring of 1960, the RCMP at Grise Fiord reported what appeared to be a case of excess profits, claiming there was “considerable difference in the amount of money the Eskimos receive for their furs and the re-sale value at the fur auctions.” The constable reported that the fur credits earned by the Inuit at Grise Fiord in 1958-1959 had amounted to a total of $6140, yet these same furs were sold for $17,953.65, netting the department approximately 200% profit. He also noted that it was only in the two high Arctic locations, that the department set the price and sold the furs, whereas in the western Arctic, the stores managed by the police sold the furs directly to the Hudson’s Bay Company. In this way, the Inuit would receive between 75% and 100% more for their furs, or between $10 and $15 more for each fox pelt.

This memo finally brought action and it was agreed that the Eskimo Loan system be abandoned and the stores turned into cooperatives. In the process, it was learned that in spite of the lack of “money” for adequate food and fuel in the winter of 1957-1958, sizable profits had accrued to the Loan Fund, but were not refunded to the stores and definitely not to the Inuit. Apparently one store (not named) had been very wisely managed and reported a gross revenue of between $30,000 and $35,000 a year, earned by the Inuit from their trapping, wages, and sale of goods. While it has been suggested that some of the profits may have been transferred when setting up the cooperative stores, one researcher found there were no set of records for the Loan Fund which covered these store accounts.

Citizens of Canada or “Wards of the State”

The operation of the Eskimo Loan Fund suggests that the reported economic “success” of the relocation projects belonged more to the department than to the Inuit. Failure to change

214 NWT Archives, N 92-023, Stevenson Papers, Sivertz to the Director, 22 October 1956.


216 Ibid., Fraser, “Officer Commanding” to the Grise Fiord Detachment, 15 July 1960 and report on “Eskimo Loan Fund Trading Stores—Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay” by Paul Godt, (ND) but probably summer 1960. The stores were turned into cooperatives as of January 1, 1961.

217 Prof. Soberman stated that he could find no records for the Eskimo Loan Fund store accounts.
the system when first suggested also raises questions as to whether the government acted in a manner appropriate to the nature of the “experiments” and in the best interests of the Inuit participants.

Relevant to this question, there is one further observation. In advice to the Minister (based on the conclusions of the Gunther report), DIAND claimed that the Inuit were considered both citizens and wards of the state. Aside from the fact that the 1992 study refutes this conclusion with its own quotations by the Deputy Minister and the Director of the Northern Administration, at the time, the RCMP Commissioner was aware that he had no legal authority to act on behalf of the Inuit. This aspect requires legal assessment.

Summary

Considering the evidence at hand, and the continued denial by government officials of the existence of any problems after the first year, one must ask whether senior officials were aware of the problems. Even with number of memos and reports missing from the administration’s files, one might also consider whether the government had been well served by its previous research and advice.

In the past, the government has questioned the credibility of Inuit complaints, but now the tables have turned. It is time to dispense with denials, and reconsider the issue in terms of apologies and making amends—not just for the errors of the past, but for the failure in acknowledging them. The priority concern should be for the individuals affected by government actions, and not for protecting the reputation of the department or individuals who may have been responsible.

D. FAILURE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT

While it is true that large expenditures of capital have since been invested into the Inuit communities of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, the government has been reluctant to accept that the original Inuit families might be justified in harbouring mistrust and alienation because of the experiences they encountered during the early years. To suffer cold and hunger in tents covered in buffalo skins while the police were warmly sheltered in a proper wooden building, 60 kilometres distant, is not an easy memory to erase from the minds of the Inuit of Grise Fiord. Nor was it easy for those at Resolute Bay to forget living in shelters made of packing cases and scrounging in the dump for food, while the white men at the military base a few miles away had ample food, warmth, and evening entertainment. There has been no understanding on the part of government that the Inuit might have felt betrayed by those they had trusted. Time has not eased the resentment they felt, but neither has it increased the sensitivity of Ottawa officials. The question is why?

Missing Records

Missing records not only created problems for researchers, but they also created confusion for those only peripherally involved, and perhaps an unexpected opportunity for those who would prefer not to know. “No evidence” is a convenient defence when accused of wrong-doing. New
evidence, however, shows that many allegations by the Inuit were indeed recorded in government records. The current government has been embarrassed on more than one occasion for having made claims which later have proved unfounded. To extract oneself involves a good measure of generosity, humility and grace.

There is also ample evidence to suggest that the government was reluctant to finance the Inuit participants’ return, either for visits or permanently. Alex Stevenson, who in 1953 verified the Inuit’s willingness to remain for two years at least, showed no reluctance to admit the promise of return in his 1977 report to the government.220 Within months of his death, officials ignored Stevenson’s report and claimed there was no record that a promise had been made and then funded a study to determine if indeed there had been a promise.221 Now, with Larsen’s telegrams and his letter to the Director advising why he had inserted that promise of return,222 along with Stevenson’s account of informing two Inuuk of the promise before departure from Inukjuak, it is apparent that the current government was misled by its advisors.

Lack of evidence in the department’s files also allowed for interminable delays while the government conducted more studies, in some cases to verify what it appears they already knew, or should have known. Hopefully the emergence of new evidence will not provide yet another excuse for “further study and evaluation.”

Significance of Motives

Apparently the question of motive is a high priority in the government’s mind—yet another point of apparent confusion. To place “motive” in its proper perspective, one might first question if a “sovereignty purpose” with potential economic benefits for the Inuit (if the experiment proved a success) was any better or worse than an “economic purpose” which offered benefits for the government in terms of cheap labour and lower welfare payments, compared to more modest material benefits and social disadvantages for the Inuit. “Humane” intentions should not be used as just cause to condone “inhumane” consequences.

Intentions may “explain,” but in themselves, they do not harm. At fault was the concept which was ill-conceived and a design which was flawed, but would cause no harm unless implemented.

For the southern Canadians working in the north, free transportation and accommodation (sometimes free food), a northern incentive bonus, free training programs, and expense paid trips home were part of most employment packages.223 Yet, except for $200 to pay for their transportation, the Inuit relocated from northern Quebec were expected to pay for their own way in an experiment to see if they could adapt. The inequality seems obvious, and confirms Diamond Jenness’s argument that the Inuit had been rejected

221 Marc Hammond, “Report of Findings on an Alleged Promise of the Government to Finance the Return of Inuit from Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord to their Original Homes in Port Harrison and Pond Inlet.” (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs, 1984). Hammond reported that one RCMP constable clearly remembered the instructions to include a promise of return.
222 RG 85, vol. 1072, file 252-3/4. Telegrams to the detachment and letter to the Director of the Northern Administration by Insp. Larsen, 14 April 1953.

223 LAC, RG 85, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 643, file 1009-10/69. 11 October 1957, Chief of the Arctic Division to Mr. Symington, explaining why he believed the Inuit at Frobisher should not be allowed to have free furnishings for their new homes as were provided to the northern service officers. Claiming his reasons were not based on race, but “on the grounds of permanency.” Evidently it was unfair to ask southerners to pay the cost of transporting their furniture to the Arctic, but it was fair to ask Inuit to buy their own. Although agreeing they might be provided with the bare essentials, he was “toying with the idea of offering to let them buy even this on the instalment plan so that they have complete independence.”
as “equal partners with the whites in developing Canada’s Northlands.”

The role of sovereignty perhaps needs clarification one last time and placed in proper perspective. In 1953, sovereignty concerns was the primary reason behind the decision to relocate Canadian Inuit to Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands. These concerns were not related to any imminent Greenlander, Danish, or American threat,” but simply a precautionary view toward protecting Canadian interests against any potential weakening of its “effective occupation” of relatively uninhabited arctic islands. The choice of Inuit from northern Quebec was based on who might gain the most economic benefit.

During the Cold War, particularly, it was important to consider all possible eventualities. The implications of a de facto loss of sovereignty arising from a massive influx of Americans was a potential political problem in Canadian-American relations, not a legal case to be settled in the international courts. Whether these concerns were valid or not is of no consequence in determining the degree to which subsequent government actions would adversely affect the lives of the relocated Inuit.

Basic Rights of Canadian Citizens

Obscured by the attention given to the legitimacy of the sovereignty motive, to my mind, was the more questionable aspect of these two relocations—the “rehabilitation” factor, a crude form of social engineering to keep the Inuit dependent upon trapping for survival, hence subservient to the white man. This objective justified minimal financial support for the Inuit in their efforts to adapt to the alien environment, as well as restrictions on the availability of store supplies, deferral of their wages, limitation of their employment opportunities, isolation of their communities, and the payment of low prices for their furs. As a lay person, without formal legal training, these actions appear to violate the basic rights of Canadian citizens.

Perhaps the most disparaging remark in recent years was the suggestion that the Inuit did not deserve any more honour for helping maintain arctic sovereignty than the hundreds of other Canadians who were employed in the Arctic during the Cold War years. If the Inuit were to believe that their hardships were justified because they were helping protect Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, then the suggestion that they were no more important than those who were paid to go north was insulting.

Reluctance to Accept Criticism

Criticism of the Resolute project came from all quarters before and after the Inuit arrival in August 1953: at the Northwest Territories Council meetings in June; by the RCAF and the Deputy Minister of National Defence in July; by Dr. Gordon Stead on behalf of the ACND in September; by Mr. Sivertz as special assistant to the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development also in September; and by Mr. Marshall of the ACND secretariat in November. The concept of employing Inuit as part of the Canadianization initiative may have received tentative approval, but only on the understanding that the Inuit would have had some prior training.

Apparent reluctance to consider the advice of the critics in 1953, was justified because of costs. Yet the same reluctance to consider there might have been mistakes also seems prevalent today. The justifications of “humane intent” and no “wrong-doing” seem to divert from the real issues involved here. The quote by H.R. Mencken (cited here after the title page,) suggests there may be no “truths” to be discovered, “just errors to be exposed,” seemed an appropriate approach to bring an end to the dispute. As a first step, however, the current government must first be willing to come forward with sincere apologies for their inferences that the Inuit were untruthful when they related their
experiences of hunger, cold, and wanting to return home.

“Attitudes of the Times” and “Budget Restraints”

Even prior to the Inuit arrival to their destinations, there were striking differences of opinion between the administration and the RCMP concerning who should or should not be selected for the Resolute settlement, as evident in the telegrams of instructions for the detachments.225 These differences indicate that the government’s actions in 1953 cannot be dismissed as reflective of “attitudes of the times,” as suggested on more than one occasion. The underlying motive was financial.

To extend that argument, other measures to improve the Inuit economy were suggested in the late 1940s and discarded because of costs. If the concept and design of the relocation projects can be explained in part by budget restraints; financial considerations were also a major factor in the reorganization of the department which resulted in increased bureaucratic control over Inuit affairs. This factor, along with the absence of an officially approved Inuit policy and an ineffective system of “checks and balances” served to diffuse the ultimate responsibility of government.

If there were differences of opinion in 1953, there seem to be even more in 1993. Ironically, the Arctic Division of DIAND still appears to take the stance of the “expert.” Similarly, just as decisions by the administration in the 1950s seemed based entirely on short term cost savings, DIAND today appears determined to avoid paying further compensation, but willing to expend further sums to prove why.

At present, there seems to be an excess of “experts” who claim to have been involved in the planning process. Several gave evidence at the RCAP hearings, claiming they were more or less involved in various advisory capacities, thus their opinions should be given priority consideration. Curiously, none were directly involved in the planning and preparations at the time.226

Based on reports and memos in 1952 and 1953, the key figures involved in the initial planning phase were James Cantley, J.G. Wright, M. Meikle, Alex Stevenson, and the Director of the Northern Administration, Col. F.J. Cunningham.227 (Alex Stevenson who had suggested moving Inuit to Ellesmere Island in 1950, seemed more peripherally involved than others in the actual planning stages, although he did write a memo to suggest that Pond Inlet families be included to assist the southern Inuit in adapting to new hunting techniques, particularly during the dark winter months.)228

Recent statements by some former officials seemed almost “un-Canadian” in character, when they

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225 LAC, RG 85, vol. 1072, file 252-3/4. Compare the “draft” telegrams by the Director prepared for Pond Inlet and Port Harrison detachments and covering letter to the Commissioner Nicholson, 8 April 1953; to the confirmation copies of the telegrams by Insp. Larsen for the detachments at Port Harrison, Fort Chimo, and Pond Inlet and the letter addressed to the Director of the Northern Administration.

226 See copy of “Testimony by Dr. Graham W. Rowley,” delivered to the Royal Commission on 29 June 1993, p.1. At the time of planning, this same individual was employed by the Defence Research Board in 1952, I believe as head of the Joint Intelligence Board. Similarly, Mr. Sivertz was not appointed Chief of Arctic Services until March 1954; although he may have been indirectly involved in 1953 as a special assistant to the Deputy Minister.

227 LAC, RG 85, vol. 1234, file 251-1/2. Memo to M. Meikle on “Proposed Eskimo Projects,” by James Cantley, 18 December 1952. There is a notation on this memo from Meikle which states that there were severe problems with the plans and that they should be shown to Mr. Wright. Col. Cunningham, the director, agreed. The annotations indicate that this plan was still under discussion on 22 December 1952.

228 NWT Archives, N 92-023, Stevenson Papers, memo from Stevenson to Cantley, 8 December 1952.
suggested that Inuit just wanted money, as reported in the *Ottawa Citizen*.\textsuperscript{229} From an observer’s viewpoint, it may be appropriate to consider “attitudes of the time” but it is just as important to respond in a manner acceptable to the standards of today.

**Change in Attitude 1958 – 1970**

As criticism mounted in 1958 and requests to return home increased, the administration decided to halt any further relocation of families to the High Arctic – primarily because of insufficient wild life to sustain a larger population. In answer to the criticism, the first step was to turn the government stores into cooperatives under Inuit management, but with police supervision. By 1960, the strict “rehabilitation” measures also changed to allow for construction of new homes for the Inuit, as well as provision of schooling and better medical services.

**The Current Controversy**

In the early 1990s, there appear to be too many “self-interested” advisors informing the government, with advice based on “opinion” rather than factual information. As a result, the circumstances encountered by the Inuit relocated to the High Arctic have become distorted and confused, until they were allowed to testify the RCAP’s April hearings. If any further study is necessary, I urge that it be de-personalized and kept at arm’s length from the department which seems to have its own self-interest in proving the infallibility of its past actions. Since the inability to resolve the issue appears to be driven by the department, the onus may lie with the political masters to take the lead in bringing about a just and honourable settlement.

The missing records, diverse opinions, bureaucratic sensitivity to criticism, and flaws in the government system of checks and balances has created a maze of vague uncertainties for those attempting to sort fact from fiction. For the Inuit, delays in settling the issue resulted in increasing resentment, and anger at the perceived insults. For former officials and the RCMP, it has meant a loss of self-esteem and uncertainty. For today’s government, it appears as if the issue is being treated as a chess game where consultants are used as pawns.

The increasing confusion arising from differing attitudes and self-serving denials seems to create a smoke screen over the core debate—whether the Inuit relocated to the High Arctic should receive an apology, further compensation and recognition for their contribution in protecting Canadian sovereignty. To clear the air, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples provided the means to bring the contradictory opinions into the open. And while it may have been an uncomfortable process for many who testified, it was a necessary one.

**CONCLUSION**

**Analysis of the Latest Government Position**

Although willing to accept some of the recommendations of the Canadian Human Rights Commission Report, the government has inadvertently inflamed tensions by accepting the findings of a commissioned study as a reliable reference for historical detail. Because this harshly critical study upheld the government’s previous position as just and honourable, any conciliatory measures put forward to settle the issue appeared patronizing and insincere. For the Inuit, the request for an official apology has become a top priority.

As a result, I am asking the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples to look at the situation as a failure of process for which the government is ultimately responsible, rather than individual actions which are subject to the frailties of human nature. Only from this perspective can we end the

\textsuperscript{229} “Inuit created claims in bid for $10M prize, ex-official says,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 May 1993.
confrontational accusations that have prevented a just settlement of Inuit requests. Too often, “government” seems committed to proving its “infallibility,” perhaps because individuals within government have identified themselves too closely with success or failure of the projects.

**General Assessment**

Unlike local relocations which occurred primarily for economic reasons, the 1953 high arctic projects were motivated by both economic and sovereignty concerns. Sovereignty factors were the primary influence behind the choice of relocation sites; high welfare costs in the more densely populated areas of Quebec were the primary reason for the selection of Inukjuak Inuit as participants. Because the dual objectives of sovereignty and economic benefits were inter-dependent, they should not be considered separately or in priority of importance.

The 1953 High Arctic relocation projects were poorly conceived, under-funded, and inappropriately executed as “experiments” to see if southern Inuit could adapt to northern climates, and further complicated by instructions for “rehabilitative” purposes to encourage their return to former dependence upon traditional hunting and trapping.

While the overall objective of the projects was designed to provide both “sovereignty” and “economic” benefits in the longer term, the rehabilitation measures created unnecessary hardships for the participants. The fact that they were considered “experiments” was used to justify lack of financial support during the first five years.

Questions concerning influences and objectives evolving around “sovereignty” or “economic” benefits should not be the only consideration in determining government responsibility. There are serious questions concerning the design and implementation of the projects which failed to protect the physical and emotional well-being of the Inuit participants.

Failure to recognize the seriousness of the problems in the early years might be explained by poor communications, language barriers, cultural differences, and the remote location of the new settlements. Continued denial that serious problems existed may have been facilitated by missing or misplaced records. Nevertheless, the government’s reluctance to honour the promise of return has fueled increasing Inuit anger and resentment. To doubt or disregard Inuit testimony at the RCAP hearings was perceived as an outright insult to Inuit integrity and credibility. As a result, the government so far has failed to effect an honourable and just settlement.

New evidence acquired over the past two years not only provides strong support for the Inuit testimony at the April hearings, but it has added further details for consideration: such as memos identifying the purpose of the projects, inappropriate responses to the needs of the Inuit, promise of a return home if requested, and failure of the northern administration to respond to constructive criticism or advice.

As far as the role sovereignty played in the projects, several departments, the RCMP, and even the Privy Council have confirmed the “sovereignty” purpose of the High Arctic relocations. Further denial of its importance seems purposeless, unless used as a diversionary tactic to hide more serious problems.

In the 1960s, there were a number of discussions and reports about the failure and success of various relocation projects, more than one suggesting relocation concept had not proved successful when Inuit were resettled at a great distance from friends and relatives, without financial assistance to return.

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230 NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, “Relocation of Eskimo Groups to the High Arctic,” memorandum to Mr. Stevenson, 4 October 1960 by C.M. Bolger, administrator; and a more detailed memo by the same title and author to the Director of the Northern Administration, 15 November 1960.
home for visits. Thirty years later, it seems incomprehensible that the Canadian government still refuses to honour the promise of return—unless it might suggest that projects were not quite the “success” as advertised.

And finally, can today’s government dispel the notion of its infallibility and offer an official apology? Or must independent scholars continue to try and expose more errors?

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Postscript
Shelagh Grant
October 2016

Royal Commission Report

Three key events occurred since the submission of my report, all of which contributed to the resolution of the 30-year old controversy over the requests of Inuit relocated to the High Arctic. The first was the release of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples’ report on the 1950-1953 relocations, which fully supported the Inuit testimonies and request for compensation. In a summary of its conclusions, the authors listed 42 points of wrongdoing, with the last emphasizing the key issues:

42. The experiment of the relocatees was a predictable result of a scheme that was inherently coercive in its objective and coercive in the means chosen to achieve that objective. The other failing in planning and implementation, as well as the failure to honour the promise to return, compounded the hardship suffered by the relocatees.¹

The commission’s full report to the Governor General two years later, reiterated their findings and recommendations on the High Arctic relocations:

In our report on the High Arctic Relocations, we called upon the federal government to recognize that moving 92 Inuit to Grise Fiord and Craig Harbour on Ellesmere Island and to Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island was wrong. We heard testimony from people who endured hardships in an alien land far from their homes and families. Our research showed that the Inuit were not given enough information about the move or about the conditions they would face.

We concluded that they could not be said to have given their informed consent to the move. Promises made by government officials were not kept, the relocation was poorly planned and executed, and there was little monitoring of its effects afterward. The report recommended that the government apologize to the relocatees and their descendants and negotiate compensation.²

This time the government would be quick to respond – but only in part.

Special $10 Million Trust Fund

Although still refusing to apologize, the Liberal government under Prime Minister Chrétien legislated a “Reconciliation Agreement” in March 1996, creating a $10 million trust fund for the relocated families. But there was a caveat, the recipients were required to acknowledge that they understood the government officials of the time were acting with “honourable intentions.”

The Fund is managed by a six person board of trustees selected by Makivik. Early distributions were generous, amounting to over $800,000 annually between 1996 and 2002. But the stock market collapse in the early 2000s the capital was reduced, payments were dramatically reduced and the administrative expenses were almost double the money earned on investments. By 2009, payments


stopped altogether when the trustees were unable to cover their expenses.³

The trustees sought approval from Quebec’s Superior Court to draw on the capital, but I could find no confirmation of the outcome or current status of the fund. Some Inuit seem willing to be “willing to let the trust fund – and the sad story that brought it into being – gradually fade away.”⁴

**Official Government Apology August 2010**

Finally on 18 August 2010 at Inukjuak, the Hon. John Duncan as the newly appointed Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs delivered an official apology on behalf of the government:

> The Government of Canada deeply regrets the mistakes and broken promises of this dark chapter of our history and apologizes for the High Arctic relocation having taken place. We would like to pay tribute to the relocatees for their perseverance and courage. Despite the suffering and hardship, the relocatees and their descendants were successful in building vibrant communities in Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. The Government of Canada recognizes that these communities have contributed to a strong Canadian presence in the High Arctic.⁵

The apology not only included recognition of their contribution to Arctic sovereignty and for their success in building two “vibrant” communities, it also acknowledged the mistakes in planning and execution of the relocation, and the broken promises of a return home.

**Monuments ERECTeD TO HONOUR THE RELOCATEES September 2010**

In recognition of the hardships encountered by the relocated Inuit during the first five years, the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI) commissioned two large soapstone statues, one each for Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. The monuments were unveiled at Grise Fiord and Resolute on September 8 and 10, respectively, with the Hon. John Duncan attending to repeat the government’s apology. Healing Circles took place after both ceremonies.

In the words of the NTI: “The wounds are deep and decades old, but the unveiling of the monuments, and the apology from the Government of Canada, will allow Inuit the opportunity to remember, grieve and heal.”⁶ And so the relocated Inuit found closure to a wrongdoing that began 57 years ago. They will hopefully forgive, but will never forget.

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³ “Quebec court to ponder big changes to the High Arctic exiles’ ailing trust fund,” Nunatsiaq Online, 5 April 2010.
THE DOCUMENTS

These documents were compiled for the use of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Human Rights Commission. Copies of these documents were obtained from the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa (now the Library and Archives Canada), the Northwest Territories Archives in Yellowknife (NWTA), and the National Archives in Washington, D.C. (NA). The documents are arranged in chronological order based on the date they were written.

1. **1920 (either October or November).** Recommendations attached to J.G. Harkin’s report to the Ministry of the Interior on the sovereignty of the Arctic Islands, including idea of moving Canadian Inuit to Ellesmere Island. (LAC, RG 15, vol. 1, file “Arctic Islands.”)

2. **18 December 1933.** Extracts from the Minutes of the Northwest Territories Council, noting difficulty in getting Canadian Inuit to work at the police detachments north of Baffin Island. (LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 32, file G-804-la/1)

3. **22 June 1948.** Report by Dr. Diamond Jenness titled “Future Developments in the Arctic.” A long term strategy requiring government expenditure to stabilize the Inuit economy, by providing education, training, and financial support for full Inuit participation in future developments in the Canadian North. One objective was to colonize uninhabited areas “to assert and vindicate Canadian sovereignty;” another would offer future employment opportunities at arctic defence facilities. (LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 51, file T 36-3-2)

4. **27 October 1949.** Meeting of the NWT Council with discussion on means to improve the Inuit economy. There is no reference to Inuit relocation in this discussion. (NWT Archives, G79-042, GC00 1/18)

5. **25 February 1950.** Extracts from the MacDonald Report on Arctic Sovereignty with covering letter by the Chairman of the ACND. (LAC, MG 30 E 133, Series V, vol. 294, file “Arctic Sovereignty.”)

6. **6 June 1950.** Pages 1 and 3 from Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee with discussion about employing Inuit at arctic military bases. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 298, file 1009-2/2)

7. **21 October 1950.** Memo by J.G. Wright concerning advisability of not stressing “need” for Inuit settlers on Ellesmere Island, and that a more accessible location than Eureka would be the first choice for relocations if the joint weather station program continued. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 2085, file 20996/3)

8. **No date but fall 1950.** Extracts from the 1950 Eastern Arctic Patrol Report, (northern section) recommending moving Canadian Inuit to Ellesmere Island for economic and sovereignty reasons. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 1127, file 201-l-8/2A)

9. **16 November 1951.** (Note date in error according to text of letter) Memo from RCMP Commissioner (signed for him by Insp. Peacock) alerting to problem of the French Malaurie
expedition on Ellesmere and suggestion that External Affairs might be notified. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7/5)

10. 22 November 1951. Memo for the Commissioner of the NWT, reporting on having received the Cantley reports and how they differed from the proposals submitted by RCMP Insp. Larsen. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/2)


13. 22 February 1952. Memo from the Deputy Minister to the Commissioner suggesting that his proposal to move Inuit from North Baffin to Ellesmere be deferred until after the Eskimo Affairs Conference. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 1070, file 251-4/1)


15. 3 March 1952. Memo from Commissioner L.H. Nicholson, Officer Commanding “G” Division, Ottawa, to General Young, Deputy Minister, Department of Resources and Development, on “problems affecting Eskimos.” (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/2 1949-1952)

16. 9/10 April 1952. First page of a report by a northern administration officer claiming the department’s objective in “rehabilitating” mainland Inuit onto the Arctic Islands was to reduce government welfare costs. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/2 1949-1952)

17. 2 May 1952. Memo from Insp. Larsen to the Commissioner concerning items on the proposed agenda for the May Eskimo Affairs Conference, including proposal of opening government trading stores and subsidies to protect against fluctuating fur prices. (LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D 1512-2-4 Q27)


19. 22 May 1952. Memo to RCMP from the Commissioner cautioning him against publicizing the possibility of setting up a government trading organization lest the Hudson’s Bay Company object. (LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D 1512-2-4 Q27)

21. **No date but early fall 1952.** Report of the southern section of the Eastern Arctic Patrol, noting that proposals had been made to send Inuit from Port Harrison to Baffin Island (6) and that the teacher had 30 regular pupils and 60 from the camps. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 1207, file 201-1-8/3)

22. **14 October 1952.** Report to Commissioner from Insp. Larsen with copies of telegrams reporting that Greenlanders had arrived at the joint weather station at Eureka, on the west coast of Ellesmere Island. Similar telegram dated 15 October was forwarded to the Northern Administration on 16 October by the Canadian Meteorological Services. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7/5)

23. **16 October 1952.** Minutes of the First Meeting of the Eskimo Affairs Committee with reference to the possibility Ellesmere Island might be “investigated” as a site for Inuit relocation, and suggestion that wages be withheld from Inuit for purposes of “saving,” and that a Royal Commission should be set up to study Inuit problems (4). (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 241-8-1/3)

24. **No date but fall 1952 (after October 14).** Extracts from the 1952 Eastern Arctic Patrol Report (northern section), James Cantley in charge, with report of the Greenlanders arriving at Eureka and the proposal that sending families from northern Quebec would help halt the problem (8). Also notes that there was room for 40 more families at Arctic Bay (9) and possibly more at Clyde River (10) (LAC, RG 85, vol. 1207, file 201-1-8/3)

25. **18 December 1952.** Report by James Cantley on relocating Inuit from Quebec to Ellesmere Island and Resolute Bay, with annotations concerning problems with this report. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 1234, file 251-1/2)

26. **31 December 1952.** Memo from the Deputy Minister to the RCMP Commissioner requesting the police open a detachment at Resolute as they could not send Inuit there without someone to supervise them. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/3)

1953

27. **22 January 1953.** Minutes from Cabinet Meeting discussing concerns about potential increase in American defence activities in the Arctic and suggestion that the ACND be reconvened. (LAC, RG 2, vol. 2652, file “Jan-Feb 1953”)

28. **13 February 1953.** Briefing for the 16 February ACND meeting for Mr. MacKay who would be sitting in for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, including list of proposed actions. (LAC, RG 25, acc. 90-91/109, vol. 58, file 50197-40/1)


30. **20 February 1953.** Memo from the Deputy Minister to the RCMP Commissioner requesting the police open a detachment at Resolute as they could not send Inuit there without someone to supervise them. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/3)
31. **9 March 1953.** Report for Year ending 31 December 1952 from the Port Harrison detachment, noting that very little relief had been distributed and that the fox yield was better than anticipated. (LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-13)

32. **16 March 1953.** “Assisted Eskimo Projects” requiring funding by direct grant or by loans from the Eskimo Loan Fund, including the relocation projects. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/3)

33. **16 March 1953.** Excerpt from letter by the welfare teacher at Inukjuak which shows the continuing influence of Hudson’s Bay Company interests in the decision of which Inuit would be moved to the high Arctic. (LAC, RG 85, file 1072, file 252-3/4)

34. **March 1953.** Interim Report prepared for the March 16 ACND meeting with sections from Resources and Development and the RCMP. (LAC, RG 18 vol. 3544, file GH 369-77/2 Appendix)


36. **2 April 1953.** Letter from the Deputy Minister to Under-Secretary for External Affairs, requesting Danish Government be notified about the Greenlanders living on Ellesmere Island. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7/5)

37. **3 April 1953.** Memo from Frobisher Bay Detachment to Officer Commanding “G” Division, describing U.S.A.F. pay and conditions provided to the employed Inuit. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/3)

38. **8 April 1953.** Covering memo to the RCMP Commissioner from the Director, and two “draft wires” as suggestions to instruct the detachments. (LAC, RG 85, file 1072, file 252-3/4)

39. **14 April 1953.** Covering memo from Insp. Larsen to the Director, explaining why he had inserted the “promise of return” in the telegrams sent to the detachments. Also confirmation copies of the 3 telegrams sent, showing a major difference in opinion compared to the above, as far as who would be sent where. (Same file as above.)

40. **18 April 1953.** James Cantley of Arctic Services to the Director, with concerns that the Defence Research Board had planned on using Greenlanders as guides for their summer field trip on Ellesmere. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 294, file 1005-7/5)

41. **22 April 1953.** Letter to Chair of DRB from the Deputy Minister expressing concern about the hiring of Greenlanders, copy to External and covering letter—also “Urgent” handwritten comments 20 April. (Same file as above.)

42. **6 May 1953.** Memo from the Commissioner to the Deputy Minister regarding lack of suitable accommodation at Resolute for Inuit from Fort Chimo. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/3)
43. **8 May 1953.** ACND document #ND-52, (map and covering memo) describing projected estimates of increased American personnel in the Arctic Islands, and their approximate location, submitted to the ACND for discussion. (LAC, MG 30 E 133, Series V, vol. 294, file “ACND 1953”)

44. **11 May 1953.** Minutes of the 9th meeting of the ACND, items of importance starred with added sheet concerning terms of reference for the proposed new Secretariat, including reference to the employment of Inuit. (LAC, MG 30 E 133, vol. 294, file “ACND-1953”)

45. **13 May 1953.** Memo from Young to the Commissioner, suggesting that the Chimo Inuit would not be able to adapt, but that they were exploring idea of contacting RCAF about housing (no reference that this was ever followed out.) (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/3)

46. **19 May 1953.** Memo from James Cantley to Mr. Fraser, showing the extent of his anger at Insp. Larsen for over-riding the authority of the administration. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 693, file 1009-10/49)

47. **8 June 1953.** Memo to Dept. of Transport regarding arrangements for sending 54 Inuit to the high Arctic that summer. (LAC, RG 33, vol. 176, file 40-2-20/3)

48. **17 June 1953.** Letter from the Acting Director to Insp. Larsen, explaining why the Inuit volunteers from “Fort Chimo” were unsuitable for the projects. (LAC, RG 85, file 1072, file 252-3/4)

49. **30 July 1953.** Letter by the Deputy Minister of National Defence (noting lack of proper consultation) and attached letter (July 6) by AOC Ripley of the RCAF which was harshly critical of the Resolute Bay project. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/4)

50. **10 August 1953.** Minutes of an “Ad Hoc” meeting called to explain the relocation projects to the representatives from the RCAF and DOT. And explanation that no wildlife studies were done, since that was the purpose of the “experiment.” (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/4)

51. **20 August 1953.** Memo from the Meterological Division of DOT, suggesting that the U.S. thought a “useful function” might be served by employing Canadian Inuit. (RG85, vol. 1207, file 4-1-8/3)

52. **No date but summer 1953.** Draft copy of instructions for the RCMP detachments, with reference to employment at Resolute—pencilled annotations suggested this be held until the 10 August meeting. Final version was missing the paragraphs on wage employment. (LAC, RG 85, vol. 1070, file 251-4/1)

53. **24 August 1953.** Extracts from the Minutes of the Administration Sub-Committee of the ACND, noting need for a written statement on Inuit policy. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/4)

54. **No date—late August or early September 1953.** An ACND “confidential” document, ND-63, describing need for an official Inuit policy. (LAC, MG 30 E 133, Series V, vol. 294, file “ACND-1953 pt 1”)
55. **23 September 1953.** Report by B. Sivertz, to the Deputy Minister regarding his inspection tour of the Arctic bases—noting the relocation plan at Resolute and stating “I do not think this will work.” (LAC, RG 22, vol. 176, file 40-2-20/3)

56. **29 September 1953.** Excerpts from a report by Dr. Gordon Stead for the ACND concerning “policy problems” of the Department of Resources and Development concerning the Inuit relocation to Resolute Bay. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 176, file 40-2-20/3)

57. **9 November 1953.** Report on the Inuit settlement at Resolute, by a member of the ACND Secretariat to Mr. Rowley, the new Secretary. (RG 22, vol. 544, file ACND 1953/l)

58. **15 October 1953.** Cabinet Document by the Prime Minister arguing for a name change and new legislation for the Ministry of Resources and Development (LAC, RG 2, vol. 1894, file C-20-5)

59. **(no date, late 1953)** Extracts from untitled report in files belonging to the Secretary of the ACND concerning “Policy towards Eskimo.” (LAC, RG 22, vol. 544, file ACND 1953/1)

60. **31 December 1953.** Report from the Craig Harbour RCMP Detachment for the year ending 31 December 1953, noting lack of proper clothing. (LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-5)

1954

61. **25 January 1954.** Reply to the Deputy Minister from the Director, regarding supply problems mentioned in November 9, 1953 memo referenced above. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/4)

62. **2 February 1954.** Memo from the Deputy Minister of National Defence to Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, claiming the Inuit at Resolute were “more or less wards of the RCAF.” And reply from the director to the deputy minister 18 February. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/4)

63. **9 February 1954.** Covering memo from the Acting Under-Secretary for External Affairs with “Secret” report for the ACND, to include in Cabinet report. Shows the radar stations on Ellesmere and Coburg were still a possibility. (LAC, RG 25, acc. 90-91/109, vol. 58, file 50197-40/1)

64. **19 February 1954.** “Note to file” by G. Rowley concerning the reasons why he had argued that the Defence Research Board could continue using Greenlanders as guides. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 544, file “Rowley ACND -1954”)

65. **11 March 1954.** Memo to the Deputy Minister, recommending the Eskimo Loan Fund be increased to $250,000 to cover additional supplies and projects, including $10,000 toward building permanent homes at Resolute Bay. Reply of 22 March 1954 attached, limiting the total amount of the loan to $100,000 (or only $50,000 more). (LAC, RG 22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/4)
66. **26 April 1954.** Excerpts from the department’s report in the ACND report to Cabinet on “Government Activities in the North.” Includes projected expenditures on Inuit affairs and territorial administration. (LAC, MG 26 N 1, vol. 18, file “Arctic”)

67. **2 June 1954.** Memo from RCMP Insp. Larsen, inquiring into why wages at Resolute Bay were not credited to individual accounts at the store. (LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-14)

68. **4 June 1954.** Memo for Mr. Sivertz from G.W.R. about problems concerning Inuit hanging about the posts, noting that it might “prove pointless to increase the Eskimo income unless there are some tangible benefits they can get from a higher income.” (LAC, RG 22, vol. 544, file “Rowley ACND -1954”)

69. **27 August 1954.** First page of report on the Eastern Arctic Patrol by the new Chief of Arctic Services, acknowledging his lack of experience in administration of Inuit Affairs. (LAC, RG. 22, vol. 176, file 40-2-20/3)

70. **October 1954.** Copy of article in *RCMP Quarterly* 20:2, by Cst. A.C. Fryer, concerning Craig Harbour “Eskimo Rehabilitation Program.”


72. **8 December 1954.** Memo for the Director with suggestions for study on planning the Inuit economy—no mention of relocations. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 545, file “ACND 1954”)

1955 - 1957

73. **18 January 1955.** Memo from the Deputy Minister to the Director, about allowing a requested Greenland expedition to Baffin Island and the diplomatic negotiations involved. (LAC, RG. 85, vol. 375, file 1005-7/1)


75. **7 September 1955.** Memo to Mr. Sivertz about stripping and re-organizing the files. (NWT Archives, Stevenson Papers, N92-023, unsorted.)


77. **22 October 1956.** Memo describing means employed to avoid having to obtain prior approval from the Eskimo Affairs Committee when implementing department policy (p. 2). (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, unsorted)

78. **25 September 1956, 27 September 1956, 4 October 1956, 23 October 1956, 26 October 1956, 4 December 1956, 11 December 1956, 28 January 1957, and 29 January 1957.** Memos re: the
non-arrival of annual supplies at Grise Fiord, and reasons for the delay in sending them. (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers (unsorted))

79. **23 May 1957.** Two memos showing attitudes towards Inuit policies. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 45, file “ACND 1957”)

80. **14 June 1957.** Memo from R.A.J. Phillips to Insp. Fitzsimmons concerning failure to assign fur credits to individuals at Resolute in 1956 and 1957. (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers (unsorted))

81. **26 August 1957.** Memo to the Chief of Arctic Services, Mr. Phillips from F.J. Neville, Welfare Officer, concerning measles epidemic at Resolute Bay. (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers (unsorted))

82. **11 October 1957.** First page of internal memo discussing why Inuit should not be supplied with accommodation or furnishings at Frobisher Bay. (LAC, RG 85, acc. 84-85/048, vol. 693, file 1009-10/69)

**1958-1960**

83. **27 August 1958.** Special report on Grise Fiord by the officer in charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol, R.A. Gould. Notes problems of acquiring stone, hunger and cold as a result of food and fuel shortages, desire to return, Inuit blame for department policy directed on police, unhealthy housing, etc. (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, unsorted)

84. **14 April 1959.** Letter from Minister Alvin Hamilton to Minister of Transport George Hees, regarding the importance of taking over the arctic weather stations for sovereignty reasons. (LAC, RG 22, vol. 545, file “ACND 1959”)

85. **20 April 1960, 13 July 1960, and 15 July 1960.** Memos regarding excess profits in furs and proposals to turn the government stores into cooperatives, plus proposal to turn stores into cooperatives (nd). (LAC, RG 18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-5)

86. **4 October and 15 November 1960.** Memo requesting feasibility report on future relocations and a copy of the report (written by Stevenson according to his draft notes, but signed by the Administrator). Both have several references about sovereignty reasons for the Inuit high arctic settlements. (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, unsorted)

87. **25 February 1969.** Report by northern administrator on move of Inuit from Sugluk in northern Quebec to Cape Dorset, for “economic, social, and political” reasons. Mentions “northward direction” of “migration.” Note, however, that housing was supplied. (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, unsorted)

88. **29 August 1969.** Department memo regarding the studies and meetings on Inuit relocations held during the previous year, including the advice that distant relocations should be accompanied by assisted visits home. (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, unsorted)
89. **30 November 1977.** Report by Alex Stevenson on the High Arctic Inuit Relocations and covering memo. In the report, Stevenson twice refers to the sovereignty purpose and once to the promise of return. (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, unsorted)

90. **13 January 1982 and 29 March 1983.** Memo by Stevenson concerning 1977 report and the mixed-up or destroyed records; also letter from Commissioner Parker who would later offer the services of Deputy Commissioner Pilot to help negotiate a settlement but received no response to his letter -- personal communication.) (NWT Archives, N92-023, Stevenson Papers, unsorted)

91. **1986.** Extracts from an article by Wilfred Doucette, the official photographer in 1953, appearing in *Postal History Society of Canada Journal*, 46 (1986), with two references to sovereignty concerns as the reason for the plan to establish Inuit settlements on Ellesmere Island.

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Inuit family on board the C.G.S. C.D. Howe at Grise Fiord (Qikiqtaaluk), Nunavut [Kyak family from Tununiq (Pond Inlet). Back row, left to right: Moses Kyak, Lazarus Kyak, Mary (née Panigusiq) Cousins, Letia carrying Elizabeth in the amauti, and Leah. Front row, left to right: David, Carmen, Timothy, and Lily.]

*Health Canada / Library and Archives Canada / e002216381*
(Above) Inuit community at Resolute as seen during Governor General Vincent Massey’s northern tour, Resolute Bay, N.W.T., March 1956. (Left) Inuit children observe the proper method of removing an Arctic fox from trap at Resolute Bay, N.W.T., March 1956. Gar Lunney / National Film Board of Canada. Photothèque / Library and Archives Canada / PA-191422 and e002265667
Recommendations.

To securely establish Canada's title occupation and administration are necessary. Therefore, next Spring an expedition should be sent north to locate two or three permanent police posts on Allesmerre land. This probably should be followed by the transfer of some Canadian Eskimos to the Island. Steps should also be taken to encourage the Hudson Bay Co. or other traders to extend their operations northward. It is also desirable that detailed exploration should be carried out on this and adjoining islands.

At present it is impossible to say what the cost of such an expedition would be. The main item would probably be the boat charter. Supplies for the police camps and exploration parties would depend on the character of the work assigned. The boat would be able to go up and come back the same year so the charter would be for only a few months. Of course there would have to be a boat each year.
Extracts from Minutes of the
North West Territories Council Meeting
held on the 16th of December, 1933,
(File G.127-1 Page 5.)

(b) Employment of Greenland Eskimos at Police posts in
Ellesmere Island; and Route of Eastern Arctic Patrol
1934.

General MacBrien said that in the past it had
been found difficult to get Canadian Eskimos to go
to the posts north of Baffin Island. Snow conditions
are quite different for travelling. In addition
they are not much use to the Police, particularly on
Ellesmere Island. As a consequence it has been the
usual practice to secure the Eskimos from these posts
from Greenland. At the present time there are
not Crawford some Canadian Eskimos who want to go back to
Baffin Island next year. The recommendations made
by officers who go north have always been to secure the
Eskimo from Robertson Bay or some similar area in
Northern Greenland.

Major MCKee and added that for years considerable
difficulty arose in getting natives to go even to
Dundas Harbour. The Baffin Islanders do not mind
travelling so long as they can visit friends. No
natives that he knew were equal to the Greenlanders
of that and Robertson Bay and accustomed to long trips
across the ice.

Major MCKee and added that he thought it might be
possible to train the Baffin Islanders to go farther
north.

General MacBrien said that as a matter of fact
they had already written to the Danish authorities for
permission to pick up some Greenland Eskimos next year
but so far no reply had been received.

Major MCKee and thought that next year the Eastern
Arctic Expedition might go direct from Burwell to
Robertson Bay and then to Craig Harbour.
Future economic developments in the Arctic, and the distribution of white and Eskimo settlements in that region, depend on such unpredictable factors as government policies in the U.S. and Canada, and on the progress of mineral discoveries.

1 U.S. Government Policy:

It is not unlikely that in response to changes in the national and international situation, and in view also of heavy commitments in other parts of the world, the U.S. government may forego any further activities in the Canadian Arctic after 1948 or 1949 and rely on Canada to maintain alone, or with only minor support, the chain of weather and loran stations that will have been established there by that time.

Some weather stations can doubtless be made automatic so that they will require visiting only once or twice a year. Nevertheless, an estimate should be obtained from the Meteorological Branch, and from the R C A F, of what personnel and freight would have to be transported north each year to the different stations, if the whole burden of their maintenance should be placed on Canada's shoulders.

2 Canadian Government Policy:

It is conceivable that, following the example of Denmark in Greenland, the North-West Territories Administration may decide to educate and train its Eskimo population to:

(a) Staff the administrative and scientific stations in the Arctic.
(b) Exploit the local resources of minerals, furs and fish.
(c) Supply all local surface transportation.
(d) Colonize those areas, now uninhabited, in which it may be advisable to establish permanent settlements in order to assist and vindicate Canadian sovereignty.

Whether or not the government decides today on such a course, it will probably be forced to move in this direction in the very near future, by reason of a steady increase in the Eskimo population resulting from the energetic measures now being undertaken to protect their health and welfare. Such an increase has already taken place in Alaska, and on a phenomenal scale in both East and West Greenland, where it is seriously taxing the local resources,
in spite of attempts to introduce new occupations and industries. In East Greenland, the Eskimos have actually quadrupled their population in the last 45 years (see diagram), compelling Denmark to resettle some of them in Scoresby Sound, at other places further north they they abandoned many centuries ago.

Can we in北极, which was occupied by Eskimos many centuries ago and then abandoned, restore, if any, for their welfare causes their numbers to increase, and thus anywhere approximating their increase else where, then we too will be able to the pressure on their slender means of subsistence by reducing their costs of living in the far north, and arranging for regular transport to provide them with necessary supplies.

An adequate educational program for the Eskimos will probably require the establishment of two or three special training schools equipped with lathes and other machinery, one perhaps at Tuktuyaktok in the Mackenzie Delta, a second at Churchill, and a third in Pobotisher Bay. These schools will cost a considerable sum of money, and for five or more years may seem to yield little or no returns. At the end of five years, however, or very soon afterwards, they should be producing the following results:

1. Training enough Eskimos to replace most of the white staff in the weather and loran stations.

(Such training at Eureka Sound carries a staff of seven white men, whose salaries alone amount to more than $20,000 yearly. The cost of their salaries and maintenance could be reduced 75% by replacing five of them with Eskimos, without any loss in efficiency.)

2. Equipping the Eskimos with, or helping them to obtain and operate, enough shallow-draft motor vessels in good condition, that they could undertake all sea transport throughout the Canadian Arctic, as they already do in Greenland, and, to some extent, in Alaska also. The government would then be responsible for the surface carriage of passengers and freight only to a few entrepôt ports within the Arctic such as Tuktuyaktok, Churchill and perhaps Pond's Inlet.

3. The real Discoveries:

There are no definite indications at the present time of any mineral discoveries that would seriously affect the amount or direction of transportation going into either the eastern or the western Arctic. This
(a) Firth River:

34 years ago traces of gold were found on this river, which flows into the Arctic Ocean just east of the Alaska-Canada boundary. Further finds made recently are causing some excitement. If the placer deposits there prove to be even one quarter as rich as those on the Kolyma River in N.E. Siberia, which also empties into the Arctic, then there will be heavy traffic into the region, not by way of the Mackenzie River alone, but also around Alaska; for mining interests will certainly risk the more dangerous sea route than pay the much higher costs of freight down the Mackenzie River. Herschel Island off the mouth of the Firth River will then become again an important port; and the necessity for a lumber mill and ship-repair yard at some sheltered deep-water port in or near the mouth of the Mackenzie River (probably at Tuktoyuktok) will become more urgent. All this would have a profound effect on transportation and supply problems in the western Arctic.

(b) Admiralty Inlet (Jaffrin Island):

The region is known to be highly mineralized. It is likely to be closely prospected in the near future, with what result no one can foresee.

D. Jonness
Geographical Bureau

June 22, 1949
Minutes of Special Meeting of Northwest Territories Council held in Senate Committee Room 368 on Thursday, October 27, 1949, at 2:00 P.M.

PRESENT:

Dr. H. L. Keenleyside (Chairman) - Commissioner
Mr. R. A. Gibson - Deputy Commissioner
Cdr. L. C. Audette - Member of Council
A/C H. B. Godwin - " " "
Major D. W. Mackey - " " "
Brigadier S. T. Wood - " " "

IN ATTENDANCE:

Mr. K. J. Christie - Lands Division, Lands and Development Services Branch.
Mr. F. Fraser - Yukon and Mackenzie River Division, Lands and Development Services Branch.
Mr. W. Nason - Solicitor, Lands and Development Services Branch.
Mr. C. H. Herbert - Economic Adviser, Department of Mines and Resources.
Mr. J. E. Howes - Research Department, Bank of Canada.
Col. J. P. Richards - Dominion Wildlife Services Branch.

1. Confirmation of Minutes -

   (i) Special Meeting, September 22, 1949
   (ii) Special Meeting, October 20, 1949

Approved.

2. Local Trustee Board, Yellowknife -

   (i) Minutes dated September 14 and October 2, 1949

Noted.

   (ii) By-laws Nos. 87 and 88

By-law No. 87 provides for assessment of real property, appoints the assessor, and sets out procedure in case of an appeal. By-law No. 88 amends By-law No. 67 to regulate traffic within the Administrative District. Both by-laws were approved.

3. Local Trustee Board, Hay River -

   (i) Minutes dated September 14, 17 and 28, October 18, 1949
The original air strip built by Consolidated proved to be unsatisfactory in some types of weather and had to be abandoned. A new strip has been started by the Consolidated Company on a location indicated by the Department of Transport on which the Company has spent $10,000. In order to bring the strip to the standard approved by the Department of Transport it will be necessary to spend an additional $30,500. The Consolidated Company was asked whether it would be prepared to pay, altogether, half the total cost of constructing the strip recommended by the Department of Transport. The reply received indicated that the Company thought it had done its part on the new strip and that it should be a government responsibility to bring this strip to the standard recommended by Transport.

Council was of the opinion that the strip should be improved, as recommended, but, at the same time, it seems evident that if things work out as expected it will not be long before further improvements will be required to service the industries and the communities that will be established. It was thought desirable that the Department of Transport should assume the responsibility for the improvements. If it has no funds for the purpose, Council was prepared to make an advance from the Liquor Fund to enable the work to start immediately.


The Commission has submitted its report and copies have been distributed to the members of Council. Council agreed that owing to the circumstances under which the Commission was organized and sent to Yellowknife the report might be made public. Copies of the report and of a summary thereof were made available to the members of the press.

The Commissioner, on behalf of Council, expressed appreciation of the work performed by members of the Commission in going to Yellowknife, conducting hearings, and putting the time and effort into the report.

Since the report of the Commission required lengthy discussion it was agreed that a meeting of Council be held on Thursday, November 3, at 2:00 P.M., for this purpose. In the meantime, to facilitate the budget of the Yellowknife Trustee Board, the Northwest Territories Council approved of an assurance being sent to the Board that a grant of a sum not less than the amount granted last year will be paid at once in aid of the Yellowknife School Board. When decisions have been reached on the recommendations contained in the report of the Yellowknife Financial Commission, further financial adjustments will be made between the Northwest Territories Council and the Yellowknife Trustee Board.

10. Fur Trade in Eskimo Territory - 4567

It was explained that under the present depressed state of the long-haired fur trade the Eskimo receives about $3.50 for white fox which in 1946 brought him $20. This is having serious effects on both Eskimos and traders. The Eskimo income is reduced by five-sixths and the price of essential goods has about doubled in the past three years. Relief costs for Eskimos will rise, particularly in areas where country food is scarce and the natives depend on store food. A number of independent traders will no doubt be forced out of business and if the low prices on white fox continue indefinitely, the Hudson's Bay Company may have to discontinue the operation of its Arctic posts as it did in Labrador a few years ago.

It was recommended that the Civil Service Commission be asked to provide, on the staff of the Arctic Division, for the employment of a
competent business man experienced in the fur trade in the north and with a sound knowledge of Eskimo conditions to undertake the following investigations:

(a) The feasibility of opening government-owned or co-operative stores at points rich in native food supplies which are not at present served by traders, owing to the local scarcity of white fox.

(b) Methods by which the Eskimo economy might be improved, such as by the introduction of new industries, handicrafts, etc.

(c) The feasibility of subsidizing fur prices at a level to permit the Eskimo to earn a decent living without reliance upon relief which has a demoralizing effect.

(d) The advisability of the government taking over all trading in Eskimo territory as in Greenland.

(e) The possibility of some arrangement whereby the Hudson's Bay Company might continue in the picture with a degree of government supervision and assistance to accomplish desired results.

The matter of employing a man capable of carrying out the above-mentioned investigations was discussed in some detail and Council approved the recommendation that such a position be established in the Arctic Division of the Northwest Territories Administration.

11. Re-establishment of Eskimos

It is estimated that about fifty Eskimos suffer some degree of paralysis as a result of the polio epidemic. Seventeen of the worst cases are in Winnipeg and the rest are in the industrial home at Chesterfield or with their people. Those in Winnipeg who recover sufficiently will be sent to their homes; others will require occupational therapy to re-train their muscles before they are sent north. Officials of the Department of National Health and Welfare feel that the cost of this training, after discharge from hospital, should be borne by the Northwest Territories Administration.

It is felt that many of these polio victims can never earn their living by hunting and trapping and will have to be taught handicraft work. There have been discussions with Bishop Lacroix as to the best way this could be done at Chesterfield and further details are being secured from that point with a view to having the training provided at the industrial home under supervision of the Administration.

The training of Eskimos in the handicraft industry has promising possibilities for many besides polio victims. The Canadian Handicraft Guild sent a handicraft expert to Port Harrison last summer to teach and organize the industry there, with good results. For such an industry to succeed it must be organized to cover teaching, supervision of quality and marketing of the products.

Council recommended that a suitable handicraft specialist be added to the staff of the Arctic Division and that his selection and appointment be handled in an administrative way.

12. Employment and Superannuation of Stipendiary Magistrates, N.W.T.
Dear General McLaghton:

At the second meeting of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development held on the 8th of June, 1946, it was agreed that a memorandum should be prepared on the subject of Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic.

This document has now been completed by Dean Vincent C. MacDonald of Dalhousie Law School. We have had to classify it "secret" because of certain references in it. Copy number 10 is enclosed for you to retain. Copies have also been sent to all the other members of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development and to the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Chairman of the Defence Research Board, Chief of the Naval Staff and to the Secretary of the Inter-departmental Committee on Territorial Waters.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

F. L. Keenleyside,
Deputy Minister.

[Address]

General the Honourable A. J. L. McLaghton,
Chairman, Canadian Section,
Nunavut Joint Board on Defence,
Ottawa.
CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY

IN THE ARCTIC

Vincent C. MacDonald, K.C.
A memorandum has been compiled from the materials contained in a memorandum prepared by the Department of External Affairs entitled "Legal Aspects of Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic" and a lengthy document prepared by the Department of Mines and Resources, entitled "Factual Record Supporting Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic" (hereinafter referred to as the "Factual Record" or "F.R.").

The compilation of this memorandum, however, has led to the consideration by the undersigned of authorities additional to those cited in the previous memorandum on Legal Aspects; and to the revision and amplification of certain parts of the original Factual Record. In effect the present Memorandum takes the form of a presentation of Canada's legal claim to sovereignty with summaries of, and cross-references to, the matters of fact set forth in the various chapters of the Factual Record, which thus constitutes an Appendix to the legal "Case".

It may be well to record the fact that though so largely based on the research of the Government Departments concerned this Memorandum was prepared by the undersigned without interference, and with the simple instruction to present the Canadian case "in its most effective and persuasive form".

(sgd) Vincent C. MacDonald.
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This opinion is, however, rejected by Smedal and (according to him) by Salomon, Paschile and Hellborn, as well as by other European writers of the Continent. (10)

Smedal believes that, there is no international decision of such a character that it may be said to establish, in a binding manner, that the discovery of land gives the state on behalf of which the discovery has been made a prior right to appropriate the land. Since International Law does not in any event fix the period during which a right of priority can be enforced, it would seem reasonable, he says, to deny the existence of the right itself. And there is other authority for the view that little or no weight now attached to discovery as such. (11)

In any event it clearly appears that title by discovery alone cannot prevail against a later display of sovereignty by another state sufficient to found title by occupation, i.e. by acts substantially continuous though marked by some intermittency. (12)

Reference to the Island of Palmas Arbitration and to the Eastern Greenland case, infra, makes clear on what slight grounds discovery as a source of title may be superseded by relatively slight acts of settlement and occupation by another state particularly having necessary regard to the character of the Arctic.

If it were necessary to base Canada's title on acts of discovery and symbolic possession done in the long ago it may well be that successful resort could be had to the record of explorations mentioned in Section A of this Chapter considered in the light of the then contemporary state of international law as establishing title or repelling adverse claims to title to territories of non-recent discovery.

However, it seems unnecessary to consider any such record or contention in the present connection for Canada's claims rest on surer foundations, e.g. Effective Occupation.

As to territories recently discovered, however, e.g. the islands discovered by Canada in Foxe Basin in 1948 (13) a claim founded on discovery alone would be of little effect under the modern law; except so far as the doctrine of inchoate title might operate to give a temporary bar to occupation by some adverse claimant sufficient to allow of more significant acts by way of an effective display of sovereignty by public declarations, mapping, etc., on the part of Canada.

Indeed, there is no doubt that the argument of discovery, if applied
by Canada to islands hitherto unknown and eventually discovered by Canada, say, west of Ellesmere Island, would be dangerous, and might open the way for foreign discoveries, in future, of unknown territories located in the zone which Canada now considers as Canadian. Moreover, it might possibly give rise to foreign claims based on past discoveries. The recent incidents pertaining to the discovery of the Sverdrup Islands (14) should be a vivid reminder of the potential danger of foreign discoveries and of foreign claims based thereon which may arise in respect of areas within the Canadian Arctic and which may not be so capable of solution.

C. The Conclusion.

The foregoing is not intended to suggest that a formidable claim to the Canadian Arctic could not be made on the basis of past discovery and derivative transfers and subsequent symbolic acts; for considering the geographical and climatic nature of the region and its scattered and backward population, and the comprehensive coverage and penetration by exploratory and government missions such a claim might be substantiated to some considerable degree. Rather the conclusion which emerges is that a claim so based might fail as to certain areas; is unnecessary; and in its application to modern and future discoveries might prove dangerous. Accordingly it is thought that except as preliminary to, or as partial support for, other contentions in respect of the Arctic-as-a-whole it should be left in abeyance, without prejudice to its application when necessary in respect of claims to individual areas or sections.

Chapter 3. Title By Effective Occupation.

I. The Law.

The General Rule.

"Theory and practice agree nowadays upon the rule that occupation is effected through taking possession of, and establishing an administration over, the territory in the name of, and for the acquiring State. Occupation thus effected is real occupation, and, in contradistinction to fictitious occupation is named effective occupation. Possession and administration are the two essential facts that constitute an effective occupation". (15)

There does not seem to be any doubt that as regards terra nullius and abandoned land, sovereignty is acquired initially by occupation and that an effective appropriation of such territories is a condition of their acquisition by occupation. International Conventions, statements of jurists and arbitration awards furnish proofs of this. (16)
CONCLUSION

The ultimate conclusion of this study is that Canada's title to the Canadian Arctic regions as a whole may safely be asserted on the basis of Effective Occupation (and the support which it derives from Discovery (aided by symbolic acts of possession) in general, and as to any particular area therein allegedly not reduced into effective possession); and upon the Tacit Recognition by the nations concerned and their acquiescence in Canada's long continued and oft-repeated claim of title; and (to the extent that it may be valid in relation to the Arctic) upon the so-called Sector Principle; and may be asserted, with less confidence, upon the doctrine of Prescription.

In sum, however, it appears that considerations of policy should lead to the maintenance of Canada's title upon the ground of Effective Occupation alone as the chief and most satisfactory ground of reliance, to which the other doctrines discussed are merely supplementary.

(sgd) Vincent C. MacDonald.

Vincent C. MacDonald, K.C.
MINUTES OF THE MEETING
ON
A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF MATTERS PECULIAR TO THE ARCTIC
HELD AT AVQ - 6 JUNE 1950

PRESENT:

S/L SE Alexander (Acting Chairman) ANOT/MASS
Mr E Fry DND
S/L A Copland ARB/DND
Mr PE Uren DND
Mr CH Herbert DRD
Lt Cdr J. Croal DRD/Arctic
Mr JD Wright DIB
Dr JC Arnell & representatives DND
Mr JW Burton DND/Arctic
Mr LA Seymour USA Embassy
Lt. Com. AH Rankin DNA/R CN
Sir Hubert Wilkins US Army

1 Opening Address

The Acting Chairman welcomed Sir Hubert Wilkins on behalf of all those present. He pointed out that in spite of the long service given to the Arctic by some of those in attendance, Sir Hubert Wilkins had not only much longer experience in the Arctic but also was familiar with the Antarctic and had first-hand knowledge of the problems involved, even those under the Arctic Seas. He went on to thank Sir Hubert for having found the time to attend this meeting.

2 The present status of protective clothing in the US Armed forces and the possible future trend

Standardisation between two countries (Canada and USA) as well as UK. A standardised head and body gear as far as insulation requirement is concerned. All three nations should exchange any ideas they may have and experience met with in the field. It was noted that each country have their own manufacturing this and type of materials chiefly used. How far is it possible for flying personnel to go along with ground personnel in the design of arctic clothing? For instance Army personnel must travel over terrain, through water, deep snow etc. US ground crew are adopting Army developments - when on flying duties equipped with aircow clothing. Clothes must be adaptable to varying temperatures, whether flying over equator or arctic region and at varying altitudes. May require a "ready" room for aircrew using cold weather clothing. Confusion exists as regards to use of term "Arctic". It was suggested that this term be withdrawn from official use as it is misleading - geographical terms would be more definite. Heavy bomber crews are interchangeable, whereas, fighter force being static would have to provide some remedy for emergency kits - must depend on survival kit only, carried in seat pack. Last year's tests in the use of nylon pile clothing, the fighter crew were happy but the bomber crews were not because they were too warm on account of aircraft temperatures; however this is only a matter of temperature control.
Indoctrination of service personnel for Cold Weather Warfare (Cont'd)

reluctant to wear sloppy clothing, improper fitting, etc., which is a quality of northern clothing for troops. It is understood that Russians grant time and a half towards leave and also a pension allowance for Arctic operations.

6 Indoctrination and Survival Training

ROCAF appreciate the fact that some method of survival training is required when going into the hinterland. In the timberland areas test teams sleep outside. In the Arctic trainees go directly into snow houses - 28 days lecture and balance of course of three weeks is spent in the field to actually live the conditions that survival would produce. Most academic work can be given before going and on returning. Not long enough in the field is the general failure of these courses. Difference between war and survival - expenditure of everything even life if necessary, whereas, survival is the conservation of everything. The ideal instructor hard to find. It was found that instructors do not spend sufficient time, generally speaking, with the trainees out in the open. US emergency kit does not include a fishing net as yet - ROCAF use a 50 ft net also a light weight seal hook. The net and hook work 24 hrs a day for survival. It is assumed that Army personnel will be flown into arctic territory and, in the event of war, a large number of people will be employed in the arctic. Sir Hubert Falklns noted that the terrain in Siberia differs from that of Alaska and Canada, also weather conditions varied. We should consider the northern reaches of the complete polar basin and not just that of North America.

7 Examinations of the Factors Influencing the Selection of Areas for Winter Exercises and the Results Obtained

During last winter exercises at Churchill the weather was around 30 and 40 deg. below zero. Jasper conditions were found to be similar to Mt. Washington. Mt. Washington temperature was found to thaw one day and then 30 below next, which gave variation for test purposes. Cambridge Bay did not have much variation with low temperatures but wind at Churchill is one advantage over Cambridge Bay. No game was found at Churchill while Cambridge Bay had local fishing and sealing. It was suggested that a more even temperature would be of greater advantage for arctic design of clothing by ROCAF using Fort Nelson for bush survival training, experiencing deep snow and bad terrain. Cambridge Bay for worst average arctic conditions.

8 The Employment of Indigenous People (particularly the Eskimo) on Service Stations or Projects

There was a discussion as to possibility of taking the Eskimo into armed services and educate and train him for northern operations with a view to eventual assimilation into white race on a long term program. Eskimos employed as mechanics, tractor operators at Point Barrow, were brought up to our requirements and drawing same pay as whites but it was considered that the Eskimo could not be enlisted in the service due to their differences in customs and eating habits, at the present time. With increased development in the north, an educational campaign is going on right now through Resources Development, Arctic Division, in establishing schools at such places as Tappunns. Southampton Island, Port Chimo and Port Harrison, most of these schools have been set up within the last year, therefore, progress should result within the next 25 years. An Eskimo is content to stay in the North, whereas, the average soldier is inclined to serve a term and then be replaced periodically. It was suggested that possibly Eskimo breeds could be enlisted in the service and be used for search and rescue. It was felt that a trained nucleus should be available for service in the Arctic

*
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BURTON:

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF EUREKA AREA

Ottawa, October 21, 1950.

I agree that while free transportation facilities are available in connection with the present joint Canadian-United States activity in the high Arctic, we should endeavour to encourage the collection of as much information as possible about these little-known areas.

This Administration does not, of course, hire specialists, but endeavours to point out to the various scientific branches of Government the need for their specialized services in certain areas. The proper procedure should, therefore, be to discuss any such projects with the officials who would be concerned with the employing and servicing of the necessary personnel. If these officials are favourably disposed towards the project and feel that they need a formal request from this Administration in order to support the request for necessary funds in their estimates, we would, of course, submit such formal request. However, I think in most cases the branch concerned would not require any formal request.

In the case in point I do not think we should stress any immediate requirement for Eskimos. In any mass movement of Eskimos we shall use more accessible areas first. However, if these Arctic weather stations prove to be a continuing project we may find it advisable to place one or two Eskimo families at certain stations. In such an event a knowledge of the local wildlife of the land and the sea would be most valuable.

I suggest you take this project up informally with the interested services on the above basis and endeavour to secure their co-operation.

J. G. Wright,
Chief, Arctic Division.
On Monday, July 17, the "C.D. Howe" sailed from Montreal on her maiden voyage carrying supplies and personnel to a number of settlements in the Eastern Arctic. This 3,600-ton vessel, the latest of the Department of Transport's fleet, with Captain A. Chouinard as Master, was built to undertake the duties of the Eastern Arctic Patrol which, in former years was carried out on the R.M.S. "Nanapie".

Calls were made at the various points as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of Arrival</th>
<th>Date of Departure</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montreal, Quebec</td>
<td>July 17</td>
<td>July 20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebec, Quebec</td>
<td>July 29</td>
<td>July 31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Hamilton, Labrador</td>
<td>Aug. 2</td>
<td>Aug. 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Burwell, N.W.T.</td>
<td>Aug. 4</td>
<td>Aug. 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fort Chimo, Quebec</td>
<td>Aug. 15</td>
<td>Aug. 23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Churchill, Manitoba</td>
<td>Aug. 23</td>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Dorset, N.W.T.</td>
<td>Aug. 28</td>
<td>Aug. 29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lake Harbour, N.W.T.</td>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pangnirtung, N.W.T.</td>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>River Clyde, N.W.T.</td>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pond Inlet, N.W.T.</td>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arctic Bay, N.W.T.</td>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dundas Harbour, N.W.T.</td>
<td>Sept. 13</td>
<td>Sept. 15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frobisher Bay, N.W.T.</td>
<td>Sept. 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebec, Quebec</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The following is a list of the Government party that sailed from Montreal:

Mr. A. Stevenson          Resources & Development  O.I.C. Eastern Arctic Patrol.
Mr. R.E.O. Johnston       Resources & Development  Asst. to O.I.C., Eastern Arctic Patrol.
Mr. R. A. Hadden          Post Office              Postmaster.
Dr. J. H. Nesbit          Nat. Health & Welfare  Senior Medical Officer.
Dr. R. E. Robertson       Nat. Health & Welfare  Dentist.
Mr. W. Lasewski           Nat. Health & Welfare  X-ray Technician.
Mr. W. Procter            Nat. Health & Welfare  Medical Attendant.
Mr. G. A. Parkin          Dept. of Transport    Helicopter Pilot.
Mr. A. Wallingford        Dept. of Transport    Flight Engineer.

Owing to the railway strike being on when we arrived at Churchill we missed part of the vessel's oil shipment. The Captain was quite concerned about this shortage and felt that there was some danger of the vessel encountering so much ice that we would consume more fuel than would allow us to complete the itinerary. With this in mind and the exceptionally good weather no time was lost and each post was visited in rapid succession. Furthermore, the stay at each settlement was cut short. I may say that this was not entirely satisfactory from an administrative point of view or for the medical services rendered to the Eskimo.
Ice chart

Very little ice was encountered by the C.D.Hove this summer. However, I am attaching an ice chart showing the ice we came across along the route according to place, quantity and date. The legend is the same as used by the "task force" in marking ice locations on their charts. So doubt Mr. J.W. Burton will be interested in this chart in connection with the ice studies he is making.

Buildings

With the exception that they need another coat of paint the school and dwelling house at Fort Chimo appear to be in excellent condition and Mr. Ekand was well pleased with these buildings which were erected by Prefabricated Homes Company Limited.

On checking similar buildings erected at Cape Dorset this summer by the same Company the following points were brought to my attention:

School—there is a quarter inch crack in the wall between the windows in the tool room.

There is only one stove in the school, Model No. M-51-D. Understand there should have been two stoves of this type.

Dwelling

House — no bedroom fixtures such as ceiling lights. There are wall plugs but no lamps.

In the kitchen over the stove the rain is getting through.

This is a slow drip and is actually running down from the opening where the stove pipe meets the roof. Mr. Applewhile should be able to fix this himself. There is no light fixture in the utility room.

Nursing Station

I was told that the old B.T.C. Building was to have been renovated for the Nursing Station. I could see no changes in this building from when we were there in 1947.

Apparantly there was not enough wire shipped in and it was necessary for the construction crew to borrow some from the Hudson's Bay Company.

Finally the Lighting Plant is 115 Volt D.C. Motor Generator. The gas consumption is one gallon of gas per hour. If the lights are on in any building the motor immediately goes into operation. There is no means of storing the power and it appears to me that it would have been more economical to have a 32 Volt Delco Plant or similar plant with storage batteries as used by the Hudson's Bay Company at their posts in the north.

I might add that the general appearance of the buildings erected by Prefabricated Homes Co. Ltd., appeared to be eminently satisfactory for use in the Arctic. Mr. Jacobsen's construction crew has given good service and you will note that a number of the points listed above are no doubt the responsibility of the Department of National Health and Welfare and have no bearing on the erection work.

Establishing Rukimo Camps North of Lancaster Sound

In discussion with Inspector H.J. Larson the question was raised whether a number of native families might be moved from Raffin Island and re-established on Devon Island, Ellemsere Island and other islands of the Canadian Archipelago. Inspector Larson was of the opinion that such a plan was quite feasible and provided the natives were willing to move he could see no reason why it should not be a success.

For example, at Dundas Harbour on Devon Island there are only two native families at present. These, of course, are employed by the R.C.M.P. Inspector Larson greatly favoured my suggestion that we place at least four families on the island and have the R.C.M.P., as they are elsewhere, responsible for their welfare. If the R.C.M.P. detachment could not carry sufficient trading supplies arrangements for the Rukimos to trade could be made and the trading could be...
conducted at shiptime. The supply vessel could carry the necessary trading goods. After all when I was at Pond Inlet the natives from Igloolik only tradecard once a year. In so far as Family Allowance supplies are concerned the R.C.M.P. could definitely handle this.

If the R.C.M.P. close Dundas Harbour and reopen Craig Harbour I still think some natives should be left on Devon Island and others established on Ellesmere Island, spreading out along the East Coast as far north as Bache Peninsula. If Bache was well stocked, plus a radio transmitter, the police could make a patrol back and forth visiting camps enroute. It would even be possible to go up from Craig in the spring - spend the summer at Bache - then return south in the fall or early winter.

There is no doubt that country produce is plentiful in the afore mentioned regions and Baffin Island Eskimos could easily live off the country. In this regard I understand that there is evidence that the Greenland Eskimos are hunting on Ellesmere Island and vicinity. Why not give the natives a chance to cover this country and also if it is considered necessary help improve the position regarding sovereignty rights.

Eskimo transported on board C.D. Howe

This summer eighteen Eskimos were moved by the C.D. Howe. Most of these were medical cases being brought out or returning after receiving the necessary medical treatment. All charges in connection with the medical cases have been forwarded direct to the Department of National Health and Welfare.

There were, however, a number of Eskimos transported at our request. You will recall that there were two native families that had been left inland at Pangnirtung to be moved to Pond Inlet. Kridluk E-1183 and his family were the only ones moved as the other family failed to get into Pangnirtung for shiptime on account of ice conditions. The Constable-in-charge at Pond Inlet is familiar with the Kridluk case and will see that he is established at Pond Inlet from where he will eventually return to his home in Fox Basin.

Another family that was moved and which I felt was the responsibility of our Department was Kowmo E-1695 and his adopted daughter Noooboyah E-1496. A number of years ago Nooboyah was brought from Clyde to Pangnirtung for medical treatment. Her step-father accompanied her. He was given employment at the Mission Hospital and placed in the Industrial Home. After the daughter's discharge she was given employment and received Nurse's Aid Training under the plan for training young Eskimo girls. Kowmo is old to do any useful work and this summer he and his daughter wanted to return to River Clyde.

On arrival at Clyde it was necessary to authorize Mr. Murdoch, Hudson's Bay Company Post Manager, to issue to Eskimo Kowmo a relief ration for two commencing in September and to continue thereafter as needed. He was also instructed to fill in the necessary Relief Application Form and submit it to the District Registrar at Pond Inlet for transmission to Ottawa.

Mr. Johnston drew my attention to the fact that our records indicate Kowmo was now entitled to Old Age Allowance, having been discharged from the Industrial Home. I informed Mr. Murdoch that this matter would be taken up with the authorities in Ottawa, in the meantime and unless advised otherwise, he could issue an Old Age Allowance to this man commencing October 1950.

It was also pointed out to Mr. Murdoch that although the relief ration was to cover Kowmo and his adopted daughter every effort should be made to encourage this young girl to get married and not be dependent upon her father's relief and Old Age Allowance in order to survive.

...21
The Deputy Commissioner,
Administration of the Northwest Territories,
Dept. of Resources & Development,
Ottawa 4, Ont.

Re - Eskimos from Northern Greenland
visiting the Canadian Arctic -
Infraction of Immigration Act.

On 24 October, 1951, the Department of External Affairs
forwarded to this Headquarters, by transit document, a letter
bearing No. 1805 dated 16 October, from the Canadian Embassy, Paris,
with enclosures. In this communication it was indicated that a copy
of similar correspondence had gone forward to your Department.

2. Mr. J. Malaurie of the Geographic Institute of France
evidently, whilst in Greenland, received the impression that Greenland
Eskimos have a permanent authorization to cross into Canadian territory
at any time they desire. Our files at this Headquarters contain no
information of any agreement between the Canadian and Danish Governments
relating to a permanent authorization allowing Greenland Eskimos to
enter Canada. For record purposes we would appreciate being advised
if there is such an agreement in effect. If the Danish Trading Company
have established a post at 5tha, Greenland, we feel that the Greenland
Eskimos will carry on extensive hunting and trapping operations on
Ellesmere Island and if this should be occurring the natural game
resources of that Island will soon be depleted.

3. It is suggested that the movement of Greenland Eskimos to
Canadian territory should be discouraged. Possibly you may feel justified
in taking this matter up with the Department of External Affairs with a
view to receiving co-operation from the Danish Authorities concerning
the matter in question.

4. A copy of a memorandum from Inspector Larsen dated 7 November,
relating to this matter, is attached.

(sgd) J. A. Peaceock.

Commissioner.
Ottawa, 22 November, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSIONER
OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

Mr. James Cantley of the Arctic Services Section of Northern Administration has been engaged in a survey of economic conditions amongst the Eskimo, and in April last the first 42 pages of his report were forwarded to you. I am now submitting for your consideration the remainder of Mr. Cantley's report, containing a review and his recommendations together with -

(a) A memorandum from Mr. J.G. Wright, Acting Chief, Northern Administration Division, concurring in the views expressed as to the desirability of certain changes in the administration of Eskimo affairs;

(b) A report by Colonel H.C. Craig, dated the 18th of October, on the financial aspects of the proposals.

2. The issue of Family Allowances, Relief, and Old Age Allowances to the Eskimo has been delegated to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Mr. Cantley expresses the opinion that these functions could be performed more efficiently by the post managers of the Hudson's Bay Company because -

(a) They are more numerous in the Arctic;

(b) They possess greater business ability;

(c) They have a better knowledge of Eskimo mentality than the Police officers who
are usually only in the North for relatively short periods.

He considers that under the present system the Eskimo are losing their initiative to provide for themselves and are rapidly becoming dependent on government assistance for a livelihood.

3. To correct the situation as far as possible, Mr. Cantley recommends that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police be relieved of the responsibility for Eskimo welfare and that this responsibility be delegated to the Hudson's Bay Company under the supervision of this Administration.

4. Colonel Craig, who has considered this proposal from the viewpoint of Treasury, states that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, being a unit of the Federal Government Service, complies with the provisions of the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act in the dispensing of allowances and relief. On the other hand, the Hudson's Bay Company, being the vendor of the supplies furnished to the Eskimo, is not in a position to do so. He points out also that, as Family Allowance payments are made from individual trust accounts, the administration of such accounts should not be delegated to the Company.

5. It is appropriate to refer here to a report from Inspector Larsen of the R.C.M.P., dated the 30th of October (copy herewith) sent to us confidentially by Commissioner Nicholson under date of the 7th of November. Mr. Cantley has dealt with Inspector Larsen's report in a memorandum of the 20th of November herewith. Inspector Larsen recommends the establishment of a Crown Trading Company. In view of the experience of the Newfoundland Government in establishing a Crown Trading Company, we cannot concur because financial control of expenditures would be difficult, the cry would be raised that the welfare of the natives was being placed in the hands of a few individuals, and the setting up of such a company would have the effect of entering into competition with private trading companies. Notwithstanding this, further reductions in the price of fur might mean the entire withdrawal of the Hudson's Bay Company from the Eastern Arctic, in which case the Government would be forced to either establish a trading agency or place administrative officers at key points.
6. Reference should also be made to an item in the Montreal Gazette of the 12th of November by Jean Michea of the National French Museum and part time lecturer at the University of Montreal who has been carrying on anthropological studies in the Eastern Arctic for the last two years. His suggestion, as a solution, is that Family Allowances be made more subtle so that the Eskimo would understand that he was not getting a hand-out but that he had to work to get the extra money, and that basic payments of these allowances be according to actual need. We are favourable to the suggestion but do not believe that Family Allowance legislation could be interpreted to put Mr. Michael's ideas into effect.

7. It has been suggested that an administrative officer, stationed at Chesterfield Inlet for instance, might maintain liaison by aircraft with the various police representatives and trading posts throughout the area to see that the departmental policy with regard to Eskimo welfare is in force; at the same time, by acting as Sub-Recorder to the Mining Recorder for the Arctic and Hudson Bay Districts at Ottawa, he could keep in touch with the mining activity at Ferguson Lake and Rankin Inlet. Against this proposal, an officer at Chesterfield would be no closer to Northern Quebec, where relief expenditures are greatest, than Ottawa - insofar as communication is concerned.

8. The tendency of the natives to remain at post centres for extended periods instead of continuing their former mode of life and the gaining of a livelihood from the sea and land is undoubtedly attributable to the encroachment of Whites, projects which give them employment, social legislation, and the availability of relief. While the increasing cost of relief is of real concern to us, the serious aspect is that the natives, with very limited opportunities of gaining a livelihood, are giving up their former mode of life and depending upon hand-outs of one kind or another to sustain themselves.

9. Some years ago an effort was made to establish committees at points in the Eastern Arctic, consisting of the R.C.M.P. officer, the Hudson's Bay Company representative, the Territorial Teacher, Mission representatives, and those of any other government agency at the point, the purpose being to develop a uniform policy and approach to the native welfare problem at each centre. The failure to implement this to a
successful degree can be attributed to the human trait of diverse interests of those stationed in a small isolated community and their inability to meet and discuss problems of interest to the natives in an unbiased way. There is no doubt that, with this Administration, all government and private agencies concerned have a real desire to place the Eskimo on a more sound economic basis. I refer to the R.C.M.P., the Hudson's Bay Company, the Indian Health Services and the Family Allowance Division of National Health and Welfare, the Department of Transport, and the Missions who have representatives at various points. I believe the situation warrants, in the first place, a round-table discussion by as many as possible of the following who have an intimate knowledge of the Eskimo problem, and, secondly, from this group the establishing of a committee to assist in determining policy:

Royal Canadian Air Force

S/L A. Copeland - former Hudson's Bay Company man
F/L S. Alexander - former R.C.M.P.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Inspector H.A. Larsen - knowledge of the Arctic through travel
(Staff Sgt. Weston
(Sgt. R.W. Hamilton - knowledge of the arctic through
(Cst. J. Gourley actual assignment at outlying posts)

Defence Research Board

(Lt. Col. Graham Rowley- several years in the Arctic on
(Thomas Manning exploration and research)

National Health and Welfare

Dr. R.N. Simpson - Superintendent, Indian-Eskimo Health Services, Eastern Arctic
National Museum

A.E. Porsild - extensive experience in the Arctic

National Film Board

D. Wilkinson - a young man with 18 months experience in the Arctic

Hudson’s Bay Company

Peter Nichols - Arctic Superintendent of the Hudson’s Bay Company

Northern Administrations

J.G. Wright
J. Cantley
A. Stevenson

Incidentally, R.H. Chesshire, Manager, Fur Trade Department, Hudson's Bay Company, will be in the city for a day or two beginning Monday, the 26th of November. If you could find time for a short talk with him and Mr. Wright, I believe it would be useful.

G.E.B. Sinclair,
Director.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

United States Activities in Northern Canada

1. The Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, in a recent letter to the Secretary to the Cabinet, has pointed out as follows:

"During the past few months reports have reached me of various activities being carried out by the United States Government in the Northwest Territories of which I had not been informed. I feel that having regard to the responsibilities of this Department and myself as Commissioner of the Northwest Territories that it is most important that we be kept informed of all proposed activities while they are in the formative stage. By that means we have an opportunity of studying the problems that may arise in respect of general administration and in more particular the safeguarding of the economy and welfare of the Eskimo . . . ."

and suggested that a meeting of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development be called to consider recent, and proposed, United States activities in Northern Canada.

2. Mr. Robertson, in replying to General Young, agreed that it would be useful to hold a meeting of the Committee, and added:

"The Interdepartmental Panel on Economic Aspects of Defense Questions has under consideration the complex question of the division of responsibilities between Canada and the United States for the financing, constructing, equipping and manning of new or expanded United States installations in Canada. The financial, material and manpower commitments involved in the Canadian 4-year defence programme adopted by the government early in the year are of such proportions that it does not appear possible to think in terms of Canada providing anything like all the installations and men required in this country by the United States and, as a result, I imagine that each proposed United States project will have to be considered on its own merits. In the circumstances, I doubt if the Advisory Committee on Northern Development could profitably discuss the question of division of responsibilities between Canada and the United States at this time."

3. Arising out of this exchange of correspondence, the Secretaries have prepared a memorandum which lists recent and continued United States activities in Northern Canada. This memorandum is attached as "Annex I".

4. Comments on Annex I, which might be circulated, are invited, following which it is proposed to hold a meeting of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development.

W.P. Chipman,
D.C. Evans, 8/L,
Joint Secretaries,
Advisory Committee on Northern Development.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its March 9, 1949 meeting, the Advisory Committee on Northern Development discussed the "Re-Canadianization of Northern Canada". A memorandum (Document ND-21, dated March 2, 1949) outlined the various United States projects which were then under way in Northern Canada. A later memorandum (Document ND-28, dated November 30, 1949) and discussions at the December, 1949 meeting dealt with the Northeastern Weather Stations.

2. This memorandum brings up to date the subject matter of Documents ND-21 and ND-28 and will form the basis of a discussion on current United States activities in Canada at an early meeting of the Committee.

II. WEATHER STATIONS

(a) Northeastern Weather Stations

3. Of the six Northeastern weather stations which continued to be operated by the United States at the end of World War II (Mingan, Chimo, Frobisher, Cape Harrison, Padloping and Indian House Lake) the only one which is still operated exclusively by United States personnel is Padloping. Although Transport had planned to take this station over this year, it was not found possible to do so because of the lack of suitably trained personnel, and the United States Air Force has agreed to continue operating the station until such time as Transport is in a position to take it over. The latest available figures, February 28, 1951, show that there are 15 United States service personnel stationed at Padloping.

4. (b) Joint Canada-United States Weather Stations

Arising out of an understanding reached early in 1947 between the Canadian and United States governments, five jointly operated weather stations (Eureka, Resolute, Iqaluit, Mould Bay and Alert) have been set up. At each station Canada is responsible for providing the officer in charge, half the personnel, their pay and subsistence and the permanent installations. The United States provides half the personnel and, until recently, has assumed all other costs, such as those in connection with temporary installations, equipment, fuel and transportation. This formula has been modified to the extent that the RCAF is now sharing airlift responsibilities with the USAF and is planning eventually to assume full responsibility for the air supply at the joint stations, although it might continue to require some assistance from the USAF.

5. The Department of Transport and the Royal Canadian Navy each have under construction an ice-breaker. It is expected that, when these vessels are in operation, Canada will share in, or take over, the responsibility for sea supply of the joint weather stations.

III. AIR FIELDS AND AIRSTRIPS

(a) Northwest Staging Route

6. The Northwest Staging Route continues to be used by the USAF aircraft in transit from the United States to Alaska. The USAF, in this connection, has a small number of personnel.
stationed at points along the route. On February 28, 1951, there were six at Edmonton, two at Fort Nelson and two at Whitehorse.

(b) Northeast Staging Route

7. The USAF makes use of the Northeast Staging Route both for the air supply of certain United States installations in Greenland and for the joint weather stations. The main landing field in Canadian territory used in this connection (apart from Goose Bay) is that of Frobisher, although, of course, for weather and other operational reasons it is occasionally necessary to use an alternative. The United States government has obtained approval to carry out Arctic air navigation and survival training courses based on Frobisher instead of at Churchill, which involves classes of from 12 to 20 periodically visiting there and the permanent stationing of four USAF personnel at Frobisher. In addition, approval has recently been given (Cabinet September 12, 1951) to the United States request to station approximately 300 additional personnel at Frobisher to survey and make necessary repairs to existing facilities and to construct and operate a radar station. Approval was given subject to the usual provisions with respect to authority of the Canadian Commanding Officer at the station and to the ultimate ownership of permanent installations.

8. The United States government, through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, is also understood to be asking for Canadian government approval to the stationing at Frobisher of an Army Airways Communications Service detachment, consisting of 31 persons, line of communication support personnel for Northern bases requiring 103 persons, and the use of the base as a weather alternate and refuelling stop requiring about 10 persons.

9. The United States government is also expected to request permission to replace the existing aircraft homing beacon at River Clyde with a more powerful one.

(o) Joint Canada-US Weather Stations

10. Each of the five joint Arctic weather stations (see para. 4 above) is supplied totally, or in part, by air, and therefore maintains, according to the season and the terrain, a land or ice airstrip. The main re-supply point is Resolute which has a year-round land airstrip.

IV. RADAR STATIONS

(a) Main Chain; Stations in Northern Canada

11. In addition to the radar station which is being built at Frobisher (para. 7 above), four stations in the Continental Radar Defence System will be located in Northern Labrador and Quebec - namely Cartwright, Hopevale, Hebron and Port Burwell. These stations will be built, maintained and operated by the United States, with Canada retaining title to the land and immovable property, and the right to take over when in a position to operate. An exchange of notes between the Canadian and US governments, dated August 1st, 1951, formally approved the policy with respect to the Continental Radar Defence System.

(b) Coburg and Ellesmere Islands

12. The United States government recently requested permission for the US Air Force to conduct surveys of Coburg Island and the East coast of Ellesmere Island, with a view to
to establishing in each locality a radar station as part of a
network surrounding the USAF base at Thule, Greenland.
Cabinet Defence Committee, on August 30, approved the proposed
surveys subject to the usual conditions regarding representation
of the RCAF and the provision to Canada of resultant reports,
and agreed that, in the event of a subsequent request for per-
mission for the USAF to construct and maintain radar stations
at these locations, the government, although unable to grant
long-term leases, would be prepared to grant such rights and
facilities as the USAF required in order to construct and
operate the stations effectively.

V. COMBINED EXPERIMENTAL AND TRAINING STATION, CHURCHILL

13. Experimental and development work on projects connected
with Army operations in the Arctic is carried out by United
States Service personnel at Churchill, Manitoba. According to
the latest available figures (February, 1951) there were 185
United States Service personnel stationed at Churchill.

VI. SURFACE COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Hydrographic Survey of Labrador Coast

14. The United States Navy completed in the summer of
1951, a four-year project consisting of the development of
up-to-date and detailed charts of the Labrador coast from the
entrance to Belle Isle Straits to Hamilton Inlet and Goose Bay.
This project which in the summer of 1951 involved the use of
two US naval vessels, of necessity included numerous landings
on the Labrador coast for the purpose of erecting triangula-
tion and other control stations.

(b) Haines Cut-Off

15. The Canadian portion of the Haines Cut-Off joining the
port of Haines on the Alaska coast with the Alaska Highway, is
of course maintained and operated by Canada, although this is
closed to traffic during the winter months. Cabinet, on
October 3, 1951, authorized the United States Army to make
relocation surveys in the vicinity of Miles 43 and 52 of the
Cut-Off, on the understanding that the survey team would
include Canadians and the permission to make the survey was
given without prejudice to a later decision concerning any
improvements on the road which the United States might propose.

(c) Haines-Fairbanks Pipeline

16. In August, 1950, Cabinet authorized the United States to
make a survey of the oil pipeline route from Haines to Fairbanks
which crosses both Northern British Columbia and the Yukon
Territory.

VII. COMMUNICATIONS

17. A recent Order in Council (PC 3484, dated August 8,
1951) grants authority to the Minister of Transport to permit
the United States government to establish and operate radio-
transmitting stations at authorized military and weather-
reporting establishments, and to employ non-British subject
operators at these stations.
The Commissioner,
R.C.M. Police,
Ottawa, February 8th, 1952.

Re: Proposed Movement of Eskimo Families from
Baffin Island to Ellesmere Island, N.W.T.

With reference to Inspection Report dated
September 17th, 1951, captioned, "Inspection - Craig
Harbour Detachment, 1951. "G" Division", and recent
telephone conversation with the Commissioner. I would
recommend that the Officer detailed to accompany the
Arctic Weather Station Re-Supply Mission aboard the
U.S.S. Icebreaker should, if possible, endeavour to locate
a Detachment site in the vicinity of Cape Sabine, on Pit
Island, off Ellesmere Island. Cape Sabine is situated across
from Etah, Greenland, and the U.S.S. Icebreaker will proceed
north along the Ellesmere Island coast on its proposed
trip to Alert Weather Station. It is thought that if the
U.S.S. authorities were requested for assistance in this
matter, the Commanding Officer of the Icebreaker would
co-operate, specially since it will hardly be out of the
way.

2. As you know, Craig Harbour was reopened last
year after being closed for over ten years but the dis-
advantage with Craig Harbour is that it is very poorly
located both from a patrol point of view and from a
supply point of view, as it is nearly always checked up
with ice. I discussed this latter point with Captain
CHUTNARD of the "G.D. HOWE" last summer and he informed
me that conditions were much more favourable for estab-
lishing and supplying a Detachment in the vicinity of
Cape Sabine than Craig Harbour. The Captain of the "G.D.
HOWE" had planned to proceed north from Craig Harbour last
summer but it was found to be too late as there were many
other assignments to carry out.

3. The advantages of placing our Detachment directly
across from Greenland would be that we then would have full
control and supervision of Greenland Eskimos and others
travelling back and forth, and over hunting activities they
may engage in. As you already know, we had a Detachment
established at Sakshe Peninsula in 1926, primarily for the
maintenance of sovereignty. This Detachment was closed in
1933 owing to the difficulties of supplying same, as the
annual supply ship had very little time to spare and the
ice generally remained in Buchanan Bay the whole summer.
I believe one mistake in connection with the Ellesmere
Island Detachments in those days was the hiring of Greenland
Eskimos exclusively (accompanied by their families) to act
as hunters and guides for our Detachments. People in those
days were under the delusion that Canadian Eskimos were
incapable and unsuited to live and travel in the islands
north of Baffin Island on account of the longer dark period.
This belief that only Greenland Eskimos were suitable was
no doubt based on the fact that the American Explorers,
PRAY and MACMILLAN, hired exclusively large numbers of
North-Greenland Eskimos with their families for their various
expeditions in the area and for their many attempts to reach
Re: Proposed Movement of Eskimo Families from Baffin Island to Ellesmere Island, N.W.T.

the North Pole. On the other hand Captain Otto SVERDRUP in the Norwegian "Fram" expedition spent the years from 1898-1904 in the same area and travelled quite as extensively without any Eskimo help whatever, and he spent his first winter in the neighbourhood of Cape Sabine, that is, he wintered in Rice Strait between Pim Island and Johan Peninsula, and, as SVERDRUP describes it, the country around there at the time was teeming with game both on the land and in the sea. Therefore, if we could get a Detachment established here, we should, in addition to the two native families employed permanently by the Police, endeavour to recruit three or four good Eskimo families from the Pond Inlet area to be transported up there for the purpose of trapping, hunting, etc., and thereby in a general way improve their economic circumstances. The Family Allowances which might be due to these people could be supplied by Northern Administration and Lands Branch, shipped up on the supply vessel with our own supplied and placed in our warehouse to be issued by our men as required. A small stock of necessities such as, ammunition, tobacco, tea, sugar, and some food could also, if found advisable, be stored at our Detachment and handled by our men for the benefit of the native trappers. The fur obtained by these native trappers could either be retained by the natives themselves or stored in our warehouse until the arrival of the supply vessel and be handed over to the Officer in Charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol who is a member of Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Dept. of Resources and Development, to be disposed of on arrival in Montreal at the fur auction sales and the proceeds credited with the proceeds. Our Detachment should be equipped with a wireless transmitting set so that in the spring we would know what fur the Eskimos had for disposal, also what their requirements are in the line of goods and equipment. This would prove a decided advantage to the natives because by this method they would only have to pay the freight charges on the goods shipped to them instead of the additional Pond Inlet Trading Post profit. At the present time the Family Allowances which are due our own employed natives at Craig Harbour are deposited to their credit at the Detachment at Pond Inlet, and arrangements are made by wireless in respect to any articles that the Craig Harbour natives wish to have shipped to them from Pond Inlet Trading Post. I wish to point out here that if the natives are to be helped to gain a livelihood the Police on Ellesmere Island would be the only persons there to look after their welfare and to help them both with advice and otherwise. The members I propose to station at the proposed new Detachment are keenly interested in the welfare of the Eskimos and speak their language as well as anyone and understand the natives' needs in that area.

4. The U.S. Weather Bureau and the Canadian Department of Transport, in conjunction with the R.C.A.F. and the U.S. A.F., have Weather Stations at Eureka Sound on Pusheen Peninsula and at Alert near the northern tip of Ellesmere Island, with considerable staffs. With a Detachment
Re: Proposed Movement of Eskimo Families from Baffin Island to Ellesmere Island, N.W.T.

located in the vicinity of Cape Sabine, two good men could carry out necessary patrols to both these Weather Stations in connection with the enforcement of the Game Regulations and other matters.

5. During the 1953 season it is believed that the R.C.H. Icebreaker, now under construction, will be in operation in the area, and in 1954 another Canadian Ice-breaker now being built for the Department of Transport will be in operation. Therefore, the supply situation, apart from the facilities afforded by the "C.D. HOWE", will be that much better.

6. If we fail to make suitable arrangements with the U.S.S. Icebreaker or with the "C.D. HOWE" this year for the search for a suitable location for a Detachment near Cape Sabine we could perhaps make a patrol to the area with the "ST. ROCH" during the summer of 1953 for that purpose and make the annual inspection at the same time.

7. In regard to the type of building for the proposed new Detachment, the building should not be an elaborate affair and not as elaborate as the new Detachment buildings being supplied elsewhere in the north these days. Our purposes would be served, I believe, by a good substantial two-room small house, the plans for which could be drawn-up in this Office. The material could be pre-cut and ready for erection. To tear-down either the present Craig Harbour or Bache Peninsula Detachment buildings, for rebuilding near Cape Sabine, would be impracticable and would cost more in time spent and inconvenience occasioned by delays than what they are worth; moreover, the buildings at both Craig Harbour and Bache Peninsula are very old now and not worth the effort in moving them; in addition they are handy to have in their present locations as standbys.

H.A. Larsen, Insp.,
Officer Commanding, "G" Division.
OTTAWA, 23 February, 1932.

Brigadier L. H. Nicholson,
Commissioner,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
OTTAWA, Canada.

Dear Brigadier Nicholson:

Referring to your letter of February 11th, 1932, I quite agree that a site around Cape Saxis would be preferable to Craig Harbour for your Detachment on Ellesmere Island.

It is noted that you are arranging to have an officer accompany this year's sea supply mission to look into this and other matters. You will also be interested to hear that we have arranged with the Department of Transport that the C.C.S. "C.D. Howe" will also examine any possible locations on the east coast of Ellesmere Island this season if ice and other conditions permit.

We have been considering, for some time, the feasibility of transferring Saxis to Arctic islands from other over-populated areas. There is no doubt that they could quickly adapt themselves to the changed conditions and could make a better living there than they are doing in their present locations. However, I would prefer to wait until we see what comes out of the meeting on Saxis affairs in May before taking any definite steps in this direction. This slight delay will, I presume, make no difference to your arrangements as I understand you are not contemplating moving Craig Harbour until 1933.

Yours sincerely,

H. A. Young,
Deputy Minister.
IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

DIV. FILE No. 31/151

H. Q. FILE No. 1512-2-4-3

Ottawa, February 29th, 1952.

The Commissioner,
R.C.M. Police,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

Re: Conditions Amongst Eskimos - Family Allowances Administration

1. I have to report that, in my opinion, one of the disadvantages resulting from the present method of paying Family Allowances to Eskimos is that it tends to make the Eskimos visit Trading Posts and Police Detachments regularly, sometimes every month, in order that they may draw their Allowances. This takes the Eskimos away from their hunting grounds, causing them to spend much time travelling to and from Trading Posts and Police Detachments, thus neglecting their hunting and trapping. The amount that each family receives each month is so small, having regard to the high prices of foodstuffs and other commodities in the north, that it is, in my opinion, not worth the time of the Eskimos to go into the Posts so often. I estimate that the average Eskimo family (those families having children) would consist of two children eligible for Family Allowances, at an average of $6.00 per month per child, that is, $12.00 per month per family. $12.00 does not buy very much in the north.

2. In my opinion it would be far better if the Allowances were paid out once a year, paid out not only in foodstuffs but in other authorized commodities, such as clothing for the children; rifles, ammunition, canoes and boats and camping equipment for the adults. The children benefit by the parents having better equipment with which to pursue their hunting and trapping.

3. The R.C.M. Police could institute a system whereby the various Detachments could arrange to be at the various settlements or Trading Posts in their Detachment areas at a certain time each year. The natives would know the dates of the visits and could all be in the Post at that time. For instance, our Pond Inlet Detachment could decide that they would pay annual Family Allowances to natives of Pond Inlet Settlement and immediate vicinity, at Christmas-time each year in Pond Inlet. At Arctic Bay in their Detachment area they could plan to be there around the 15th of February each year; at Igloolik in their Detachment area they could plan to be there around the 25th day of February each year; at Clyde River in their Detachment area they could plan to be there at Easter-time each year. Our members whilst at the Posts at these times of the year could check all the families and their children and issue orders on the Trading Post to cover the whole of the past year's Family Allowances.
credits. Whilst there could be to it that the articles which the Eskimos bought with their Allowances are those which are going to be the most use to them.

4. It would eliminate a great deal of clerical work for all concerned (Police, Traders, and Department officials and employees) if Family Allowances Issue Vouchers were done away with. I would say that it would be sufficient for accounting and control purposes if the Traders merely submitted invoices for the sum of the goods supplied rather than showing every item of merchandise as is done on the issue vouchers. If our men were present at the annual payments and issued the orders on the Trading Posts, as suggested above, there would be just as much and in many cases more control over the issues of Family Allowances than there is under the present system.

5. A great deal of clerical work would be eliminated if the Police were to deal direct with the Family Allowances Division of the Department of National Health and Welfare in Ottawa, in respect to Family Allowances Accounts, and if the Traders sent their invoices direct to that Department, rather than sending them to Northern Administration and Lands Branch of the Department of Resources and Development, as at present, who in turn send them to the Family Allowances Division of the Department of National Health and Welfare.

6. At the present time, the Family Allowances Accounts for individual Eskimos and groups of Eskimos are kept by one particular Registrar (Police) or Sub-Registrar (Trader) depending upon where the particular native or group of natives had been living at the time that Family Allowances were first introduced and this has a tendency (even though provision is made in the regulations for the transferring of accounts from one district to another) to keep the particular native or natives permanently in that particular district which is contrary to the nomadic habits of the natives and therefore bad. A native should be free to travel where and when he wants to. If he knew that no matter which district he moved to he would still receive annual Family Allowances payments when the Police made their annual visit he would not be inclined to stay permanently in any particular district merely on account of Family Allowances.

7. I would make an exception in respect to annual payments for the Attawak registration district which is a small district. There the Eskimos could very well draw their Family Allowances oftener than once a year but I am of the opinion that the Eskimos in that District should be paid their Family Allowances by cheque. The Indians in that district receive Family Allowances cheques and the Eskimos there are every bit as capable of handling Family Allowances cheques.
Re: Conditions Amongst Eskimos - Family Allowances Administration

I am submitting the foregoing recommendations with a view to having them placed on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting on Eskimo Affairs which is to be held in Ottawa next May, if you see fit to send this report to the Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, for that purpose. I hope that we will receive a copy of the agenda some few days before the meeting opens so as to have an opportunity to study it and perhaps to make suggestions for items to be included in it.

H. A. Larsen, Insp.,
Officer Commanding, "G" Division.
Dear General Young:

Re: Problems affecting Eskimos.

1. I have your note of February 20th informing me of the intention to hold a meeting in Ottawa on May 16th, in order that there may be a full discussion on the problems affecting Eskimos.

2. Most certainly I will be glad to attend and contribute in any way possible. I would like Inspector Larsen to accompany me, and it may also be that I would like to take along one of the senior Officers from the Directorate. I cannot designate that Officer at once, but if it is suitable, I will let you know well in advance of the meeting.

3. I will go over the draft Agenda accompanying your note with Inspector Larsen, and if we have any thoughts on further items which might be added, I will get in touch with you.

4. I am sure the proposed meeting should do a great deal of good.

Yours sincerely,

Major General H.A. Young,
Deputy Minister,
Department of Resources and Development,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

LHN/PLS
The D-O.I.

1. To note.
2. It seems to me that either you or the Asst. D-O.I. should also attend this meeting, and depending on circumstances at the time, I will ask that the name of one or the other be added to the list of delegates.

OTTAWA, 3-3-52. Commissioner.
A year ago, the undersigned had conversations in Ottawa from which it was hoped that the Hudson's Bay Company would build an outpost on Banks Island and thus encourage a number of Eskimos who had left the Island four years previously for the mainland to return and trap. This project did not materialise mainly because of the uncertainty of the fur market, and the high cost of maintaining and operating a trading post. Little also was known of the cyclical fluctuations of the fur and game resources, thus making a trading venture precarious. The Hudson's Bay Company had suggested an alternative, i.e. to outfit a number of the better Eskimos at Tukttoyaktuk and persuade them to cross from the mainland to Banks Island with a year's supplies. Last summer, the undersigned worked on this alternative proposal, and, as a result 27 Eskimo or 9 families left Tukttoyaktuk on the 4th Sept. for Banks Island in the two native schooners, 'North Star' and 'Reindeer'. Their destination was Saks Harbour on the west coast of Banks Island. Credit Advances were made as follows:

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</tbody>
</table>

The N.W.T. Administration which is responsible for Eskimo affairs was anxious to eliminate large scale relief among the Eskimos on the mainland, and all efforts were in consequence directed towards their rehabilitation to the Arctic Islands. Having been successful in moving these nine families to Banks Island, and it was known that ice conditions would prevent them from returning to the mainland until late July, and, if further Eskimo families were to be encouraged to go, some information regarding the natural resources and the general economic conditions should be obtained before next summer.

For can the high morale value of such a trip at this time be underestimated.

Accordingly, plans were made to undertake this trip and the following persons were selected for the trip:

- L.A. McPhee, Administrator
- Dr. McEwan, Surgeon
- Sgnt. De Valgaughan, R.C.A.

Each member would take out a separate report on the conditions prevailing in
Re: Problems Affecting Eskimos

Referring to your minute to me dated 3-3-52, forwarding correspondence concerning the meeting to be held on May 19th, 1952, including a copy of the proposed Agenda.

2. In addition to my suggestion that the matter of our personnel in the field paying out Family Allowances just once a year, which I dealt with in my report to you of February 29th, 1952, and which the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories has advised you will be added to the Agenda, I have the following additional suggested additions:

(a) For the purpose of the conference define what is meant by "The Native Way of Life", ("The Native Way of Life", in my opinion is the absolutely primitive way of life which the Eskimos followed before the advent of the white men and traders. Since then they have not followed altogether their native way of life because their lives have been controlled by the traders who have given priority to trapping for fur instead of the Eskimos spending their lives hunting for meat which they did before the traders came).

(b) What legal authority exists which gives the Department concerned authority to control Eskimo affairs, and to what extent?

(c) The desirability of having legislation passed by parliament for the control of Eskimos and Eskimo affairs.

(d) The desirability or otherwise of bringing the Eskimos under the Indian Act (assuming that parliament does not pass an Eskimo Act) having regard to the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada, in 1939, ruled that Eskimos are Indians within the meaning of the British North America Act.

3. Attached hereto will be found, for your information and that of A/Supt. Peacock, my comments on the various items listed in the proposed Agenda which you sent to me.
Re: Problems Affecting Eskimos - Comments on Items Appearing in the Proposed Agenda of the Meeting to be Held on May 19th, 1952.

1. Recent Changes - Eskimo Economy.

(a) The decline of available country food appears to be more pronounced in the seas off the Coast of Northern Quebec (Ungava Bay, Hudson Strait, Hudson Bay) in so far as seals and walruses are concerned. It should be remembered, however, that seals and walruses are usually difficult to obtain anywhere in Eskimo territory in wintertime. In so far as land game in Northern Quebec is concerned, that is, caribou, they have almost entirely disappeared. Also, the natives have, to some extent, in recent years, lost their skill and/or patience in hunting.

(b) The employment of Eskimos at Air Bases has been very beneficial to them and to their families. These employed natives should receive the same pay that is paid for comparative work to white persons. A system should be devised whereby their pay would be controlled or administered by some competent authority (police for instance, who are actually doing it at Frobisher Bay now to some extent) and surplus monies, if any, banked for them. This to be done until such time that they are able to look after their money affairs themselves. Traders should not be allowed to act as bankers for these employed Eskimos for the reason that it gives the traders too much say as to how the Eskimos' funds should be spent.

(c) In addition to the low price of white foxes and consequent reduced Eskimo income, the items which they buy from the Trading Posts have increased considerably in price, thus the Eskimos are adversely affected both ways.

(d) - - -

(e) It is doubtful whether there is any more expenditure on relief these days than there has been over the past twenty years or more, having regard to the higher present-day prices of commodities, but even if relief costs are higher these days after allowing for present-day prices, it probably just means that in previous years Eskimos who needed relief didn't get it. In some places, more advanced than others, the natives have become used to certain whiteman's food (obtained by them from their own income in good times) which in years past they did without, but which they now come to look upon as more or less necessities.

(f) Family Allowances payments and Old Age Assistance payments and Blind Pensions payments, are good and necessary welfare measures for the Eskimos. It would be better to pay Family Allowances to the natives once a year instead of every month or every two or three months, so as to keep them more on their hunting grounds and away from the Trading Posts and eliminating the waste of time taken up by travelling from their hunting grounds to the Trading Posts and return, (the foregoing suggestion respecting payments annually has been added to the Agenda at our suggestion by the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories). As an alternative to annual payments the Eskimos could be issued by the Departments concerned with a sort of credit book or card, on which would be
Re: Problems Affecting Eskimos - Comments on Items Appearing in the Proposed Agenda of the Meeting to be Held on May 19th, 1952.

stamped, by the police or traders, the dates and the values of each issue. With such a credit book or card a native family need not confine itself to perpetually trading at the same Trading Post (in other words, confine themselves to the same general district) but would be freer to move around to other hunting grounds and to obtain their allowances at the nearest Trading Post.

2. Cumulative Effects of Government Aid.

(a) - - -
(b) Declining native morale and independence is not a recent happening. It commenced with the advent of the white men.

(c) It is not unlikely that one of the causes for Eskimos congregating around Trading Posts is the feeling amongst them that they want a more civilized way of life and more of the amenities of the whiteman's way of life, for themselves and their children. In fact, if their children are to get any schooling, under present conditions, it is almost necessary that the families congregate around the Trading Posts. Another cause, to a lesser extent, is the fear they have of starving to death if they go too far away from the Posts. That fear has been expressed to the police by certain natives in the Port Harrison and Fort Chimo Districts. Another probable cause is that in past years the traders were themselves responsible for the natives staying at the Post longer than what was good for them. In past years when fur was fairly plentiful close to the Trading Posts the traders welcomed the Eskimos to the Post as much as they could (as long as the Eskimos brought in fur) and made much fuss of them, particularly favouring the good or successful trappers but ridiculing the unsuccessful trappers. The unsuccessful trapper is not necessarily a poor provider for his family. In many cases the opposite is true. There are still many natives who prefer to spend their time away from the Posts hunting for meat for their families rather than trapping for fur.

3. Functions of R.C.M. Police in Respect to Eskimos.

(a) (b) (c) Patrols by the R.C.M. Police for the maintenance of law and order are entirely a matter of concern for the R.C.M. Police and have nothing to do with the administrative work in Eskimo welfare. Parliament has decreed that the R.C.M. Police shall be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the Northwest Territories (reference Sub-Section 3, Section 12, R.C.M. Police Act. See also Section 40, Northwest Territories Act). In respect to the enforcement of the Game Ordinance, the R.C.M. Police are responsible for that as for the enforcement of other Ordinances. I consider that the civilian Game Officers or Game Wardens now employed in the District of MacKenzie by the Northwest Territories Government are not necessary - the police can do all that is required in respect to the Game Ordinance.
Re: Problems Affecting Eskimos - Comments on Items Appearing in the Proposed Agenda of the Meeting to be Held on May 15th, 1952.

I consider that the R.C.M. Police in Eskimo territory should continue doing the welfare work pertaining to Eskimos. There are no other persons in the country more competent than they to do it and moreover we are doing it now and have been doing it for a great number of years even before the advent of Family Allowances and other allowances. We are doing it now without any help, in the field, from any employee of the Department and that includes the clerical work as well as the field work. We were short of personnel a few years ago but that is not the case now. For instance, we are sending a member of the Force to Aklavik to do nothing else there but Eskimo welfare work which includes the clerical work, and which is enough to keep one man fully employed. The Eskimos prefer to do business with and bring their troubles to the police rather than to others. The police are the most logical persons to control and to have supervision over Eskimo welfare.

Suggestions Received for Improving the Situation.

(a) The establishment of a Government Trading Organization offers the most hope of salvation of the Eskimos from their present economic situation, unless the Eskimos were to be left to follow their original primitive way of life, but it is too late now for them to follow their original way of life. The Danish Government established Government control trading for Greenland Eskimos. If our Government feels it cannot establish a Government Trading Organization, then, as an alternative, I consider that the Government should encourage and assist the Eskimos to organize and operate native co-operative stores as is done now in Alaska where the U.S. Bureau of Education supervises the native stores. I am quite sure that the Canadian Eskimos are capable of running their own stores. A start could be made slowly, first in the most likely places, employing the most likely Eskimos, and then expanding. In addition to trading their fur the Eskimos could make and trade their handicraft work. They could be encouraged to do more handicraft work. The possibilities of their running leather tanneries for their seal skins should be explored. With these measures and encouragements the natives could regain their confidence in themselves which they have lost to some extent through being continually told, by other persons, what they should and should not do.

(b) It might be useful to have resident Eskimo Agents in the country. Such Agents could be the Welfare Teachers or School Teachers. Such Agents should be persons of understanding and very practicable. Each Agent could have a large territory to administer, including in it a large number of Eskimo settlements and camps. One of the duties of the Agent could be responsibility for the efficient running of co-operative stores. He could order the supplies for the stores and do the marketing of the furs and handicraft work.

(c) It is said that the H.B. Company is losing money in Eskimo territory. If they were to withdraw from the territory their Trading Posts could be taken over as co-operative stores by the Eskimos.

(d) The desirability of consolidating grants of Family Allowances payments, Relief payments, Old Age Pensions payments,
Re: Problems Affecting Eskimos - Comments on Items Appearing in the Proposed Agenda of the Meeting to be Held on May 19th, 1952.

and Blind Pension payments, has been advocated by the R.C.M. Police in the past. Two of the best reports pertaining to that are Cpl. G.A. Mansell's report dated at Port Harrison, P.Q., April 24th, 1950, and Cpl. W.J. G. Stewart's report dated at Port Harrison, P.Q., December 22nd, 1947. Cpl. Mansell, in his report, suggested a basic minimum grant of between $5.00 and $8.00 per head for every Eskimo man, woman and child every month, to take the place of the Allowances and Relief payments. In respect to consolidating other native income, that is, their income from fur, handicrafts, and sealskins, etc., most of our detachments have at various times over the years, suggested some form of Government control of trading. If control of native income was established, the prices of the commodities sold by the traders would have to be controlled also. If co-operative stores were established the storekeeper could keep individual credit accounts for each Eskimo which would include Family Allowances grants and other grants, as well as native income from trapping, etc. The individual Eskimo would then know how his credit standing stood and he would be encouraged to endeavour to better himself. If co-operative stores were established it could be impressed upon the Eskimos that the stores are their own and that each has a share in it and that therefore, each was responsible for making a success out of it. There is a lot of natural enthusiasm in Eskimos. They just need the proper encouragement and guidance.

(e) I cannot say very much about the desirability of a Trust Fund until details of the proposal are made available. The Government would have to make a grant of money in order to establish a Trust Fund. Monies could be drawn from the Fund to start co-operative stores.

(f) I think that a "floor" under fur prices as paid in the country would work out much the same as would a subsidy on fur, that is, the traders would benefit greatly whilst the Eskimos would make only a pittance of gain out of it. It would only be a makeshift and not get to the root of the trouble with Eskimo economy.

5. Policy on Eskimo Education.

(a) (b) (c) (d) If the living standards of the Eskimos are ever to be raised they will require education, and education will interfere with their so-called nomadic life, but their nomadic life has, to a large extent, already been eliminated by changing them from hunters of meat to fur trappers. Fur trapping keeps them comparatively close to the Trading Posts to which they go often with their fur, and of course, the traders encourage them to do as much trapping as possible. If the Eskimos were living their true nomadic way of life they would, to a large extent, be living hundreds of miles away from Trading Posts, following caribou herds or fishing some good lakes or streams or camping at good sealing and walrus grounds.
Re: Problems Affecting Eskimos - Comments on
Items Appearing in the Proposed Agenda of
the Meeting to be Held on May 19th, 1952.

Anything in the way of education, whether Federal or
mission day schools, residential schools or hostels,
itinerant teachers, summer schools, manual and technical
training in the country, advanced educational facilities
or technical training in "outside" institutions, literature
in the Eskimo language, the teaching of the use of Roman
Script in place of syllabics, the teaching of English, etc.,
should be introduced if the Eskimos are ever to attain a
higher standard of living.

Conditions differ greatly in different parts of Eskimo
territory in respect to the degree of education already
attained. In places like Aklavik I would say educate the
Eskimos quickly and thoroughly as they already have so much
background there. In places like Spence Bay, Cape Dorset,
and Pangnirtung, what is immediately needed are small
industrial or mechanical schools where mechanical work, such
as, the care and repair of engines, the making of fishnets,
the manufacture of harpoons, and such like, could be taught,
as well as handicrafts, and where some of the old people,
now too old to hunt and trap, could spend their remaining
years making handicrafts and teaching native handicrafts
to the younger people, and where at the same time, these
old people could be themselves looked after.

6. Policy on Employment of Eskimos

(a) An immediate policy is required which should take care
of a long term policy. It is questionable as to whether or
not the Eskimo population is actually increasing (see Item
7 (b). In the Western Arctic the population seems to have
been reduced drastically as compared with thirty years ago.
The present Eskimo Vital Statistics if used to determine
whether or not the population today has increased as com­
pared with thirty years ago, would not be reliable, because
Vital Statistics were not taken in any part of the Northwest
Territories until 1926, and for a number of years after 1926
the Eskimo Vital Statistics Registrations were simply not
bothered with to a very large extent. Neither would the
1951 Decennial Census, as compared with the 1941 Decennial
Census, be reliable for comparison purposes because, whereas
the 1951 Census is in all probability almost one hundred
percent accurate, the 1941 Census was not at all accurate,
particularly in that part of Eskimo territory in Northern
Quebec.

(b) There is really no valid reason why the Eskimos should
be made or encouraged to continue to exist as hunters and
trappers in the Arctic, especially if they don't want to.
(Recently, some two or three Eskimos from the Aklavik District
have joined the Canadian Army, and others want to join). If
they could get some other work in the Arctic which education
might fit them for, then it would be perhaps better if they
were encouraged to stay in the Arctic. The fact that they
are as free as white persons to move where and when they
want to must be kept in mind.

(c) I would say that the more employment that is found for
Eskimos other than as hunters and trappers, the better. I
think it is useless to talk of them resuming the native way
of life. They should be brought to a whiteman's standard
as quickly as possible in those localities, such as, Aklavik
Re: Problems Affecting Eskimos - Comments on Items Appearing in the Proposed Agenda of the Meeting to be Held on May 19th, 1952.

and Fort Chimo, where they have been in contact with white men for a considerable number of years and where they have already partially taken to the whiteman's way of life. In general, Eskimos can easily adapt themselves to the white-man's way of life if given a little direction, and they can quickly learn trades and occupations.

(d) In addition to the various occupations listed in (d) of the Agenda, I believe the Eskimos should be given employment as seamen on such Government Vessels as the "C.D. Howe" and the "N.B. McLean" in Arctic waters.

7. General.

(a) Wherever the Eskimos continue to remain as hunters and trappers permanent wooden dwellings should be built for them or by themselves under competent direction at the various settlements, which dwellings they would keep clean and sanitary. There should be separate buildings for their meat and blubber and skins. There should be a community hall in each settlement. They will quickly learn to keep their surroundings sanitary if they are given the opportunity and facilities to do so.

(b) It will be very interesting to hear the opinions of the Medical Officers who are to attend the conference, and particularly interesting to know whether or not, in the opinion of the Medical Officers, native health and strength is deteriorating, and whether there is any indication at the present time that the Eskimos are deteriorating in health to the "Point of No Return", that is, to the point where their health and that of their off-spring is deteriorating so rapidly as to point to the possibility of the extermination of the race.

(c) I doubt whether the Eskimos need the help of any scientific studies to enable them to obtain more caribou, walrus, etc. Their ancestors obtained those mammals since time immemorial. I consider that Eskimos should be allowed to take a certain number of Greenland whales, but today, with the exception of one old man at Pangnirtung, probably none of the Eskimos know how to hunt these large whales, nor have they the necessary equipment. A small whale catching vessel (such as those used by whaling firms) purchased by the Government, would be a great asset in the Eastern Arctic. It would have to be manned by experienced white whalers. It could also be used for trawling for fish and for seal and walrus hunting.
NOTES FOR DEPUTY MINISTER RE OPENING OF ESKIMO CONFERENCE, MAY 13-20TH.

OBJECT OF THE MEETING

TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TRADING COMPANIES, MISSIONS, AND ALL DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND EXPRESS OPINIONS WITH THE OBJECT OF IMPROVING THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE ESKIMO.

THE MEETING WILL AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY OF HAVING DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW PRESENTED. I HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE OPEN AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS AND FOR THIS REASON THE PRESS WILL NOT BE ADMITTED TO THE MEETING.

THE MEETING IS NECESSITATED BY THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION REGARDING THE MANY PHASES OF ESKIMO ACTIVITY. WE HAVE PROBLEMS RELATIVE TO EDUCATION. WE HAVE PROBLEMS OF FOOD RESOURCES, BOTH THOSE THAT CAN BE PURCHASED AND THOSE OBTAINABLE FROM LOCAL RESOURCES. WE ALSO HAVE THE EFFECT OF THE DECLINE IN FUR PRICES ON THE NATIVE ECONOMY.

RULES FOR OPENING AND CARRYING ON DISCUSSIONS

IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE MANY MORE PEOPLE ATTENDING THE MEETING THAN ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR SPEAKERS TO BE BRIEF AND TO THE POINT. I DO NOT WANT TO ENUNCIATE ANY FIRM RULES BUT I FEEL THAT IF EACH GROUP WOULD RESTRICT ITSELF TO ONE SPEAKER AND LIMIT THE TIME OF ANY TALK TO FIVE MINUTES THAT WE WILL MAKE BETTER PROGRESS. YOU WILL NOTE THAT WE HAVE A TAPE RECORDER SO THAT WE CAN TAKE VERBATIM THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH TAKE PLACE. IN A REPORT OF THE MEETING WE WOULD, OF COURSE, CONTEMPLATE A VERY MUCH CONDENSED VERSION.

PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED

FIRST CONSIDER PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE UNDERLYING CAUSES, THEN PROCEED TO A CONSIDERATION OF WHAT CAN BE DONE AT ADMINISTRATIVE AND FIELD LEVELS TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS.

AFTER THAT CONSIDER WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE EDUCATION AND HEALTH AND WELFARE SERVICES.

FINALLY CONSIDER WHAT CAN BE DONE BY WAY OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY AND IMPROVED CONSERVATION METHODS TO PERMIT GREATER UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES.
AGENDA OF MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED AT A
GENERAL MEETING ON ESKIMO AFFAIRS TO BE
HELD MAY 19, 1952, IN THE BOARD ROOM,
FOURTH FLOOR, CONFEDERATION BUILDING,
OTT. 111.

1. Recent Changes in Eskimo Economy
   (a) Decline of availability of country food in some areas.
   (b) Employment at bases.
   (c) Low price of white foxes and reduced income.
   (d) Increased prices of store commodities.
   (e) Increasing relief costs.
   (f) Advent of Family Allowances, Old Age Assistance, and Old Age
       and Blind Pensions.

2. Cumulative Effects of Government Aid
   (a) Native awareness of two sources of supply.
   (b) Native morale and independence reported on decline.
   (c) Encouraging congregation around posts rather than dispersal
       to their former hunting grounds.

3. Functions of R.C.M. Police in Respect to Eskimos
   (a) Patrols for the maintenance of law and order and enforcement
       of game regulations, etc.
   (b) Registrars for Vital Statistics - Family Allowances, Old Age
       Assistance, and Old Age and Blind Pensions.
   (c) General supervision of native welfare.
   (d) Eskimos and Liquor.

4. Suggestions Received for Improving the Situation
   (a) The formation of a Government trading organization.
   (b) The appointment of Eskimo agents.
   (c) Better utilization of existing facilities and closer
       co-operation with the Hudson's Bay Company.
   (d) Desirability of consolidating and controlling native income
       so that it may be used to the best advantage and reduce the
       necessity for issuing relief.
   (e) Establishing a Trust Fund to improve Eskimo economy.
   (f) Placing of a "floor" under fur prices paid in the country.

5. Policy on Employment of Eskimos
   (a) Consideration of long-term policy to be followed in providing
       for a steadily increasing Eskimo population.
   (b) Are Eskimos generally to be encouraged to live in the Arctic
       as hunters and trappers?
(c) Are they to be encouraged to take other employment, temporary or permanent, that later may have the effect of unsuiting them or their families for resuming the native way of life?

(d) Exploration of the possibilities of finding permanent employment in the Arctic for the average Eskimo or for those who could be trained in any particular field, viz.,

(i) as Canadian citizens or as a branch of the Armed Services to occupy and patrol the Arctic - for the purposes of sovereignty and security;

(ii) as labourers and mechanics at Arctic settlements, radio and meteorological stations, airfields, etc.;

(iii) as specialists in trades such as carpentering, boatbuilding, the designing and making of suitable clothing, repairing rifles and guns, clocks and watches, cooking, practical nursing, midwifery, etc.;

(iv) development of a wider range of vocations, e.g. handicrafts, eiderdown industry, etc.;

(v) greater development of fisheries and the use of fish, particularly in the Eastern Arctic;

(vi) consideration of improvements that could be made in methods of hunting and fishing;

(vii) reindeer herding;

(viii) transfer of groups to under-populated areas.

6. Policy on Eskimo Education

(a) Consideration of the problems of bringing education to a nomadic people without disturbing their native way of life -

(i) Federal and Mission day schools in the settlements;

(ii) Residential schools or hostels;

(iii) Itinerant teachers;

(iv) Summer schools;

(v) Manual and technical training in the country;

(vi) Advanced educational facilities and, or, technical training in outside institutions.

(b) Periodicals or pamphlets in the Eskimo language - problem of translating into various dialects.

(c) The possibility of teaching Eskimos in the Eastern Arctic the use of Roman script for their own language instead of syllabics.

(d) Teaching of English.

7. Health and Welfare

(a) General medical, dental and eye care;

(b) Incidence of tuberculosis;

(c) The problems raised by the prolonged treatment of natives at outside hospitals, including care of families during hospitalization, and of convalescence and rehabilitation after their return home.
MEETING ON ESKIMO AFFAIRS
HELD IN THE BOARD ROOM OF THE CONFEDERATION BUILDING
ON THE 19TH AND 20TH OF MAY, 1952

Chairman
- Major-General N.A. Young,
  Commissioner of the
  Northwest Territories

PRESENT:

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<th>Department of Resources and Development</th>
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<td>Department of Resources and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. C.H. Herbert</td>
<td>Chief, Economic Division</td>
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<td>Mr. A.J. Baxter</td>
<td>Chief, Editorial and Information Division</td>
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<td>Mr. G.E.S. Sinclair</td>
<td>Director, Northern Administration &amp; Lands Branch</td>
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<td>Colonel H.C. Craig</td>
<td>Financial Adviser, National Parks Branch</td>
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<td>Colonel J.P. Richards</td>
<td>Administration Section, Canadian Wildlife Service</td>
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<td>Dr. V.E.F. Solman</td>
<td>Chief Biologist, Canadian Wildlife Service</td>
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<td>Mr. J.S. Tener</td>
<td>Canadian Wildlife Service</td>
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<td>Mr. J.F. Doyle</td>
<td>Administration - Northern Administration and Lands Branch</td>
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<td>Mr. J.G. Wright</td>
<td>Chief, Northern Administration Division</td>
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<td>Mr. J. Cantley</td>
<td>Arctic Services, Northern Administration Division</td>
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<td>Mr. A. Stevenson</td>
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<td>Mr. R.E.G. Johnston</td>
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<td>Mr. J.C. Jackson</td>
<td>Conservation &amp; Management Services, Northern Administration Division</td>
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<td>Mr. E.N. Grantham</td>
<td>Education and Welfare Service, Northern Administration Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. T. Clifford</td>
<td>Conservation &amp; Management Services, Northern Administration Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. J.R.E. Bouchard</td>
<td>Public Services, Northern Administration Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. A.E. Forslid</td>
<td>Botanist, National Museum of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. J.D. Leechman</td>
<td>Archaeologist, National Museum of Canada</td>
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Northwest Territories Council

Major D.M. MacKay
Commander L.C. Audette
Air Commodore W.I. Clements

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Commissioner L.H. Nicholson
Inspector H.A. Larsen
Superintendent J.A. Peacock

Deputy Minister of Health
Director, Old Age Pensions Division
Regional Director, Family Allowances Division
Registrar of Foreign Births, Family Allowances Division
Assistant to Regional Director, Family Allowances Division
Assistant to National Director, Family Allowances Division
Department of National Health & Welfare (contd.)

Indian Health Services
Dr. P.S. Moore - Director
Dr. R.H. Simpson - Regional Superintendent, Ontario and Eastern Arctic
Dr. H.A. Procter - Assistant Director

Department of Citizenship and Immigration

Indian Affairs Branch
Colonel E.H. Jones - Superintendent of Welfare
Mr. P. Phelan - Superintendent of Education

Defence Research Board
Mr. G.W. Rowley - Arctic Research

Department of National Defence
Colonel E.H. Webb - Directorate of Military Operations & Plans
Flight-Lieutenant S.E. Alexander - Survival and Arctic Problems

Department of Transport
Mr. R.W. Rae - Telecommunications Division
Mr. M.C. Risteen
Mr. G. Wells
Mr. J. Wyatt

Department of Fisheries
Dr. W.M. Sprules - Chief, Fish Culture Development Branch, Conservation and Development Service

Hudson's Bay Company
Mr. R.H. Chesshie - General Manager, Fur Trade Department
Mr. P.A.C. Nichols - Manager, Western Arctic Section

Roman Catholic Missions
The Most Reverend J. Trocquier - Vicar Apostolic of Mackenzie
The Most Reverend M. Lacroix - Vicar Apostolic of Hudson Bay
The Most Reverend L. Scheffer - Vicar Apostolic of Labrador
The Reverend G. Laviolette - Assistant Superintendent, Indian Welfare Training Commission

The Reverend R. Buliard
The Reverend J.E. Pelletier
The Reverend C. DeHarveng

Anglican Mission
The Right Reverend D.B. Marsh - Bishop of the Arctic
The Venemable J.H. Webster - Archdeacon of Aklavik
The Reverend Canon H.G. Cook - Superintendent, Indian Welfare Commission

United States Embassy
Colonel J. Bollerud - Air Attaché Office

National Film Board
Mr. D. Wilkinson
The meeting was opened by the Honourable Robert H. Winters, Minister of the Department of Resources and Development and presided over by Major-General E.A. Young, Commissioner of the Northwest Territories.

In outlining the purposes of the meeting and the reasons why such a conference was considered more necessary now than at any time in the past, reference was made to the changes that have been taking place in the Arctic, particularly during the past decade and the effects they are having on the Eskimo economy and way of life. The decline in white fox values, increased cost of merchandise and apparent declines in the availability of food resources in some areas have all had their effect on the native population, as have also temporary employment at military bases, a seemingly greater incidence of disease, payments of family and other allowances, and increased relief issues. Greatly improved means of transportation and communication and the rapid opening up of the country by outside interests are constantly presenting new problems and emphasize the necessity for educating and preparing the native population to meet them. In view of the many divergent opinions held on what could or should be done to cope with changing conditions, it was felt that a collective approach by all those interested would be the most practicable one and it was hoped that everyone present would take advantage of the opportunity to express his views frankly. The Minister expressed the appreciation of his department as the one chiefly responsible for the administration of Eskimo affairs for the interest which had brought together so many experienced people from private organizations and government departments to discuss the problems involved.

The agenda was then taken up and the following summarizes the main points raised and the views expressed.

1. Recent Changes in Eskimo Economy

2. Cumulative Effects of Government Aid

Developments in the Canadian Arctic were reviewed from the entry of the whalers during the latter part of the nineteenth century to the present day, particular reference being made to the changes that have taken place in the Eskimo economy and way of life since the opening up of the fur trade early in the present century.

It was recognized that conditions vary greatly in different parts of the Arctic and can also vary within the same area and from year to year. Canadian Eskimos can, however, for all practical purposes, be divided into five main groups from east to west, viz., Northern Quebec and Newfoundland-Labrador; Baffin Island; Central Arctic including Southampton Island; Western Arctic; and the Mackenzie Delta. Of these, the Mackenzie Delta group is considered to be the farthest advanced culturally and the best off economically. Northern Quebec and Newfoundland-Labrador are the most densely populated and the poorest economically.

Although there are reported declines in some food resources in certain areas, most Eskimo groups can still obtain a large part of their living within their own country. All, however, have now passed the primitive stage when they were wholly self-sufficient and they could not survive without much of the supplies and equipment they obtain from the trade stores. The drastic decline in white fox prices during recent years, accompanied by greatly increased prices of store goods, has therefore had a very adverse effect on the economy of most groups. The least affected have been the more remote settlements where hunting has remained the principal occupation. While this situation may be temporary and results cannot be gauged on a
short-term basis, the fact remains that such occurrences create serious difficulties and make it necessary to consider what remedial action can be taken.

Natives employed at military bases during the war who became accustomed to living in heated accommodation and to receiving regular wages and rations, have also posed a problem during recent years. Families, particularly, which grew up at these bases, have found it very difficult to adjust themselves to the life of the hunter, fisherman and trapper now that employment has ceased. This raises the question as to whether Eskimos should accept such employment if it is to be only temporary or if it does not offer prospects for their families as they grow up.

The decline in fur revenue has been off-set in part since 1945 by issues of family allowances and direct relief, amounting in all to some $1,687,000. While these issues have done much to assist the Eskimos over this difficult period, the effect on morale has not been all that could be desired. It has now become apparent that in many instances the natives are coming to depend on such issues rather than on their own efforts for a living. There has been a decided tendency, particularly among the poorer groups, to forsake their former hunting way of life and to congregate in larger groups near the settlements where they can obtain this assistance more regularly. This trend raises the question as to whether present policy and arrangements for issuing family allowances and relief should not be carefully revised.

3. Functions of the R.C.M. Police in Respect to Eskimos

The enforcement of law and order and the laws of the Northwest Territories are considered to be a minor part of the R.C.M. Police duties in the Arctic. Eskimos as a race are law-abiding and there is little crime. The Police are mainly occupied in welfare work among the natives and act as representatives of other departments in the Arctic. They act as registrars of vital statistics, control the issues of family allowances, old age allowances and pensions, pensions for the blind and relief to the destitute. They assist in establishing Eskimos in better hunting grounds and in caring for them during periods of sickness and epidemics. They also issue game and hunting licences, fur export permits, act as post-masters and surveyors of boats, and collect revenues for various departments.

In common with others, the R.C.M. Police have found difficulty in interesting and retaining suitable personnel for Arctic work but steps are now being taken which it is hoped will correct the situation.

4. Suggestions Received for Improving the Situation

Consideration was given to various suggestions that have been made for the improvement of the administration of Eskimo affairs.

A recommendation that has been put forward from time to time was brought up again at this meeting, i.e. that Canada should adopt the Greenland policy of closing Eskimo territories and creating a state monopoly of the trade. In this instance, it was proposed that a government organisation should take over the administration and trade of all Eskimo territories except those of the Mackenzie Delta and Northern Quebec, and endeavour to educate and bring the natives in those areas to a stage where they could ultimately take over and handle their own affairs, either as individuals or as members of co-operatives. In brief, it was proposed to take the best in both the Greenland and Alaskan systems and endeavour to adapt them to meet...
Canadian requirements. The advantages claimed for such an organization were that the administration and trade would be centralised under one authority, both at headquarters and in the field; that it would be staffed by people who know the north; that it would allow assistance to be extended to the Eskimos without giving such assistance the appearance of charity; and that any necessary subsidies and losses could be absorbed more readily by the Government than by private enterprise. Mission activities would not be interfered with and the co-operation and assistance of local committees - white and Eskimo - could be sought where practicable.

The feeling of the meeting was that although the main problems were economic and there was need for close supervision and guidance of all Eskimo affairs, a change from private to public ownership and direction would not in itself provide a solution. It was felt that the Hudson's Bay Company was providing an efficient and satisfactory service at these northern places and that if assistance had to be given to Eskimos, it could be extended through existing agencies by the development of special projects or by means other than creating and subsidising a government organization. While the Greenland system had apparently worked satisfactorily while primitive conditions prevailed in a closed territory with scant resources, it had proved inadequate under the stress of modern development and was now being discarded as quickly as possible to permit the opening up of the country and to encourage participation in the development of its resources by private enterprise. Keeping in mind that Canadian Eskimos were not legally wards of the government, it was not considered desirable to attempt at this late date to segregate the Eskimos or to retard native progress in any way. Solutions to the problem should be sought rather through co-operative effort on the part of all agencies directly concerned, including the natives themselves. It was agreed, however, that this subject would be further explored at a later date.

A suggestion that special field representatives should be appointed to supervise Eskimo affairs in much the same way as Indian agents act on behalf of Indians was not very favourably regarded. It was pointed out that the R.C.M. Police were already functioning in this capacity and although detachments could not be maintained at all centres, the supervision given was probably as effective as that which could be given under any other arrangement, particularly in view of the distances to be covered and the difficulties of travel. Here again, it was felt that more could be accomplished by closer co-operation among those already in the field than by adding to the existing organizations. It was pointed out too, that with the improved means of transportation now available, most places in the Arctic were as accessible to staff working out of Ottawa or other centres as to agents residing in the country. The possibility of having regional supervisors in some of the more important areas was left for consideration at a later date.

Ways by which the Eskimos could be assisted, not only in meeting the present crisis, but in adapting themselves to the changes that can be anticipated in the Arctic in the future, were discussed. Education along practical lines was regarded as being the prime requirement but it was recognised that until such time as these people can be brought to a stage where they can intelligently handle their own affairs, they will have to be given assistance and above all, some form of leadership and direction. Attention was drawn to the equal dangers of doing too much for them as of doing too little, thus breaking down native incentive and morale. Assistance, where it is to be given, should be extended in a way that would encourage the Eskimos to feel that they were expected to remain self-supporting.

Consideration was given to means that might be taken to widen the Eskimo economy and to guarantee the natives a reasonable standard of living. Among suggestions made were the placing of a floor under fur prices, the subsidisation of freight and equalisation...
of rates throughout the Arctic, the consolidation and control of spending native income from all sources so that it may be used to the best advantage, the development of small industries and local projects, and the setting up of trust and revolving funds to encourage thrift and the development of native enterprise.

No definite conclusions were reached on what could be done along these lines but it was arranged that the practicability of these suggestions would be more fully explored and dealt with by a small committee which it was proposed should be set up to make a detailed study of Eskimo affairs.

5. **Policy on Employment of Eskimos**

Although it was agreed that the bulk of the Eskimo population must and would prefer to continue to live in the Arctic, it was suggested that provision would ultimately have to be made to assist those capable and willing to do so to move outside and find other employment. Hitherto, the growth of the Eskimo population has been limited by the hazards of its environment; disease, starvation and a declining birthrate kept it at a level where it could subsist on the resources available. It was pointed out, however, that with an effective medical and welfare program the population could increase so rapidly that the natural food resources would become quite inadequate to supply its needs. Relief would therefore have to be sought either by enabling the people to earn sufficient in the country to purchase imported foods and other goods or to take up employment in other areas.

At present, there are less than 250 whites employed in various capacities in Eskimo territories, so that unless there are very extensive future developments, the opportunities open to Eskimos in their own country, even when they become capable of taking up such work, are definitely limited.

It was agreed, however, that the educational program should be directed to fitting Eskimos to take over as many of the jobs as possible that may become available in the north country.

It was felt, however, that the immediate need was to assist the natives to continue to follow their traditional way of life as hunters. This assistance could be extended by seeing that they were properly equipped and placed in the most suitable areas for hunting. Movements could be initiated from over-populated or depleted districts to areas not presently occupied or where the natural resources could support a greater number of people. Steps should be taken to assist the Eskimos in improving their hunting techniques and in interesting them in making fuller use of all the resources available.

This did not mean the Eskimos should be discouraged from accepting any suitable employment that may be offered so long as they could be assured that it would be reasonably permanent or that by following it they would not become wholly incapable of returning to their native way of life if it should fail. The present systems of rotating employment at certain establishments and of allowing native employees reasonable time off for hunting were discussed, as were also the desirability of standardizing wages, rations and other perquisites of natives employed by various organizations.

Consideration was also given to the possibility of extending the employment of natives in such organizations as the Canadian Ranger Force and at northern meteorological stations. It was also recommended that the possibility of introducing small local industries whereby the natives could at least supply their own needs should be carefully explored.
6. **Policy on Eskimo Education**

The problems involved and the progress made in bringing education to a widely scattered nomadic race were reviewed.

Federal day schools are now operating at Aklavik, Tuktoyaktuk, Coppermine, Port Harrison, Port Chimo, Cape Dorset, Chesterfield Inlet and Southampton Island. The Roman Catholic and Anglican missions, assisted by Federal grants, maintain eighteen other day schools and four residential schools at places where missions are established. It is estimated that about 500 children are attending these various schools but it would be impossible to increase this number greatly without disturbing the native mode of life. Residential schools are not favoured because it has been found that children who spend the formative years of their lives there have considerable difficulty in taking up the native life again after they return home. Day schools in most communities can effectively reach only the very small number of children actually resident in the settlements. To overcome these difficulties, it was recommended that summer schools should be opened where children from outlying districts could be accommodated in hostels and taught during the summer months. It was considered that such an arrangement which would enable children to spend about half their time at school and the other half with their parents in the native camps would be the most satisfactory, provided arrangements could be made to have the children transported to and from the schools at these seasons.

Attention was drawn to the need for a program of adult education at centres where this would be practicable, particularly among patients in outside hospitals. The average tuberculosis patient has to spend about three years in hospital and usually finds it very difficult to return to his normal pursuits after discharge. It was considered, therefore, that any practical training that could be given to him during this period would give him an interest while in hospital and could also probably help towards his rehabilitation after his return home. Technical training in mechanics and radio, which could possibly be put to use in the north, were among the subjects suggested for men, and training as nurses' aids and in midwifery for women.

The curricula at schools vary widely depending on the stage of development reached by the Eskimos in the various areas but include the essentials of reading, writing and arithmetic, together with such other subjects as it is found possible to introduce. It was emphasized that the approach to education should be realistic and practical and, at the outset at least, only those arts in which the Eskimos are interested or of which they can make practical use should be taught.

In view of the difficulty of getting teachers and nurses for work in the north, it was recommended that steps should be taken to select and train promising Eskimos for such duties. A few have already shown interest in and aptitude for work of this kind and if a sufficient number of pupils came forward, the possibility of establishing a normal school or training centre in the north might be considered.

Consideration is also to be given to the types of text books to be used in Eskimo schools. It was apparently thought that some of those in use in the Provinces were not entirely suitable for Eskimo children and that there would be advantages in having special text books prepared.

There was some difference of opinion as to whether English or Eskimo should be the language used for instruction in schools. While it was agreed that Eskimos should certainly be
encouraged to learn English, it was conceded that Eskimos would have to be used extensively for a number of years yet in dealing with subjects of general interest. To assist in overcoming dialectal differences and formalizing the Eskimo language, it was recommended that Roman script should be substituted for syllabics in writing. Roman script is used in Greenland, Newfoundland-Labrador and the Western Arctic and its use in the Eastern Arctic would greatly facilitate the preparation of text books and other publications in Eskimo for use throughout the Canadian Arctic. It could also conceivably permit the use of literature published in Greenland and Newfoundland-Labrador.

7. Health and Welfare

The Department of National Health and Welfare assumes responsibility for the medical care of Eskimos throughout the Arctic. Full-time doctors are maintained at Aklavik, Chesterfield Inlet and Pangnirtung, where hospitals are operated by the Roman Catholic and Anglican missions under grants from the Federal government. Nursing stations are operated by the Department of National Health and Welfare at Coppermine, Southampton Island, Port Harrison, Port Chimo, Cape Dorset and Lake Harbour. Tubercular and other patients requiring prolonged treatment are brought out to Charles Camsell Hospital, Edmonton, Parc Savard, Quebec, and the hospital at Goose Factory, Ontario. Medical facilities at Churchill, Frobisher Bay, Gander Bay and other centres are also used from time to time when required. The C.G.S. "C.D. Howe" is fully equipped for medical work during her patrol of the Eastern Arctic and carries a doctor, dentist, X-ray technician and hospital staff. With the co-operation of the Canadian National Institute for the Blind, eye specialists and opticians also accompany this patrol every few years. The C.G.S. "H.B. McLean" also carries a doctor who attends to the needs of Eskimos and others encountered during this vessel's summer patrol of Hudson Strait and Baffin Bay. Western Arctic requirements are met by medical staff patrolling out of Aklavik and Edmonton by boats or planes. It is estimated that the annual cost of medical services to Eskimos is not less than $1-million. Appreciation was expressed for the services rendered by the R.C.A.F. in dealing with emergencies and in transporting Eskimos to and from hospitals.

Reference was made by the Department of National Health and Welfare to an apparent deterioration in native health conditions in recent years. Tuberculosis has an incidence now of 7 - 8 per cent and runs as high as 12 per cent in Newfoundland-Labrador. There are now some 300 Eskimos under treatment in southern Canada, of whom over 90 per cent are being treated for tuberculosis. A measles epidemic took a toll of 10 per cent of the population of Ungava Bay early this spring. It spread to southern Baffin Island later in the year but the casualties there were comparatively light.

Dealing with suggestions that had been made to have more Eskimos treated at hospitals in the Arctic rather than brought out to hospitals in the cities, it was pointed out that apart from the much heavier costs that would be involved, modern treatment of tuberculosis requires the services of specialists, who are available only in the larger centres in the south. It was realized, however, that it would be preferable to have as many Eskimos as possible grouped together in one hospital, and enquiries were being made regarding having a 200-bed hospital in Halifax set aside for this purpose.

The problems involved in the after-care of discharged patients were considered. Many of these, after years in hospital, were unable to return immediately to the rigours of native life and there were others partially or totally disabled who could never resume their normal pursuits. Although provision is made for special rations to convalescents and for assistance to the disabled, it was felt that there is need for some intermediate rehabilitation centre
May 22, 1952

THE G.C. "G" DIVISION, R.C.M.P., OTTAWA, ONTARIO.

re: Eskimo Affairs.

At the conference held in this connection on May 19 and 20 several subjects which might be of interest to members in the field were discussed. As it is quite likely that the fact that the conference was held will become known to field personnel and also that certain matters were discussed, I think it would be appropriate to give members in the Northwest Territories a short statement of what actually transpired at the conference before exaggerated or misleading information concerning the conference reaches them.

2. I think a short statement regarding the conference might be compiled and distributed to detachments in the Northwest Territories as an interim instruction to be cancelled in possibly six months time. The statement should deal shortly with health and welfare, education, employment and also the discussion regarding the general economic condition of the Eskimos.

3. The fact that a recommendation was made to the conference that a Government trading organization be set up with the ultimate objective of being turned into local co-operatives should be mentioned. As you know such a trading organization would in effect supplant all traders as they would not be able to compete with a Government controlled trading establishment. When this information reaches the North the traders and our personnel may feel that it is only a matter of time until the traders are forced to close their posts and
this might cause embarrassment for the traders and friction between them and our personnel. This I wish to avoid so accordingly our members should be told of the recommendation made, but additionally that no decision was reached regarding it although it was referred to a standing committee for further study. It should be impressed upon our members that until such time as some decision is reached there should be absolutely no change in their relationship with the traders.

4. Would you please have a statement along the foregoing lines drafted and forwarded to me for approval before it is sent out.

(L. H. Nicholson),
COMMISSIONER
MEMORANDUM TO

THE COMMISSIONER

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

Re: Conditions Amongst Eskimos

I have tried to analyze Inspector Larsen's report dated September 22 and break it down into headings as follows:

(a) Legal status of Eskimos
(b) Position of R.C.M.P. in Eskimo affairs generally
(c) Transportation of supplies to Eskimos and return of furs and products by Government vessels
(d) Native councils
(e) Criticism of N.W.T. officials
(f) Illegitimate children
(g) Publicity

2. I think the view generally held now is that Eskimos are not wards of the Government but have complete citizenship rights. There was a Supreme Court decision holding that Eskimos and Indians were in the same category but I do not think that is the opinion held by Northern Administration officials. The problem could be decided by legislation as Inspector Larsen suggests and to follow his other suggestions the Eskimos must be made wards to make them subject to control by the Federal Department. There might be some advantage in airing the Eskimo problem in the House.

3. I think Inspector Larsen is suggesting that the Force accept almost complete responsibility for the Eskimos and do away with field N.W.T. administrative officials. He suggests that Detachment members could supervise Eskimo hunting methods, establish local camps where sick persons could be rehabilitated and also provide nursing service. This is a large order and would to a great extent remove supervision of the Eskimos from the Department and put it in the hands of the Force. It seems to me that it would confuse two functions and would not work unless, (1) we were prepared to accept a good deal of the responsibility, and (2) the N.W.T. administration was entirely in agreement.

4. The matter of supplying Eskimos by Government vessel and transporting their furs and products outside by the same means comes very close to the establishment of Government trading posts. Certainly if the Government operated to that extent in competition to the independent traders the traders would not be able to exist.

5. Inspector Larsen suggests that local native councils be set up in order that the views of the Eskimos might be obtained with respect to their own welfare. I think this would be a good plan but would require organization under an administrative official.
6. The criticism directed against N.W.T. officials is that a number of them are ex-traders and still think and act as such. I cannot express an opinion on this but certainly Baker Lake Detachment report August 11 and Inspector Larsen's memorandum September 19 indicates a lack of interest by one such official in the welfare of the natives.

7. The illegitimate children problem, especially in the Eastern Arctic, seems to be reaching alarming proportions. It is a difficult problem with which to deal and the matter of passing legislation providing punishment for white men who cohabit with Eskimo women out of wedlock might be considered. Any such legislation would have to be carefully drafted and we would need a legal opinion as to whether it could be passed by the Northwest Territories Council or whether it would have to be put into the Northwest Territories Act.

8. The heading of publicity is closely related to the problem of airing Eskimo conditions in the House. I cannot suggest any way that journalists might be encouraged to study the problem and unless they knew something about Eskimo ways and psychology I am afraid their writings would be misleading. Mr. Wilkinson has dealt with the matter quite well but I doubt that it is the responsibility of the N.W.T. administration or the Force to encourage publicity, a great deal of which would be adverse to present administration.

9. Attention is directed to the final paragraph of Inspector Larsen's memorandum in which he suggests that a Detachment be established at Clyde River.

Supt.

R. A. Peacock
Asst. D. C. I.

27-9-52
JAP/MWB
The C.G.F. "C.D. Howe" sailed from Montreal on her third voyage to the Eastern Arctic, on June 27, 1952 at 8 a.m.

**L I T E N E Y**

The following is a list of the ports of call made on the voyage from Montreal to Churchill and the actual dates of arrival and departure at each:

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<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Date of Arrival</th>
<th>Date of Departure</th>
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<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
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<td>June 27</td>
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<td>C pe Bannister</td>
<td>July 1</td>
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<td>Quebec</td>
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<td>July 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>July 20</td>
<td>July 26</td>
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<td>Knivit (One Hope Advance)</td>
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<td>Fugluk</td>
<td>July 31</td>
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<td>Iggyvit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Harrison</td>
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<td>Aug. 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Churchill</td>
<td>Aug. 7</td>
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**Passengers**

Personnel carried on this part of the voyage were as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Department/Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. R.T.C. Johnston</td>
<td>Officer-in-Charge, Western Arctic Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. R.G. Christie</td>
<td>Deputy Governor of Greenland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. R.E. Johnston</td>
<td>Senior Medical Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. R.E. Robertson</td>
<td>Dentist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J. Cameron</td>
<td>X-ray Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J. Cameron</td>
<td>Dental Technician</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. J. Cameron</td>
<td>Medical Attendant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. J. Cameron</td>
<td>Postmaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J. Cameron</td>
<td>Hydrographer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. J. Cameron</td>
<td>Northern Ranger</td>
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Mr. & Mrs. J. Houston of the Canadian Handicraft Guild were picked up at Cape Hope’s Advance for passage to Cape Dorset.

Mr. & Mrs. A.F. Appleshipe the welfare teacher and a Nurse from Cape Dorset arrived at Iuvivik by Petrelhead boats, and embarked on board the "Hope" for Churchill.

Mr. Charleston of the Department of Transport remained with us until our return to Quebec where he disembarked and returned to Ottawa after Mr. Wallingford had completed the required number of hours flying from ships to qualify for his licence.

Thirteen Eskimo patients were also returned from Hospitalization, two for the Quebec coast, one for Pond Inlet and eleven for Cape Dorset. The Cape Dorset natives disembarked at Iuvivik and proceeded to Dorset by Petrelhead boats.

Weather and Ice Conditions

The usual amount of fog was encountered in the Belle Isle Straits and along the Labrador Coast, but good progress was made to Cape Harrison. Field ice of a width of 40 miles was encountered just outside the entrance to the station at Cape Harrison. This ice was similar to the ice in Ungava Bay last year. Capt. Fournier proceeded through at slow speed but encountered one piece which grounded well to just below the waterline, thus necessitating the return of the ship to Quebec and Montreal for repairs. No further ice was encountered except a few bergs until we were off the west coast of Hudson Bay enroute from Port Harrison to Churchill. Here we encountered approximately 60 miles of close-packed ice, which stretched as far north as Eskimo Point. The Helicopter was used to this point to find what leads there were and guided the ship through at slow speed.

Ports of Call

Cape Harrison

The call was made at this point for the sole purpose of discharging approximately 250 tons of cargo for the Department of Transport, Radio Station at this point. The cargo was landed in approximately a day and a half by means of the two snows and barge, which the ship carried. After this call we returned to Quebec for repairs.

Koontuk & Cape Hope’s Advance

We arrived at Koontuk late in the evening of July 29th and were met by Father A. Steineck the R.C. missionary at that point.

The Department of Transport Station is some distance along the coast at Cape Hope’s Advance.
Education

Father Steinman keeps the school open for approximately two hours each day having about sixty pupils of all ages in attendance. He uses a large common room attached to the residence and conducts his classes in small groups on the floor. He has one very small black-board attached to the wall, in such a position that only a small number can see it at once. He has asked that another board be supplied. Father Steinman has made good use of the three primary books "We Look and See, We Come and Go, We Work and Play" and finds these very good and well received by the Natives. Father Steinman suggests that wooden blocks, showing different animals with their syllabic and English name, would be very useful in teaching the younger children.

Game Walrus

Walrus are very plentiful this year around Akpatok Inland in Ungava Bay, and hunts are being made there from both Koastak and Payne Bay. The Walrus at this point are very large as compared with reports from the west and west coast of Hudson's Bay, where they reported the Walrus taken as very small. A boat which had just returned had nine Walrus on board, having lost two.

Fur

The sea-fur seal and common seal are very plentiful, and particularly in the spring around Bina Bay. Nets are used quite extensively in this area for sealing.

White Whale

The White Whales are very plentiful in the spring of the year around Cape Hopes Advance and Diana Bay.

Shark

Father Steinman reported that shark are very plentiful in the area this past year.

Employment

Up until the early part of this year the H.C. Mission have employed a native family to look after their hunt, and keep the house and grounds tidy. This year Father Steinman felt that by dispensing with the service of a permanent native family, in the employ of the Mission, he could utilize this money amongst a larger group. Then the natives regarded as school they do the cleaning inside the building as part of their education.

The Officer in Charge at the Radio Station at Cape Hopes Advance reported the employment of George Kotook and family effective August 1, 1942, at a salary of $40.00 per month plus $5.00 per month for his wife and children. The previous incumbent Klimen 79-1130 had already left on the S. S. McCall for England. Klimen left the employment of the Department of Transport with the following:

Two dogs, Dog harness, Koati', Kyak (not quite completed) Tent, Primus stove, Blankets, 25 Fox traps, Fish net, Rifles, 26, 3042, shot gun, Telescope, 50 feet rope, Axe and Hunting knife.

He also had a credit remaining on the Department of Transport books of $211.21 less some goods of the approximate value of $135.10, which were being forwarded to him, having
boat for transportation back to Cape Dorset instead of being taken the rest of the way to Churchill and return. The sessions of justices for those returning natives were held, and at a general
exemption, they had to be purchased from the Chief Assessor on
board the "Glenie". In any future trials of this nature it would
be preferable to purchase tickets either in Montreal before
sailing or at a Hudson's Bay Company's post enroute.

One native Panikia de PS-1073 was returned to his home here at
Ivujivik, and one native Hecjussie was taken on board in his
place, and discharged to St. Boniface Hospital, Winnipeg, with
a bad knee. The General Superintendence and Health of the Fakino at
this point is much better than last year, although the natives
are still suffering right through the spring.

**Port Harrison**

On arrival at Port Harrison on Saturday August 2nd, and
encountered about 15 miles off the post, much further out than
in previous years. As in the past the co-operation of the
Department of Transport radio station was lacking, and after
radio calls on our nightly raid we could not raise this
station. However, Constable Mehe reported that the Department of
Transport had heard the "Glenie", but as we were using the
Hudson's Bay Company frequency on our call, Mr. Hotblack told him
that they did not have the authority to answer us on that
frequency. Unfortunately due to the fire at the radio station
1st floor the Hudson's Bay Company set was used by the
Department of Transport. Constable Mehe's police set, which
is crystal-controlled, did not work. However, Constable
McBride gave the word that we could be in sometime on Saturday.

At this point the medical party all worked ashore in
the station, with the exception of the Central section, which worked on board, not as only three natives were referred to them by the medical officer.

**Movement of Natives**

Mr. Sluchman reported that the Hudson's Bay Company
are planning this year on putting a group of Fakino families
on the Ootne Island. Mr. Sluchman and Constable Mehe
have investigated the island and at this time appeared to be
fairly plentiful.

Constable Mehe reported that the native camp at
Port Harrison had been moved to the creek islands where they will
be in a better position to look after themselves.

With reference to the transfer of natives from Port
Harrison to Richmond Gulf, this project got under way April
23. Due to adverse weather conditions the families got held
up at Peguis and are unable to proceed until the M.C.W.
patrol in early July, when they brought a little boat from
Port Harrison. Constable Mehe did not know how this experiment
was progressing, however a report will be submitted this fall
when the natives return to Port Harrison.

If it is desired to save any native camp off the
Quebec coast and north to Puffin Island Amputar 53-034.
Polly while 19-74 and eight other families of the Port Harrison
reservist have signified their willingness to move. In order that
they might encourage natives to move from Quebec to better
hunting grounds it is suggested that those people be moved next summer
on the "Horse".

A large number of Esquima are in the Moose Factory
Indian Hospital the question of mail addressed to these people
came up. On occasion the mail for the hospital has all been
placed in one big and 1 baled for the hospital, however, due to
their being no stamps on the letters the mail was not delivered.
The natives in the hospital have the same difficulty as they
cannot write hose unless they are able to purchase stamps.
I suggested to Constable Gibson that he forward all letters in
a government envelope, and send them direct to the Hospital for
distribution. The same system could apply at the Hospital that
we have in effect at Fort Howard.

It was pointed out that no progress report had been
received at Port Harrison recently on the condition of the
patients in the Moose Factory Hospital. No doubt Dr. Harper
had the reports with him when he arrived after we left. With
Dr. Harper now no longer at Moose Factory, Dr. Simpson might
be requested to secure quarterly returns for us from the
institution and to decide then be certain that the next of kin,
be informed of the condition of their relatives.

Constable McRae reported that on the same the
Indian Agent at Moose Factory was still instructing him to bring
patients into the post to be transported to Hospital, as well as
sending returning patients direct to him with orders to be given
a special Indian section. The Indian Health Service maintains
a nursing station at this point, and as the responsibility of
being the only nurse at this point, and as the responsibility of
bringing in the returning Indians to their own camp is
the responsibility of that service, these communications should
be routed through Mrs. Hewlitt, the nurse in charge. It is
also suggested that the Constable in charge of the R.C.M.P.
detachment at Moose Factory be kept informed of the movement
of Esquima in and out of Hospital at Moose Factory, either
directly or to another hospital in one of the provinces. As you see, more Esquima are sent to
numerous hospitals in Ontario, without our knowledge.

Hendier Inc.

The Hendier & Hendier at Port Harrison is being
opened with much success. As mentioned in
the previous report this subject the prices were still high,
however, as Hr. Burton advised Dr. Flaugher to increase his price
to the native, and of course, the Hendier & Hendier had to
increase theirs as well. It is suggested that this be done to make
the Hendier & Hendier at Port Harrison a better producer.

Relief

The report of the Relief at Port Harrison was still quite high, although
Constable McRae has reduced it considerably due to efficient
handling of the recipients and placing them in better hunting
grounds.

Country Produce

The country produce around Port Harrison is fairly
plentiful particularly Seal and Fish. There are a number of
excellent fishing spots within a very short distance from the
post.
It is reported that a large group of Murder are now wintering on the north Tchesher Islands.

Employment

Mr. Piaschuk reported that nearly all the employed natives are returning to save a portion of their monthly salary and in building up a substantial credit with the company. This is in response to an appeal made to the white residents to impart to their employees in order that they will not be a burden on the community, and government should they lose their employment.

Family Allowance

As Constable McRae was being transferred to Bker Lake, I took the opportunity of going over his records. Contrary to our past practice his previous post all accounts and records were up to date and in order for the new Constable in charge.

Education

In company with Mr. Hall, architect with Toner Construction Company, the school and teacher at Port Harrison were inspected. With the school決, the buildings had settled again but not completely into their final position. There were still large cracks in the interior walls, and along the roof. Mr. Hall felt that this is a high-wire table crossing, that caused the buildings to move. He felt that by jacking the buildings up, and clinching the new beams under them that repairs could be completed, and the building restored. He also felt that the ventilator at the end of the building to prevent rain and snow blowing in the insulation. I feel Mr. Hall will repair the building and leave them in good order.

Mr. Hall felt that in future the choice of sites should be left to the engineer in charge of construction. I have asked Mr. Moss Anderson of the Department of Transport who was formerly with our department to check the completed work on these buildings, when he visits Port Harrison in September.

Then I went to Fort Riel from this spring it was very difficult to check the interior paint. I note out that the interior needs painting. The only part that remains is the put on in the front of the before the buildings were closed. Next for this might be added to the requisition for next year.

Miss Hinds is teaching approximately 35 children in the school and 16 one children, the class in all times. She thinks the best teacher we have found for this type of work in the present time. Miss Hinds has also done a large amount of work in adult education during her stay at Port Harrison.

Churchill

On left Port Harrison in the afternoon of the 5th of August, and arrived in Churchill in the early afternoon of the 7th. Arrangements were made to immediately dispatch the cargo which was on board for Fort Chimo, and other points at which the "Voice" had not called, and to take on the cargo for the second half of the voyage. Mr. Coutley arrived in the evening of Monday August 11th and I left for Ottawa on the noon plane Tuesday out of Churchill.
Ottawa, October 14th, 1952.

The Commissioner,
R.C.C., Police,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

Re: Greenland Eskimos Hunting in Canadian Territory

The following radiogram has been received from Mr. ELVIN, Department of Transport Officer in charge of Eureka Weather Station, Ellesmere Island, N.W.T.:

"OCTOBER 13TH 1952
FN ELVIN EUREKA NOT
TO ZEN/CONTROLLER DOT TORONTO OUT
ZEN/INFO REICHELDERT REC VIA DO
INFO 6C RCSP 9 DIV OTTAWA OUT

TWO ESKIMO CHILDREN TWO ESKIMO ADULTS ARRIVED THIS STATION BY DO TEAM OCTOBER ONE YEAR AND FROM INFORMATION HAVE BEEN LIVING VICTIMITY HACHE PENINSULA FOR ONE YEAR C.A. TRIP TOOK EIGHT STEERS FROM HACHE. STATION THESE ESKIMOS HAVE NO IDENTIFICATION NUMBER, BUT NAMES ARE SAGAPLIMA AND SAKUSAK ESKIMO SLEW CALLED VIKING A ESKIMO FEMALE STATION AT HACHE HAS TWELVE RESIDENTS AND FOOD PLENTIFUL. ALTHOUGH THERE NO TOBACCO AND HONOR OTHER ITEMS STATION NO POSTMASTER OR POSTMANS HAS BEEN APPOINTED FOR THIS STATION AND POSTMASTER OFFICE HOLDER LEAVING STATION"

2. You will note that Mr.ELVIN sent the radiogram to the Controller at the Meteorological Division, Dept. of Transport, Toronto, and had it repeated to this office, and also had the message sent to "Reichelderfer". I do not know who "Reichelderfer" is, but from enquiries made I learned that it is probably the name of one of the United States weather men at the base at Ushuaia, Greenland.

3. Hache Peninsula, where at one time we had a Detachment and where we still have the detachment buildings, is some 300 miles north of our Gruel Harbour detachment on Ellesmere Island. I have sent the following radiogram to the Constable in charge of Gruel Harbour Detachment, today:

"OCTOBER 13TH 1952
FN ELVIN EUREKA NOT
TO ZEN/CONTROLLER DOT TORONTO OUT
ZEN/INFO REICHELDERT REC VIA DO
INFO 6C RCSP 9 DIV OTTAWA OUT

AN ESKIMO OF EUREKA HAS ADVISED US BY RADIO THAT CALLED ESKIMO TWO CHILDREN AND ONE FEMALE ARRIVED EUREKA ON OCTOBER 13TH FROM VICTIMITY OF HACHE WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN LIVING FOR ONE YEAR AND THE CAMP AT HACHE HAS TWELVE PERSONS AND FOOD PLENTIFUL. STOP PLEASE PATROL TO HACHE AND VICTIMITY BUT SPRING WHEN TRAVEL CONDITIONS ARE GOOD AND TAKE THESE PEOPLE RETURN TO GREENLAND"
Re: Greenland Eskimos Hunting in Canadian Territory

4. Having regard to previous correspondence on the matter of Greenland Eskimos crossing over to Canadian Territory, your file C.11-15-39, I would suggest that you send this to the Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, who already has said that he is dealing with the subject of Greenland Eskimos crossing over to Canada.

H. A. Larsen, Insp.,
Officer Commanding, "G" Division.
Mr. J.G. Wright,
Northern Administration and Lands Branch,
Department of Resources and Development,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Wright:

For your information the following message was received from our station at Eureka on Ellesmere Island on October 13.

"THREE ESKIMOS ARRIVED THIS STATION BY DOG TEAM OCTOBER ONE TWO AND THREE INTERROGATION HAVE BEEN LIVING VICINITY BACHE PENINSULA FOR ONE YEAR CMA TRIP TOOK EIGHT SLEEPS FROM BACHE STP THESE ESKIMOS HAVE NO IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS BUT NAMES ARE NAGAPLINGA AND SAKUS ESKIMO MALE CMA NEWVIKINGA ESKIMO FEMALE STP CAMP AT BACHE HAS TWELVE RESIDENTS AND FOOD PLENTIFUL ALTHOUGH HAVE NO TOBACCO AND MINOR OTHER TIMES STP"

Sincerely yours,

R.W. Rae

for Andrew Thomson, Controller.

c.c. Director of Air Services
Minutes of the First Meeting of Special Committee
on Eskimo Affairs held Thursday, October 16,
1952, in Room 304, Langevin Block, Ottawa

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major-General H.A. Young - Chairman
   Deputy Minister, Department of Resources & Development

Commissioner L.H. Nicholson
   Royal Canadian Mounted Police

The Most Reverend J. Trocellier, O.M.I.,
   Vicar Apostolic of Mackenzie

The Right Reverend D.B. Marsh
   Bishop of the Arctic

Mr. R.H. Chesshire
   General Manager, Fur Trade Department, Hudson's
   Bay Company

Dr. P.E. Moore
   Director, Indian Health Services,
   Department of National Health and Welfare

Mr. J.G. Wright
   Chief, Northern Administration Division,
   Department of Resources and Development

IN ATTENDANCE:

Colonel F.J.G. Cunningham
   Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch,
   Department of Resources and Development

Mr. B.G. Sivertz, Administrative Officer,
   Department of Resources and Development

The Reverend G. Laviolette, O.M.I.,
   Assistant Superintendent,
   Indian Welfare Training Commission

Inspector H.A. Larsen
   Officer Commanding "G" Division, Royal Canadian
   Mounted Police

Dr. R.N. Simpson
   Regional Superintendent, Ontario and Eastern Arctic,
   Indian Health Services,
   Department of National Health and Welfare

Secretary to the Committee:

Mr. J. Cantley
   Arctic Services, Department of Resources and Development
1. In opening the meeting, the Chairman referred to the Conference on Eskimo Affairs held in Ottawa, May 19 and 20, 1952, at which the present Standing Committee and Sub-Committee on Eskimo Education had been appointed. At the Conference a number of matters had been suggested for further study by these two groups and it was proposed to deal with some of these now with a view to deciding what action could be taken on them.

It was felt that greatly improved educational facilities must be made available to the Eskimos to enable them to meet the changing conditions brought about by the encroachment of white civilization upon their territory. Careful planning must also be undertaken to improve the general level of the Eskimo economy.

2. Education

The report of the Sub-Committee on Eskimo Education was studied and the following items were approved:

(a) The construction of a new 8-room school at Aklavik to be started in 1953 and completed in 1954. The present two-room day school to be converted to a manual training centre for Eskimos and other children attending the new school. Children from outlying points would be cared for in a hostel to be operated by the Church of England Mission.

It was felt that the new school would provide new opportunities for Eskimo children. Promising pupils could go on to receive special training to fit them as teachers, stenographers, clerks, technicians, etc., for employment in their own country or outside the Arctic. In the manual training centre pupils would learn skills which would be of value to them in the normal native way of life and also as craftsmen for construction or other projects arising from the growth of activity in the north. Special facilities can be provided at a large school such as this which cannot be economically provided in small one-room schools.

(b) A day-school and nursing station to be established at Frobisher Bay where a number of Eskimos are employed at the air-base. As these people are likely to remain in close contact with outsiders and have opportunities to learn skills at the air-base, it is most important that both child and adult education be provided.

The materials will have to be shipped in 1953 in order for the school to be erected and operated in 1954. Northern Administration and Indian Health Services are to co-operate in planning this project.

(c) Tent-hostels for schools at Chesterfield and Coppermine. These are to enable children of remote families to attend school from Easter to the end of August. Northern Administration will furnish the teachers and camp equipment, and the Missions will operate the hostels on a per diem rate basis and provide catering, laundering and the general supervision of the pupils residing in the hostels. As far as possible, these hostels should be operated along lines comparable to ordinary Eskimo camp life.

All arrangements for these hostels should be worked out by the Sub-Committee on Eskimo Education and submitted to Northern Administration and the Missions for ratification.

In order to have these hostels in operation by the spring of 1954, it will be necessary to purchase and ship in the supplies during the 1953 navigation season.

(d) Full-time welfare teachers to be appointed in 1953 to teach Eskimo patients in Pears Savard and Charles Camsell Hospitals. A teacher will have to be provided at Moose Factory Hospital in 1954.
Instruction in Eskimo schools should be in English. The use of Roman characters instead of syllabic script in writing the Eskimo language should be encouraged.

Elementary text books suited to Eskimo should be prepared. They should follow existing readers as a pattern but the text and illustrations should agree with the Eskimo scene. They should be in English with an accompanying version in Eskimo, using Roman script.

Specially prepared film strips and KeraScope film projectors should be supplied for use in camps and schools where there is no electricity.

Special phonograph recordings should be used for instruction in home and school.

The Book of Wisdom should be expanded and used principally for home study.

3. Health and Welfare

(a) Field Medical Services:

It is not practicable at the present time to establish more hospitals in the Arctic. The great majority of Eskimo patients are T.B. cases, and specialized treatment can only be given in properly equipped sanatoria outside. To overcome the objection of some Eskimos to going outside for treatment, Indian Health Services, in co-operation with Northern Administration, should undertake an educational program on the treatment of T.B. and the necessity for hospitalization. Hospitals should send reports more frequently to the patient's relatives, and both patients and relatives should be encouraged and assisted to correspond more frequently with each other.

Field services could be improved by arranging for advanced first-aid courses to be given to R.C.M. Police and other personnel before taking up duties in the North. The R.C.M.P. and Indian Health Services are to investigate this subject further.

(b) After-care and Rehabilitation of patients discharged from Hospitals:

By way of experiment towards meeting the growing problem of rehabilitating Eskimo patients who, through permanent disability or protracted stays in hospitals, have become totally or partially unfit to return to the native way of life, it was agreed to establish two centres as follows:

At Driftspile, Alberta, Indian Health Services will make a nursing station and supervisor available. Northern Administration will provide a caretaker and the cost of operating the project. Arrangements should be made to study the possibility of assisting ex-patients unfit for northern life to engage in gardening or other occupations in southern areas.

At Frobisher Bay, Baffin Island, an existing building or tents will be used to house ex-patients under the supervision of the R.C.M.P. They will be assisted in readjusting themselves to northern life or in obtaining suitable work at the air base.

4. Improvement of Eskimo Economy

(a) Loan Fund:

It was agreed that arrangements should be made to set up a fund of $50,000 from which returnable advances could be made to Eskimo groups or individuals to assist them to purchase necessary supplies and equipment with which to increase their earning power or to embark upon any approved project which local traders or others may not be prepared to finance.
Handicrafts:

It was agreed that encouraging progress was being made in the development of an Eskimo handicraft industry, that the grant to the Canadian Handicrafts Guild should be continued and the effort extended. An investigation should be made of possible markets for utility articles made by Eskimos which the Guild will not handle.

Approval was given to special projects such as boat building, fishing, eiderdown collecting, etc., designed to widen the native economy.

Transfer of Eskimos:

Considering was given to the possibility of assisting natives to move from over-populated areas to places where they could more readily obtain a living. It was agreed that Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine on Ellesmere Island should be investigated as possible localities where Eskimos could be placed under the care of the R.C.M. Police detachments and arrangements made to enable them to obtain necessary supplies through the loan fund.

Employment of Eskimos:

Eskimos should be encouraged to take employment at northern centres provided that they and their families do not lose their ability to return to the native way of life if employment should cease. Rotation of employment and time off for hunting are good precautions.

Eskimos should receive the same wages as white employees for the same class of work. Uniform scales for various classes of labour should be worked out and circulated to employers. All agreements made for the employment of Eskimos should provide for withholding and setting aside a fixed percentage of the monthly income as savings.

Government Departments and contractors who import labour into the north should be asked to use native labour on local projects whenever possible. A register of available Eskimos and their qualifications should be compiled and made available to prospective employers. The co-operation of government departments might be sought through the Committee on Northern Development.

Improvement of Administrative Methods

Consideration was given to a suggestion that a Royal Commission should be asked for to inquire into Eskimo Affairs. It was agreed that the present Committee should continue its investigations during the next two or three years and put forward solutions to the problems involved. If, at the end of that time the problems are such that a Royal Commission seems called for, the matter will be considered again then.

Field Agents:

Consideration was given to a proposal to place qualified men in the field to undertake the development of special projects for the better utilization of resources and the improvement of the Eskimo economy and standard of living. As there was some difference of opinion on the desirability of having agents permanently assigned to certain areas, it was decided to leave the matter for further consideration at the next meeting of the committee. In the meantime, it was suggested that where special surveys were needed, qualified men could be sent out from Ottawa.
Progress:

Reference was made to the changes that had taken place in the Arctic during the past fifteen years, and the opinion was expressed that although development must necessarily be slow, a great deal of progress had been made by Government during that period in providing for the care and development of the Eskimo population.

Conclusion

The Chairman explained that in view of the importance attached to the development of an overall educational program, this subject had been given priority at this meeting. He suggested that at the next meeting of the committee, which might be held during the first week in May, 1953, first consideration might be given to problems affecting Eskimo administration. He also referred to the great interest now being taken in the Arctic and the Eskimos by both the public and the Government and the importance of the work of this committee in dealing with the difficult problems presented, and thanked the members for the time and thought they had given to the committee's work.
EASTERN ARCTIC PATROL
1952

CHURCHILL TO QUEBEC

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He promised, however, to discuss the matter with Idlout and to let us know what he wished to do later in the year.

Idlout was interviewed regarding Mr. D. Wilkinson's proposal to return to Pond Inlet next year to live at Idlout's camp. Idlout stated that he was quite willing to have Mr. Wilkinson stay with him, provided he was self-sustaining and was prepared to pay the usual rates for any services Idlout or other Eskimos may be asked to perform. Dr. Y.O. Fortier, with a party from the Geology Division of the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys intends to make a survey of the Pond Inlet - Arctic Bay areas next year. Advantage should be taken of this opportunity to have them examine the coal deposits in this region. At present, the Hudson's Bay Company and the two missions are taking enough coal to supply all their local requirements. The Hudson’s Bay Company also ships about 10 tons each to Clyde River and Pangnirtung. The R.C.M.P. Police are the only people at Pond Inlet who still import coal and even supply their Special Constables with imported coal for use in the native houses. If, after examination, the deposits at Pond Inlet seem to warrant it, consideration should again be given to putting in a briquetting plant at this point. The coal itself is reported to be very suitable for briquetting and it only remains to be proved that there would be sufficient available in the present or other areas to supply the requirements from year to year. If this should turn out to be the case, all the posts in eastern Baffin Island and on Ellesmere Island could be supplied with briquettes from this source, probably at less than half the cost of imported coal and a very profitable industry could be built up for the natives to follow during the spring and summer months.

Constable Moody of the Pond Inlet detachment reported that observations made on patrols to Igloolik and back across Baffin Island via Clyde River indicated that caribou were plentiful throughout the northern part of the island. This was verified by later enquiries at Clyde River and Pangnirtung. Another winter patrol is being made by the R.C.M.P. Police and Hudson's Bay Company post manager and if the reports are still favourable, consideration should be given to relaxing the present ban on Eskimos hunting caribou on the island. These Eskimos do not ordinarily hunt caribou to any extent for food but they do require the summer skins for clothing. The number they would kill would be comparatively small and would not adversely affect the caribou population if it is as great as reported.

Both Missions do a limited amount of teaching among the children when they come in with their families to the post but it is only a few families who are employed at the various establishments the year round who benefit to any great extent. More elaborate arrangements would not be justified at the present time but if coal mining were to be developed and the natives were to be congregated in or near the settlement for possibly five or six months, consideration should be given to expanding the educational facilities.

Craig Harbour

The R.C.M. Police detachment at this place will consist of Constables Johnson and Fryer during the coming year. Two Eskimo families from Pond Inlet are employed by the Police and live in wooden houses during the winter and in tents during the summer. One family was relieved this year and returned to Pond Inlet and another family was taken from Pond Inlet to Craig Harbour as replacement. Walrus, seals and other country food are quite plentiful in the area and there is no reason why more Eskimos should not be moved over to Ellesmere Island to live permanently. This was suggested to Inspector Larsen and he expressed his willingness to have the Police detachment co-operate with the Department provided arrangements could be made to have the necessary supplies made available. This could probably be arranged next year through the “loan fund”
that has been applied for. A similar arrangement could also be made if a further detachment is established in the Cape Sabine area next year. Six or eight families could be placed there also and could probably be drawn from one or other of the over-populated northern Quebec areas. A few families at Fort Harrison have already expressed their willingness to go further north and others could also probably be found in other areas if they were to be approached.

Muscox and caribou were reported to be fairly numerous on Ellesmere Island although no estimate of the actual numbers could be obtained. The Craig Harbour natives shot a few caribou during the winter but otherwise land animals were left unmolested. The most disturbing news is, however, that Greenlanders are crossing over to the island and apparently hunting there. Six of them visited Craig Harbour last spring by dog team and Eureka has since reported that twelve Eskimos had arrived from around Bache Peninsula, where they had apparently spent the winter. Mr. Christensen wrote to the Greenland authorities at Thule last spring, asking them to discourage Greenlanders from crossing to Canadian territories but he admitted that it was unlikely that this would have any effect. The only way that any control could be exercised would be to have a R.C.M. Police detachment in the Cape Sabine area where these people are entering.

If Police detachments could be maintained at both Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine and arrangements could be made to have them supplied through the "loan fund", ten or twelve Canadian Eskimo families could be transferred to Ellesmere Island and used made of the natural resources that are undoubtedly available there. The occupation of the island by Canadian Eskimos will remove any excuse Greenlanders may presently have for crossing over and hunting there. Using Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine as starting points, consideration might then be given to the possibility of finding employment for natives at Eureka and Alert, under the supervision of the Police, during the summer months. Such an arrangement would probably be welcomed by the Meteorological Division and also have the support of the R.C.M. Police.

Resolute Bay

No difficulty was experienced this year in getting through to Resolute Bay. Ice conditions were unusually favourable but it is doubtful if the "O.D. Howe" could be depended upon to get there in a normal year when heavy ice may be expected anywhere in Barrow Strait. Snow and sleet were encountered when passing through Barrow Strait on August 30 and after our arrival at Resolute Bay that night we had a heavy gale of north wind. Next day the weather moderated but the land was covered with snow and the temperature was around 20°F.

There are joint United States-Canadian weather and radio stations and a Canadian ionospheric station at this point, and also an R.C.A.F. base and airfield. Altogether there were about 300 men there at the time of our visit, a large number of whom were engaged in construction work for the R.C.A.F.

Although there seemed to be co-operation between all factions in this area, each unit is quite independent and there is no central authority governing the settlement as a whole. The R.C.M. Police did have a detachment here up to a year ago but it was closed out on the grounds that there was not sufficient work to justify keeping a man there. While this may be true so far as the Police are concerned, it does seem that there should be someone, even if only one of the O.I.C.'s of the various operating departments, who should be charged with the general administrative authority for this settlement. At the moment, there are no means of enforcing the Game Regulations, the preservation of archaeological sites or any of the other ordinances affecting the Northwest Territories. To obtain any assistance at all, it would be necessary to write to three separate O.I.C.'s, i.e. of the meteorological...
and radio stations, the ionospheric station and the R.C.A.F. If all these men co-operate in enforcing the regulations—well and good. If one of them refuses, however, there is nothing the others can do about it and the outcome may well be that everyone in the place does as he sees fit. This situation is further aggravated when outsiders visit the area and may appear to violate some of the regulations. Criticism was heard of the number of specimens taken by R.F. Jesse when he was there last summer. Rightly or wrongly, the senior men at the stations felt he had abused his privileges and taken much more than he needed for scientific purposes. He was also reported to have killed a muskox in "self-defence".

At places such as this, where there are large permanent staffs the year round and a large transient population during the spring and summer, it seems desirable to have a capable Police officer or someone else who would be independent of the various stations and who would act as general government representative. One difficulty experienced at most stations of this kind is that the personnel does not stay more than a year or two in the country. The consequence is that few of these men take any real interest in the areas or in the stations for which they are temporarily responsible. This is particularly noticeable at Resolute Bay where the condition of the stations, inside and out, leaves a visitor with a very poor impression.

**Arctic Bay**

This settlement consists mainly of the Department of Transport—the meteorological and radio stations with five men, and the Hudson’s Bay Company store with one man. Both establishments are well kept and the personnel seem to have got along very well together.

A catch of 1,225 foxes was made last year and the natives had no difficulty in getting all the country food they wanted. They appeared to be very poorly clad at the time of our visit but enquiry revealed that as they expected to be handling coal and other cargo, they had put on their oldest clothing.

Meningitis was reported to have been prevalent during the spring but all those affected seem to have made a good recovery and the general health of the natives at the time of our visit appeared to be good.

It was reported that quite a number of the natives who had been trading at this post in past years are now moving down towards Igloolik where walrus are much more plentiful. Most of the natives attached to Arctic Bay hunt between there and Igloolik, mainly along the eastern shores of Admiralty Inlet. Few, if any, live on the western shore or up towards Lancaster Sound, even though these areas are reported to be good hunting grounds. There are, at present, only about 40 families attached to Arctic Bay and there will be no difficulty in accommodating as many more if natives could be persuaded to transfer from other areas and to settle north of Arctic Bay along the Brodeur Peninsula. There is no lack of country food and trapping opportunities would be as great there as anywhere else in the Eastern Arctic.

**Clyde River**

Here also the settlement consists only of the Department of Transport meteorological and radio station and the Hudson’s Bay Company post. Two United States personnel were attached to the radio station last winter and it was expected there would be one during the coming year. It was reported that the United States had decided on Cape Christian as a site for the proposed new radar station and its construction would start early next year. It was also rumoured that a 15-mile road would
be constructed between this new station and Clyde River settlement so that if due to weather or ice conditions supplies could not be landed at Cape Christian, they could be put ashore at Clyde River and trucked from there to the station.

Only 364 foxes were trapped in this area during the past winter; despite this the Eskimos were fairly well off as country food had been quite plentiful. This group consists of about 30 families but they are still fairly primitive in their outlook and not very ambitious. They have very few boats and many of them have to depend on the Hudson's Bay Company's boat to take them to and from their hunting grounds in the summer. The only boat the Hudson's Bay Company had was lost by natives during a storm just before we arrived; another was put ashore for post use from the "C.D. Howe." If United States plans go ahead next year, no doubt many of the Eskimos will be able to find employment landing cargo and assisting in the building operations. Enquiries should be made as to who is to be responsible for these operations and what their attitude towards employing native labour may be. If there is demand for more natives than there are at Clyde River, other families could be transferred from other places and encouraged to settle there permanently. All reports indicate that a larger population could be supported from the natural resources of this area and if summer employment were also available, this would provide an income in addition to that from trapping.

It would seem that quite a bit of trading was done by the radio station employees at this point and particularly by the cook. This man took out with him eight polar bears, twenty blue fox and six white fox under an export permit issued to him by the R.C.M. Police at Pond Inlet. It was rumoured that he had purchased other furs and country produce which he had sold to United States personnel on ships and planes which had visited Clyde River during the year. No confirmation of this could be obtained, however. Under Section 72 (1) and (2) of the Game Regulations, residents and visitors in the Territories may purchase skins for use by themselves or their families up to a value of $200 in any one year. At a place such as Clyde River, where there may be six or eight employees, up to $1,200 or $1,600 could be legally purchased under these sections of the regulations. This is the only place where there appears to be any abuse of these privileges but with the increasing number of white men going into the north, trade done by such people could conceivably seriously affect the business of the regular licensed traders. There is also the possibility that Government stores may be bartered for such produce.

Marketing

There are about 10 Eskimo families residing in this area, of whom only 2 are permanently employed as labourers and truck drivers at the United States station. The others, however, obtain temporary employment from time to time, particularly when cargoes are being discharged. The United States staff at this station number about 20 and only arrived two weeks prior to our visit and were all new men to the north. They will be leaving again in February, United States policy at this station being to relieve personnel twice a year.

Although Lt. Becker, U.S.N.F., the C.I.C., had had no previous experience with Eskimos, he was quick to realize the importance of keeping them self-sustaining and away from the base when not employed. He was most co-operative and as long as he is there, I feel sure this small group of Eskimos will be well looked after. Although this station
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MURPHY:

The attached two memoranda outline the programmes that may be undertaken over the next year or two:

(a) To improve conditions among Eskimos generally.

(b) To deal specifically with the suggestions made by Mr. Hunt for the improvement of conditions at Aklavik.

If anything is to be attempted this year it will be necessary to start making preliminary arrangements immediately. There will have to be close liaison with the R.C.M. Police, the Hudson's Bay Company and possibly others on most of the projects both in the field and at executive level. Communication with the field organizations takes time and they in turn must have sufficient notice to make the necessary local arrangements with natives and others.

It would be desirable, therefore, to have an early decision on what we should attempt to do during the coming year.

3) Mr. Murphy - I agree that we should ask Mr. Wright to comment.

J. Cantley, Arctic Services.

22.12.52
1. TRANSFERS OF NATIVES FROM OVER-POPULATED AREAS TO PLACES WHERE THEY CAN MORE READILY MAKE A LIVING AND BE MADE SELF SUPPORTING:

(a) Transfer of about ten families from the Port Harrison area in Northern Quebec to Ellesmere Island, where they can be looked after by the present R.C.M. Police Detachment at Craig Harbour and by the proposed detachment near Cape Herschel. Transfer of natives' dogs, boats and other equipment to be arranged on the C.G.S. "C.D. Howe" and C.G.S. "d'Iberville" Season 1953. Trade supplies for both detachments to be purchased through Eskimo loan fund and shipped from either Montreal or Churchill by these two vessels. Furs and other produce traded to be brought out to Montreal for disposal and credited to the loan fund.

(b) Transfer of about ten families from Northern Quebec and/or Cape Dorset area to Resolute Bay, Cornwallis Island, provided arrangements can be made with the R.C.M. Police to station a man there to look after the natives and enforce observance of Northwest Territories ordinances and regulations. R.C.M. Police officer could probably obtain accommodation and board at either the R.C.A.F. or the Meteorological Station and a small building could probably be made available as a store. Transfer of natives' dogs, boats and other equipment to be arranged by C.G.S. "C.D. Howe" and C.G.S. "d'Iberville" season 1953. Trade supplies to be supplied through loan fund and shipped from either Montreal or Churchill. Eskimos could find at least seasonable employment at the base. Arrangements could probably be made with the Department of Transport or the R.C.A.F. to employ some on a year round basis as maintenance crew. Furs, Handicrafts and other produce traded could be disposed of either locally to white employees and visitors at the base or brought to Montreal for sale.

(c) Transfer of ten Eskimo families from Northern Quebec and/or Cape Dorset area to Clyde River, Baffin Island. If the proposed U.S. Radar Station is erected at Cape Christian, most of the Eskimo men in this area could probably find employment on construction during the summer months. There is no R.C.M. Police detachment there but if the Hudson's Bay Company places a capable man there, he could be responsible for looking after the Eskimos' interests. No supplies would be necessary to pay wages or for trade since the Hudson's Bay Company have a post at Clyde River.
(d) Arrangements for the utilization of the loan fund to assist Eskimos who are already living and hunting on the islands off the East coast of Hudson Bay and to encourage others to go there as conditions warrant. Arrangements for transfers can be made locally using R.C.M. Police, Hudson's Bay Company and Eskimo Peterhead boats. Eskimos would be outfitted for winter by existing Hudson's Bay Company posts and no special supplies would have to be provided other than possibly one or two whale-boats for hunting.

2. ORGANIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF HUNTING TECHNIQUES:

(a) Organization of hunting and fishing in Ungava Bay to make a fuller use of the walrus obtainable at Akpatok Island, the seals and codfish at Fort Burwell, the salmon in the Koksoak and George Rivers, and Arctic char throughout the area. Leadership is the prime requisite in this area. The Eskimos have sufficient boats and would only require the other equipment and supplies necessary for hunting and fishing. Whatever is required in this respect could be obtained through the Hudson's Bay Company's posts at Fort Chimo and Payne Bay.

(b) Organization and supervision of walrus hunting at various centres in the Eastern Arctic to insure that herds are not killed off or driven away from their present haunts. Areas which are in danger of being seriously depleted by uncontrolled hunting are Benoas, Salisbury and Nottingham Islands and Loks Land. Hunting at all these places should be supervised by the R.C.M. Police. Shooting should be prohibited unless animals are harpooned first and the kill at each place should be restricted to what the boats engaged in the hunt can carry.

(c) Encouraging Eskimos everywhere to make greater use of nets for taking seals and white whales. Nets are more economical than rifles taking into consideration the present costs of rifles and ammunition and the loss of animals shot, particularly during the summer months when they do not float. Nets are already being used successfully in certain areas both winter and summer.

3. WHALE HUNTING:

(a) Outfitting Fred Carpenter's boat to kill large whales in the Beaufort Sea and Amundsen Gulf, to supply meat requirements of natives on Banks Island and also possibly at Aklavik, Reindeer Station, Tuktoyaktuk, Stanton and Paulatuk.

(b) Chartering small whale hunting steamer for whaling and research in Hudson Strait and Bay. Whales could be killed and towed to
the nearest native settlement where meat and oil could be stored and utilized. Research into the availability of whales and other marine resources could be carried out each season, in conjunction with the whaling operations. Note: Meat and fat obtained from whales would reduce the drain on walrus and seal. Consideration may also have to be given to providing cold storage facilities for the preservation of meat.

4. AUGMENTING AND CONSERVING ESKIMO EARNINGS:

(a) Wider distribution of population during winter months for trapping and hunting.

(b) Distribution of meat and fish caches to attract white foxes.

(c) Providing suitable box traps for taking ermine: most ermine are caught accidentally in fox traps.

(d) Investigation of present methods of marketing white foxes and part Department might play in promoting their use and obtaining a greater return for the Eskimos. The average catch of white fox in Canada is about 45,000 per annum. The only other producing country of any importance is the U.S.S.R., whose foxes are presently under ban in the United States. White foxes could conceivably be glamorized as a scarce commodity through control of the markets and the right kind of advertising and promotion.

(e) Encouraging Eskimos to save and better prepare hair sealskins so that they may command a better market outside or be used to make up saleable articles for disposal in the country.

(f) Investigation of dressing and tanning processes for foxes, white bears and sealskins with a view to improving the products either for sale outside in the raw state or for local manufacturing.

(g) Exploration of markets for walrus and white whale hides in Canada, United States and Europe.

(h) Organizing small fisheries for supplying local settlements and the larger bases, such as Frobisher Bay, Fort Chimo, Goose Bay, Padloping and the one proposed at Cape Christian.
(i) Wider development of Eskimo handicrafts in co-operation with the Canadian Handicrafts Guild.

(j) Development of other local industries the products of which could be sold outside.

(k) Development of local industries for supplying Eskimo requirements either locally or in other areas.

(l) Employment of Eskimos:
   (1) By various agencies in the smaller settlements.
   (2) At isolated radio stations.
   (3) At High Arctic joint U.S. - Canadian weather stations.
   (4) At U.S. and Canadian Army and Air Force bases.
   (5) Standardization of wages and rations for various jobs.
   (6) Deductions from wages,
       For savings or under unemployment insurance and other social security legislation.
       For income tax.

(m) Consideration of means that may be taken to consolidate Eskimo income from all sources and to regulate its use to the best of advantage.
Memorandum for the Minister

Northern Arctic Developments

I wish to draw to your attention some of the prospective new developments in the Arctic of which this Department has become aware in recent months. While some may fail to materialize, the Canadian Government has already received, or can expect in the near future to receive, requests for approval for most of them. These prospective developments include the following:

(a) The establishment by the United States of three or four experimental early warning stations with a view to the ultimate development of a complete Arctic radar chain of possibly 40 stations;

(b) The development by the United States of the air strips at Alert and Eureka and construction of a new air strip at River Clyde to a standard suitable for large transport aircraft and jet fighters to meet the need for emergency alternates for Thule and for Arctic resupply missions;
(c) The establishment of one or two loran stations on the east coast of Baffin Island to meet the needs of ships and aircraft on route to Thule and other Arctic points;

(d) The establishment of two Early Warning/GCI radar stations, one on Coburg Island and one on Ellesmere Island as part of the defensive installations in connection with the U.S.A.F. base at Thule;

(e) The opening of a commercial air route across the Arctic, from Edmonton to Thule.

2. As you know the Canadian Government at the end of the last war embarked on a vigorous programme intended to "re-Canadianize" the Arctic. It was carried out under the aegis of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development and included the take-over from the USAF of a number of wartime air fields, weather stations and communications facilities, the development of new transportation and communications facilities with a view to reducing Canadian dependence on U.S. resources, and the establishment in cooperation with the United States, of the joint Arctic weather stations. This programme was well on the way to completion by 1949 and the Advisory Committee has not met to review progress since December of that year.

3. These prospective new developments in the Arctic suggest to me that there is every likelihood in the course of the next three or four years of a new influx of U.S. citizens to the Arctic. One probable consequence is that the number of U.S. citizens in the District of Franklin will probably be substantially greater than the number of white Canadians. Furthermore, if Canadian transportation and communications facilities cannot meet the load that these developments
are bound to create, there will be a demand from the United States that it be permitted to do so, thus involving additional U.S. commitments.

4. If this analysis of the situation is correct, then it would seem that now is the time to give serious consideration to the adoption at the highest level of a vigorous policy in all Canadian Arctic services including communications, transportation, aids to navigation, meteorology and police. I am of the opinion that it should be considered as a matter of some urgency since past experience has shown that a lengthy period is required, when dealing with Arctic activities, to convert decisions into realities.

5. If you agree, I propose to write to General Young, both in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Resources and Development and as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, and suggest to him that this matter might be an appropriate subject for consideration by the Advisory Committee. However, in view of the current budgetary situation, I felt that before doing so I should obtain your views as to the usefulness and expediency of promoting a study of this problem at the present time.

L. D. W.
CABINET CONCLUSIONS

A meeting of the Cabinet was held in the Privy Council Chamber on Thursday, January 22nd, 1953, at 10:30 a.m.

Present:

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent), in the Chair
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fournier),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Chevrier),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate (Senator Robertson),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson),
The Minister of Justice, (Mr. Garson),
The Secretary of State (Mr. Bradley),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Lapointe),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Harris),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Frudham),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Cote),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Pickersgill),
Mr. Paul Pelletier, Privy Council Office.
It was recommended that Dr. G.C. Monture, Director of the Mineral Resources Division of the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, attend the initial meetings of the Planning Committee and report on the possible extent of the Canadian interest and the importance of direct Canadian representation in the Committee's work. After the report was received, consideration would be given as to whether continued direct Canadian representation was warranted.

An explanatory note was circulated.


27. The Cabinet, after discussion, noted the report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and agreed that Dr. G.C. Monture of the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys attend and report on the initial meetings of the Industrial Raw Materials Planning Committee established by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Estimates for 1953-54

28. The Minister of Finance reported briefly on the 1953-54 Main Estimates which would shortly be tabled in the House of Commons.

Total estimates for the next fiscal year, exclusive of old age security payments, totalled $4,404,976,236. This compared with total estimates, exclusive of old age security, of $4,376 millions for 1952-53. This represented an increase of $29 million. In respect of old age security payments, there was an increase of $23 million from $322 million in 1952-53 to $345 million for 1953-54. The major causes of the increase in the Estimates for the coming fiscal year were public debt (increase of $33 million), tax rental agreements ($12 million) and health and welfare ($19 million on family allowances and old age assistance). Public Works showed an increase of $6 million, Defence Production a decrease of $50 million and National Defence remained approximately the same.

29. The Cabinet noted the report by the Minister of Finance on the Main Estimates for 1953-54.

Arctic; review of U.S. and Canadian developments

30. The Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out that interest in the Canadian Arctic had increased substantially since the joint Arctic weather stations were established in 1947. The display of interest, the expenditure
of money and the exploitation of manpower in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago had been at least as great by the United States as by Canada, and in some respects greater. The main continuing activity was the weather station programme at the five joint Arctic weather stations. Half the meteorological staff at these stations was Canadian. There were also small Canadian weather stations at Arctic Bay and at Pond Inlet. At Resolute Bay, there was an R.C.A.F. station and an Arctic Survival School was conducted during the winter months at Cambridge Bay in the southern Archipelago. These were the only exclusively Canadian stations and the total number of Canadian officials in the entire Archipelago was less than 50 men. This figure was now matched by the United States which, in addition to supplying half the meteorological staff, operated an exclusively U.S. weather station at Paddlingo and manned a floating ice island within the Canadian sector. Transient U.S. officials both civil and military, outnumbered Canadian transients during the summer months.

Everything pointed towards an increase in U.S. activity in the Arctic during coming years. Several new U.S. projects had recently come to the attention of the Department of External Affairs. The largest of these if implemented, would involve eventually the establishment of a chain of 40 radar stations right across the Arctic. As a first step in this programme, the United States government had allocated $20,000,000 for the establishment of three or four experimental radar stations probably in the general area of the Mackenzie River delta. The U.S. Airforce had also indicated that it might approach Canada for permission to develop air strips at the two northernmost joint Arctic weather stations on Ellesmere Island. In addition, the U.S.A.F. would like to construct an air strip at River Clyde on Baffin Island. The U.S.A.F. proposed that these air strips be constructed in such a manner as to be suitable for emergency landing by the heaviest freighter aircraft and by jet fighters. The United States also wished to establish a Loran station on the east coast of Baffin Island. Over a year ago, the United States had been given permission to make surveys as a preliminary to the establishment of radar stations on Ellesmere and Coburg Islands for the protection of Thule. A request had also been received by the Canadian government for consideration of the possibility of opening up a commercial air route from Edmonton across the Canadian Arctic to Thule and thence to Europe.

If Canadian claims to territory in the Arctic rested on discovery and continuous occupation, Canadian claims to some relatively unexplored areas might be questioned in the future. He was concerned about the de facto exercise of U.S. sovereignty, examples of which were numerous during the last war in other parts of Canada, and it seemed clear that an increase in U.S.
activity in the Arctic would present risks of misunderstandings, incidents and infringements on the exercise of Canadian sovereignty.

In the circumstances, he urged strongly that the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, which had not recently been active, be directed to consider all phases of development of the Canadian Arctic and to report on the present situation and on the means which might be employed to preserve or develop the political, administrative, scientific and defence interests of Canada in that area.

(Minister's memorandum, Jan. 21, 1953).

31. The Minister of Agriculture thought the problem was a serious one and that steps should be taken immediately to ensure that Canadian sovereignty was not imperiled by the continued and increasing exercise of de facto U.S. jurisdiction in many parts of the Arctic Archipelago.

32. The Minister of National Defence said the last quarterly report received from the Pentagon on the subject revealed that there was a decrease in the total numbers of civilian and military U.S. personnel in all parts of Canada except Newfoundland and Labrador.

He was satisfied that everything which could be done had, in fact, been done in respect of existing U.S. activities in Canada to ensure preservation of Canadian sovereignty. There were several cases of U.S. military developments in northern Canada having eventually been taken over by Canada. Nonetheless, continued U.S. activity in the North presented a problem and he agreed that the matter should be looked into by the Advisory Committee and reported on as soon as possible.

Referring to U.S. proposals for the establishment of a chain of 40 radar stations across the Arctic, he pointed out that it was not yet established by any means that radar could successfully be operated that far north. Such a programme would represent a very large outlay of money and manpower. Each station would cost from $6 to $15 million and would be manned by 100 to 300 persons.

In this connection, he said that a possible substitute for radar was now being developed by his department in cooperation with McGill University. If this development proved successful, it might be possible to establish a chain of warning stations across the Arctic at a fraction of the cost involved in the proposed radar system.
33. The Prime Minister, in reply to a question as to how the matter of sovereignty was met in N.A.T.O. developments in western European countries, pointed out that no parallel could be established between the situation in western Europe and the situation which might develop in the Canadian Arctic. A N.A.T.O. establishment in, say, Germany was, in fact, sponsored and paid for by all N.A.T.O. members and not by a single foreign state as was the case with U.S. installations in the Canadian Arctic. Furthermore, such N.A.T.O. establishments in Europe represented a very small fraction of the sum total of human activity in those areas and thus did not in any sense constitute a threat to the sovereignty of the state within which they were located, whereas it was within the realm of the possible that in years to come U.S. developments might be just about the only form of human activity in the vast wastelands of the Canadian Arctic. This was the problem which had to be met. In the deliberations of the Advisory Committee some thought might usefully be given to the possibility of ensuring in some practical manner extension of normal Canadian customs and immigration facilities to those areas in the Arctic where the more important developments were taking place.

34. Mr. Pearson suggested that the Advisory Committee might usefully give consideration to the formulation of "principles of cooperation" in respect of the Arctic which might in future govern U.S.-Canadian relations, in all matters pertaining to that area.

35. The Cabinet after considerable further discussion, noted the report by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on current and prospective Canadian and U.S. developments in the Arctic Archipelago and directed the Secretary to request the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development to have that Committee consider and report periodically on all phases of development of the Canadian Arctic and on the means which might be employed to preserve or develop the political, administrative, scientific and defence interests of Canada in that area.

War claims; proposed automatic awards to ex-prisoners of war

36. The Prime Minister mentioned that Chief Justice Campbell, Chief War Claims Commissioner, had stated that the Commission was not sending out claim-forms to ex-prisoners of war pending receipt of information as to the attitude the government was likely to take on representations which would probably be submitted in the near future by the Association of Ex-Prisoners of War, urging a variation in the Ilsley principles to provide for automatic payments to all ex-prisoners of war.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MACKEY

Brief for Meeting of Advisory Committee on Northern Development to be Held on February 16, 1953

Cabinet has directed that the Advisory Committee on Northern Development should consider and report immediately, and periodically thereafter, on all phases of development of the Canadian Arctic and on the means which might be employed to preserve or develop the political, administrative, scientific and defence interests of Canada in that area.

2. I understand that Government Departments carrying on activities in the Arctic have been instructed to bring to the meeting a report of their programmes. Presumably a compilation of these reports will constitute a sort of compendium of Canadian Governmental activity in the Arctic. If the Government Departments do not do so on their own initiative, I suggest that they should also be requested to provide some information on non-governmental activities, e.g., the Hudson's Bay Company, church missions, etc.

3. It is suggested that before the Committee proceeds to a consideration of "means", one further step might be taken by way of preparation. This would consist of a projection of existing programmes in the Arctic over a period of two, three or four years in the future, in order to obtain a picture of what the situation is likely to be if the current programme of Arctic administration and development continues to be followed.

... 2
4. In considering the question of "means", I think that it is useful to bear in mind the situation which led to consideration of Arctic programmes by the Cabinet. You will recall that our Memorandum of December 31, 1952, to the Minister (see flag A on File) listed a number of prospective new developments in the Arctic, most of them involving the U.S. Armed Forces. It drew attention to the fact that if Canadian transportation, communications and other administrative facilities could not meet the load these developments would be bound to create, there would be a demand from the United States that it be permitted to do so, thus involving additional U.S. commitments.

5. With this situation in mind, I suggest that the most important single method which might be employed to preserve and develop Canadian interests in the Arctic is the adoption at the highest level of a vigorous policy in all Canadian Arctic services, including communications, transportation, aids to navigation, meteorology and police. I suggest that it should be considered as a matter of urgency since past experience has shown that a lengthy period is required, when dealing with Arctic activities, to convert decisions into realities.

6. In using the term "vigorous policy", I have in mind such measures as the development or expansion of training programmes to ensure the availability of technicians; possible increases in the number of Canadians servicing Arctic installations; the adoption of incentives such as increased northern allowances to make work in the Arctic more popular; adoption of a policy of requiring all navigation aids, etc. to be manned by Canadians even if this requires the making of arrangements for payment by the United States for the services thus provided; sympathetic consideration by Treasury Board and the Civil Service Commission of requests for exemption with respect to regulations governing working conditions, etc.
7. In his Memorandum to the Secretary of the Cabinet, dated December 29, 1952, Mr. Phillips suggested a number of possible courses of action which might be taken to enhance the Canadian position in the Arctic. These also merit consideration by the Committee and are summarized as follows:

(1) Canada might gradually take over the manning of the whole Arctic weather chain. This would require only about 20 more men.

(2) Canada might gradually increase its part in the Sea Supply Mission.

(3) The RCMP might open up new posts in the Arctic. There is a proposal that the post at Resolute should be re-opened and I recommend that we support this idea.

(4) The Department of Transport should be urged to assume responsibility as soon as possible for the Padloping Island weather station now manned by the United States. This action was directed by Cabinet some time ago (I think in 1950), but has not yet been complied with.

(5) If it is necessary to improve the air strip facilities at Alert and Eureka, Canada might take full responsibility, letting the United States provide only materials and transport.

(6) If a Loran station is to be established on Baffin Island, Canada might man it.

(7) The expeditions of scientific and geographical exploration and flag raising which the Canadian Government sponsored in the past might be revived.
(8) The Government might consider extending the boundaries of the electoral district of Mackenzie to include the whole of the District of Franklin. The legal and psychological effect of this action might be useful.

(9) We might encourage greater emphasis on and greater attention to the Arctic in civilian and service departments by such methods as

(i) making more effective use of existing committees; 

(ii) reorganization within Government Departments to facilitate co-ordination of Arctic activities and the exchange of information;

(iii) encouraging National Defence College and the service staff colleges to study Arctic problems more fully;

(iv) lectures and films for government officials on the development of the Canadian Arctic.

8. It would probably be desirable to incorporate in the report of the Advisory Committee a list of U.S. activities in the Arctic which have been authorized to date. I will prepare this in the course of the next week or so.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

The sixth meeting was held on Monday, February 16, 1953, at 2:30 p.m., in the Privy Council Committee Room, East Block.

Present:

Major-General H.A. Young (Chairman)
Deputy Minister of Resources and Development,

Mr. J. W. Pickersgill,
Secretary to the Cabinet,

Mr. K. W. Taylor,
Deputy Minister of Finance,

Mr. Yarc Boyer,
Deputy Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys,

General A.G.L. McNaughton,
Chairman, Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence,

Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee,

Dr. O. M. Solandt,
Chairman, Defence Research Board,

Commissioner L.H. Nicholson,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,

Mr. R. A. MacKay,
Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs,

Mr. A. Watson,
Marine Superintendent,
Department of Transport.

Mr. W.P. Chipman,
Lt-Cdr. A.A. Beveridge
(Joint Secretaries)
Privy Council Office

Also present:

Mr. Andrew Thomson,
Controller, Meteorological Service, Department of Transport,

Mr. F. J. G. Cunningham,
Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development,

Mr. R. A. J. Phillips,
Privy Council Office.
Also present (cont'd)

Mr. G. W. Stead,
Department of Finance,

Mr. G. W. Rowley,
Defence Research Board,

Mr. S. E. Barton,
Department of External Affairs,

Mr. A. C. W. Browne,
Controller of Telecommunications,
Department of Transport.

1. The Chairman informed the Committee that the purpose of the meeting was to bring the Committee up to date on northern development, and to report to the Cabinet as soon as possible respecting problems within the Canadian north. The Chairman gave the background and history of the committee's activities since its formation on January 19, 1948, under Cabinet authority, with terms of reference as follows:

"To advise the government on questions of policy relating to civilian and military undertakings in northern Canada and to provide for the effective coordination of all government activities in that area".

Recent meetings had been held but as the major questions required specialized consideration the Sub-Committee on Transportation and Construction had been more active.

Recently, the Cabinet had directed that the Committee should consider and report immediately, and periodically thereafter, on all phases of the development of the Canadian Arctic and on the means which might be employed to preserve or develop the political, administrative, scientific and defence interests of Canada in that area. He asked the Committee for views on the territorial limits implied in the terms of reference and the Cabinet directive.

2. The Secretary to the Cabinet reviewed the background of the Cabinet's concern about the Canadian north. Ministers had a genuine feeling of interest in this area but, unfortunately, incomplete knowledge of northern activities. There was also an apprehension of seeming encroachment upon Canadian sovereignty. The Cabinet wished to be informed of all activities in this area, to have periodic reports of proposed developments, to receive recommendations of what could be done to promote Canadian initiative, and to have Canada take the lead rather than be paced by the United States in areas of joint participation.

3. The Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that it might be useful to provide the members of the Committee with a list of US activities in the Canadian north. Steps could then be taken to assess the effect of these activities on Canadian sovereignty.

A study was being made of the question of territorial waters in the Canadian north but, as yet, no policy recommendations had been made.
4. The Chairman of the Defence Research Board said he felt that there was a question of initiative in the Arctic development problem. There appeared to be little or no real grounds for objecting to US activities. On every occasion the US had been more than willing to cooperate with Canada. The problem was to ensure that Canada's national interests were being adequately served. The US interest was solely the defence of North America. The Canadian problem required the development of a relationship between civil and military interests and the adjusting of military interests, where possible, to conform to present and projected civilian development. At present there was a lack of coordination which could have unfortunate results. Canada, too, was in a secondary position as a result of the accumulation of Arctic knowledge by the United States in fields such as transport, logistics, communications and meteorology.

5. General McNaughton expressed the view that there was nothing sinister about US activities in Canada. He spoke of the long cooperation on the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and he sensed that it was US awareness and sensitivity to the increasing problem on the other side of the pole that spurred them in their efforts. If Canada failed to cooperate, or left undone those things considered vital by the US, they would find some other way to meet the problem. In the Board declaration of 1947, he recalled the provision for full cooperation, and the feature of a self-liquidation clause by which either party could participate as long as required and then withdraw. With respect to joint installations or facilities in Canada, ownership of the sites reverted to Canada on completion of operations. He expressed the strong view that Canadian interests must not be compromised by inaction.

6. Mr. Pickersgill stated that the US was obviously aware of the considerable resources being expended in Northern Russia, and were taking precautions commensurate with their intelligence appreciations. To illustrate his previous comment about Canadian initiative in the Arctic, he queried the need for the use of US facilities for working up Canadian statistics, for example, in the weather stations. What was at the root of the problem of Canada not taking the initiative -- personnel, salary limitations, the priority on departmental estimates for the Arctic?

7. The Deputy Minister of Finance agreed that in the preparation of departmental estimates the Arctic was a fringe problem. He asked if the Committee was of the opinion that a higher priority should be assigned to northern development.

8. General Foulkes, speaking of the defence aspect, suggested caution in attempting to assume too great a share of defence and related activities in the Canadian North. Pressure had been evident concerning some elaborate schemes in the recent past. It might be that some formula could be worked out to ensure that Canada was not bearing a disproportionate financial burden. Emphasis should be laid on joint responsibility in every aspect. It did not seem, however, that Canadian sovereignty was in jeopardy. It was apparent that some arrangement was needed to collect, collate and disburse information respecting the Canadian North. A panel might be set up to examine the requirements that were now lacking and to act as a central information agency.

9. Mr. Pickersgill emphasized the need to ensure that the civilian activities in the North were predominantly Canadian. He noted that there was a disproportionate amount of funds spent by the United States and Canada on certain activities.
10. The Controller of Meteorological Services stated that though there was a difference in the amount of money spent by the weather services of the two countries, the ratio of personnel was maintained as close to fifty-fifty as possible. It was not a question of either country trying to increase the ratio in its own favour, but rather of filling vacancies by whichever country had the men available.

11. The Controller of Telecommunications said that it was the firm intention to take over, on September 1, 1953, the three loran stations in Newfoundland. No decision has been made about Padloping.

12. Dr. Solandt stressed the necessity of looking to the future in coordinating civil and military activities in areas of economic development.

13. The Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police asked if any thought had been given to the potential of the Inhabitants of the North -- training, development or adaptabilities, and so forth.

14. General Young outlined the plan of Resources and Development for education of the Eskimos over the next ten-year period. It was felt by his department that use could be made of the Eskimo, as they had considerable latent ability which could be developed gradually. Additional school facilities were being provided, including a high school for nursing and vocational studies.

15. The Marine Superintendent raised the question of sea transportation. He stressed the future importance of the two icebreakers, now building, in maintaining a sea transport contact with Northern Canada, independent of the United States. Canada would be able to provide her own sea transport in the next year or so, as the men and knowledge were available, and the icebreakers would be shortly. For freight-carrying, Canada could use standard cargo vessels, as did the US, although it would be more satisfactory if specially strengthened ships could be provided. Some thought should be given in the near future to this question and that of the part which Canada should play not only in the resupply of Canadian installations but also of joint Canada-US installations, in the Arctic.

The Department of Transport had been nominated during the early stages of the Committee's activities as coordinator for government agencies of sea transport to Northern Canada. Coordination, as far as civilian government departments were concerned, had worked extremely well and effected a considerable saving in transportation costs. The annual effort involved about 3,000 tons of freight for ten departments being carried to approximately thirty-five locations. The only breakdown in coordination was caused by the RCAF making their own independent arrangements for their requirements.

16. General Foulkes said that there would be advantages in having the Transportation Sub-Committee, with the Chief of the Naval Staff and Chief of the Air Staff in attendance, discuss the coordination of transportation requirements and the role of the RCAF icebreakers. Recommendations from the Sub-Committee would have considerable weight.

17. Mr. Pickersgill stated that there was evidence of the need for vesting executive authority in one person who would, as his prime responsibility, ensure coordination of all
similar requirements and facilities, both civil and military. Unfortunately, a panel - even permanently staffed - was unable to perform such a task satisfactorily. One person could ensure that the right things were done and could be held accountable for action or inaction.

It was of interest that Citizenship and Immigration was considering the possibility of authorizing senior civil servants in Northern Canada to carry out certain functions under the Immigration Act.

18. Mr. MacKay remarked that the function of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development was to prepare a comprehensive statement about activities, both Canadian and foreign, in Northern Canada. This statement, he felt, should be prepared under the guidance of Resources and Development. All other departments should keep Resources and Development fully informed respecting their activities in the North and of any new developments that were being considered.

19. Mr. Pickersgill suggested that the Committee render an interim report to Cabinet through the Minister of Resources and Development, incorporating the nature and scope of the discussions and conclusions reached at this stage.

20. The Committee, after considerable further discussion;

(a) noted:

(i) the reports on departmental activities tabled by the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, the Deputy Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, the Deputy Minister of Transport, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Defence Research Board and the Commissioner of the R.C.M. Police;

(ii) that, for the purposes of the Committee, Northern Canada should be defined as the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories, together with, when appropriate, those portions of Ungava and Labrador where activities of interest to the federal government might be taking place;

(iii) that the Department of Transport was planning to take over the three loran stations in Newfoundland on September 1, 1953;

(iv) that the question of vesting senior civil servants at northern posts and stations with certain functions under the Immigration Act was under consideration by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration; and

(v) that Clause 5 of the statement made by the Prime Minister on February 12, 1947, respecting the security relationship between Canada and the United States in North America --

"5. As an underlying principle all cooperative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory"

should be included in the preamble to each agreement reached with another country for activities in Northern Canada; and
(b) agreed:

(i) to recommend to Cabinet, through the Minister of Resources and Development, that the Department of Resources and Development assume sole responsibility for coordinating activities in the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories, with executive authority subject to the approval, as necessary, of the Governor in Council;

(ii) that the Department of Resources and Development, together with the Secretaries of the Committee, prepare for consideration at the next meeting the comprehensive report on Canadian and foreign activities in Northern Canada required by the Cabinet;

(iii) that the question of the reconstitution or establishment of sub-committees, with appropriate terms of reference and membership, for consideration of such problems as transportation, recruitment and training of personnel, the establishment of a central agency for the collection of Arctic information and the preparation of an information booklet for travellers to the Canadian North, be considered at the next meeting; and

(iv) that the Committee would meet again on Monday, March 16, at 2:30 p.m., in the Privy Council Committee Room;

W. P. Chipman,
A. A. Beveridge,
Joint Secretaries.

Privy Council Office,
February 25, 1953.

Commissioner L.H. Nicholson,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Ottawa.

Dear Commissioner Nicholson:

I wish to thank you for the copy of Sergeant Keurmay's report on Resolute Bay enclosed with your letter of the end of February.

As you are aware, we have been giving consideration to the possibility of transferring a few native families from overpopulated areas to places in the High Arctic, including Craig Harbour, the proposed detachment site at Cape Herschel, and Resolute Bay. It would be possible to establish these small settlements only with your co-operation as there is no one else at these places who could assist these people in adjusting themselves to new conditions.

You have a detachment at Craig Harbour, and I understand you intend to put one at Cape Herschel this year. There is none at Resolute Bay at present, but I understand the meteorological people would like very much to see a detachment reopen there. We could not consider placing Eskimos at Resolute Bay unless we had someone to look after them and direct their activities. This could not ordinarily be done by any of the people employed at the station there. I would be interested to hear, therefore, if you propose to open a detachment at that point this year.
In his report Staff Sergeant Kearney also mentions the possibility of employment of Eskimos by the army at Churchill. In a letter to me dated the 13th of February, 1952, the Director of Civilian Personnel of the Department of National Defence raised the question of employing at that point two Eskimos who have worked for the Foundation Company for some time. We have replied that it will be in order for him to employ these men for an indefinite period.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

H. A. Young
Deputy Minister.

APPROVED

[Signature]

Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch.
During the past three months the writer has patrolled the detachment area from Great Whale River in the south to Sugluk on Hudson Strait. This includes all the detachment area except Wakeham Bay, Belcher Islands, King George and Sleeper Islands. The following are the general conditions found at the various camps and settlements in this area:

PORT HARRISON During the present winter white foxes are building up to a peak which is expected to be reached next year. The H. B. C. have forecast a fur return of 1500 white fox and to date the return is up to expectations. Some other fur is brought in but not enough to influence the economy of the natives. In addition to the income from fur, the natives brought in handicraft (soapstone and ivory carvings, baskets) to the approximate value of $5000. Construction work underway at Port Harrison last summer also contributed to their income.

During the fall of 1952 the HBC outfitted 7 walrus and whale hunts for the natives. These hunts resulted in 35 walrus, 40 white whale, and 15 square flippers, besides a few smaller seals. The winter has been mild, and for the most part suitable for seal hunting. This, and the nearness of the flow-edge, has enabled the natives to procure a higher than average amount of seal meat throughout most of the winter. These factors have resulted in a marked decrease in relief issues, both by the HBC and this office. HBC relief approximated 2300, all of which went to cover the above mentioned hunts. Very little government relief is being issued other than to sick people, cripples, aged, and families with the head out in hospital.

The majority of the Port Harrison natives are spread out in camps along about 100 miles of the adjacent coast. In cleanliness these camp vary from the very clean to very dirty. On the whole however, when the general conditions are considered, they are not unsatisfactory to any extent. It has been noted that the majority of the natives are easily influenced towards personal cleanliness. Any of them who have come in close contact with white establishments retain markedly clean habits even after returning to the nomadic life. Very few natives live in the settlement other than servants for various establishments. This is due however, to continuous efforts by various detachment members to discourage them in this regard.

POVUNGNIITUK The increase in the white fox population has helped the natives here to a considerable degree. Other than this however, there has been no improvement in their lot. The Povungnituk area continues to be a poor meat area although fishing is generally good and the natives are depending more and more on that as a food staple. A small income is derived from handicraft but not nearly (cont'd)
shotguns, while of great importance, are very carelessly handled and indifferently cared for.

A recent check placed the estimated dog population at well over 2000. This is considered too many, being several hundred more than the native population. Every effort is being made to persuade the native people to cut down on the number of dogs kept, for this large canine population just places another strain on the resources of the country.

GENERAL Throughout most of the detachment area the natives are enjoying a good fur year, and prospects are for an even better one next year. This temporary increase in their income however, has done nothing to solve any of the problems which beset the Eskimo. Much of the fur return has so far gone to paying off HBC debt, and while most of the trappers clearing off their debt, some even building up credits, their economy is still unsound, and will continue to be so as long as it is based on a fluctuating fur market and fox cycle. §7, and later §8 has been the price received for white fox, and although this is apparently an increase over last year, it is still not enough to compensate for the general rise in the cost of trade goods.

As has been reported on many occasions, the population of this area appears to be too great for the available resources. To alleviate this effort has been made to settle natives on the various islands of Hudson Bay, namely the Aing George and Sleeper islands. There is no doubt that these undertakings have been of great benefit to the natives involved. It is doubtful however that it can be maintained without being regularly subsidized, as the resources of these islands are restricted mostly to country food. The subsidization is not excessive when the benefits are considered but the dependency of the native on government handouts is an undesirable feature which should be considered. It is felt too, that with better direction and leadership the people on these islands could do much more to support themselves.

During the coming summer the writer intends to fully investigate the practicability of outfitting other groups to winter in other island groups.

While the resources of the country might be inadequate, it is quite probable that the natives could make much greater advantage of them if they had the proper leadership and direction. Many of them, even some of the poorest of the Inefficient Trappers, showed marked abilities and initiative when given the opportunity. There is however, a strong general tendency to expect, even demand, free handouts in any form, and to do nothing as long as there is an even remote possibility of getting by on some form of relief. This is probably due to the fierce competition which once prevailed along this coast between two rival trading concerns.

The clothing of the entire native population is poor and in many cases consists of casts-off and the contents of mission bundles. They are strongly dependent on store bought clothes for they have almost no opportunity to kill caribou during the summer when the skins are suitable for clothing. In fact, very little caribou is taken at any time. Some caribou clothing is in existence but it is of skins bought at the HBC. Skin boots are used to a great extent, most of
the natives preferring them to rubber boots. Seal skin pants are used to some extent but never parkas. Although shabby, the clothing is for the most part adequate especially among the children. Clothing for children has been given priority on family allowance issues. Other than for making boots, seal skin is used very little. One reason for this is that usually the women get the skins and use as many as they can for "spending money". None of the money thus derived goes to the support of her family but to tobacco, gum, ribbons etc.

During the next year every effort will be made to direct the spending of the natives to the greatest advantage and it is hoped that their clothing, tents etc. will be greatly improved. The writer has discussed this point with all the traders and missionaries in this area, and all are cooperating fully.

(A. A. Webster - Reg. No. 14901)

i/c Port Harrison Detachment.

The Commissioner, R.C.M.P. Ottawa.

1. Sir: FORWARDED 4-4-53, for your information.

W. DICK, Insp.,
Officer Commanding, "G" Division.

The Director, Northern Administration & Lands Branch,
Dept. of Resources & Development,
Vimy Building,
Ottawa, Ontario.

1. Sir: FORWARDED 4-4-53.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER

ARRESTED ESKIMO PROJECTS

It is proposed, with your approval, to initiate certain new projects and continue certain existing projects in the interest of improving the Eskimo economy. These projects are listed beneath the headings under which they will be financed.

ESKIMO LOAN FUND

Loan Project No. 1
Cape Frobisher

The R.C.M. Police will establish a detachment at Cape Frobisher on the east coast of Ellesmere Island to police a region where Greenland natives have from time to time been hunting on Canadian territory. Native food supplies are reported to be plentiful. There are no Canadian Eskimos in the region and it is planned to move in five Eskimo families from overpopulated depressed areas and establish them in the native way of life under the direction of the R.C.M. Police. It is estimated that the cost of moving these Eskimos and equipping them to live at Cape Frobisher will not exceed $1,000 per family or $1,000 in all, which will be charged to the item in the estimates - Transportation of Eskimos - and to Relief.

As there is no trading post at Cape Frobisher a year's stock of supplies for the natives will have to be provided in care of the R.C.M. Police. It is proposed to finance the purchase of these supplies under a loan issued to a leading Eskimo in the group. These goods will be held by the R.C.M. Police as security for the loan and will be dispensed by the Police on behalf of the lessee in return for payment in money or in kind and the proceeds will be credited to the loan. When goods for relief or family allowances are to be issued, the R.C.M. Police will make out the vouchers to show the order as being filled by the Lessees who for this purpose will be acting as a trader. When the vouchers are approved for payment the amounts will be credited to the loan.

The exact cost of supplies will not be known until the families are selected and the purchases made. It is estimated that the cost should not exceed $1,000 per family. The loan to the leader of the group should, therefore, be for an amount up to $5,000.

Loan Project No. 2
Craig Harbour

This project is similar to Project 1. Five Eskimo families would be established under the R.C.M. Police to live off the country where native food supplies are reported to be good. The amount of the loan would be up to $5,000.

Loan Project No. 3
Resolute Bay

It has been tentatively agreed with the R.C.M. Police that if we will move five Eskimo families to Resolute Bay they will reopen their detachment there to supervise the Eskimos and maintain law and order in a settlement where there are four different organizations, each with its
own senior officer, and many transient visitors.

The Meteorological Service could offer permanent employment to at least one Eskimo to learn to replace one of their mechanics and might employ one or two others on semi-skilled jobs. All could be employed on seasonal jobs but, except in summer, we prefer at least part of the group to hunt and trap after the native way so that the children of employed Eskimos can learn the native way of life with them. The details as to terms of employment and rotation of labour will be carefully worked out for the guidance of the R.C.M. Police.

As there is no trading post at Resolute Bay this project would operate on the same principle as Project 1. The amount of the loan would be up to $5,000.

The above three projects have as their object;

(a) Relief of population pressure in distressed areas.

(b) A pioneer experiment to determine if Eskimos can be induced to live on the northern islands which, relieves indicate, some supported a native population.

(c) An experiment to work out a method by which Eskimos may be trained to replace white employees in the north without the Eskimo children losing touch with the native way of life.

(d) If these projects warrant it, more natives can be moved north both to these pioneer points and to other points to be selected later.

Project No. 4
Banks Island

During the prosperous years of the white fox trade many Eskimos from the Aklavik and Tuktoyaktuk areas made a lot of money from trapping on Banks Island during the winter and trading their catch on the mainland each summer. When fox prices dropped below $5.00 these people no longer found it economically possible to outfit themselves for Banks Island and some of them became relief cases.

In the fall of 1931 nine Eskimo families comprising twenty-seven people, under the leadership of Fred Carpenter, were outfitted for Banks Island at a cost of $10,069 with the backing of two traders and Northern Administration. The group lived well on Banks Island, were free from the influenza epidemic which attacked natives on the mainland and returned in August 1932 with sufficient furs to pay off all their debts and partially equip themselves for another winter on Banks Island. Thirty-one people went to Banks Island last fall and about $1,000 was advanced to five new members of the group.

Fred Carpenter reported that bowhead whales were plentiful in summer off the west coast of Banks Island and he asked for a loan to outfit his schooner to take one whale to provide dog food and oil for his group, to relieve hunting pressure on caribou. Oil could be brought back to the mainland for native use but could not be exported under the treaty convention in regard to bowhead whales.

A poor fox year can be expected either this winter or next, in which case it is unlikely that traders will be able to advance credit for another winter on Banks Island. In view of the population pressure around Tuktoyaktuk it is most important that Carpenter and his group return to Banks Island next fall. It is, therefore, recommended that, if Carpenter applies for a loan to outfit his natives for Banks Island and equip his schooner to catch a whale, he be given a loan up to $10,000.
Loan Project No. 8
Barreter Island

There are at present about forty-three Eskimos in the Barreter Island region who do not find it worth while to travel 160 miles to the nearest trading post (Aklavik) with the small amount of fur they catch. For the past two years the R.C.M. Police detachment at Barreter Island has stocked relief supplies for these people and accepted in return what fur the natives had to offer. In this way relief costs have practically disappeared for this group.

It is now recommended that this project be financed under the Loan Fund. A loan of $5,000 would be made to the group leader and the goods would be purchased, held and dispensed on his behalf by the R.C.M. Police in the same manner as outlined in Project 1.

POSSIBLE COMBINED LOAN AND RELIEF

It is reported that Eskimo employment and income would be increased if natives were assisted to trap fine fur in inland areas.
It has been suggested that one party of trappers be organized from Aklavik and Tuktoyaktuk to go into the marten area on the lower Anderson River and another party from Stanton should go into the marten area in the upper Anderson River. Both parties would need food supplies and air transportation at a cost of perhaps $5,000 for each party. If carefully supervised by a game warden, perhaps 50% of the cost could be recovered and, therefore, would justify a loan. The balance of the cost would have to be provided from relief. The two projects will have to be further studied in the field before details can be worked out. If the general principle is approved of supporting such projects partly by loans and partly by relief, we will have Mr. Hunt arrange for the necessary investigations.

PROJECTS PROVIDED FOR IN ESTIMATES

Lake Harbour
Boat Building

This is a co-operative project with the Hudson's Bay Company upon which agreement was reached in the fall of 1963 but which was not carried out in 1963 owing to an epidemic of measles at Lake Harbour in the spring of that year. The company has supplied the materials for five whale boats and will pay all normal costs of building the boats. We are to pay the wages, travelling and living expenses of an expert boat-builder, Mr. Joe Thorpe, who has been engaged by the Hudson's Bay Company to instruct the Eskimos. We would also pay the transportation costs of two Eskimos from Cape Dorset to go to Lake Harbour and learn with the local group. The company agreed to take over the five boats, when completed, and sell them at what they cost the company plus 25%. We have an item of $5,000 in the 1965-66 estimates to cover our share of this project.

Ungava Bay
Hunting and Fishing

We have an item of $5,000 to encourage hunting and fishing in Ungava Bay where relief costs have been high. This will entail the repair and outfitting of native boats and rations for organised hunts to Apsato Island for caribou and to Port Burwell for cod-fish and seals to relieve the food situation at Port Chimo, George River and Payne Bay. The Hudson's Bay Company will co-operate with the R.C.M. Police in organizing and supervising this project and will arrange for the storage and distribution of meat and seal skins brought back by the expeditions. Financial assistance will also be given for the repair or replacement of fish nets for the taking of fish by the natives for their own use and for sale locally. These operations will be supervised by the R.C.M. Police.
Atkak

Workshop

An item of $5,000 was provided in the 1953-54 estimates to provide materials for the construction of a workshop for community use in which to promote local industries such as boat building and repairs, making sleds, toboggans, snowshoes, etc. Mr. Harmsbeal was of the opinion that this building could be erected by voluntary local labour. Now that it is planned to convert the present government school into a vocational training school, the two projects will have to be closely integrated. The matter is being discussed with Mr. Hunt.

PROJECTS UNDER RELIEF

Tuktoyaktuk

Boat Repairs

The Eskimos of the Tuktoyaktuk region are not making the best use of the resources of the area, particularly in regard to taking white whales and fish which would augment the local food supplies both for men and dogs. Their power boats are said to be in disrepair because of low fur prices and they have no money to buy gasoline. It is proposed to assist these people to outfit for whaling and fishing to the extent of about $1,000. Fuller details will be obtained through Mr. Hunt.

Port Harrison

Sleeper Islands

The region around Port Harrison is overpopulated in relation to the available country resources. Food supplies from the sea are scarce but white faxes are usually plentiful in good years. Many of the natives depend on food supplies purchased from the trading post from the proceeds of their white fox catch. Relief costs are high in poor fur years and with low fox prices some unsuccessful trappers are unable to support their families even in good fur years.

For several years it has been the policy to assist indigent Eskimo to earn part of their living on the chains of outer islands 100 miles or so out in Hudson Bay where seals are plentiful. In 1951-52 fifty-five Eskimos were outfitted at a cost of $2,500 to winter on the Sleeper Islands. In 1952-53 $1,027 of relief funds were spent to re-outfit thirty-five Eskimos to go to the Sleeper Islands. A good part of the supplies consisted of ammunition to enable these people to obtain seals for food and fuel. Issues of tea and tobacco were reduced to encourage these people to produce fur and oil for barter. It is proposed to follow the same procedure next fall.

Port Harrison

King George Islands

Twenty-five natives wintered successfully on King George Islands and were re-outfitted last fall at a cost of $915.00 from relief, most of which was for ammunition, fish nets and traps. It is proposed to continue this project next fall.

Port Harrison

Richmond Gulf

Four Eskimo families from Port Harrison were assisted last summer to move south to Richmond Gulf where sea food is plentiful, at a cost of $400 from relief. While there is little prospect that these people will be able to produce much in the way of trade goods, they are able to secure country food supplies which reduces the cost of relief and benefits their morals. It is proposed to continue this project if it works out well this winter.
OTHER PROJECTS BEING INVESTIGATED SOME OF WHICH MAY BE LATER SUBMITTED FOR ACTION IN 1966 AND OTHERS IN 1967

Shell Re-loading Industry

Eskimos pay about 30¢ per shell for rifle ammunition which includes a 15¢ sportman's excise tax and a 15¢ sales tax. In Quebec there is a further 2% provincial sales tax. Investigations are under way as to the feasibility of developing a small shell re-loading industry at certain points under the supervision of the R.C.M. Police. The reloaded shells would be marketed by the Hudson's Bay Company and suitable places to start would be Fort Harrison, Fort Chimo, Aklavik and possibly the proposed rehabilitation centres at Driftwood and Prince Harry.

Manufacture of Clothing

Eskimos purchase certain types of ready-made clothing manufactured outside. It is believed that such items as trousers, shirts, parkas, mittens and socks could be manufactured in the country by small groups of indigent women who are presently living on relief. Sewing machines, knitting machines, and materials and patterns would have to be supplied and the work done under supervision, possibly in schools and nursing stations. It also seems probable that such small industries could be carried on by some disabled persons at rehabilitation centres. The Hudson's Bay Company has offered its co-operation in marketing these products.

MAJOR PROJECTS UNDER STUDY

Eiderdown Industry

A large amount of information from existing records has been assembled on previous efforts along this line in Canada. No eiderdown is presently produced in Canada, and Greenland and Norway are understood to be the principal sources of supply. Information from both these countries has been received through diplomatic channels. Preliminary inquiries indicate that the feather-using trade in Canada is most anxious to obtain eiderdown.

Reindeer Industry in Ungava

The information already available on this subject will be assembled in close co-operation with the Wildlife Division. It has been pretty well agreed that further field studies on range conditions will have to be made to determine their suitability. A careful study will also have to be made of climatic data and local index plants to determine the possibility of this region being visited by icing storms which would freeze over the food supply of the deer. This has been given as a possible cause of the disappearance of the caribou except for a few small inland herds. The possible effect of these few caribou and the probable development of an iron ore industry in the region on imported reindeer will have to be carefully considered.

Handicraft Industry

A separate report will be submitted on this subject.

F.J.G. Cunningham,
Director.
EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM MISS E.M. HINDS - MAR. 16, 1953.

"(1) It is now doubtful whether Inukpuk will go north as he is considered to be a good leader of his people and the H.B.C. post manager feels that the district cannot afford to part with good leaders. But I understand that Fatty wants to go. He is a dirty old rascal, but has two excellent sons and I think it would be good to have them in the party. However, as soon as arrangements are definite we can go ahead with the selection of people. "

NAC RG 55/167/252-3/4
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT;

REPORT TO THE CABINET

on

ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN CANADA

OTTAWA, Ontario
March, 1953
SECRET

ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN CANADA

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Summary of Reports by Federal Government Departments and other agencies of activities in Northern Canada.

PART II

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DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT

Responsibilities:

Federal: The Department of Resources and Development is responsible for administering the resources of the Canadian North, including land, minerals, oil and gas, water power, timber and grazing, but excluding fish and marine animals (which are the responsibility of the Department of Fisheries) and game (which is the responsibility of the Territorial Government). The Department is also responsible for Eskimo. (Indians are the responsibility of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration).

Territorial: The Northwest Territories Act, 1905, as amended, provides for the government of the Northwest Territories by Commissioner (who is Deputy Minister of the Department of Resources and Development) under instructions given from time to time by the Governor in Council or the Minister of Resources and Development. The Act also provides for a Council consisting of eight members, one of whom is Deputy Commissioner. Of the eight, three are elected by the people of Mackenzie District to represent three constituencies in the Mackenzie District, and five are senior federal officials appointed by the Governor in Council. The Act confers upon the Commissioner in Council legislative powers similar to, but less extensive than, those of a provincial legislature. The principal items within its jurisdiction are the education, health and welfare of whites and persons of mixed blood, development services (including local and trunk roads, and water supply services) and municipal affairs. There is no territorial civil service and federal employees perform both federal and territorial functions.

The Yukon Act, 1927, as amended, provides for the government of the Yukon Territory by a Commissioner (who is an officer of the Department of Resources and Development) under instructions given from time to time by the Governor in Council or the Minister of Resources and Development. The Act also provides for a Council of five elected members, with powers similar to those of the Northwest Territories Council. In the Yukon Territory there is both a federal and a territorial civil service responsible to the Commissioner.

(A) Northern Administration and Lands Branch:

The Branch administers federal responsibilities vested in the Department in both the Northwest Territories and the Yukon Territory, and territorial responsibilities in the Northwest Territories. Branch offices for field staffs are situated at Fort Smith, Hay River, Yellowknife, Aklavik, Whitehorse, Mayo and Dawson. In other settlements administrative functions are performed by the R.C.M. Police.

1. Northern Administration Division

(a) Public Services Section;

Responsible for the administration of the Northwest Territories Act, and Northwest Territories Ordinances and Regulations respecting such matters as public health, welfare, municipal affairs, workmen's compensation, liquor, and various licences and permits.

(b) Education and Welfare Section;

Responsible for educational facilities in the Northwest Territories, which comprise federal day schools operated by this Section, day and residential schools conducted by the Church of England,
the Roman Catholic Church and other missions, Indian Day Schools operated by the Indian Affairs Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, and a public school and a separate school at Yellowknife operated by School Districts. Scholarships, free correspondence courses, film shipments, CBC school broadcast programs, are provided.

- School, Authorities, Attendance

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Enrolment at Federal Schools for Eskimos in the Eastern Arctic:

- Coral Harbour: 21
- Fort Harrison, Que: 30
- Fort Chimo, Que: 18
- Chesterfield Inlet: 38
- Cape Dorset: 4

Approximately 500 Eskimos attend mission schools operated by church denominations in the Eastern Arctic.

A number of Eskimo receive instruction at the mission of the Eskimo Field Section of the Canadian Interior Mission at Maguse River (headquarters at Bemidji, Minnesota) and the Northern Canada Evangelical Mission at Padlei (headquarters at Buffalo Narrows, Saskatchewan).

At the Charles Camsell Indian Hospital, Edmonton, 47 Indians, 12 half-breed Indians, and 36 Eskimo patients receive instruction. Of these, 72 are adult. At Parc Savard Indian Hospital, Quebec City, 39 children and 49 adults receive instruction.

(c) Development Services Section:

An administrative and advisory unit acting in co-operation.
with such agencies of Government as Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, the Engineering Division of the Department of Resources and Development, the Department of Public Works, in the construction of departmental residences, schools, garages, sewage and water systems, roads, highways, power plants and tourist facilities and camps throughout the North.

(d) **Conservation and Management Section:**

Responsible under the Game Ordinance for wildlife in the Northwest Territories, for the Reindeer Station, Wood Buffalo Park, and for the Thelon and Twin Islands Sanctuaries and the Mackenzie Delta Beaver Sanctuary, where there is no hunting, for the Game Preserves of the Arctic Islands, Peel River, Slave River, Yellowknife, Mackenzie Mountains and James Bay, where only Indians or Eskimos may hunt.

Because of the fluctuations in nature, the provisions of the Game Ordinance are kept under continuous review by the field staff and at headquarters in order to make changes required by altered wildlife and economic factors. Warden services for game and fire protection are provided. Individuals or groups are assigned rights in specific registered trapping areas.

There are today in Wood Buffalo Park some 12,000 buffalo. In the 1952-53 round-up 245 animals were slaughtered and 108,600 pounds of meat were sold to the general public, to missions for consumption in hospitals and schools, and to the Indian Affairs Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration for relief purposes.

The reindeer station near Aklavik has a nucleus of Eskimo and Lapp herdsmen. The training of young Eskimos as herd managers is an important, long-term feature. There are approximately 8,000 reindeer at present in the reserve which comprises 17,900 square miles. Annual shipment of skins is made to Eskimos in the Eastern Arctic.

(e) **Arctic Services Section:**

Administers Eskimo affairs (except health and education) in co-operation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in matters of administration, the Department of Transport in matters of northern transportation, and with the Department of National Health and Welfare for the health and well-being of the Eskimo people and whites resident in the Arctic. Its special task is the improvement of the economic status of the Eskimo through the fur trade, fisheries, other natural resources, handicraft arts, and home industries. Patrols are made in the East and West by air, land and sea. The Eastern Arctic Patrol, coordinated by Arctic Services, yearly travels at least 10,000 miles through the Eastern Arctic Archipelago, calling at points such as Tuchialik Bay, Resolution Island, Fort Chimo, Sugluk, Ivuyivik, Cape Smith, Port Harrison, Churchill, Coral Harbour, Cape Dorset, Lake Harbour, Cape Hope, Pangnirtung, River Clyde, Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, Dundas Harbour, Craig Harbour, Padloping, Resolute, Frobisher. The Patrol is comprised of administrative officers, a medical party usually made up of a general practitioner, a surgeon, a dentist, x-ray party, and sometimes an eye specialist, survey parties and research workers from various agencies. During the patrol the problems of Canadian citizens in the Arctic are heard and given study. In some years a legal party travels with the Patrol to hear cases. Royal Canadian Mounted Police officials and Hudson's Bay Company officers join the Patrol to inspect their outposts. Complete reports on the Patrol are handed in to Arctic Services by all concerned, and recommendations are made for the development of the Canadian Arctic.
While the fund for providing Family Allowances to the Eskimos comes from the vote of the Department of National Health and Welfare, the Northwest Territories Administration is charged with registering Eskimo families and paying the allowances to them in a manner which will be of benefit to the children without impairing the native initiative to provide for themselves. All Family Allowances are paid in kind from selected lists.

2. Lands Division

Administers Crown-owned lands, minerals, oil and gas, timber and grazing in the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory; under Territorial Lands Act and regulations timber and grazing rights are leased. Land is leased or granted as circumstances require. Prospecting and mineral rights are granted under regulations covering petroleum and natural gas, quartz mining, placer mining, dredging, coal mining, sand, stone, gravel and quarrying.

Mines are inspected under the Northwest Territories Mine Safety Ordinance. Mine rescue and first aid training is conducted at the Yellowknife Mine Rescue Station, and teams are trained for each mine through services provided by this station.

3. Eskimo Research Section

Conducts research into the best means of educating and adapting the Eskimos to changing economic conditions through improvement of hunting and fishing techniques, greater use of local food resources, handicrafts, whaling, codfishing, elder-down, boat-building. Plans transfers of Eskimos from over-populated, depleted areas to areas where game is more plentiful, or where employment may be found. Recommends loans to Eskimos or investments in their projects. Studies Eskimo-trader relations.

(B) National Parks Branch:

1. National Museum

Conducts field investigations in Northern Canada, particularly in the fields of anthropology, archaeology and biology. Collects, studies and files information received from the reports of other scientific investigators and the examination of specimens.

The educational services of the Museum provide a media for lectures, exhibits, exhibition hall tours, loans of visual aids, including natural history and anthropological specimens and exchanges.

2. Wildlife Division

Administers the Migratory Birds Convention Act (in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police); carries on scientific research into wildlife problems in the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory, advises Northern Administration and Lands Branch and co-operates in wildlife management. Deals with national and international problems relating to wildlife resources. Publishes wildlife bulletins.

(C) Engineering and Water Resources Branch:

1. Water Resources Division

Compiles and analyzes basic data of stream-flow and run-off for use in connection with power development, storage, irrigation, draining, flood warnings, flood control, fisheries research, navigation, and domestic water supply. Maintains gauging stations and carries out hydrometric investigations. Administrator
the Dominion Water Power Regulations in the Northwest Territories.

2. Engineering Division

Composed of six sections: Highway and General Engineering; Architectural; Structural Design; Electrical Design; Heating, Plumbing and Water System Design; and Administrative. These make field surveys, prepare plans and specifications, bills of materials, estimates of construction costs of roads, bridges, water supply, drainage, power systems and building construction, as required by the Northern Administration and Lands Branch in the Canadian North.

3. Northwest Territories Power Commission

Created by Act of Parliament in 1948 to construct and operate electric power plants in the Northwest Territories. By amendment of the Act in 1950, its authority was extended to the Yukon Territory. Operates and maintains the Snare River hydro-electric development (8,350 h.p., 1948) supplying power to the Yellowknife mining area and townsite 90 miles away, a diesel generating plant (1950) supplying Fort Smith in the Northwest Territories, the Mayo River development (initial capacity 3,000 h.p., 1952) supplying lead-zinc-silver mines and communities of Mayo Landing, the Keno Hill and Galena Hill Districts, in the Yukon Territory.

(D) Forestry Branch:

National Parks and Northern Administration Section

Prepares reports, lectures, on fire protection, silviculture, timber cutting on permit and licensed berths, insect and fungus damage. In conjunction with Northern Administration and Lands Branch, makes forest inventory surveys and forest inspection trips in the Northwest Territories and Yukon.
OUTLINE OF WORK OF THE R.C.M. POLICE IN THE CANADIAN NORTH

The R.C.M. Police are responsible for the maintenance of law and order and for the enforcement of all laws and ordinances in the Northwest Territories. The Arctic is part of the Northwest Territories. That responsibility has been placed upon the Force by Parliament and is written into subsection 3 of section 12 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act.

2. Another Act of Parliament, namely, the Northwest Territories Act (section 40) gives authority to the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, subject to any Orders made in that behalf from time to time by the Governor-in-Council, to issue orders to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in aid of the administration of civil and criminal justice and for the general peace, order and good government of the Territories.

3. Apart from the foregoing responsibilities, the Force does a great deal of the civil administrative work in the Territories on behalf of the Territorial Government, including practically all of the civil administrative or welfare work pertaining to the Eskimos in the field.

4. This civil administrative or welfare work amongst Eskimos consists of:

(a) The registrations of vital statistics (births, marriages, deaths, burial permits).

(b) The control of the payments, in kind, of Family Allowances, Old Age allowances and pensions for the blind.

(c) The relief of destitution amongst Eskimos.

(d) The issuing of numbered identification discs to all Eskimos.

(e) At times assisting Eskimos to establish new camps in new and better hunting grounds.

(f) Preventing material exploitation of the Eskimos by Whites.

(g) Giving first aid in sickness and injuries and epidemic to the Eskimos and assisting the field nurses and field doctors in those matters where there are nurses and doctors.

5. There is little crime amongst the Eskimos but the Force does a considerable amount of enforcement work in respect to Whites and Indians in the Territories.
FUTURE PLANS

6. The Force expects to continue the service we presently give in the North and to open new detachments when Canadian interests seem to call for such action. For instance - it is planned to open a detachment at Cape Herschel on the east coast of Ellesmere Island and another one at Clyde River on the east coast of Baffin Land this year. The Cape Herschel Detachment will, it is hoped, encourage the move of some Canadian Eskimos into that part of Ellesmere Island and will also tend to prevent Greenland natives from making hunting excursions into Canadian territory. The projected detachment at Clyde River will be set up in order to provide a better policing service in that area, having regard to projected new developments.

Additional projected detachments to be opened this year:

Sachs Harbour, Banks Island
Resolute Bay, Cornwallis Island
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET.

Advisory Committee on Northern Development:

First Report on Activities in Northern Canada

1. The Cabinet, on 22 January, 1953, directed that the Advisory Committee on Northern Development consider and report immediately and periodically thereafter on all phases of development of the Canadian Arctic, and on the means which might be employed to preserve or develop the political, administrative, scientific and defence interests of Canada in that area.

2. Attached is a report prepared by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development outlining Canadian governmental activities in the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories, in the Department of External Affairs section of this report. It is a summary of the present and projected official United States activities in the same area. The appendices to the report show in greater detail these activities of Canada and the United States in Northern Canada.

3. Certain questions of major policy have arisen from consideration of this report and will be the subject of recommendations at an early date.

R. H. Winters,
Minister.

Department of Resources and Development,
March 31, 1953.
1. Participation in Joint Arctic Weather Station Programme

This involves the provision by the U.S. Weather Bureau of approximately one-half of the staff of the five joint Arctic weather stations (total number of U.S. personnel about twenty) with the technical equipment and certain other supplies for the stations. In addition, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard are largely responsible for the annual sea supply and the USAF shares with the RCAF the task of carrying out the air supply. The joint Arctic weather station programme was approved by the Canadian Government in 1947. The sea supply missions are authorized annually by an Exchange of Notes between the two governments. Authorization for USAF participation in the air lift is given through service channels.

2. USAF Personnel on Baffin Island

(a) River Clyde: The USAF has a radio beacon at River Clyde which is manned by two USAF operators. The USAF has proposed informally that the Department of Transport should take over the responsibility of operating the beacon.

(b) Frobisher: The USAF in 1951 was authorized to station up to 150 USAF personnel for staging operations on the air route to Thule. In addition, there is under construction a large early warning radar station. This is the northernmost station of the Labrador radar chain and is a part of Project Pinetree.

(c) Padloping: During the Second World War the USAF set up a weather and radio station at Padloping manned by a staff of about twelve. Cabinet directed in 1947 that DOT should take over this station by 1950. It has not been possible to do this as yet, however.

3. Future Projects Involving U.S. Installations in the Canadian Arctic

(a) Loran Stations: The United States, in 1952, was granted permission to carry out surveys on the east coast of Baffin Island in the Cape Christian - Cape Dyer region, with a view to the subsequent establishment of one or two Loran stations for the use of ships and aircraft en route to Thule. The surveys have been completed but as yet no request for permission to construct any stations has been submitted by the U.S. government.
(b) Radar Stations for the Thule Defences

The USAF in 1952 received permission to carry out surveys for sites for GCI radar stations (stations of this type have a complement of about 200 men) in the general area of Resolute Bay, Eureka and Alert. They would be used for the control of fighter aircraft operating from Thule. No request for permission to construct any stations has yet been submitted.

(c) Experimental Early Warning Stations:

The United States on January 30, 1953, requested permission from the Canadian Government to carry out an experimental early warning project (Project COUNTERCHANGE) in the Western Arctic. It would involve two stations on Canadian territory, one at Herschel Island and one at Aklavik, with some unattended stations at intermediate points. A Canadian reply concurring in the project subject to certain conditions is now being prepared. If the project were to be followed by the completion of an operational installation, it would involve a chain of stations across the Arctic Archipelago.

(d) Alternate Landing Facilities for Use of Aircraft Operating out of Thule:

The USAF has informed the RCAF that it is preparing proposals for the development of air strips at Alert and Eureka and the construction of an air strip at River Clyde to a standard suitable for large transport aircraft and jet fighters to meet the need for emergency alternatives for Thule and for Arctic re-supply missions.

4. Mapping, Survey and Photographic Activities

The United States has at various times obtained permission to carry out hydrographic and topographic surveys and photographic reconnaissance operations in the Arctic. In each case, the Canadian Government has required that copies of all information obtained be supplied to the appropriate Canadian agency.

5. USAF Weather Station on Arctic Ice Island T-3

Early in 1952, the USAF landed on an ice island in the Arctic Ocean, using the weather station air strip at Alert as a staging base. The island at the moment is drifting in a southerly direction towards Ellesmere Island. It is believed that the ice island was formed by breaking off from the shelf ice on the coast of Ellesmere Island. A joint Canada-U.S. expedition proposes to investigate this shelf ice during the summer of 1953.
L.D. Milgrew, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Milgrew:

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police detachment at Craig Harbour,
Ellesmere Island, has reported that Greenlanders, presumably from the
Eskimo area, have been living in the vicinity of Bache Peninsula, on the
east side of Ellesmere Island, during the last two years at least. Our
latest information is that there are two men, two women and eight children
living near Bache Peninsula now.

From talks we have had with various Greenland officials from
time to time, we have gathered that they, like ourselves, have no desire
to encourage casual migrations of this kind between the two countries.
We think, therefore, that, with the developments that are now taking
place in the Arctic regions of both Greenland and Canada, the present
would be an opportune time to bring this matter to the attention of the
Inuit Government and to ask for their co-operation in preventing natives
from either country crossing over without complying with the usual
inmigration requirements.

I may add that Canadian Eskimos are already residing at
Craig Harbour, and that we intend to transfer others to places in
Ellesmere Island during the coming year. It seems advisable to us,
therefore, that arrangements should be made to have the Greenlanders
presently in this area sent back to Greenland before any difficulties
may arise through the intermingling of the two groups.

We will be glad, of course, to receive any suggestions the
Greenland Administration may care to offer on the steps that should be
taken to return the present group and to prevent others from crossing over.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. Youngs,
Deputy-Minister.
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
"G" DIVISION

Frobisher Bay, N.W.T.,
April 3rd, 1953.

The Officer Commanding,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
"G" Division, Ottawa, Ontario.

Sir:

Re: Employment of Eskimos by the United States Air Force - Frobisher Bay.

1. Please be advised that on March first, 1953, employment of the Eskimos on the Frobisher Bay Air base was taken over by the United States Air Force.

2. Arrangements were made through this office, and are now being submitted to you for your consideration and approval. A number of factors were taken into consideration, and we believe that this is the best arrangement that we could make, and that it is a good one.

3. Only eight Eskimos are to be employed. The wage scale will run from $116.00 to $140.00 per month, six of them drawing the maximum now. When they show the ability to do skilled work they will be given wages according to that rating, meanwhile they are classed as native labour. The U.S.A.F. could not provide them with rations under their present set-up, hence a raise in pay from $65.00 - $100.00 to the present $116.00 - $140.00 was requested and obtained. This increased salary will allow them to purchase the food themselves. The mid-day meal will cost them 40¢ if they wish to obtain same. Considering that the Eskimos are provided with homes, stoves, fuel, lighting, and everything, this salary is pretty good. All they have to buy is food and clothing.

4. Payment is made in cash, which also was requested. The present set-up of giving credits to the Hudson's Bay Company is not totally successful. There is a Royal Bank of Canada at Goose Bay, Labrador. Would it be possible for our office to deduct from the salaries at time of payment, or even make it a voluntary effort, that a sum from each payment be deposited in the Bank at Goose Bay. In this the Eskimos would not be obliged to purchase high priced goods from the holder of their credits, and further they would be drawing interest. This detachment could keep five or six hundred dollars on hand here for immediate needs and keep a ledger on Eskimo savings. Whenever a large sum of money had accrued it would be a simple matter to have it deposited to the Eskimos accounts in Goose Bay. Even if the money were to be held at this detachment, it would be more available to the Eskimos than under the present set-up where all they can get for it is Hudson's Bay goods.

5. The Eskimos seem to be very pleased with the present set-up ... but of course they don't realize the value of things. As it stands they get a good basic salary, and it is believed that in the near future they will be able to buy food stuffs from the U.S.A.F. Commissary at very low prices. Considering the many advantages the Eskimos get here this new wage scale offers them a good living. The armed forces base is very good to the native -- to good for now the natives come up to the base when they are out of tea, etc., and are supplied with same. With the
proper administration the natives at this base could be quite wealthy, but first they must be educated to the point where they appreciate this type of living.

6. At the present time we must allow the native to trade fairly freely with the transients and armed forces men, for this business adds up to quite a sum. There is one answer to administration here, and that is a government store. With that we could institute a educational program which would within a few years make the type of citizen we want out of these natives. From previous correspondence this detachment believes that Headquarters considers this area as a testing ground, which is quite so. It would be an interesting experiment to make this test insofar as the education of the native is concerned and too the release of these people from government by the Hudson's Bay Company.

7. There will be work for eskimos at the Fraser-Brace Terminal Construction this summer, but it will be only for four or five months, hence this detachment will assume responsibility for making arrangements for their hiring direct with the Superintendent here. Concerning the arrangements made to date concerning the eight permanent workers, might this detachment be instructed regarding whether or not this arrangement is satisfactory. Also of concern is the matter of banking outlined in para. four. This report submitted for your consideration and approval, please.

signed H.D. Van Norman

(R.D. Van Norman) 15306
I/C Frobisher Bay Det.

The Commissioner, H.C.M. Police, Ottawa.

1. Sir: FORWARDED May 11th, 1953

2. I think that the suggestion contained in paragraph 4 on the banking of a portion of the employed Eskimos salary in the Bank at Goose "ey, Leb., and the suggestion that Constable i/o of Frobisher Bay Detachment keep in his possession $500.00 or $600.00 of the Eskimos pay in cash, for them to draw on, are both good, and I would recommend them for your consideration and that of the Director, Northern Administration and "anda Branch.

signed H. A. Larsen, Insp.
Officer Commanding "G" Division.
Commissioner L.E. Nicholson,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Commissioner Nicholson:

You will recall that at our recent meeting in your office we agreed on a proposal to transfer approximately fifteen families of Natives from northern Quebec and southern Baffin Island, and to place five families at each of your detachments at Craig Harbour, Herschel Island and Resolute Bay. It was understood that you would be establishing Cape Herschel this season, and that if natives were transferred to Resolute Bay you would reopen there. Craig Harbour is already open.

As the first step towards carrying out this plan, we would suggest that the attached telegram should be sent to your detachments at Port Harrison and Pond Inlet, so that we may obtain information regarding the natives who are willing to go and what they will require in the way of equipment and supplies. You may wish to add to these messages anything that may assist you in making your own arrangements.

I think it would be most desirable, at the outset at least, to have one family at each place from the Pond Inlet area. These northern people are accustomed to the long darkness and could do a great deal to encourage and assist the newcomers in adjusting themselves to strange conditions. You already have two Pond Inlet families at Craig Harbour, one of whom could possibly be transferred if necessary, and I do not think there will be any difficulty in getting one or two more. Idlout, two years ago, expressed a desire to go to Baffin Island and it is probable that he will wish to take one or two families with him if he is still of the same mind.

In order to meet our Treasury's requirements regarding Eskimo loans, it will be necessary to appoint one Eskimo in each group as trader and to make him nominally responsible for the supplies that will be shipped in for trade. This will not make any actual difference
in the arrangements made as we shall still have to look up the H.C.O. in charge of each detachment to supervise and direct the operations. It will be necessary, however, for us to know the names of the Inuit to be nominated as traders.

As soon as we get the information asked for in these telegrams, we shall be able to go ahead with our arrangements and we shall keep you informed of what is being done. Your kind co-operation in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Yours very truly,

F.J.G. Cunningham,
Director.

4 copies "G" Division, RCMP
Ottawa, April 8, 1953.

The Constable in Charge,
R.C.M. Police Detachment,
Pond Inlet, N.W.T.

In connection with plans being made to transfer Eskimos from northern Quebec and southern Baffin Islands to Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands this season understand Idlout & five cash seven six six previously expressed desire to go to Ellesmere Stop If he still wishes to go there to hunt and trap please wire names and disc numbers of hunters who would accompany him comma number of dependants and particulars of boats comma calibre of rifles and other major equipment owned and also number of dogs to be transferred Stop If Idlout not interested can you suggest one or two other men who would be qualified to assist newcomers in adjusting themselves to conditions in High Arctic Stop As it will be necessary to appoint one Eskimo as trader at Craig Harbour comma Cape Herschel and Resolute Bay to act under Police supervision please give names of men you would recommend to act in this capacity.

J.J.G. Cunningham
Director.
The Constable in Charge,
R.C.M. Police Detachment,
Port Harrison, Que.

Officers of Resources and Development Department discussed with
Constable McRae last spring and also with Miss Hinds in Ottawa recently
suggestion to move out ten families from Port Harrison to Ellesmere
and Cornwallis Islands by C.D. Howe this summer Stop Understand
several families expressed willingness to go Stop If they are still
interested please wire names and disc numbers of hunters comma number
of dependants and relationships of families involved comma also give
particulars of boats comma calibres of rifles and other major equipment
owned and also number of dogs to be transferred Stop Conditions in
High Arctic should be carefully explained to natives Stop Some may
find temporary or permanent employment but majority will have to hunt
and trap for a living.

F.J.G. Cunningham
Director.
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
"G" DIV. C.I.B.

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

DIV. FILE No. 31/181

H.Q. FILE No. 1512-2-4-0-27(Vol.2)

Your File 9450

Ottawa April 14, 1953.

The Director,
Northern Administration and Lands Branch,
Dept. of Resources and Development,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Re: Responsibility, Care and
Supervision of Eskimos.

1. By direction of the Commissioner of the R.C.M. Police, and having reference to your letter to him, dated the 8th. inst., I enclose one copy of each of the wireless messages which we have today sent to our Port Harrison, Fort Chimo and Pond Inlet Detachments.

2. Please note the reference in the messages to the Eskimo families being brought back to their homes. I considered it advisable to make that promise. I have in mind the sad experiences of those families of Eskimos (I believe eleven families) who were taken from Cape Dorset to Dundas Harbour in 1934 by the then Northern Administration and after being there with the Hudsons Bay Company for two years were taken to Arctic Bay and Fort Ross. They suffered hardships and asked, from time to time, to be taken back to Cape Dorset. They never were taken back and the survivors and their descendants are still in the Fort Ross - Spence Bay district, under the supervision of our Spence Bay Detachment.

H. A. Larsen, Insp.,
Officer Commanding, "G" Division.
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

TELETYPE MESSAGE

BRANCH: "G" DIV. C.I.B.

FILE NO. 31/131

OTTAWA, April 14th 1953

THE N.C.O. IN CHARGE, R.C.M.P., PORT HARRISON, P.B.

IT IS SUGGESTED BY DIRECTOR NORTHERN ADMINISTRATION TO MOVE THIS SUMMER ON THE C.D. HOME FROM PORT HARRISON DETACHMENT AREA FOUR ESKIMO FAMILIES TO CRAIG HARBOUR ON ELLESBERE ISLAND AND THREE FAMILIES TO CAPE HERSCHEL ON ELLESBERE ISLAND TO HUNT AND TRAP FOR A LIVING UNDER SUPERVISION OF R.C.M.P. POLICE DETACHMENTS STOP PLEASE ASCERTAIN WHETHER ANY FAMILIES ARE WILLING TO GO AND IF SO NIRE NAMES AND IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS AND NUMBERS OF DEPENDENTS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF FAMILIES INVOLVED STOP ALSO GIVE PARTICULARS OF BoATS COMM. CALIBRES OF RIFLES AND OTHER MAJOR EQUIPMENT OWNED AND NUMBER OF DOGS STOP CONDITIONS ON ELLESBERE ISLAND SHOULD BE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED PARTICULARLY COMPLETE DARK PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS AND OTHER SHORT DAYS AND ONLY ANNUAL VISIT BY SUPPLY SHIP STOP IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF ONE OR TWO MEMBERS OF FAMILIES ARE QUALIFIED AND NAMED TO ACT AS TRADERS UNDER SUPERVISION OF R.C.M.P. STOP TRADE SUPPLIES WILL BE SHIPPED IN STOP POND INLET DETACHMENT BEING ASKED TO NAME THREE FAMILIES AND PORT CHINO DETACHMENT FIVE FAMILIES STOP FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALL FIFTEEN FAMILIES WILL BE FIVE EACH AT CRAIG HARBOUR CAPE HERSCHEL AND RESOLUTE BAY STOP THE HEADS OF FAMILIES SHOULD BE GOOD ENERGETIC HUNTERS STOP FAMILIES WILL BE BROUGHT BACK HOME AT END OF ONE YEAR IF THEY SO DESIRE

H. A. LARSEN

The N.C.O. 1/c Port Harrison Detachment.

Confirmation copy.

H. A. Larsen Insp.

O.C. "G" Division.
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

TELETYPYPE MESSAGE

BRANCH: "G" DIV. C.I.H.

FILE NO. 31/81

OTTAWA. April 14th 1953.

THE CST 1/C, R.C.M.P. FORT CHIMO, P.Q.

IT IS SUGGESTED BY DIRECTOR NORTHERN ADMINISTRATION TO MOVE
FIVE ESKIMO FAMILIES THIS SUMMER ON C.D. HOME FROM FORT CHIMO
DETACHMENT AREA TO LIVE AT ABSOLUTE BAY ON CORNWALLIS ISLAND
N.W.T. WHERE THEY CAN POSSIBLY GET PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT AT
AIR BASE AND WEATHER STATION AS DRIVERS OF TRUCKS, CATERPILLARS
AND BULLDOZERS AND HUNT AND TRAP IN SPARE TIME AND BE UNDER
SUPERVISION OF R.C.M.P. POLICE DETACHMENT STOP PLEASE ASCERTAIN
WHETHER ANY FAMILIES HAVING MEMBERS PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED AS
DRIVERS OF ABOVE MENTIONED EQUIPMENT ARE WILLING TO GO AND IF
SO WRITE NAMES AND IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS AND NUMBERS OF DEPEN-
DENTS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF FAMILIES INVOLVED STOP ALSO GIVE
PARTICULARS OF BOATS COMM. CALIBERS OF RIFLES AND OTHER MAJOR
EQUIPMENT OWNED AND NUMBER OF LOADS STOP LIVING CONDITIONS AT
ABSOULTE BAY ARE FAVOURABLE STOP TRADE SUPPLIES WILL BE SHIPPED
IN STOP IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF ONE OR TWO MEMBERS OF FAMILIES
ARE QUALIFIED AND NAMED TO ACT AS TRADERS UNDER SUPERVISION OF
R.C.M.P. STOP THE HEADS OF FAMILIES SHOULD BE GOOD ENERGETIC
HUNTERS STOP FAMILIES WILL BE BROUGHT BACK HOME AT END OF
ONE YEAR IF THEY SO DESIRE.

The CST 1/C FORT CHIMO DETACHMENT.

CONFIRMATION COPY.

H.A. Larsen

H.A. Larsen Insp.
O.C. "G" Division
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

TELETYPE MESSAGE

BRANCH: R.G. DIV. C.I.B.

FILE NO: 3/181

OTTAWA, April 14th 1953

THE CONSTABLE IN CHARGE, R.C.M.P., POND INLET, N.W.T.

IT IS SUGGESTED BY DIRECTOR, NORTHERN ADMINISTRATION TO MOVE THIS SUMMER ON THE C.D. HOME FROM POND INLET DETACHMENT AREA A TOTAL OF THREE ESKIMO FAMILIES ONE OF THE FAMILIES TO CRAIG HARBOUR ON ELLESMERE ISLAND THE OTHER TWO FAMILIES TO CAPE HERSHEY ON ELLESMERE ISLAND TO HUNT AND TRAP FOR A LIVING UNDER SUPERVISION OF R.C.M. POLICE DETACHMENTS STOP PLEASE ASCERTAIN WHETHER ANY FAMILIES ARE WILLING TO GO AND IF SO, WIRE NAMES AND IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS OF DEPENDENTS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF FAMILIES INVOLVED STOP ALSO GIVE PARTICULARS OF BOATS CALIBERS OF RIFLES AND OTHER MAJOR EQUIPMENT OWNED AND NUMBERS OF DOGS STOP CONDITIONS ON ELLESMERE ISLAND SHOULD BE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED PARTICULARLY LONGER DARK PERIOD AND ONLY ANNUAL VISITS BY SUPPLY SHIP STOP IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF ONE OR TWO MEMBERS OF FAMILIES ARE QUALIFIED AND NAMED TO ACT AS TRADERS UNDER SUPERVISION OF R.C.M. POLICE STOP TRADE SUPPLIES WILL BE SHIPPED IN STOP PORT HARRISON DETACHMENT BEING ASKED TO NAME SEVEN FAMILIES AND PORT CHIMO DETACHMENT BEING ASKED TO NAME FIVE FAMILIES STOP FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALL FIFTEEN FAMILIES WILL BE FIVE EACH AT CRAIG HARBOUR CAPE HERSHEY AND RESOLUTE BAY STOP THE HEADS OF FAMILIES SHOULD BE GOOD ENERGETIC HUNTERS STOP I UNDERSTAND THAT IDLOUT E5-766 EXPRESSED DESIRE TO GO TO ELLESMERE IF SO HE COULD POSSIBLY HELP YOU NAME OTHERS STOP FAMILIES WILL BE BROUGHT BACK HOME AT END OF ONE YEAR IF THEY SO DESIRE.

The Cst. 1/o, Pond Inlet Detachment, N.W.T. H. A. Larsen

Confirmation copy, H.A. Larsen Inso.

O.C. "Q" Divn.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

You will recall that on April 2nd, we prepared a letter to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, for the Deputy Minister, relating to the matter of Greenlanders living in the vicinity of Bache Peninsula, N.W.T. We pointed out that this might be an opportune time for External Affairs to bring this matter to the attention of the Danish Government and ask for their cooperation in preventing natives from either country crossing over without complying with the usual immigration requirements. We further stated that it was our intention to transfer Canadian Eskimos to places in Ellesmere Island, during the coming year.

1. In connection with Greenland natives living and hunting on Ellesmere Island, we have unofficially heard that an expedition, sponsored by the Defence Research Board in conjunction with the Geological Survey of Canada, plan to use Greenland Eskimos and dogs on their trip to the north coast of Ellesmere this spring and summer.

2. On March 27th we issued Scientists and Explorers Licence No. 461 to Mr. G.F. Battenley-Smith, of the Arctic Section of the Defence Research Board, who is in charge of the expedition in question. The purpose of the project is to carry out investigations on the shelf ice and geology of that coast. No reference was made, however, in the correspondence, that Greenland natives and their dogs were being used; and this matter is being brought to your attention for whatever action is deemed necessary, in view of our letter to the Under-Secretary of External Affairs.

J. Cantley,
Arctic Service.
Ottawa, 12 April, 1956.

L. E. Wilgress, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Wilgress:

I wrote you on the 2nd of April regarding the presence of Greenland Eskimos on Ellesmero Island.

It is now reported to me that Defence Research Board proposes to use the services of Greenland Eskimos on an expedition to Ellesmero Island during the coming summer. I have written to Dr. Colman suggesting the use of Canadian Eskimos for this purpose, and attach a copy of my letter for your information.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

R. A. Young,
Deputy Minister.

[Note]
Copy to be returned to Col. Cunningham.

Ottawa, 22 April, 1953.

Dr. C. H. Colson, O.B.E.,
Chairman, Defence Research Board,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

Dear Dr. Colson:

On the 17th of March, 1957, the Government of the
Northwest Territories issued a licence under the
Scientific and Inlanders Ordinance to Dr. J. H. Battersley-Kitle of the Arctic
Section of the Defence Research Board, under which I understand
it is proposed to carry out investigations of the shelf ice and
glacial features of portions of Ellefmarkt Island during the summer of
1957. The officers of the Northern Administration and Lands
Branch of this Department are concerned with Tikse affairs
and have heard unofficially that Dr. Battersley-Kitle has already
traveled to Tikse, and proposes to employ a Greenland Eskimo and
men in connection with this expedition.

I feel some concern about the employment of
Greenland Eskimos for this purpose rather than Canadian Indians. As
you know, Greenland Eskimos have, from time to time during
the past few years, been living in the vicinity of Ellefsmark
on the coast east of Ellefsmark Island, and it does not wish to
encourage them to live or hunt on that island. On the 10th of
April, 1951, I wrote to the Under-Secretary of State for External
Affairs requesting him to ask for the cooperation of the Danish
government in preventing natives from crossing over without conducting
with immigration requirements. Greenland Eskimos are
available at present, and, if I had learned of the intention
earlier, I would have requested you
to employ a Canadian Indian instead.
In future I would be glad if you would bear in mind our policy with regard to this matter, and refrain from deploying Greenland Eskimos in the Canadian arctic.

 Yours sincerely,

E. A. Zant,
Deputy Minister.

W. C. R. Wilson,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.
Mr. Pickley -

Could canister be used? If so, where would they be got? Would it be as cheap? Is there time to change the present plan?

If canister can be used at no greater cost, please prepare a letter from Mr. W. Chairman 42 B. requesting that they be used.

Yours,

[Signature]

End Comm.,

If we have been amenable early enough, we continue formally to announce 42. B. can be done from present 42.

30. W. note there must be pending the consideration, and it would be in consideration various more can is much more

As the above note be more among a larger group it can be decided upon delaying the matter 42. B. the attention of 42. B. for future guidance. A letter can now also attach Chairman in respect of some letter of 42. B. now.
Major General H. A. Young,
Deputy Minister,
Department of Resources and Development,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

Dear General Young:

Re: Transfer of Eskimos to Resolute Bay, Craig Harbour and Cape Herschel

I refer to the messages sent our detachments at Port Harrison, Fort Chimo and Ponds Inlet on this subject on April 12, copies of which were passed to you direct by Inspector Larsen.

A reply has been received from Fort Chimo and I quote it hereunder:

"Fort Chimo 26-4-53
Reference transfer Eskimos Fort Chimo area to Resolute Bay stop There are Eskimos here who are willing to go however they wish to know if they will have houses to live in as none of these people have ever lived in snow houses stop Information as requested will be forwarded when advice in above regard has been received."

In forwarding this message Inspector Larsen comments as follows:

"The Eskimos who are willing to go to Resolute Bay are no doubt some of those who were employed as truck drivers, tractor operators, etc., by the United States Army and Air Force at Fort Chimo Air Base, when the Base was in operation. They lived in houses on the Base.

"Please refer to report dated January 22, 1953 by S/Sgt. H. Kearney, in which he states that quarters would have to be built for any Eskimo families who might be sent to Resolute Bay Air Base, or that possibly a quonset hut now at the R.C.A.F. Detachment at Resolute Bay could be converted into four suites."
You may now wish to take this matter up further with
the R.C.A.F. and the Meteorological Services, Depart­
ment of Transport.

We have not as yet had replies from Port
Harrison and Fonds Inlet.

Yours truly,

[Signature]

H. H. Nicholson
COMMISSIONER.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

Canadian and United States Personnel in Northern Canada

1. Latest available information from departments concerned indicates that, in the Arctic Archipelago -- the most sensitive area so far as sovereignty is concerned -- there are 140 Canadian Government personnel and 72 United States Government personnel. If all the projected and presently proposed US developments in this area are carried through, however, there would be about 1200 US personnel in this part of Canada.

2. Attached to this memorandum is a map showing the distribution of Canadian and US Government personnel in the high Arctic. Although supply routes are not shown, it is of interest that the United States, as part of its operation to Thule, supplies its own forces at Frobisher, Padloping and Clyde; undertakes the sea supply of Resolute, Eureka and Alert; and is largely responsible for the air supply of Eureka and Alert. Other establishments are supplied under arrangements made by appropriate Canadian agencies.

3. The Committee is asked to note the present and anticipated future distribution of official personnel and responsibility for supply in the high North.

W. P. Chipman,
Secretary.

Privy Council Office,
May 8, 1953.
SECRET DISTRIBUTION OF CANADIAN AND U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL IN THE HIGH NORTH

Present Canadian and U.S. Personnel
Projected Canadian and U.S. Personnel

John A. Macdonald Station

Northwestern Limit of Tents

Canadian Bases (Dated 16 May 1943)
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

The ninth meeting was held on Monday, May 11, 1953, at 2:30 p.m., in the Privy Council Committee Room, East Block, Ottawa.

PRESENT

Major-General H.A. Young, Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, (Chairman)
Mr. J.W. Pickersgill, Secretary to the Cabinet (for Agenda Item V)
Dr. R.A. MacKay, representing the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (For Agenda Items I, III and V)

Air Vice Marshal A.T. Cowley, representing the Deputy Minister of Transport
Dr. G.W. Stead, representing the Deputy Minister of Finance
Mr. Marc Boyer, Deputy Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys
General A.G.L. McNaughton, Chairman, Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence
Vice Admiral E.R. Mainguy, representing the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Commissioner L.H. Nicholson, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Colonel G.M. Carrie, representing the Chairman, Defence Research Board
Dr. E.W.R. Steacie, President, National Research Council

Mr. A.A. Beveridge, Privy Council Office, (Secretary)

ALSO PRESENT:

Mr. F.J.G. Cunningham, Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development
Mr. R.A.J. Phillips, Privy Council Office
Mr. W.H. Barton, Department of External Affairs
Mr. Alex. Watson, Marine Superintendent, Department of Transport
Air Commodore H.H.C. Rutledge, Coordinator, Joint Staff, Department of National Defence.

I. MINUTES OF THE EIGHTH MEETING

The Committee approved the minutes of the eighth meeting.
II. BUSINESS ARISING OUT OF EIGHTH MEETING

2. The report of the sub-committee appointed to consider the establishment and terms of reference of the Coordinating Secretariat was made by the Chairman. The Committee unanimously agreed that Mr. G.W. Rowley, of the Defence Research Board, should be asked if he would be willing to head the new organization. Dr. Solandt had suggested that, should the appointment be accepted, all the non-defence Arctic activities of Defence Research Board be transferred to the Department of Resources and Development. The terms of reference and details of the organization would be discussed when the appointment was filled.

3. The Chief of the Naval Staff had enquired into the possibility of the operation of Padloping Island Radio Station by the Department of National Defence until the Department of Transport could supply civilian staff (Para. 32 - Minutes of 8th meeting). The RCAF had no men available for the purpose. The RCN, although not anxious to assume the commitment, would be prepared to supply eight radio operators after six weeks' training, together with a radio technician, a stoker mechanic and a cook. The RCN still lacked many details on the requirements at Padloping. The Department of Transport estimated that about two years would be required before civilians could be made available to man this station.

4. The Committee expressed approval of the RCN offer and agreed:

(a) that a memorandum should be submitted to the Cabinet recommending that the RCN take over responsibility for the operation of Padloping Island Radio Station from the United States as soon as suitable arrangements could be made; and

(b) that, upon approval by the Cabinet, the Department of Transport and the Royal Canadian Navy arrange the details of transfer of the Padloping Island Radio Station from the USAF to the RCN as soon as possible.

5. The Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Administration reported that there would be no difficulty in the appointment of officials to act as Immigration and Customs officers in remote areas.

6. The Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch reported on Eskimo training programme. Three Eskimo were ready for training for technical employment in stations in the North. Approximately thirty-nine others, in due course, could be considered as good prospects. This source of labour could be utilized by Transport at a number of outposts.

III. FROBISHER BAY; U.S.A.F. OCCUPANCY
(AGENDA ITEM V; DOCUMENT ND-51 CIRCULATED)

7. The Chairman referred to the Joint Agreement concluded by the RCAF and USAF on arrangements at Frobisher Bay. Although it was probably too late to consider the document, this arrangement, and the manner of concluding it, illustrated a fundamental weakness in liaison in northern matters among departments concerned. Departmental planning was bound to be exacerbated if, as was often the case, information was derived from rumours and
stories from unofficial sources. The first news of RCN construction at Aklavik had come from the resident missionary; the first intimation of the USAF "taking over" Frobisher Bay had come from the RCMP constable stationed there.

It was apparent from these developments that the Advisory Committee was unknown except at the level of the Committee members. The Chairman emphasized that everyone in the government service having any responsibility for activities in Northern Canada should be informed both about the Committee and the new responsibilities of the Department of Resources and Development for coordinating information.

2. The Secretary to the Cabinet asked how the agreement had been made without the knowledge of all interested departments.

9. The Coordinator, Joint Staff, outlined briefly the background of the Agreement and the view of the RCAF on the division of housekeeping functions. The RCAF believed it generally appropriate for any branch of the Armed Forces to supply its own services. As the RCAF had not wished to act as a housekeeper for the USAF, the latter was allowed to acquire all buildings not used by the RCAF or Transport; these would probably be fully occupied until at least August, 1953. The RCAF had understood that Eskimos would be employed where practicable.

10. The Chairman, Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence questioned the RCAF view on the allocation of housekeeping functions. In order to implement government policies for the maintenance of sovereignty, it might sometimes be necessary to take a flexible view of normal operating procedures. This agreement raised the question of the powers which the RCAF could, and would, exercise through the Commanding Officer at Frobisher Bay. These should be enumerated to ensure that command and control was still firmly in Canadian hands.

11. During the discussion, it was pointed out that the RCAF had provided medical services for Eskimos at Frobisher, although there was no obligation to do so. To ensure that this service was continued, Canada would either have to negotiate with the United States or provide Canadian medical staff.

12. The Chairman read a draft letter which he proposed to send to all Deputy Ministers in order to explain the functions of the Advisory Committee and the powers now vested in the Department of Resources and Development by the Cabinet. The letter asked that the Deputy Ministers ensure that all officials concerned in their departments be made aware of the need to create effective liaison through cooperation on matters relating to Northern Canada. Mention was made of the value of the proposed Information Center in supplying answers to departmental questions.

13. The Committee, after further discussion;

(a) noted the RCAF - USAF Agreement (Frobisher Bay);

(b) asked that a report be made to the Committee by the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, clarifying:

(i) whether the USAF would employ Eskimos at
(ii) whether medical services could be continued by the USAF for Eskimos; and

(iii) whether certain buildings required by the Department of Resources and Development might be made available, and at what date; and

(c) agreed that the Chairman send a letter to all Deputy Ministers outlining the position of the Advisory Committee and the Department of Resources and Development with respect to activities in Northern Canada.

IV. HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EASTERN ARCTIC

(Agenda Item I; Document ND-47 Circulated)

14. The Committee considered the report of the Chairman, Sub-Committee on Transportation, together with the report of the Dominion Hydrographer. The Sub-Committee had recommended that the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys be provided with a survey vessel and the equipment necessary to undertake the urgent demands for northern charting.

15. The Deputy Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys reported that the present basis of carrying out surveys on a priority basis with chartered vessels was unsatisfactory. There was a need for continuous and systematic hydrographic surveying throughout nearly all the northern waters. Without a survey vessel - constructed for the purpose at a cost of approximately $22 million - adequate charting in the north could not be carried out; vessels would be dependent upon incomplete and out-of-date Admiralty charts.

16. Dr. Stead said that the maintenance of sovereignty in Northern Canada would necessarily entail considerable cost. The dependence of Canada upon the United States for surveying and charting might lead to disputed sovereignty. The Department of Finance was sympathetic to the need for a survey vessel.

17. In the course of discussion, it was pointed out that the need for further survey work was now evident on both economic and military grounds. Recently a mining company had been unable to reach its property at Rankin Inlet owing to the lack of adequate charting. The importance of the developments in Ungava also substantiated the need for completed charts of that area. Icebreakers, while of considerable assistance, could not be considered as alternatives for this type of work. It was considered important that the markers used by the US survey teams have inscribed at the top, the word CANADA when affixed to stones in Canadian territory. This has not been done in the past and might be the cause of differences of opinion in the future. Information obtained by non-Canadian survey teams in Canada should be released only by Canada.

18. The Committee accepted the recommendation of the Sub-Committee on Transportation and -

(a) directed that a memorandum be submitted to the Cabinet recommending that the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys be authorized to procure a survey vessel and the equipment necessary and suitable for work in northern waters and that funds be provided in the estimates for

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2.18
(b) agreed that the Departments of External Affairs and Mines and Technical Surveys should make appropriate arrangements to ensure that markers affixed in Canadian territory by non-Canadian survey teams be inscribed with the word CANADA at the top, followed by such information as is normally recorded;

(c) agreed that information obtained by non-Canadian survey teams be released only by Canadian authorities.

V. LORAN STATION; CAPE CHRISTIAN, BAFFIN ISLAND

19. The Chairman outlined the paper prepared on the United States request to establish a loran station near Cape Christian on Baffin Island. The Chiefs of Staff had expressed no objection to the proposed construction.

20. Dr. MacKay said that the Department of External Affairs was not prepared to enter into a firm agreement with the United States at this stage, but would ask approval in principle for the United States request. (A draft aide memoire addressed to the United States Embassy was circulated). The Department of External Affairs did not wish to deny the United States request, although it might involve future commitments for Canada.

21. Air Vice Marshal Cowley asked that the Department of Transport be permitted to exercise control on the type and construction of buildings to be erected in case the buildings were ever taken over by Canada. Extensive modifications to United States buildings had often been required when they were occupied by Canadians.

22. The Committee, after further discussion:

(a) agreed in principle to the United States request for permission to erect a loran transmitting station at Cape Christian, on Baffin Island;

(b) approved, with minor modifications, the proposed aide memoire drafted by the Department of External Affairs;

(c) asked that a memorandum be submitted by the Department of External Affairs to Cabinet Defence Committee recommending that the Canadian Government give approval, in principle, to the establishment by the United States Coast Guard of a loran station at Cape Christian, Baffin Island, and that rights of entry to the selected site be granted to the United States Coast Guard in order to carry out preliminary construction work in 1953, on the understanding that the detailed written terms and conditions remain to be negotiated; and

(d) recommended that the agreement to be negotiated contain the following conditions:

(1) The Department of Transport to reserve the right to control and design and construction of buildings to be erected;

(2) Canadian vessels be assured of rights of entry and use of port facilities when required;
(3) All business, including employment, affecting the interests of Eskimos to be conducted through the agency of an official of the Canadian Government, to be designated by the Department of Resources and Development; and

(4) Canada to reserve the right to appoint a Canadian Commanding Officer.

VI. ARCTIC RE SUPPLY: RESOLUTE, 1954 and FOLLOWING YEARS
(AGENDA ITEM II - DOCUMENT ND-48 CIRCULATED)

23. The Committee considered the recommendation of the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transportation that the Department of Transport be authorized to plan, build and operate a strengthened vessel of approximately 5,000 tons cargo capacity to be used in conjunction with a chartered tanker for the annual resupply of Resolute, and, as appropriate, other Arctic, Labrador and Newfoundland posts and settlements.

24. Dr. Stead agreed that it was desirable to acquire a suitable cargo vessel to work with the icebreakers. If Canada were able to undertake the supply of Resolute, it was logical to supply Eureka as well. The U.S. Task Force could supply Alert, which was an extension of the sea line to Thule.

25. In the course of the discussion it appeared that, in the interests of sovereignty and control in the Canadian North, steps should be taken to commence the supply of the northern bases. Two sea routes were involved, one to Thule in Greenland and then on to Alert on Ellesmere Island, and the other to Resolute and on to Eureka. As the United States have considerable interest in Greenland, it seemed that this supply line should, for the time being, remain the responsibility of the United States. Canada might assume the responsibility for the sea supply of Resolute and Eureka, thereby carrying the flag into the interior of the Archipelago and the United States would be concerned only with the fringe.

It was pointed out that a cargo vessel, although a valuable asset, was less urgent than the survey vessel. There still were alternative methods of supplying northern bases, such as the United States Task Force and the Spring Airlift.

Both the Department of Transport and the Royal Canadian Navy icebreakers would be required to assist in the resupply mission. The future employment of the naval icebreaker was at present under discussion. It seemed likely that the naval icebreaker could be made available for a three-week period during the navigation season, when the first priority would be to assist the Department of Transport in the annual sea supply of northern bases. The second priority at this time was to aid in the activities of the Department of National Defence, particularly research.

26. The Committee, after further discussion:

(a) considered the acquisition of a cargo vessel to be a good idea, but was not prepared to accept the recommenda-

(b) tion of the Sub-Committee on Transportation at this time, but would review the requirements for a cargo vessel at
(b) agreed that Canada accept the responsibility for the sea supply of Resolute and Eureka in 1954, and during the following years;

c) directed that a memorandum be submitted to the Cabinet recommending that Canada assume the responsibility of the annual resupply by sea of Resolute and Eureka in 1954 and the following years;

d) directed that, upon approval by the Cabinet, the Department of Transport and the Royal Canadian Navy arrange the details of:

(i) the employment of both icebreakers on the supply route to Resolute and Eureka;

(ii) the chartering of a vessel of approximately 3,000 tons cargo capacity and a tanker; and

(iii) the assumption of the annual resupply by sea of Resolute and Eureka during 1954, and following years.

VII. CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES PERSONNEL IN NORTHERN CANADA

(AGENDA ITEM VI - DOCUMENT ND-52 CIRCULATED)

27. The Committee noted the map outlining the present and projected disposition of Canadian and United States personnel at bases in northern Canada. The deletion of Cape Dyer was noted and the figures of US personnel at Cape Christian were increased to forty.

VIII. ARCTIC INFORMATION; FOREIGN-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS

(AGENDA ITEM IV - DOCUMENT ND-50 CIRCULATED)

28. Mr. Phillips emphasized the desirability of exploiting fully the Arctic information contained in foreign-language publications. He stressed the need for careful use of both procurement and translation facilities, particularly in the case of Russian-language publications. Though publications were being received in many departments, it was possible that improvements could be made in the circulation of translated material, and there was some reason to hope that coordination in ordering might result in the procurement of more material without duplication of effort. A preliminary study of the problem might be undertaken by the Administration Sub-Committee before the Information Center was established, as the present international situation might favour the possibility of obtaining some foreign publications not available in the past. The supply and use of foreign-language publications containing Arctic information might later be kept under review by the proposed Information Center.

29. The Committee agreed that the Sub-Committee on Administration should examine the procurement, supply, translation and circulation of foreign-language publications containing Arctic information, and report to the Committee.
IX. COLD WEATHER INFORMATION; U.S. AGENCY
(AGENDA ITEM VII - DOCUMENT ND-53-CIRCULATED)

30. The Committee noted the report of the Joint Secretary and agreed that the report be forwarded to the Organization and Methods Division of the Civil Service Commission for evaluation of the system described and on its suitability and usefulness as a component of the proposed Information Center.

X. GENERAL INFORMATION; NORTHERN CANADA
(AGENDA ITEM VIII - DOCUMENT ND-54-CIRCULATED)

31. The Committee noted the following items:

(a) Granting of permission for a United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Party to enter Canadian territory in the vicinity of Rampart House on the Porcupine River, approximately five miles east of the Alaska-Canada boundary;

(b) Granting approval for a joint United States-Canadian expedition this summer to the Beaufort Sea and adjacent waters; and

(c) Proposed Smithsonian Institution Expedition to Ellesmere Island, 1953.

XI. NEXT MEETING

32. The Committee agreed to meet at 2:30 p.m., on Monday, June 15, 1953, in the Privy Council Committee Room, East Block, Ottawa.

A. A. Beveridge,
Joint Secretary.

Privy Council Office,
May 15, 1953.

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A. Functions

Under the direction of the Deputy Minister:

1. To examine all activities in Northern Canada proposed by government departments and agencies, and to make recommendations to the Deputy Minister with a view to ensuring that the location and methods used in connection with such projects are as effective as they can be made not only for the purpose of the immediate project but also with a view to the economic development of the area.

2. To examine all defence projects and, wherever Canadian participation is considered insufficient, to so advise the Deputy Minister.

3. To prepare a long-range program for the development of the resources of Northern Canada, and to make recommendations to the Deputy Minister as to specific areas and resources the development of which might be considered either in conjunction with projects primarily intended for other purposes or as independent projects.

4. To consider and make recommendations to the Deputy Minister designed to co-ordinate and ensure the provision, by all government departments and agencies concerned, including the Northwest Territories Administration, of administrative facilities at all northern projects; e.g. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (enforcement of Canadian and Territorial law), Citizenship and Immigration (Immigration laws), Customs and Excise (Custom laws), National Health and Welfare (hospitals and nursing stations), and Resources and Development (schools).

5. To recommend to the Deputy Minister measures to ensure the availability of appropriate personnel for northern projects by:

(a) Utilizing as much as possible the services of Eskimos, and

(b) Recruiting Canadians from the Provinces for service in the north. This involves the development of training plans and providing greater incentives than now exist for such Canadians to enter upon careers in the north.
Comissioner L.H. Nicholson,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Commissioner Nicholson:

With reference to your letter of the 6th of May, regarding the arrangements being made to transfer Eskimos to Resolute Bay, Cape Herschel and Craig Harbour, S/Inspector J.J. Atherton had already written to our Northern Administration and Lands Branch and I am enclosing a copy of the letter we sent to him in reply.

We are rather doubtful as to how the Chimo Eskimos would be able to adapt themselves to conditions at such a place as Resolute Bay. Few, if any of them, can build snow-houses and they would certainly have to be housed and be guaranteed full time employment at the base. We have been exploring this angle with the Air Force and are awaiting their reply as to what number, if any, they could give full time employment to.

When we have received replies from the Detachments at Fort Harrison and Pond Inlet, we can then go more fully into the whole matter and decide from which areas we should draw for the initial experiment.

Yours sincerely,

H.A. Young,
Deputy Minister.

Encl.

APPROVED

[Signature]

Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch.

Ottawa, 15 May, 1953.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRASER

Before replying to Commissioner Nicholson's letter of May 13, I think we should carefully consider all the possible implications of Constable Van Norman's est wives at Frobisher Bay.

2. Despite the agreement reached by the Committee on Makino Affairs that Makino trade should be left to private enterprise and that all agencies represented at the meeting should co-operate closely in everything pertaining to Makino affairs, Commissioner Nicholson, Inspector Larsen and others in the R.C.M. Police have continued to openly express themselves as unalterably opposed to the Hudson's Bay Company being allowed to continue in the Arctic, and to advocate the establishment of a Government trading organization or Makino co-operatives. Constable Van Norman's reference in paragraph 6 of his latest report to "previous correspondence" would indicate that the views he has expressed are not entirely his own but may reflect those of his superiors.

3. Obviously Constable Van Norman has made no attempt to co-operate with the Hudson's Bay Company's manager at Frobisher Bay. On the contrary, he seems to take pride in the fact that he has done everything he can to discredit the Hudson's Bay Company in the eyes of the Makinos and to influence and assist them to take their trade elsewhere. As a private individual he is entitled to his opinion. As the representative of this Department he has placed us in a very embarrassing position.

4. This raises the point as to where R.C.M. Police responsibility in the administration of Makino affairs begins and ends. With practically no personnel of our own resident in the field, we have to depend almost entirely on the R.C.M. Police and the Hudson's Bay Company to deal with local matters. Co-operation between the two in the field and between all three agencies at administrative level is essential. Without it, we can never hope to accomplish anything. It would seem, however, from what has happened at Frobisher Bay and from what we have been observing elsewhere, that the Police are not prepared to accept our policy with regard to trade, or to attempt to co-operate with the Hudson's Bay Company in the
field. Their feeling seems to be that they are at least equally responsible as this Department for Eskimo welfare and that they are not obliged to follow the lead of Resources and Development unless it is in line with their own ideas. If this attitude is to continue, then perhaps the time has come when the whole problem of Eskimo administration should be carefully reviewed again.

5. For us to accept either of Constable Van Norman’s proposals would mean that we agreed with his views and that we are prepared to deliberately force the Hudson’s Bay Company out of business at Frobisher Bay. In other words, we are to be forced by the R.O.M. Police into the very position we had decided to avoid. Any such move as Van Norman recommends cannot be confined to Frobisher Bay. Immediately a concession is made there, there will be pressure extended to other places.

6. We can be sure that the Hudson’s Bay Company are well aware of Van Norman’s activities at Frobisher Bay and of the Police attitude to the Company generally and that they are watching the situation very carefully. Any indication that this Department is prepared to depart from the policy agreed upon with regard to trade, and to follow the lead of the Police, could very well have serious consequences.

7. Constable Van Norman’s latest proposal that he should handle and control practically all of the Eskimo income at Frobisher Bay would have much the same effect as his previous one of establishing a trade store. Obviously he intends to divert as much as possible of the natives’ purchases away from the local store to mail order houses. This would mean that the Hudson’s Bay Company would be left to supply only the staples on which the mark-up is small, while the more lucrative trade would go elsewhere.

I doubt if the Hudson’s Bay Company would look favourably on such an arrangement.

8. I also doubt if the Bank at Goose Bay would be anxious to deal at long range with an illiterate people with little knowledge of banking procedure, particularly where transfers of fairly large sums of cash, both ways, and the attendant risk of loss, would be entailed. The only solution here would be to open a Trust Fund Account for Eskimos and to have the Police act as trustees. This, too, has its dangers and difficulties, and I doubt if the benefits that could be obtained would warrant the trouble it might cause. According to his own admission, Van Norman has not been successful in getting the Eskimos to save any considerable part of their income. His assertion that they are living on family allowances and relief does not agree altogether with his further statement that they have been able to purchase such luxuries as radios, musical instruments, canoes and outboard motors. If this was the situation when Eskimo credits were being set up and controlled by the R.O.M. Police at the Hudson’s Bay
stores, there does not seem to be any reason to believe that there will be any change for the better now that wages are being paid in cash.

9. Unless we are to accept the Police recommendations and run the risk of the Hudson's Bay Company closing their store at Frobisher Bay, I would recommend that we continue to follow the system that has worked quite satisfactorily in the past of depositing wages to the Eskimos' credit at the Hudson's Bay Company posts and allowing them to draw on these credits in cash or goods, as required. I think that Constable Van Norman should also be requested to refrain from making any changes in policy without first receiving authorization from this office.

J. Cantley,
Arctic Services.
Dear Mr. Lessard:

I wish to acknowledge with thanks your letter of the 26th of May with which you enclosed a statement showing our Eastern Arctic freight requirements for 1953, together with copies of packing instructions and the proposed itineraries of the vessels concerned.

As requested, arrangements are being made to furnish the Department of Transport with a financial encumbrance in the amount of $6,000, which you estimate will cover all handling costs and any transportation charges on commercial carriers for this department's freight.

In so far as our passengers for the C.G.S. "C.D. Howe" are concerned, we have already advised Mr. A. Watson, your Marine Superintendent, regarding the names of our representatives who will be going north on the Eastern Arctic Patrol this summer. At that time, we pointed out that we would like to transfer a number of Eskimo families and their equipment from northern Quebec and Baffin Island to places in the High Arctic. Our plans have now been completed, and we expect to move these natives as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Embark</th>
<th>No. of Eskimos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port Harrison, Que.</td>
<td>7 families - (34 Eskimos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Churchill, Man.</td>
<td>1 family - (4 Eskimos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Pond Inlet</td>
<td>3 families - (20 Eskimos)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the exception of one family from Churchill who will be going to Pengnirtung, N.W.T., the above listed Eskimos will be distributed
2.

In groups -- four families to Resolute Bay, four families to Craig Harbour and three families to Cape Herschel.

I understand that Mr. Watson will be calling a conference shortly with others interested, and at that time there will be an opportunity for all those interested to fully discuss the project of moving natives to northern areas and other matters connected with the Eastern Arctic Patrol.

Yours sincerely,

H.A. Young,
Deputy Minister.

APPROVED

Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch.
Ottawa, June 17, 1953.

Inspector F.A. Larsen,
Officer Commanding, "C" Division,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Your File: B.1512-8-4-3-27

Reference is made to the copy of your memorandum of June 10 to your Commissioner, forwarded by you to us June 10.

2. In mentioning four families to be taken from Fond Inlet we included, of course, the family which you had already engaged for one of your detachments. As I think you understand, we feel it is most desirable that at least one Fond Inlet family should be allotted to each of the three places so that the Fort Harrison natives may receive some assistance and guidance in adjusting themselves to a new environment, particularly during the dark period.

3. As we have also explained to you, we regard the present movement in the nature of an experiment to see how these southern natives will adapt themselves to living in higher latitudes. At the outset, we do not think it would be desirable to take in two groups, one to be definitely earmarked for employment at Resolute Bay, as the Fort Chimo natives would have to be, and the other as hunters and trappers at the other two places.

4. We are at present following up the possibility of being able to arrange for the employment of some Fort Chimo natives at the base at Churchill, where we feel they could much more readily adapt themselves than at Resolute Bay. These people have always lived in bush country and few, if any of them, can even build a snow house.

5. As we mentioned in our letter of June 8, you and Mr. Stevenson will have an opportunity of going into these matters during your coming trip and will no doubt get more information on them than we have at present, particularly as regards the Fort Chimo natives.

C. K. LeCapelain
C.K. LeCapelain,
Acting Director.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER
OTTAWA

30th July, 1953

Major General H.A. Young, CB, CBE, DSO,
Deputy Minister,
Department of Resources and Development,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear General Young:

In reference to your letter of 15th June, 1953 and my reply of 23rd June, 1953, concerning the transfer of Eskimo families to Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands, I enclose a copy of a self-explanatory letter from the Air Officer Commanding, Air Transport Command RCAF, Lachine, PQ.

It will be noted that the Air Officer Commanding is quite worried that the experiment will result in hardship on the Eskimo families concerned and that the RCAF will likely be faced with the problem of tendering care for which they are unprepared. Possibly the concern evinced by the Air Officer Commanding Air Transport Command, and which is shared by staff officers at Air Force Headquarters, might have been avoided if this department had been represented at some of your preliminary discussions on this experiment.

Even though the Eskimo families are en route now it might not be too late to hold an inter-departmental meeting under the chairmanship of someone in your department which could be attended by officers representing the Air Officer Commanding, Air Transport Command, Air Force Headquarters and Defence Research Board. If you agree, it is suggested that such a meeting be arranged as quickly as possible.

Yours sincerely,

(C.M. Drury)
Deputy Minister.
Civilian Employment - Resolute Bay

1. Your 443-5 (A/F) dated 23 Jun 53 concerning the proposal of the Department of Resources and Development to place a few Eskimo families on Cornwallis Island near Resolute Bay is viewed with considerable misgivings. The general principle of establishing Eskimos under proper surroundings where their standard of living can be improved and where they can be usefully employed cannot be argued against. However, casual information picked up by myself through various channels would indicate that the present proposal has not been discussed at the proper levels nor has the plan been formalized in a way that would guarantee some success.

2. We now have considerable experience with Eskimos at Frobisher. Over a period of years, some of these people have become very useful, but the majority have not, because their living and health standards make them unpredictable, unreliable and unemployable. Your letter indicates that an RCP constable will be established at Resolute and that the RCAF or DOT will give the Eskimos useful jobs. At a recent conference with DOT (A/V/H Cowley) I raised this subject and DOT claimed that their Department were not involved as yet. As the majority of the DOT staff will be moving into the RCAF site this year, it would appear that the onus for training and employment will fall on the shoulders of the RCAF.

3. No mention is made of housing or support of the Eskimos. Because of the necessity of holding all present buildings for overflow of personnel during operations, no accommodation has been allocated for either the RCP or Eskimo families. Similarly the question of food arises. Cornwallis Island cannot be expected to support Eskimos on a scale that would make them suitable for manual or other labour. They must have a properly balanced diet, clean healthy living accommodation and proper clothing, which will have to be supplied to them. Medical attention is not possible on Cornwallis other than the simplest first aid.

4. I am very much against the proposed program, except if under the following plan:

**Single Eskimos**

(a) Selected Eskimos, preferably with schooling, be placed in a proper school and given basic training in useful trades such as drivers, general duties, etc. They should be indoctrinated into clean habits, proper living accommodation, etc. When they prove themselves useful, then they could be sent as normal employees to a remote site such as Resolute.
Eskimo Families

(b) If the added airlift is accepted by AFHQ to a site as remote as Resolute and if Eskimo families are to be sent there, these should be trained the same as suggested in sub-para (a) and housed in properly constructed homes. Proper food and clothing should be provided for the whole family. A situation such as at Frobisher where the working Eskimo eats white man's food and on the sly takes the left-over home to his family is not acceptable.

5 This letter is not being written in a way that should be considered as opposing the impetus now being placed on helping the northern natives. We, in this Command, have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on medical attention, mercy missions and transportation to help them. To myself and many of my staff much of this expense is to no purpose because the basic causes of malnutrition and disease have not been attacked. For example, we have recently flown thirty odd natives from Quebec hospitals back to the north. Many of them will be mercy or ordinary patients again because they are returning to the same conditions. Therefore, even with the best intentions in the world, it does not appear to make sense to add further difficulties to the operation of a place as remote as Resolute unless the primary principles laid down in para 4 have been planned and properly executed.

6 For your information, a very worthwhile report by the US Navy on their program at Pt. Barrow some years ago is worthy of study. I believe DRB have a copy. (Mr. Graham Rowley).

7 In view of the general instructions received to reduce overhead and airlift into Resolute Bay, I would greatly appreciate a further review of the necessity of adding to the population of Cornwallis Island. If the policy is to be accepted it is requested that full details be provided as to the RCAF responsibility.

(SGD) "ROBT C. RIPLEY A/C"

(R.C. Ripley) A/C,
Air Officer Commanding,
RCAF Air Transport Command.
Minutes of a Meeting Held at 10:00 A.M. on August 10, 1963, in Room 504, Langevin Block, to Discuss the Transfer of Certain Eskimo Families from Northern Quebec to Cornwallis and Ellefsone Islands.

Chairman -
Col. F.J.G. Cunningham - Resources and Development.

Those Present -
Mr. L. T. Campbell - Meteorological Division, Transport.
Mr. Jas. Cantley - Resources and Development.
Mr. Fred Fraser - Resources and Development.
Mr. C. J. Marshall - Secretary of the ACHD.
Dr. H. A. Proctor - Indian Health Services, National Health and Welfare.
Mr. E. G. Siverts - Resources and Development.
Mr. W. B. Smith - Telecommunications Division, Transport.

Col. Cunningham, Director of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development, opened the meeting with a resume of the duties and responsibilities of the Department towards the Eskimo of northern Canada and the policy of the Department in providing for their health and welfare. He pointed out that three different types of situations now have to be dealt with:

1. In areas where the natural resources will support the Eskimo inhabitants it has been decided that their basic way of life is to be maintained as far as possible.

2. In areas where permanent white settlements have grown up, the Eskimos will be educated to adapt them to this new situation.

3. In areas of the north which cannot continue to support the present Eskimo population, attempts will be made to move the Eskimo to areas with greater natural resources.

The Administration has found that the eastern coast of Hudson Bay cannot continue to supply the Eskimo there with a reasonable standard of living and, therefore, efforts will be made to re-settle some of the inhabitants in more prosperous areas. This year the Administration is carrying out an experiment in which it will transplant a small number of Eskimo families from the eastern shore of Hudson Bay to certain settlements in the High North to see if they can find a better living there.

Mr. Fraser, Chief of the Northern Administration Division, then took the chair and asked Mr. Cantley, Head of the Arctic Services Section of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch, to explain the details of the Administration's experiment.

Mr. Cantley said that eleven 'Eskimo families in all' were involved in this year's experiment. Most of these were taken from Port Harrison, Que. Three families were from Pond Inlet and would be used to help adjust the other families to conditions in the High North. All of the people involved were volunteers and each had been told of the type of
environment and conditions which would be found wherever he was going. Families are to be settled at Resolute, Craig Harbour, and Cape Vorpal. At each of these points the local R.C.M.P. constable will supervise the experiment. Each group will be provided with sufficient supplies to last a year. Of the three points where the families will be settled, Resolute is the only one where there may be the possibility of the Eskimos finding employment. However, the possibility of securing employment was not an important factor in deciding where the Eskimo should be settled. The men of the group are primarily hunters and the main purpose of the experiment is to see if it is possible for the people to adapt themselves to the conditions of the High North and secure a living from the land.

Mr. Fraser asked the R.C.A.F. representatives if they were afraid that the Eskimos taking part in this experiment might become dependent on the R.C.A.F. for food and clothing if the experiment were not successful. S/L O'Neill stated that this was the case and that the R.C.A.F. did not expect to be able to offer any employment at Resolute except if Eskimos there had some type of technical training. He asked how many families would be going to each of the three settlement areas. Mr. Cantley stated that this would be decided on the boat taking the Eskimo to their destination. It was not desirable to break up family groups if possible.

Mr. Smith said that the Telecommunications Division of the Department of Transport operates ionosphere stations at various points in the north and had found Eskimos very useful particularly at Baker Lake and Fort Chimo where they worked as general handymen and kitchen help. The Department of Transport would like to hire at least one Eskimo as a general handymen for the ionosphere station at Resolute if any of those settling there are found to be suitable. He asked what arrangements would be made for payment in the event that an Eskimo was hired at Resolute.

Mr. Cantley said that one of the Eskimos at Resolute, under the supervision of the R.C.M.P. constable, would act as trader for the group. Mr. Smith stated that the Department of Transport would receive credit on the trader for his services, the bill would be sent to the Department of Resources and Development in Ottawa and forwarded to the Department of Transport.

Mr. Campbell stated that the Meteorological Division did not expect to be able to offer employment to any Eskimos at Resolute for the time being at least since the housekeeping arrangements there were provided by the R.C.A.F.

S/L O'Neill stated that he was afraid that there was not sufficient wildlife in the Resolute area to provide for the proposed Eskimo population. Mr. Cantley replied that he had reason to believe that there was sufficient wildlife to support the Eskimo families concerned. No one could say for sure that this was the case and, consequently, the experiment was being staged.

Mr. Sivartz pointed out that the Canadian Government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the north as possible and it appeared that in many cases the Eskimos were the only people capable of doing this.

Mr. Fraser outlined some steps being taken to provide technical training for Eskimo, particularly the trade school to be opened soon at Aklavik. Mr. Smith said that diesel mechanics were always very scarce and that his Department would welcome such a training programme if it could provide qualified diesel mechanics.

A discussion of medical facilities available at Resolute followed. Mr. Cantley stated that all the families taking part in the experiment had been examined beforehand by a doctor and given a clean bill of health. S/L O'Neill said that he understood the R.C.M.P. would be responsible for medical attention given to the Eskimo. Supt. Fassock said that the R.C.M.P. representative had first-aid training and would have first-aid
supplies available. S/L O'Neil said that a doctor visited the Resolute base once a month and that a medical orderly was on duty at all times.

W/C Brodribb requested that in future, when such experiments were being planned, that the Air Force be informed well in advance so that it would have a chance to comment on the plans.

Mr. Siverts summarized the situation by stating that the R.C.M.P. constable in charge of the experiment was representing the Department of Resources and Development, that the Eskimos' prime purpose in going to the High North was to see if it were possible for them to adapt themselves to conditions there and secure a reasonable living. Steps will be taken to see that the Eskimo are provided for in case the experiment is not successful and that every effort will be made to see that the R.C.A.F. is not inconvenienced.

Mr. Cantley stated that those taking part in the experiment were not seeking employment but that the Administration would not stand in their way if employment became available.

At the conclusion of the meeting those attending were satisfied that the arrangements and planning of the experiment were such that the Eskimo families involved would not become a liability to the R.C.A.F.

C. J. Marshall,
Secretariat, DND.
F.J.G. Cunningham, Esq.,
Director,
Northern Administration and Lands Branch,
Department of Resources and Development,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Sir:

Further to our letter of July 31 concerning the possible employment of Eskimos at some of the joint Canadian-United States Arctic weather stations, we are enclosing a copy of a letter which was received from the U.S. Weather Bureau on this subject.

We are in agreement with the U.S. Weather Bureau that a useful function could be served by Eskimos at Eureka and Alert as well as at Mould Bay and Isachsen. However, in view of the problems involved with regard to accommodation, messing, supervision, etc., it is felt that it would be desirable to have this matter discussed thoroughly at the annual meeting in Ottawa in January when representatives of all departments concerned will be present.

Sincerely yours,

Andrew Thomson, Controller.
The purpose of these operations is primarily to determine how well Eskimos transferring from over-populated areas in northern Quebec can adapt themselves to conditions in presently unpopulated high Arctic areas where there is reason to expect they can make a satisfactory native living by hunting and trapping.

The families being transferred from Port Harrison this year are essentially hunters and trappers and it is thought that with assistance and guidance, they can make a better living for themselves in the high Arctic than they can ever hope to do around Port Harrison now. To assist them in adapting themselves to high Arctic conditions and particularly to the period of darkness, it is being arranged to have at least one family from Pond Inlet placed at each station. It is hoped that with the experienced guidance of the Pond Inlet natives and the encouragement and supervision of the men in charge of the detachment, these Quebec natives will quickly become accustomed to their new environment and adapt themselves to the difference in hunting and living conditions there. If this initial experiment turns out satisfactorily and it is felt that the resources in these areas are sufficient to support a greater population, arrangements will be made to transfer other families from northern Quebec and/or southern Baffin Island next year.

We are not overlooking the possibility that some at least of these natives will be able to find permanent or temporary employment at one or other of the weather stations in these areas. It is quite probable that all those going to Resolute Bay will find permanent employment. Both the R.C.A.F. and the Department of Transport have expressed interest in employing Eskimos at this base and every assistance should be given to them in employing suitable men. Arrangements between the Eskimos and the personnel at the stations will have to be made by the Police detachments. Wages should be fixed on the basis of the prevailing rates paid to white personnel for similar work, due consideration being given to the comparative ability of the Eskimos to perform the duties assigned to them.
The people who are not employed should, of course, be assisted and encouraged to set up their camps away from the settlement at places where hunting conditions are favorable and where they will have the best chance of at least procuring their own food. Care will have to be exercised, however, that they do not take more than they actually need and that in particular they do not deplete the land resources. Musk-ox, of course, must be fully protected.

Trade supplies are being sent to each of these three places by GGS "C.D. Howe" and GGS "d'Iberville" via Churchill, this season. The purchase of these supplies will be made through the Eskimo Loan Fund of Northern Administration and Lands Branch of the Department of Resources and Development. The conditions governing the operation of this Fund and the necessary documents to be completed are attached hereto. It is important that these should be completed and returned here by the "d'Iberville" this fall.

You will note that we are arranging for the appointment of one Eskimo at each place as borrower and trader and it will be necessary for him to sign the attached documents as such. Since few, if any, of the Eskimos being transferred are qualified yet to act independently as traders, or to keep the necessary records and accounts, it will be necessary for the Police at each detachment to closely supervise the business on behalf of the native trader and to keep the records.

Copies of the orders and invoices covering the shipments of goods being made this year will be handed to you when the ship arrives. On these will have been entered the prices at which the goods are to be sold. In fixing these prices, allowance has been made for a mark-up on the costs to take care of handling and other charges, and to allow for a reasonable profit on the operations. All goods issued will be charged at these selling prices and the inventory at the end of the year will be priced in the same way. Provided that all goods have been accurately accounted for, the totals charged to the various accounts, plus the inventory at the close of the year, should, of course, equal the total of the goods received at selling prices. If there are any shortages or overages, these should be explained in your report.
The Eskimos at these places may have revenues from several sources; i.e. from furs and other produce they may obtain, from wages they receive for work performed and from Family Allowances, Old Age Assistance, Old Age Security or Blind Pensions, where these apply. There may also be times when it will be necessary to issue direct relief to certain individuals when they may be temporarily unable to provide for themselves. Every effort should be made, however, to keep the Eskimos self-supporting and independent.

Each detachment is being supplied with counter-slips and a ledger in which records of transactions will be kept in simple form. It is suggested that the following accounts should be opened in the ledger and used in the following manner:

**Eskimo Customers:**

Open a separate account for each customer dealt with, including the Eskimo trader himself. On the credit side, enter the amounts of all furs and other produce he turns in and also of any cash or credits he may receive from stock. Where wages are not paid in cash but are billed to the employer, accounts will have to be opened in the ledger for the employers too and the amounts charged to them. Statements of all accounts against employers should be prepared and certified, in triplicate, and forwarded to the Director of Northern Administration and Lands at the first opportunity for collection from the employers concerned.

**Family Allowances:**

Open a separate account for each family receiving Family Allowances, and enter in it all goods issued against these credits. From these records the usual Family Allowance vouchers and accounts will be made out and forwarded for collection to Ottawa in the name of the Eskimo trader.

**Relief:**

Open a separate account for each person who receives Relief and enter in it all goods issued. From these records, prepare accounts in the name of the trader for all Relief issued and forward these accounts to the Director of Administration and Lands for collection.
Expenses:

If any goods have to be issued for the operation of the trading post, they should be charged to this account and information given as to the purposes for which they were used.

Counter Slips:

These should contain a complete record of all transactions and where necessary, explanatory notes should be entered. They can be used to show the details of furs and other produce purchased and any other credits that may be made to the Eskimo accounts, and they will also show, of course, the details of the goods given out. All transactions will be on a barter basis, i.e. no credit will be issued. If anyone needs supplies that he cannot pay for, these will be issued on Relief Account. A complete copy of all counter-slips issued should be sent to the Director of Northern Administration and Lands Branch at Ottawa by any opportunity that offers; and at the close of the year, a statement showing the total debits and credits to each ledger account should also be prepared and sent in. The fiscal year for accounting purposes, will end July 31st. An inventory should be taken on this date each year and a copy sent to the Director of Northern Administration and Lands Branch.

These supplies that are being sent in this year are comprised only of the staple goods which we have considered necessary for the first year’s operations. In the event of Eskimo earnings being fairly high, care will have to be taken to ensure that these supplies are equitably distributed to the various families over the year. In other words, each family should be allowed to purchase only what they may reasonably require for their current needs. Any surplus goods can be set aside as savings or for making special purchases in the following year.

After the first year’s experience you will be in a position to judge more accurately what the requirements are to be and to send in requisitions accordingly. Reports on the operations and accounts for Family Allowances and Relief should be sent to the Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch by every opportunity that offers and requisitions for the following year’s supplies should be sent in not later
than the spring air-lift. In sending in reports and accounts you
will, of course, follow the usual procedure of sending them to the
Director of Northern Administration and Land's Branch, Department of
Resources and Development, Ottawa, through the Officer Commanding
"G" Division and the usual copies of reports should be sent in for
their files.

All furs and other produce traded should be packed
and shipped by the supply ship each year. Furs, sealskins and other
produce should all be packed securely so that it may be distributed
to the various selling outlets without having to be unpacked. All
packages should be numbered consecutively and marked with the name of
the detachment from which they are sent and a list showing the number
and contents of each package should accompany the shipment.

These instructions will be reviewed
every 6 months and directives issued
as circumstances warrant.
V PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF GENERAL POLICY GOVERNING ESKIMO

(ConRidential)

19. Commissioner Nicholson said that he considered it very important to have a long-range policy aimed at helping the Eskimo through the difficult transition period they are now experiencing due to their rapidly increasing contacts with modern civilization and the resulting effects on their primitive way of life. It might be possible to present the general outline of such a policy to the main committee but the sub-committee should first consider whether such a matter was its responsibility.

20. Mr. Fraser said that much of the criticism directed at government policy towards the Eskimo originated from people with a very limited knowledge of the north. He mentioned a number of the measures being taken by the government to assist the Eskimo and the difficulty of following a general policy where conditions varied so greatly that each individual case frequently required consideration on its own merits. He doubted therefore whether the sub-committee would be able to assist by defining a broad policy.

21. Mr. Phillips considered that since a number of departments were concerned with Eskimo matters, the policy towards Eskimo was a proper matter for consideration by the A.C.N.D.

22. Mr. Sivertz stated that a government policy was required and that the main features should be clearly expressed in a written statement. He suggested that effective fusion be established between the A.C.N.D. and the Committee on Eskimo Affairs.

23. Mr. Bowley pointed out the advantage of securing A.C.N.D. endorsement of a general policy as this would ensure the support of the many government departments and agencies represented on the committee.

24. Colonel Jones agreed that if the sub-committee was to discuss Eskimo problems, some sort of liaison should be established with the Eskimo Committee. He suggested however that the whole matter should first be referred to the main committee for guidance and instructions.

25. Commissioner Nicholson said that the question of attempting to formulate a government policy towards the Eskimo was not one which the sub-committee could take on immediately. He suggested that the sub-committee agree in principle that there was a need for a clearly stated government policy towards the Eskimo and that the A.C.N.D. should take an active part in helping formulate such a policy. He noted however that there was already in existence a Committee on Eskimo Affairs and proposed to ask the A.C.N.D. where the responsibility for formulating an Eskimo policy lies.

26. The Sub-Committee agreed that there was a need for a clearly stated government policy towards the Eskimo and that the Advisory Committee on Northern Development should be asked where the responsibility for formulating this policy lies.

The sub-committee then returned to the consideration of Item I.

27. Commissioner Nicholson suggested that the Sub-Committee report to the main Committee that Item I is so closely related to the general question of Eskimo Policy that it must have instructions before attempting to recommend a solution. He said that until the general policy question had been settled it would be unwise for the Sub-Committee to recommend any new legislation for regulating the movement of people in the north. He suggested that with the co-operation of interested groups existing administrative processes would serve for the time being. For the guidance of those groups instructions for controlling the contact between Eskimos and non-Eskimos could be issued from time to time.

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28. Dr. Proctor pointed out that the quarantine provisions of the Northwest Territories Public Health Ordinance would, on occasion, be effective in controlling contact between Eskimos and others in the north.

29. A/C Wray stated that the R.C.A.F. considered the presence of Eskimo around the air bases in the north to be a real problem. It was difficult to prevent them from entering the bases and there was a tendency for them to become scavengers and hangers-on. The commanding officers of the bases could limit the movement of their personnel but at the moment this was not being done and the R.C.A.F. would be reluctant to initiate measures limiting freedom of movement unless it was absolutely necessary.

30. Mr. Rowley suggested that in the case of U.S. activities in the north it might be possible to include in the agreements a clause limiting movement to a defined area except with the approval of the local representative of the administration.

31. After further discussion, the Sub-Committee agreed to report to the A.O.H.D. that:

(a) until the general question of an Eskimo policy had been settled it could not attempt to suggest any new legislation for controlling the contact between Eskimos and non-Eskimos in the north.

(b) for the time being, present administrative processes, supplemented by periodic instructions to cover particular situations, would suffice to control contact. In drawing up future agreements with the U.S., however, consideration should be given to defining limits to which U.S. activities should be restricted.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE ACND:

GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD THE ESKIMO

At the session of the Council of the Northwest Territories held in Yellowknife in June and July 1953, it was agreed in principle that in many cases it was clearly necessary to control the contact between Eskimos and non-Eskimos in the north. It was determined, however, that the Council did not have the authority to pass legislation declaring Eskimo settlements out of bounds to non-Eskimos. The matter was referred to the ACND for its suggestions as to how contact could best be controlled. The Chairman, ACND, referred the question to the Administration Sub-Committee.

The problem was considered by the Administration Sub-Committee at its first meeting held on August 24, 1953. In the discussion it became evident that the subject could not be considered separately from the general government policy towards the Eskimo. There was a need for a clearly stated government policy and, since many departments were concerned with Eskimo matters, this appeared to lie within the interests of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development. The Sub-Committee noted the existence of a Committee on Eskimo Affairs which included representatives of the churches and the Hudson's Bay Company and had responsibilities for advising the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development on matters affecting the Eskimo.

The Sub-Committee agreed that (a) there was a need for a clearly defined government policy toward the Eskimo and that the ACND should be asked where the responsibility for formulating such a policy lay; (b) until the question of government policy toward the Eskimo had been settled it was unable to recommend new legislation to control the contact between Eskimos and non-Eskimos in the north; (c) for the time being, present administrative processes, supplemented by periodic instructions to cover particular situations, would suffice to control contact. In drawing up future agreements with the U.S., however, consideration should be given to defining limits to which U.S. activities should be restricted.

L. H. Nicholson, RCMP,
Chairman,
Administration Sub-Committee, ACND.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER.

Trip to the Eastern Arctic.

On September 8 I left on one of the scheduled monthly flights of the Air Transport Command from their Montreal Headquarters to Churchill, Coral Harbour, Resolute, Mould Bay, Sachsken, Frobisher Bay and Goose Bay. There was fog at Sachsken so we could not land. On the way south we circled Fort Chino to observe the extent of that disused base. The trip was to take 4 days but a weather delay extended it to 5. The cost to the department was $5.80.

The visit, while short and not calculated to make an Arctic expert out of me, was nevertheless of very great value. Having seen the places and talked with the men on the job, the whole thing is infinitely more meaningful. Air Commodore Dipley of the Air Transport Command is very keenly interested in native problems and is ready to give every assistance to our work. He accompanied us on this trip and went everywhere with Mr. H. H. Davis, in charge of Air Force Estimates, Mr. Sotron Smad and me. The Air Commodore believes that officers of the administration should visit northern bases more frequently and he is ready to transport them whenever desired.

I have many impressions, but on 4 chief ones I wish to comment as follows:

(a) Frobisher Bay.

Our construction plans will be the subject of a report from Mr. Marr to Mr. Cunningham on the work of a team of experts led by Mr. Leicester who have gone there at your direction, following my oral report.

(b) Resolute

Our plan to resettle a group of Eskimo families proposes to mix the primitive life with casual employment at the base. I do not think this will work and I suggest that because of the isolation of Resolute and the apparent willingness of the Air Force to co-operate, we have an opportunity to put into
a bold plan of moving competent Eskimos to Resolute with their families for full time permanent employment while residing in an Eskimo married quarters area.

(a) Churchill

Employment of single Eskimos at the army base should progress to affording those of them who adjust successfully to this new life, with assistance in housing and transportation of families to Churchill.

(d) Coral Harbour

Abandoned buildings apparently owned by War Assets Corporation, and left without arrangements for caretaking have been pilfered and wrecked by white men and Eskimos with bad general results. The same condition is reported to exist elsewhere. I suggest that discussion take place with War Assets with a view to having them arrange for removal of goods or proper caretaking.

These 4 points are amplified in the attached notes.

B. G. Sainty
Administrative Officer.
RESOLUTE BAY.

It seems to me that our Eskimo resettlement project has two forms - one is the arranging of permanent employment for selected individuals preferably trained in some trade as is being done at Churchill with 7 Eskimos, 5 recently transported from Chimo. For such to be successful it is essential that the men and their families be housed adequately. In other words, the change over from the primitive way of life must be complete. If this is not done the workman will show up in clothing appropriate to the snow house or tent and carrying evidence of the dietary and sanitary practices of the primitive life. It would be impossible for the employee or his children to study or read. Also, the ties of such an employee to his job must have much to be desired because life in the snow house or tent is too likely to continue in the seminomadic pattern which is not conducive to regularity or punctuality.

The second form of Eskimo resettlement is the transplanting of groups of families from regions where game is scarce, to places where it is plentiful, and where the people can live as hunters. Such is the Craig Harbour project.

At Resolute there are 4 families consisting of 23 persons, 14 of whom are children. They have 29 dogs, live in tents on the beach where they will build snow houses when there is enough snow, are to be supplied with a boat next year through the Eskimo Loan Fund. They are expected to earn their living principally by hunting but it is intended also that they be employed at the R.C.A.F. and Department of Transport establishments casually from time to time. The two forms of Eskimo resettlement are here being mixed. I think there is danger these people will become camp fringe dwellers, combing refuse dumps and looking for handouts. If they are to be hunters they should live away from the base. If they are to live near the base they should be made part of it.

Air Commodore Ripley informs me that the 4 Eskimo men now at Resolute could all be employed as unskilled workers by the R.C.A.F., and, if Eskimos can be found who have any experience in any of the common trades he feels sure that employment could be found next summer for 15 or 20 more. He considers that it would be advantageous to Canada in many ways to replace with Eskimos as many as possible of the white men who have to be sent there at great expense and who are generally dissatisfied themselves and render indifferent service.

As a prerequisite to such a program it would be necessary to assist the Eskimos to build an Eskimo married quarters area say a half mile from the other establishments. I would suggest that materials for a simple house could be bought out of the Eskimo Loan Fund, shipped to Resolute in a government vessel gratis, and erected by the Eskimo who is to live in it under supervision and
with the assistance of a carpenter supplied by the Administration. Repayment
to the Loan Fund could then be made over a period of say 3 years. Arrangements
can perhaps be made for the Eskimos to be allowed to purchase from the
Commissariat oil for heating, food and other necessities at prices that should
not include the full cost of transportation.

This proposal entails operating a school for the children. It would be very
expensive, but I think it would have a better chance of real success in the
long term objectives than any other Eskimo school. Pupils would attend full
time. They would be motivated in studies by the fact of their parents and
neighbours being salaried employees, in jobs which they, the children, can
qualify for and improve on. In ten years such a school at Resolute could be
producing Eskimo boys and girls ready for vocational and technical training at
Aklavik and return to the high Arctic. In due course, I would hope to see
establishments such as Mould, Isachsen, Eureka and Alert substantially, if
not entirely, manned by Eskimos with their families in residence.

I realize that the foregoing is no more than a set of preliminary ideas from
a layman. Some aspects might require extensive modification. Some aspects
touch Canada's policy respecting the Eskimo people. I suggest, however, that
the present moment at Resolute offers a unique opportunity for bold steps that
could be fruitful and the possibilities should be examined afresh and at an
early date.
REPORT ON TOUR OF THE ARCTIC ISLANDS

September 3 - 12, 1953

This trip was undertaken in order to obtain a background knowledge of the Eastern Arctic with special reference to the business of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development and the Estimates and policy problems of the Department of Resources and Development. It was intended that Mr. R. C. MacEachin should also make this trip but at the last minute he was unable to get away and I therefore endeavoured to gain a general perspective of the situation at the various military installations and to look specifically into certain problems which MacEachin referred to me before I left.

The trip was by means of RCAF North Star aircraft on one of its regularly scheduled supply flights. Air Commodore Hindley and Hendrick were also aboard this aircraft and the former, who is Air Officer Commanding Transport Command, adjusted the detailed time table of the flight so as to permit us to see everything we wanted to at the various points. The passages had to be made in daylight due to the somewhat primitive navigation and landing facilities and the impossibility of getting any rest in the plane. Thus the time on the ground was rather restricted but advantage was taken of the long period of twilight in those latitudes so that several hours were profitably used at each point despite the nearness of the equinox. Air Commodore Hendrick is Chief of Telecommunications. Also on board were Mr. N. G. Siverts of the Deputy Minister's staff, Lieutenant of Resources and Development, and Mr. R. L. Levis, Superintendent of Engineering and Construction, Requirements Division, Department of National Defence, together with several members of the staffs of the two Air Commodores. The aircraft also carried stores, service and construction personnel.

The route was as follows:

Ottawa (Uplands)
Winning
Churchill
Coral Harbour (Southampton Island)
Resolute (Cumberland Island)
Mould Bay (Prince Patrick Island)
Resolute
Probusier Bay (Harris Island)
Goose Bay (Labrador)
Ottawa (Uplands)

It was intended to go to Iqaluit but the weather did not permit. The whole amounted to slightly more than 6,500 miles and was flown in four days, plus one day at Churchill where we were delayed owing to weather. In addition, side trips (without landing) were inserted between Churchill and Coral Harbour to examine the wreckage of the Lancaster aircraft which recently crashed west of Mould Bay and between Resolute and Goose Bay to examine the general locality of Port Chalmers.

In what follows the bulk of the material will be arranged in chronological order except that certain policy questions and the substance of subsequent discussions about them will be discussed at the end.

WIKILG: The time here was entirely spent on the station. We saw the site of construction of the new cantilever hangar, looked at completed barracks blocks and had discussions with the Commanding Officer of the station apparently the Telecommunications Unit
Resolute Bay

A general tour of the Military installations occurred but no particular problems arose. I was not able specifically to inquire into the degree of cooperation between the Department of Transport and the RCAF particularly with reference to supplies. There have been occasions when particular items seem to have been overlooked for one or another of the weather stations which resulted in large bills being incurred for emergency transport. However, it was my impression at the weather station that the cooperation on the ground is satisfactory.

An Inuit family had just been put down a few days before the sea supply at this place and an RCMP post established. The Inuit family came from Port Harrison on the east coast of Hudson Bay where the increasing Inuit population has been outrunning the food supply. Inuit lived at Resolute some 300 years ago and I can only assume that they moved away owing to a decline in the availability of food which now seems to be restored. As soon as the Inuit family arrived problems of their relationship to the Military encampment began to appear. Where Military camps and Inuit villages are adjacent, the Inuit tend to be turned into "followers". The different moral bases of the two societies tend to exercise a harmful influence on both; junior members of the Army Forces attempt to get a corner on the output of handicrafts and so forth. The Anglo approach that presently passes for policy fails between two stools. The reasons for moving this family are ground in an attempt to keep the Inuit in his native area and to preserve that culture as primitive as it is. However, by moving the Inuit to an area where they come into intimate contact with White men destroys the basis of this reasoning while leaving them untrained to cope with the problems presented by this contact.

In discussion, grave doubts were expressed that the Department of Transport would be able to handle all the problems involved in taking over the sea supply at Resolute in 1954. The beach is narrow and the convoy may have as little as three or four days in which to unload and get out before it is frozen in. This calls for much equipment, manpower, and organization. When the United States Navy was doing this job it brought with it many landcraft by means of which the convoys were unloaded. It also has been in the habit of bringing mobile cranes, numerous trucks, and two ranges of men, one to load the landing craft from the ship and the other to unload the landing craft on the beach and quickly remove stores to the camp as to keep the beach clear, the whole under the direction of a beachmaster. The operation has many of the attributes of a ambitious Military landing. This last year there was a small administrative breakdown in that the United States Navy decided not to supply the gang and equipment for the shore part of this operation and this advice was not received by the proper authorities on our side. Fortunately a Construction and Maintenance Unit of the RCAF was working at Resolute and this Unit was pulled off its regular work and turned loose on unloading and clearing the beach. But for the absence of this Unit a serious breakdown would have occurred. Also it is necessary to have adequate ice reconnaissance for the convoy. This implies the presence of appropriate aircraft and integrated radio facilities. While the United States Navy was doing the job all these facilities existed within its own organization. Immediately upon my return to Ottawa a meeting of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development was held and I raised these questions with the Deputy Minister of Transport, who was present at the meeting. He indicated that he was aware that there were some difficulties but had not had quite as clear an idea before on what they were. He intends to look into them thoroughly. I pointed out that it was apparent that the cost estimate of $124,000 a year which his department had submitted to the Committee in gain approval was probably only a beginning of the actual expenses involved. While I still supported that the principle of taking over sea supply operations within the Arctic Archipelago, I felt that we should be told the total cost and that the administrative problems
include in addition to the oil Company Manager a Bank Manager and so forth.

NOTES OF MEETING POLICY

It has been becoming evident to several branches of the Government that thought should be given to the continuing growth of contacts between the Eskimo culture and White civilization in the Arctic. The matter was raised at the last meeting of the Council of the Northwest Territories where it was suggested that the Council might consider legislation declaring Eskimo settlements out-of-bounds to non-Eskimos. As it was felt that the Council did not have authority to pass such legislation the matter has been referred to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development. There is in existence a Committee on Eskimo Affairs which includes representatives of the churches and the Hudson Bay Company which has the responsibility of advising the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development.

This question is not only a problem in itself but also has a bearing on the sovereignty issue. The lack of suitable action or behalf of our Eskimos has already been raised on more than one occasion in the United Nations. It seems to me that our sovereignty can certainly be regarded as in jeopardy if we do not carry out the somewhat basic function of adequately training the aboriginal population as to fit them for participation in the life of a modern state. Our efforts so far apparently suffer seriously by comparison with Alaska and Greenland.

I understand that Commissioner Nicholson of the R.C.M.P. has suggested the setting up of a Royal Commission. Certainly the problems involved are complex and I feel sure no one in the Government service has studied the problem from all the angles, sociological, political and economic. However, I feel that the formal setting up of a Royal Commission would attract more attention than seems advisable with reference to a problem concerning a population of only about 9,000. It would be bound to raise further questions about Indians. In my view the present Committee on Eskimo Affairs does not contain people with the type of training necessary to suggest a long-term solution. I made some of these points at the recent meeting of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development and General Young seemed willing to add non-Civil Service specialists to the present Committee on Eskimo Affairs but did not suggest a fresh start.

My opinion at the moment is that we should gradually drop the assumption that the Eskimo culture should be maintained. The process can be gradual, starting with the present points of contact between the cultures and extend it as further contacts demand or opportunity offers. Whether we like it or not these contacts are occurring and I think we should endeavour to fit the Eskimo in. Beginning with the present younger generation training should be provided so that Eskimos can be made welcome in the present Military establishments as truckdrivers, junior technicians and the like. And in line with this village development along the lines of Happy Valley should take place so that the living standards of the Eskimos will be raised. This must be done so as to permit the older generation to continue to live as they have done for I see no chance of their making a clean break with their culture. Nonetheless the key to the problem is the raising of living standards which will give reason to the training and will make demands upon the Eskimo so that he is obliged to develop steady work habits which alone will make him acceptable to the Military. This is not always the case now, the Eskimo being regarded as lazy, when after two or three days he feels the case acquired to be sufficient for his present needs and goes fishing.
For the time being I feel such Eskimo communities should be developed at a respectable distance from the Military bases so that contact is reduced to that required by the employment until the passage of time removes those Eskimos which are not trained to meet the White culture.

In the development of an Eskimo policy the experience of Alaska and Greenland should be studied. There is not too much integrated information about Alaska although I have seen a paper on the employment of Eskimos by the United States Navy at Point Barrow which is now on our files. From this it is evident that the policy has not been fully thought through but that temporary results have occurred through the Navy's need of labour complicated by a measure of the usual American idealism. Greenland has been working at this problem for centuries and by this time considerable capital investment is in place. Intermarriage has occurred so that there is now only one band (at Thule) which is pure-blooded Eskimo.

Greenland takes annual reports to the United Nations and I now have a copy on loan from Graham Rowley. It would be my hope that the Greenland experience might serve to stake out future guide posts to which immediate policy can be oriented. Also we should be able to profit by any mistakes they may have made.

Although the legal status is different there are some points of resemblance with the Indian question. Certainly the two will be associated in the minds of Parliament and the public. We should take into account the best modern thinking about Indians although not necessarily present practice in this regard.

We must face the possibility that if we train Eskimos to live in contact with and be participants in White society, any retreat of the frontier, military or economic, must be met by arrangements for moving the Eskimo population to conform at least in respect of those Eskimos which have been in contact. A general development along the lines suggested above may well denude certain Islands of their civilian population. This is most likely to occur only if the major Military bases are closed down in the future and, of course, if this happens the pressure of the sovereignty question will be relaxed.

I have discussed all this with Mcقرر, Rowley and Sivert who are continuing to give the matter thought.

C. W. Stead

29 September, 1953.
Ottawa, 9 November, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROUSEY:

ESKIMO SETTLEMENT AT RESOLUTE

During my recent visit to Resolute Bay with the R.C.A.F. resupply mission I had a number of conversations with Constable Rose Gibson the member in charge of the R.C.M.P. detachment at Resolute. As you know he is in charge of the four Eskimo families which were sent there this summer. I also visited the Eskimo settlement several times. I thought you might be interested in my impressions of the Resolute experiment.

Although it is too early to make any definite statement I feel personally that the experiment will be an unqualified success. The people are well fed and happy and seem to be satisfied with their new environment. However, it appeared to me that if the experiment is successful it will be owing primarily to good luck and to the resourcefulness of Constable Gibson.

Since my experience in the north is so limited my observations and any conclusions I have reached should of course be examined by someone with more extensive knowledge of the problem.

The Eskimo settlement at Resolute consists of 19 people and 33 dogs. Included among the people are 6 men, 6 women, 2 teen-agers and 9 children. One of the women is now pregnant and an additional member of the settlement is expected in December. The group is made up of four families. Three of these families came from the Port Harrison area and one from Pond Inlet. The family from Pond Inlet, I understand, was brought to Resolute to help the families from the more southerly Port-Harrison area adapt themselves to the long winter nights of the high north. The settlement is on the beach about two miles south-west of the former D.N.A.E. quarters at Resolute Bay. In addition to the four Eskimo homes there is a small wooden building which the Eskimo built from old packing crates under the guidance of Constable Gibson. This will be used as a workshop, school, church, and as a place to dry skins. At the moment the families are living in tents banked with snow but as soon as the snow conditions are right they will build igloos for the winter.
From what I could gather the settlement is a happy one because hunting has been very good. Almost every time the men go on a hunting trip they bring back one or more seals and have already shot five polar bears. White fox are very plentiful and as soon as the season opens the Eskimo will lay out their trap lines. Reports indicate that during the summer months seals are numerous in the Resolute Bay area. With what the men are able to secure from hunting and purchase from their store they and their families have plenty to eat. Health is very good and there is no reason why this should not continue to be the case since the Eskimo's contact with the white residents of the area is very limited. The women of the settlement have never been to the Air Force base and the men go there only once a month to pick up their Family Allowances. No white person goes to the settlement unless he is accompanied by Constable Gibson and these visits are kept to the minimum. The Officer Commanding the R.C.A.F. detachment at Resolute reports that the Eskimo have caused him absolutely no trouble and he is quite content to have them in the area.

Constable Gibson has made extensive plans to help the Eskimo over the long dark period. He is securing a supply of soapstone which they will use for carving and there is a large amount of whale bone in the area which also can be used. Constable Gibson has school supplies and will attempt some elementary teaching of the children during the winter. He plans to live for several days at a time in the wooden building at the Eskimo settlement during the dark period. He is very well liked by the Eskimo and they appear to trust him implicitly.

However, I think it should be pointed out at this stage that Constable Gibson's task at Resolute has been made more difficult than it need have been by what appears to have been hasty planning of the experiment. I understand that the idea of moving some Eskimo families from Port Harrison was being considered almost a year ago but Constable Gibson received no instructions until April. By this time most of the Eskimo in the Port Harrison area were away on the spring hunt and it was only with some difficulty that he was able to contact a number of the families to ask for volunteers to go to Resolute.

The Eskimo were transported from Port Harrison to Resolute via Churchill by boat. They were on board ship for approximately six weeks during the summer when hunting was at its best and consequently when they arrived at Resolute on September 7 they had no stockpile of meat for the winter. This has meant that they have had to hunt every day since they arrived there and must continue to do so as long as the weather allows leaving them insufficient time to repair their gear and prepare in other ways for the winter. I was told that during the summer there were R.C.A.F. North Star aircraft flying from Churchill
to Resolute on an average of once a week. If the Eskimo had been carried on one of these planes they could have been at Resolute by early August and have had that month to hunt walrus which are apparently plentiful there.

The ship transporting the Eskimo arrived at Resolute at 9:00 p.m. September 7. The next morning Constable Gibson and the Eskimo were landed on the beach and the ship was gone by noon, though it had been planned to stay a couple of days to help the settlement to get established. No site had been previously chosen for the Eskimo settlement, no quarters had been arranged for Constable Gibson and no storage space had been provided for the supplies for the Eskimo store. The Eskimo tents were in very bad condition but no new tents or repair material were sent to Resolute. As a result the first week was unnecessarily unpleasant while the members of the group adjusted themselves. Constable Gibson arranged quarters for himself at the old D.O.T. site and through the courtesy of the Department of Transport was given part of a Quonset hut in which to put his supplies.

During my visit at Resolute I was with Constable Gibson when the Eskimo store was opened to issue supplies for the week. After the Eskimo had left he showed me the manifest for the supplies and I was rather surprised at some of the items which were sent to Resolute and at others which were not sent. As you know a $5,000 loan was made from the Eskimo Loan Fund to purchase these supplies and the Eskimos are expected to pay this loan back. Since this first year at Resolute is an experiment, one would have expected that every effort would have been made to see that the store contained a good supply of the necessaries and that most unnecessary items were omitted.

Among the supplies sent to Resolute were:

- 96 lbs. of butter at $1 a lb., but only 134 lbs. of lard at 25c a lb.
- 60 yds. of cheap cotton print.
- 24 towels at $1 each.
- 144 yds. of llama braid for decorating parkas - enough for about 30 parkas.
- 24 pairs of men's work pants although there are only 4 men in the group. These pants are in sizes of 36 to 38 which make them much too big for the Eskimo.
12 pairs of boys' pants although there are only 2 boys in the settlement.

5 lbs. of putty.

200 gals. of gasoline at approximately 70\(\frac{\text{c}}{\text{gal.}}\) and 2 Hot Shot batteries although the Eskimo have no internal combustion engine of any kind.

36 pairs of wool mitts which I understand the Eskimo can easily make for themselves.

12 pairs of men's braces for 4 men.

12 coat sweaters of poor quality at $1 each for 4 men.

Among the items which were not included in the supplies were:

**Rifles** - the rifles which the Eskimo have are in poor condition and they will undoubtedly need replacements during the year. While I was at the store one of the Eskimo reported that he had broken the butt of his rifle and would like to buy a new one. Constable Gibson had to tell him that he did not have any. He said that he would try to borrow one from the Air Force.

**Duffel cloth** - I am told that duffel cloth is an absolute necessity for Eskimo in making their clothing.

**Oil lamps** - there were no lamps and only three lanterns for four families. Most of these people are to experience their first dark period and should have lamps to help them light their houses.

**Wash tubs** - it is hoped that the Eskimo will be taught basic sanitation and personal cleanliness but they have no means of washing.

**Tent material** - there is no material with which the Eskimo can repair their tents which last spring were reported in bad condition.

**Snow knives** - the knives sent for this purpose were apparently of no use. The Eskimo just laughed when shown them.
Fish hooks - fishing line was sent but no fish hooks. It was hoped that the Eskimo could fish through the ice during the winter but this will not be possible now.

First-aid supplies - Constable Gibson has no first-aid supplies at his disposal in case of any accident or sickness.

When Constable Gibson arrived at Resolute he went over the supplies which had been landed there comparing them against the manifest. He found a total shortage of $1,151 worth of goods. These shortages were made up of three .303 rifles, three .22 rifles, 120 yds. of tent material, 60 yds. of khaki drill, 60 yds. of blue denim, 60 yds. of white duffle, 1,000 board feet of spruce.

It seems particularly unfortunate that all the shortages should be made up of those items which are the most necessary for the Eskimo and I understand that the lack of such items as rifles and duffle cloth will make their life more difficult than it need have been this winter. What happened to the $1,151 worth of goods no one appears to know, but the fact remains that the Eskimo, during the most difficult period of the year, will have to do without some of the necessities of life.

I personally examined the goods in the Eskimo store and would say that for the prices charged some of the items are of extremely poor quality. If the supplies had been purchased from a wholesale house at Montreal and loaded on the "C. P. Howe" instead of being bought in Winnipeg and shipped by rail to Churchill, it might have been possible to secure them at lower prices.

It is my own personal estimate that of the $5,000 borrowed for supplies approximately $2,000 or 40% of the total has gone astray through items not being delivered, unnecessary items being purchased or excessively high prices being paid. Everyone wants the experiment at Resolute to be a success and I feel sure it will be but the task at Resolute has been made more difficult than it need have been through what appears to have been hasty planning during the early stages of the experiment.

For complete success this experiment should not have to depend on the white residents of the area for assistance. However,
in the two months that the settlement has been established at
Resolute, Constable Gibson has had to ask for quarters for himself,
storage space for his supplies, transportation for the supplies
from the beach to the storehouse, and building material for the
wooden building which was put up at the Eskimo settlement. He is
now attempting to borrow a rifle from the R.C.A.F. so that one of
the Eskimos can continue to hunt. If there is any accident or
sickness he must immediately ask the R.C.A.F. station for medical
supplies. Personnel at the R.C.A.F. and weather stations are
genuinely interested in the experiment but it seems too bad that
Constable Gibson should have had to ask for help unnecessarily.
It may be that at a later stage during the winter season he will
really require their co-operation.

C. J. Marshall,
Secretary, A.C.N.d.C.
The Department of Resources and Development Act; proposed repeal and re-enactment

1. The Department of Resources and Development Act was passed in 1949. Under the Act the Minister and the Department have responsibility for a number of matters connected with the resources of Canada, in so far as they come within the responsibility of the federal government. Authority is given to formulate plans for resource development and to cooperate with the provinces and municipalities for the purpose. Section 6 of the Act also provides that:

"6. The Minister has the control and management of

(a) the affairs of the Northwest Territories, and of the Yukon Territory;
(b) all lands belonging to Her Majesty in right of Canada except lands specially under the control and management of any other Minister, department or agency of the Government of Canada."

Section 6(a) is the only indication in the Act that the Department has general responsibility for all matters relating to the northern territories of Canada.

2. Since the present Act was passed the importance of the north has greatly increased. In particular, the growing United States interest in air defence in the north has made it more important for Canada to take measures that will make clear and effectively maintain Canadian sovereignty throughout the entire area, including the Arctic islands, and that will further the development of the north generally. In view of these circumstances it is desirable to indicate more specifically by legislation the extent of Canadian government interest in that area. For that purpose it is recommended that the responsibilities of the Minister and the Department be redefined and that increased emphasis be given to those that relate to the north. Among other things, there should be reference to:

(a) administration of the Yukon and N.W.T.;
(b) coordination of government activities in the Yukon and N.W.T. (which is the responsibility of the Department under the Cabinet decision of February 19, 1953);
(c) measures for the economic and political development of the Yukon and N.W.T.;
(d) protection of the Eskimos and measures to strengthen their economic and social position;
(e) measures for the effective administration and control of the Arctic Archipelago. (This might be done in such a fashion as to give a legislative statement of Canadian sovereignty over the entire Archipelago.)
In order to make more apparent the importance that the government attaches to the north, it is recommended that the name of the department be changed to "Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources" ("Ministère du Nord Canadien et des Ressources Nationales"). The term "National Resources" would meet criticisms that have been made that a department of "Resources" suggests federal intervention in matters that are under provincial jurisdiction.

4. The legislation will not create any immediate charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Measures required by the growing importance of the north and to further its development can be expected to lead to some new expenditures in the area. Departmental responsibility for such added measures will necessitate adjustments from time to time in organization and establishment. Proposals for such measures or adjustments will be for consideration in the normal way in relation to departmental estimates and establishment and will not directly result from the legislation.

5. The Bill will be of approximately the same length as the present Act. It is recommended that it be introduced early in the coming session of Parliament and dealt with at that session.

Prime Minister's Office, October 15, 1953.

Louis S. St-Laurent, 
Prime Minister.
6. Policy Towards the Eskimo

The long-term government policy is presumably to make the Eskimos full citizens of Canada with rights, responsibilities, and a standard of living comparable to those of the white population. In the past few years a number of measures have been taken in order to assist the Eskimo. They have however been done piecemeal, and at times they have appeared to be mutually inconsistent. Our first need is the preparation of a written policy outlining the objectives of the government, and the methods it is proposed to adopt to achieve them. Such a policy should be considered by the Committee on Eskimo Affairs, and passed through the Administration Sub-Committee to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development.

The major fields to be covered in this policy are health, education, economic development, administration, and political development. These fields are inter-related and any policy should be considered as a whole.

Health

Since the war the Indian Health Services of the Department of National Health and Welfare have been responsible for a very marked improvement in the health services provided for Eskimo. They have in particular conducted a vigorous campaign which is still continuing against tuberculosis and a large number of the more seriously affected Eskimo have been removed for treatment outside. So far the Indian Health Services have concentrated on curing sickness. The next stage must be directed towards prevention of disease. Here there are two major factors - malnutrition, which is widespread and which, apart from its direct effects, renders the population more susceptible to disease, and bad hygiene which encourages the spread of disease. The treatment of disease in the Arctic is a difficult and expensive matter, entailing hazardous mercy flights and the separation of the sick from their families for long periods. When the patient is returned cured to his own people, he is again in the environment which caused his sickness. In this way the efforts of the medical services are largely neutralised by malnutrition and bad hygiene. The former is in most ways an economic problem, the latter an educational one. An improvement in either should lead to a reduction in the costs of treatment of sickness.
Education

Just how bad the standard of education is among the Canadian
Eskimo can be illustrated by the fact that scarcely 8% are literate,
only about 20% of the children receive regular education (this includes
all those hospitalised in the south), and only one is receiving
technical education. This can be compared with Greenland where the
whole population has in general been literate for a century, where all
children receive regular education for seven years followed by high
school for the more promising, and where there are four technical colleges
in Greenland with in addition over 200 Greenlanders receiving higher
training in Denmark. The provision of education in the Canadian Arctic
is of course more difficult than in Greenland as the population is more
dispersed, but the present situation could in some ways be described as
a national disgrace. A particularly serious condition exists in some
places such as Probisher where many of the men are employed at the base.
As a result the children receive no education, nor can their fathers
teach them to be hunters. They can only grow up to be a source of cheap
and unsatisfactory labour. The government long-term policy must be to
provide regular education for all Eskimo children. The first priority
should be to provide schools in those areas where the lives of the Eskimo
are affected by employment at bases, or other white influence. It is at
these places too that the Eskimo are no longer nomadic, and the need for
education in elementary hygiene is consequently most pressing. The problem
is not as urgent in the areas where the Eskimo still follow their
traditional occupation of hunting.

Economic Development

In their primitive state the Eskimo were solely hunters and by
this means they supported themselves with success, though doubtless with
numerous periods of starvation. Their needs were simple and the country
supplied them all. The influence of the whalers, though harmful in many
ways, did not affect their way of life very much, except by destroying
some of the resources on which they depended. The fur trade however was
responsible for a major change. The Eskimo became trappers and with the
revenue from their fur purchased imported goods which rapidly became
necessities. Now, with low prices for their fur and with the cost of their
purchases greatly increased, they are in a very bad way economically, with Family Allowances frequently the major source of income. It is in their poverty that the root of the problem of malnutrition lies. The government should make every effort to provide new sources of income within the country, by handicrafts, by the manufacture locally of building materials, boats, etc., which are now imported, by employment at government stations and defence establishments, and by the examination of possible new industries, such as eiderdown collecting and reindeer harding. Consideration should also be given to lowering the age for Old Age Pensions, to something approaching the age when a hunter is no longer able to pursue his occupation effectively. In Greenland the age is fifty. The only alternatives to new sources of income are a race living on relief, or government stores selling goods at a fraction of cost price.

Administration

Administration of the Arctic has been carried out almost completely by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. They have done this well, following the policies laid down by the Administration in Ottawa. They have on many occasions reported that serious problems exist which are not being tackled, and the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. is very concerned about the current situation. The Administration makes inspection trips, but these necessarily consist of a large number of very short visits. The time has surely come when the Administration must broaden its activities, both by more thorough examination of problems in the country, and by studying the methods by which related problems have been met elsewhere. There are no administrative officers resident in the Arctic. It is obviously impossible to post an officer at each settlement. There are however some areas with comparatively large Eskimo populations, such as for instance the north of Fove Basin, and others where there are special problems, such as the Belcher Islands, where there are no R.C.M.P. and where an administrative officer could do most useful work. He would also gain experience essential to him if he is to be responsible in any way for the administration of the country.

So far as I know no officer of the Administration has ever paid an official visit to either Greenland or Alaska. We could certainly learn a great deal from Greenland. I suggest that consideration be given to
appointing a northern attaché from the department in Copenhagen. It could be a posting of say two years, a portion of the time being spent in Greenland, and should be part of the training of most officers engaged in northern administration.

Political Development

The political development of the Canadian Inuit has been completely neglected. As social evolution in a democracy is based on education, this is scarcely surprising. In Greenland local councils composed of Danish officials and elected Greenland representatives were introduced in the 1880's. In 1908 district councils were formed which were responsible for local matters such as public assistance and were also a means of political expression. In 1960 a national council was established with representatives elected by all Greenlanders over twenty-three years old, in addition to local councils which handled local government duties. In 1965 Greenland became a part of the Danish State, returning members to the Danish Parliament. Political development in Greenland was probably much slower than necessary, but it does indicate a line we might follow. Certainly some sort of local councils could be set up as soon as resident administrative officers are appointed. These local councils could be of great assistance to the Administration both in the local social welfare matters, and also as a means of sounding local opinion. So far the Administration has had to rely almost completely on missionaries, traders, and the R.C.M.P. to interpret the feelings of the Inuit population.
Re: Eskimo Conditions, Craig Harbour Area, period ending December 31st, 1953.

1. The following is the first Eskimo Conditions Report submitted by this detachment and concerns those natives that the Government transferred to this point from Fort Harrison and Pond Inlet under the new rehabilitation program presently under experimentation.

2. The following families arrived at this point via the C.S. S. C.D. ROWER on August 29th, 1953, PATTY E9-713; JOATAHNE E9-715; PHILAPUSHIK E9-721; from Fort Harrison and the following family from Pond Inlet, AKNAK A DLK E9-787. The following two families originally destined for Cape Herschel (now Alexandra Fiord), Tchassie E9-1589 from Fort Harrison and Akpaluakik E5-83; from Pond Inlet arrived Graig Harbour via the C.S.S. D.R. 1 IBERVEILL on September the 4th, 1953. All families were united into one group and gradually transferred by police power boat from Graig Harbour to their present camping spot on Lindstrom Peninsula, just west of the mouth of Grise Fiord.

3. The above named camping spot was picked for several reasons. It was thought best to have the natives away from Graig Harbour at least by one days sled travel. Being encamped at Graig Harbour might have given these natives the tendency to look for handouts when not absolutely necessary. The land between Graig Harbour and the present camping spot is very suitable for natives however it is also the main feeding grounds for caribou and muskox. Having the natives encamped in or too near the breeding and feeding grounds of the caribou would probably in a short time delete the herds or drive them further inland out of reach. The present camping site is on a small point and the hunters are able to see sea game for quite some way. However it is a very poor spot from which to operate a boat, and as these natives are now using a small police power boat it is thought that in the coming year they will be moved a few miles further west to a more suitable harbour. The natives or majority of same wish to move a little further west. Apparently it is the custom of the Fort Harrison natives to reside in a valley where they can see a long way, whereas now they have a high cliff immediately at their back. Harbour Fiord appears to answer all above problems. It is the intention of the natives to scout further in the springtime by dog team.

4. To assist all families in starting their new lives they were taken on two supervised caribou hunting trips one to Grise Fiord on September 3 - 4th through which ten caribou were obtained and the second on September 13th and 14th through which ten more caribou were obtained. The natives were advised at this time that it was considered best that as long as they had sufficient other native food stuffs that no more caribou be taken between their camp and Graig Harbour, but they could hunt further as ribou to the west.
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

DIVISION FILE NO. ----------------------------------------

PROVINCE

DATE

Ref: Eskimo conditions, GRAFTON HARBOR Area,
prior ending December 31st, 1953.

1. DURING THE WINTER if they so desired, further assistance was given in the form of five walrus, six seal, two bearded seal and one bear, which were obtained in and about their camps on police patrols and at periods with the natives assistance. As these natives had no funds by which to secure an outfit each family was given one issue of destitute rations at the time of leaving GRAFTON HARBOR. This has been covered by separate reports and destitute application forms gone forward.

5. The issue of buffalo hides has been covered by a separate report. The reindeer skins have been issued out to those hunters needing same. All caribou skins obtained in above mentioned hunting trips were turned over to the natives. They report that the reindeer skins are not altogether most suitable for clothing due to the thickness and stiffness of the skin, however they advise that if nothing else is available they could use some to advantage. The mansearing deputed GRAFTON HARBOR for the natives will be reported on when same has been all issued.

6. As is known the natives now GRAFTON HARBOR were originally two distinct tribes, each with their head men. Former as all would be living at GRAFTON HARBOR it was thought best to unite these natives into one camp under one head man and this was done, PATTY EG-713, the designated trader for GRAFTON HARBOR being so named. This has worked out very well and the FRED HARRISON and FRED JUPT natives from all reports are getting along very well together, much better than first expected. There is no signs of friction whatever.

7. There seems to be very little between the mode of life followed by the FRED HARRISON and FRED JUPT natives. Both groups appear adept at hunting seal through the seal holes, however the HARRISON natives appear to be better boat men. The FRED JUPT natives are more accustomed to the dark period, but this does not seem to hamper the young HARRISON men from hunting or trapping. The HARRISON natives are more accustomed to "whiteman's" food stuffs and clothing, but this can be primarily due to other types of food not being so plentiful at HARRISON. The HARRISON natives usually do not use the seal oil lamps to any extent relying chiefly on small wood to burn in stoves, however at present they are using the seal oil lamp exclusively. At present all families are living in tents due lack of suitable snow for snow houses, but the difference in warmth has been compensated by the use of the buffalo skin as an outside covering. It is thought that if these natives remain as a unit for any length of time their modes of life will be united and their differences will be nil. Each adapting the better points of the other.

8. (continued on page three)
8. The clothing of all natives, in the opinion of the writer, is not adequate at present in the form of skin clothing. All hunters have been provided for in the form of skin clothing, but the children have little or none at all. Following is quote of message sent in the above regard to the Officer Commanding "D" Division, dated CRAFT HARBOR December 4th, 1953.

QUOTE: PLEASE REQUEST DEPARTMENT TO FORWARD FOR NATIVE TRADING STORE TWO HUNDRED CLOTHING SKINS STOP TO DATE ONLY HUNTERS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WITH SKIN CLOTHING STOP THIS PROCEDURE CONSIDERED ADJUSTABLE RATHER THAN A LARGE VILLAGER OF CARIBOU THIS AREA EVERY FALL WHEN OTHER MEAT OBTAINABLE STOP NATIVES DO NOT WISH TO FORWARD FURTHER INFORMATION LATER DATE: UNQUOTE.

Following is quote of message from "D" Division in reply to above:

QUOTE: NOT 09/17 IF YOUR REQUEST FOR TWO HUNDRED CLOTHING SKINS HAVE ARRIVED WITH ROOF TO DROP IF POSSIBLE UP TO TEN BUNDLES OF REINDEER SKINS SOME TIME DURING THIS WINTER: UNQUOTE.

It is hoped that during the spring and summer these natives can be encouraged to wear more seal skin garments in the form of pants, boots, mitts and even parkas. However this maybe easier said than done, as the PORT HARRISON natives appear very much in favour of "whiteman's" clothing. It is noted that the skins of seal obtained during the winter from seal hole hunting are not being destroyed, but are being kept for cleaning and drying in the spring. It is assumed at present that the natives will wish to trade most of these skins, but an endeavour will be made to have them utilize them for clothing purposes first and trade purposes second.

9. There has been no serious illness in this native camp to-date. Shortly after the departure of the last supply ship some of the natives were temporarily afflicted with colds and from the description obtained possible measles, but since freeze-up to date no illness whatever has been reported.

10. All natives, with the exception of one, state being happy and content in the CRAFT HARBOR area. The one native not being wholly content is PATSY E7-912, but this maybe due to his lack of enthusiasm in outside trapping and hunting, spending the whole of his time inside the tent. Further he complains of not being able to see a long way in all directions from his tent, but this will probably be corrected in the spring or summer. However he has stated that this is a good native country and since their arrival have not gone in want as they have done at PORT HARRISON. There have been no rumours of natives wanting to leave the area in the very near future.
11. The PORT HARRISON natives have been handicapped in not having suitable material for carving purposes in this area. Some carving has been done in ivory amounting to approximately one hundred and seventy dollars. No suitable stone has been located. However there is a large amount of old whale bone in the area and the natives advise they will try carving it during the lighter period. They request and it is recommended, if possible quarried stone be shipped in next navigation from the PORT HARRISON area. With suitable carving material on hand, plus trapping and the same available, these natives should be in a much better condition next winter.

12. To date approximately one hundred and fifty two fox have been trapped by this camp. This is considered very good taking into consideration the number of traps available to each man and the dark period in which they are trapping. The traps left here by the Department have been loaned out to the natives and divided equally amongst the trappers over sixteen years of age. It is expected that the number of fox obtained will decrease for a short time during the extreme dark period and then increase again in the light period. At present the trap lines are quite short, but as the days increase in length some of the men advise they will extend their lines and several will proceed to the vicinity of CAPE SEBASTIAN on DEVON ISLAND, which is straight across JONES SOUND from their present camping spot.

13. Several of the PORT HARRISON natives have been handicapped slightly in not having sufficient dogs for extended trapping purposes. The one most in need is TECHASSE Ep-1589, but at present has teamed up with PHILIPA Suite Ep-718. The PORT HARRISON type sledge is not wholly practical for the type of travelling encountered in this area. The detachment has offered the natives the use of old police sleds if they so wish, and at present one is in use by the natives. It is thought by next year the majority of trappers will have teams of nine to ten dogs and it is hoped to restrict them to this number.

14. Through their own hunting efforts this camp has obtained two walrus, forty seal, and six narwhal, to date. From reports there appears to be numerous seal holes very close to thier camp. A small net is also being utilised in a tide crack near the camp. It is thought that thier present supply of dog feed will run out near the end of January or early February and the natives will have to hunt more seal holes until the middle of April when the seal begin coming up on the ice. From than on there should be no difficulty whatever. Seven large bear have also been obtained and as they are in good bear country it is expected many more will be obtained in the spring. Tho natives will be asked not to kill bears with small cubs, unless absolutely necessary.
Re: Eskimo conditions in the CRAIG HARBOUR area,
Period ending December 31st, 1953.

15. The natives will retain the use of the small police power boat in the coming season. Last season it was necessary to supply them with gasoline and oil on destitute and it maybe necessary to follow the same procedure in the coming year. The natives have been requested over and over many times to save some of their trapping earnings but to date only one man, JOATANTE E9-715 has put any money aside, this amounts to approximately eighty dollars. However with one starting the rest may follow suit when they see the advantage of it.

16. It is also proposed that the large police power boat will be used more extensively, ice conditions permitting, in joint hunting operations with this native camp to provide them with sufficient dog feed to carry them through the year, and also in obtaining a limited number of caribou in the same fashion as last year. Undoubtedly if these natives were granted permission to hunt caribou as and when desired, the herds would soon be depleted.

17. It is regretted that two musk-ox have been shot, but under the circumstances the writer advised the natives concerned they were perfectly in the right and that they would hear no more about the incident. On October 16th several natives arrived at CRAIG HARBOUR by sled under very poor travelling conditions. They departed Craig Harbour on the seventeenth, but the ice had left the shore near thier camp. The provisions they were carrying were transported from the ice edge to land by small boat in rough water which caused some of the supplies in being lost. The natives returned towards CRAIG HARBOUR and went to shore near PILOT POINT. They encamped there about four days and ran out of dog feed. Not having any dog chains the dogs were at large. During the night two musk-ox came near this camp and the dogs gave chase. The musk-ox formed defensive positions and killed one dog. As it was apparent more dogs may be killed JOATANTE E9-715 killed the first musk-ox. Attempts were made to scare the other away, but to no avail. As the natives thought more dogs would be killed the other one was destroyed jointly by JOATANTE E9-715 and AFFATAPAYIK E5-834. The hides were put to good use and the meat was consumed by the natives and dogs jointly. Apparently musk-ox can be very mean as far as dogs are concerned. Two native dogs at the camp have now been killed by this manner.

18. From having observed many eskimo camps in the past it is the opinion of the writer and of the other detachment member who has had much previous experience, that this native camp is in very good condition and there appears to be no reason why it should not continue in the same manner.

19. Further reports will be submitted in due course.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER

Ottawa, January 25, 1954.

Reference is made to your memorandum of January 6, 1954, regarding goods purchased for Resolute Bay under the Eskimo Loan Fund last summer.

2. As a result of inquiries we have been making, we find that lumber intended for Resolute Bay was wrongly billed by the supplier to Craig Harbour and was landed there. It will be used at Craig Harbour and the necessary adjustments made in the accounts.

3. We are still endeavouring to trace the other articles reported missing, but in the meantime we have arranged to replace the rifles, cotton duck and blue denim by the R.C.A.F. on a regular flight out of Churchill.

4. All goods for these northern places were purchased through our Departmental Purchasing Division. As the goods had to be shipped from Churchill and the quantities of the various items were small, the orders were placed with western suppliers. Examination of the invoices does not disclose that the prices charged were unreasonable. The prices Mr. Marshall saw were the selling prices at Resolute Bay, which included an average mark-up of 25 per cent to provide for a small profit being made on local sales.

5. The following larger staple items purchased comprise over 60 per cent of the value of the shipment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity/Weight</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41½ yds. Duffle</td>
<td></td>
<td>269.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 30/30 Rifles</td>
<td></td>
<td>186.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 bales Flour</td>
<td></td>
<td>363.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 cases Pilot Biscuits</td>
<td></td>
<td>240.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 doz. Klim</td>
<td></td>
<td>392.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240 lbs. Tea</td>
<td></td>
<td>141.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 lbs. F.C. Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td>157.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 lbs. Pipe Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td>74.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 gals. Kerosene (including drums)</td>
<td></td>
<td>225.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 gals. Gasoline (including drums)</td>
<td></td>
<td>180.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,000 Cartridges</td>
<td></td>
<td>783.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 doz. Traps</td>
<td></td>
<td>148.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $3,163.60
The balance of less that $2,000 was spread out over more than 100 small items. In view of the small amounts involved, I scarcely think it would be worth while to pursue the matter further. If, however, you feel that the Department's purchasing arrangements should be reviewed, this would be a matter for discussion with Mr. Warner.

F. J. G. Cunningham,
Director.
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Office of the Deputy Minister
Ottawa

2 February, 1954.

Dear Mr. Robertson,

In the Fall of last year the Department of Natural Resources and Development experimented with the move of 20 Eskimo families to Resolute Bay, N.W.T. It has been reported that these families have become, more or less, wards of the R.C.A.F. Detachment at Resolute Bay. It is perhaps possible that this state of affairs could have been avoided if a representative of the responsible Department had been posted to the R.C.A.F. Detachment, Resolute Bay, for the purpose of administering and directing the Eskimos involved in the experiment.

The Department of National Defence appreciates that your Department is completely responsible for the welfare and administration of Eskimos and no doubt you will be planning and executing additional experiments. It is desired to inform you that it is the intention of this department to co-operate with you, whenever possible and practicable, in any of your plans or experiments. However, you will appreciate that because our northern requirements in personnel and equipment must perforce be kept to the barest minimum, it will not be possible, or practicable, for this department to accept, on your behalf, any responsibility for the care, welfare and administration of Eskimos.

Yours sincerely,

"James A. Sharpe"

Mr. R. Gordon Robertson,
Department of Northern Affairs
and National Resources,
Langevin Block,
Ottawa, Ontario.

(C.M. Drury)
Deputy Minister.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER

Referring to your memorandum of the 3rd of February, Mr. Drury has apparently been misled regarding the arrangements at Resolute Bay.

Constable Gibson of the R.C.M. Police was stationed at Resolute Bay primarily to supervise the Eskimos' operations. He has had previous experience with Eskimos and when he was here recently it was apparent that he was keenly interested in this project and very satisfied with the way it was going.

The R.C.A.F. have had no part in this operation beyond taking in a few packages of reindeer skins and supplies to replace those short-landed last summer. These were taken when space was available on a regular flight and caused no expense or inconvenience.

The Eskimos were transferred from Port Harrison and Pond Inlet by the C.G.S. "C.D. Howe" and accommodation for the policeman and the Eskimo trade supplies has been provided by the Department of Transport Ionospheric Branch.

It is rather difficult to understand why the R.C.A.F. should be so concerned about this project, particularly since the Eskimos have been purposely kept away from the base, but it will be interesting to hear how the R.C.A.F. reacts to the suggestion that they might consider offering employment to suitable Eskimos.

F.J.G. Cunningham,
Director.
Deputy Minister,
Department of Northern Affairs
and National Resources,
Langevin Block,
Ottawa.

Attention: Mr. G.W. Rowley, Secretary,
Advisory Committee on Northern Development

With reference to your letter of January 29, 1954, regarding the report on government activities in Northern Canada, I am enclosing two copies of a report "U.S. Activities in Northern Canada" which brings up to date the statement submitted by the Department of External Affairs for inclusion in the "Report to the Cabinet on Activities in Northern Canada", dated March 1953.

BENJAMIN RUGERS
FOR THE

Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs
A. Current U.S. Activities

1. Joint Arctic Weather Stations

The five Joint Arctic Weather Stations are situated at Resolute, Eureka, Isachsen, Mould Bay and Alert. The permanent installations at each of these stations are supplied by Canada, and half the personnel (including the officers in charge) are Canadian. The U.S. provides half the personnel (20 to 24 men in all), technical equipment and most of the supplies for these stations. A sea supply mission is sent each year to Resolute, Eureka and Alert. The sea missions to Resolute and Eureka, which in the past were carried out by the U.S. Navy, starting in 1954 will be conducted by the Department of Transport with assistance from the R.C.N. Only the mission to Alert will continue to be conducted by the U.S. Navy. Air supply is an R.C.A.F. responsibility, with assistance provided, as required, from the U.S.A.F.

2. River Clyde

The U.S.A.F. has a radio beacon at River Clyde, manned by two U.S.A.F. operators.

3. Frobisher

The Canadian Government has granted permission for up to 150 U.S. servicemen to be stationed at Frobisher for staging operations on the air route to Thule, Greenland.

4. Arctic Ice Island T-3

T-3 is an ice island in the Canadian sector of the Arctic Ocean drifting in a southerly direction towards Ellesmere Island. The U.S.A.F. established a ten-man weather station on T-3 and kept it in operation during 1953. As the ice island has now drifted to within 175 miles of Alert, the value of the station scarcely merits any longer the expense involved. It seems unlikely that the station will be continued or that others will be established. Alert is used as a staging point in supply operations.

5. Project Pinetree

A chain of radar stations extending from Newfoundland along the Labrador coast to Resolution Island and Frobisher, is under construction.
6. Mapping and Photographic Work

The U.S. has from time to time carried out hydrographic and topographic surveys, and photographic reconnaissance operations in the Arctic.

7. Haines-Fairbanks Pipeline

An agreement between Canada and the United States has been concluded authorizing the construction of a military pipeline from Haines, Alaska, through British Columbia and the Yukon Territory to Fairbanks, Alaska. Construction of the pipeline is now under way.

8. Project 572

This project was originally known as "Counterchange" and later "Corrode". The United States originally requested permission to build two early warning radar stations in the Western Arctic - one on Herschel Island and one at Aklavik. This request was later revised and approval was granted for the construction of an experimental station on the Arctic coast about 25 miles east of the Alaska-Yukon border. This station is now under construction. If this experimental project were to be followed by the completion of operational installations, it would evolve into a chain of radar stations across the Canadian Arctic.

B. Projected U.S. Activities

1. Loran Stations

Surveys were carried out in the Cape Christian-Cape Dyer region of Baffin Island as a preliminary to the establishment of one or two Loran stations for use of ships and aircraft proceeding to Thule. The Cape Dyer site is no longer of interest but with Canadian approval, clearing operations were conducted at Cape Christian in 1953 with a view to possible construction in 1954. Canada has informed the U.S. Government of the conditions which it proposes should govern the construction and operation of a Loran station at that site. The U.S. reply has not yet been received, but it is expected that the conditions will be acceptable and that construction will get under way during the summer of 1954.

2. Radar Stations for the Defence of Thule

In 1952, the U.S.A.F. was granted permission to carry out surveys for sites for radar stations in the general area of Resolute, Eureka and Alert. The proposed stations would have a complement of about 200 men each. Permission has, however, not yet been asked to establish these stations, and it now appears unlikely that such a proposal will be made.
Ottawa, 19 February, 1954.

NOTE TO FILE:

I discussed over the telephone today with Mr. Cunningham and Mr. Harwood the suggestion that the Defence Research Board should use Greenland Eskimo on the Ellesmere Shelf Ice this summer rather than Canadian Eskimo. It was agreed that Greenland Eskimo could be used. The main reasons were:

(a) The Greenland Eskimo are more familiar with conditions in that area and would therefore be of more use to the expedition.

(b) The Eskimo who moved to Ellesmere Island last summer will not have settled down, and could not in any event reach Alert for the operation.

(c) There are only a few Eskimo at Resolute Bay, and the Geological Survey is anxious to employ two of these on another expedition if they can be spared.

(d) The Greenland Eskimo employed last year may be available and will know what to expect or will have told the other North Greenlanders about the expedition.

(e) Transport is being provided by the U.S.A.F. and the Eskimo with the dog teams etc. should be picked up at the most convenient place for them.

O. W. Howley.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER

Ottawa, March 11, 1954

I refer to your notes on my memorandum of February 17 regarding the proposal to increase the amount of the Eskimo Loan Fund and to amend the conditions governing the operation of the Fund.

2. Approximately $20,000 has been committed to date on the Eskimo resettlement projects at Resolute Bay, Craig Harbour and Alexandria Fiord and in supplying Eskimos at Herschel and Banks Island. Reports received so far indicate that all these projects are working satisfactorily and that substantial amounts will be repaid on the advances during the current year. It will be necessary, however, to replenish the supplies at all these places this summer before furs and other produce can be brought out and sold and credits passed to the accounts concerned. These replacements will probably require further advances of $15/20,000 which may bring total commitments on these projects temporarily to $35/40,000.

3. If it should be decided to form a co-operative for the Banks Island Eskimos as has been suggested, this would require an initial outlay of $20,000 and a like amount temporarily for replacement supplies the following year, making a total of $40,000 in all.

4. There are at present seven Eskimos employed at the Churchill military base. Two of these are married and living in the townsite in small houses they have built for themselves. The other five have single status and are quartered in barracks at the base. We are now arranging to fill the army requirements for ten additional men for this base which will bring the total number of employed to seventeen. As this employment is likely to prove permanent, we shall probably have to make arrangements that will permit the single men to marry and to build their own homes in Churchill. On the basis of the present number employed and depending on the type of dwelling adapted, materials for such a project could amount to approximately $3,500 per unit or a total of $60,000. The labour would be contributed by the Eskimos themselves and they would pay for the houses by way of rent.
5. It will probably be necessary, too, to provide similar housing for employed Eskimos at Frobisher Bay and for any Eskimos who may take up permanent employment at Resolute Bay or other northern bases. The expenditure required at Frobisher Bay would probably be about the same as that for Churchill. At Resolute Bay and other places, $10,000 would probably be sufficient at the outset, but this will depend on the number who find employment.

6. Other projects that may be undertaken over the next two years will require around $20,000.

7. While a fund of $100,000 would meet the probable requirements during the coming year, it is quite possible that there will be a need for approximately $230,000 over the next few years, as our plans for Eskimo development progress. The question therefore is whether we should limit our application to Treasury this year for an extra $50,000, or whether we should apply now for a total amount of $250,000 to cover the present foreseeable requirements over the next few years.

Y. J. G. Cunningham,
Director.

c.c. Mr. Nason

"Mr. Cunningham
I think we had better limit ourselves to the $100,000.
$250,000 is too big an increase at this stage.

22/III/54"
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT:

GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH

The Advisory Committee on Northern Development was instructed by the Cabinet on January 22, 1953, to report immediately and periodically thereafter on all phases of development in the Canadian Arctic. A report on government activities was prepared at the time and submitted to the Cabinet. At the seventh meeting of the A.C.N.D., it was agreed that the report should be brought up to date periodically.

The attached report covering activities during the past calendar year, and outlining plans for the present year, has been prepared by the Secretariat from information supplied by the various agencies concerned.

The form of the report was approved at the fourteenth meeting of the A.C.N.D.

G. W. Rowley,
Secretary.

Department of Northern Affairs
and National Resources,
April 26, 1954.
The Eskimos around Great Whale River and on the Belcher Islands are being supplied with four boats at an approximate cost of $5,000 to assist hunting.

(5) Welfare - Relief costs for Eskimos in the Northwest Territories, Quebec and Labrador in 1954-55 are estimated at approximately $165,000.

(c) Territorial Administration

(1) Education -

(i) Northwest Territories - A two-room school and rehabilitation centre together with the necessary living accommodation will be built at Frobisher Bay at an estimated cost of $55,000.

The vocational training programme will be expanded.

A teacher will be provided for both the Moose Factory Indian Hospital and the Aklavik All Saints Hospital, and a handicraft instructor for both the Pecr Savard Hospital and the Richmond Rehabilitation Centre. Correspondence courses will be provided for children and adults who cannot obtain tuition at schools.

A new Roman Catholic hostel at Chesterfield Inlet will provide accommodation for 25 additional pupils for the federal school.

(ii) Yukon - Construction of a new 14-room school will be begun at Whitehorse.

(2) Development Services -

(i) Northwest Territories - Four new houses at a cost of about $100,000, 6 new warden's overnight cabins at a cost of $6,400, and 1 look-out tower and building at a cost of $6,000 will be built, and alterations to other buildings will cost $28,900. Four houses at Yellowknife for employees of the liquor staff will cost about $100,000.

$98,780 has been provided for maintenance of trunk roads in the Northwest Territories, and an additional $56,600 for roads in the Wood Buffalo Park.

Preliminary steps to relocate the settlement of Aklavik in the Mackenzie District of the Northwest Territories will be undertaken. It is expected that $500,000 will be expended in preliminary investigations, and provision of heavy equipment and materials during the year.

(ii) Yukon Territory - Two double garages and a warden's cabin will be built at a cost of $6,500.

Extensions to the water and sewer systems
and other improvements in the housing area at Whitehorse will cost $32,000. $145,000 has been provided towards the maintenance of highways, with an additional $110,100 as the federal contribution towards the completion of new highways.

In the years 1954 and 1955 the Federal government will lend $1,000,000 to the Government of the Yukon Territory on a basis of repayment over a period of thirty years, to enable it to lend to the City of Whitehorse the capital cost of the construction of a sewer and water system. $700,000 will be advanced in 1954 and the remainder in 1955.

To meet the increasing needs of the Whitehorse area, a substantial addition to the hydro-electric plant of the Yukon Hydro Co. Ltd. will be commenced.
Ottawa, June 2nd, 1964.

NORTHERN ADMINISTRATION
FILE: 1000/123

The Director,
Northern Administration
and Lands Branch,
Dept. of Northern Affairs
and National Resources,
O T T A W A, Ontario.

Re: Conditions Amongst Eskimos - Resolute

I acknowledge receipt of your two letters of May 26th, 1954. We have sent an appropriate wireless message to Resolute Bay concerning the two Polar Bear skins for the Prime Minister's Office.

2. I have also received copies of your letter of May 26th, addressed to Resolute Bay Detachment, giving the result of the sale of fur at the Hudson's Bay Company's auction sale in April. The prices realized appear to be very satisfactory.

3. There is one matter which I am not clear about and that is the disposal of the wages earned by the Resolute Bay Eskimos for their employment with, for instance, the geological survey party at Patrick Island and with the R.C.A.F. and D.O.T. at Resolute Bay. From Para. 6 of your letter of March 31st, 1954, your file 251-B, which deals with the wages of Eskimo AAMAQOALIK and his wife, each at $5.00 per day, for their employment with the geological survey party, I get the impression that AAMAQOALIK and his wife do not actually receive their wages either in cash or in goods from the Eskimo trading store but that the whole of their wages goes to your department to help pay off the Eskimo Traders' Loan Account. If I have the wrong impression may I please be advised accordingly. I would say that the individual Eskimo who earns such wages should receive them in the form of goods out of the Eskimo Traders' Store, or if such goods are not available, that the Eskimo concerned be credited with the appropriate amount, to be drawn by him as and when he so desires.

H. A. Larsen, Supt.
Office Commanding, 14th Division.

THE COMMISSIONER, R.C.M. POLICE, O T T A W A.

Sir: FORWARDED 2-6-54, together with copy of a letter dated May 26th, 1954, sent by the Director, Northern Administration, to Resolute Bay, N.W.T., --- for your information.
Ottawa, 6 June, 1964.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SIVERTZ

I have looked through the memoranda you mentioned and here are my comments. I am afraid they are not very helpful.

The problem seems to lie in the fact that the Inakimo find that they can do just as well for themselves by staying around the posts and doing very little as they can by going out and trapping. The reaction seems to be that this is the fault of the Inakimo for being lazy and that we should therefore withhold their allowances to make life impossible for them at the posts. I do not know whether this would be legal but it appears to be much too high-handed to be tolerated. There might also be some objection to their getting a lot all at once when it might be consumed all at once. On the other hand it should be possible for families that are going away trapping and hunting for a period of several months to draw their Family Allowances in advance to take with them. This seems only fair and would remove a source of temptation to return early.

The alternative is to convince the Inakimo that there is a better way of life to be gained by trapping; rather than by hanging around the posts - a way of life that will benefit them as well as the Hudson's Bay Company. At present they have a choice of a bare subsistence level at the posts, but with no fear of starving, as against a possibly slightly less bare subsistence level away from the posts with a possibility of real hardship. At the settlements there is some chance of education of a sort for their children. Until fur trade conditions are good enough for trapping to provide a chance of raising the Inakimo's standard of living appreciably, it is hard to justify any attempt to coerce them to go out and trap. If there is little hope for improvement in fur trade conditions we must find other employment and this is difficult without better education. I would therefore consider that where the Inakimo hang around the posts chronically it is an indication that a school should be provided. In this way there would be some chance of a long-term solution.

- 2 -
The return from trapping could be increased by higher prices for fur or by better trapping techniques. The former would probably require a strictly controlled economy, as was practised in Greenland. It would really imply government trading stores, and is probably the last thing which Mr. Cruikshank's memorandum was meant to support. It might be possible to improve trapping techniques. There is a very marked variation in success between different Eskimos. Some go in for trapping seriously and their catch compares with that of professional white trappers. The majority however probably get far fewer foxes than they would if they used better techniques.

It might also prove pointless to increase the Eskimo income unless there are some tangible benefits they can get from a higher income. There is little incentive to earn when there is nothing useful to buy. They should also have some way of banking surplus income so they are not led to spending it on things they do not really want.
Ottawa, August 27, 1964.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

REPORT OF B.G. SIVERTZ,
EASTERN ARCTIC PATROL 1964,
FIRST PART OF VOYAGE

I joined the C.G.S. "C.D. Howe" at Montreal on the 23rd of June, employing the afternoon of that day to visit the Canadian Handicrafts Guild and the Arctic Institute. The ship sailed next morning at 10, calling at Quebec to pick up 13 Eskimos returning from Hospital and some last minute supplies. I left the ship on Saturday, the 24th of July, at Churchill, Manitoba, after calling at Cape Hope Advance, Koartak, Lake Harbour, Cape Dorset, Sugluk, Nottingham Island, Ivugivik and Port Harrison. Progress was much delayed by ice in Hudson Strait. We lay for three days off Koartak waiting for the wind to change and clear the beach. Finally, 13 Eskimos were x-rayed, but we left without having seen the main group of Koartak Eskimos because they were at their summer camp some 9 miles away in a place inaccessible to boats on account of heavy ice. Wakeham Bay was on the ship's itinerary, but it was passed because the bay was full of ice when we got there and there was no immediate prospect of clearing. Consideration was to be given to visiting these two places on the way out through Hudson Strait on the second leg of the voyage. There was no trouble with ice anywhere else although we continued to meet ice fields, the largest in the middle of Hudson Bay on July 20th and 21st.

The trip was intensely interesting. I had no previous conception of the nature of this part of the country or the tasks of operating ships in ice, landing goods on these shores and carrying out our administrative tasks with the Eskimos.

As Officer-in-charge Eastern Arctic Patrol I found that my position was anomalous. The Captain follows precedents of long standing in arranging, with little or no consultation, such things as times of arrival and departure, route, speed, communications, changes in itinerary, etc. The medical work similarly is carried on as a separate operation with, as a rule, no discussion of the various procedures, some of which have
ESA KIMO REHABILITATION PROGRAM at CRAIG HARBOUR

By Cst. A. C. FRYER

For many years it has been evident that Eskimo districts were becoming over-populated and that game was gradually dwindling. These conditions were more apparent in the Hudson Bay area, at places such as Port Harrison in the Province of Quebec.

The Canadian Government decided to take steps to rehabilitate groups of Port Harrison natives to areas farther north, where game was known to be plentiful. With this plan, the Eskimo could follow the native way of life and become less dependent on the white man. One of the natives would be appointed trader and would be granted a loan of $5,000 worth of trade goods. The member in charge of the RCMP detachment would supervise the trading until the native trader was capable of assuming full responsibility. Also, with each group of families from Port Harrison, there would be one family from Pond Inlet, the latter being accustomed to the country and hunting conditions in the more northern regions. Such a scheme was to be carried out at Craig Harbour, situated on southeastern Ellesmere Island.

On Aug. 29, 1953, three Port Harrison Eskimo families and one Pond Inlet Eskimo family disembarked at Craig Harbour from C.G.S. C. D. Howe. Due to adverse ice conditions encountered by C.G.S. d'Iberville, on the return trip to Alexandra Fiord, (a Police detachment situated 250 miles north of Craig Harbour) two Eskimo families that had been scheduled to land there, were transferred to Craig Harbour. This made a group of four Port Harrison and two Pond Inlet families who were to reside in the Craig Harbour area.

After the natives were temporarily encamped, close to the detachment, the men were taken on a hunting trip in the vicinity of Jakeman Glacier. Hunting conditions were ideal for walrus on this particular day. There were large packs of loose, floating ice, on which groups of walrus were sleeping. For the majority of the natives, it was the first time they had ever shot a walrus and they were unfamiliar with the method of cutting up the carcasses. Three walrus were killed and at least 50 others were counted, but left unmolested as the boats had full loads. We returned to Craig Harbour with a spirited group of natives, who were enthused over the abundance of game.

Following the walrus hunt, the younger Eskimos were taken on a caribou hunting trip in Fram Fiord. Again with the exception of the Pond Inlet natives, the others had never seen or shot a caribou before. Ten caribou were obtained,
mainly for the purpose of supplying natives with skins, with which to make winter clothing.

Even in the short time that had passed since the natives had arrived at Craig Harbour, there was a marked difference in them. The first impression given to the members of this detachment by the Port Harrison natives, was that they were a depressed, lifeless group of individuals, who were looking for too many handouts from the white man. Since familiarizing the Eskimos with surrounding country and hunting conditions, they now have an eagerness to proceed to their new camp and look after themselves.

The new camp site is on the southeastern tip of Lindstrom Peninsula in Grise Fiord, approximately 40 miles from Craig Harbour Detachment. This location was chosen because of the known abundance of sea game, especially the harp-seal in Grise Fiord, and for the fact that it would be a good distance away from the caribou and musk-ox feeding grounds.

In three trips with the Police power boat, all the natives and their belongings were transported to Grise Fiord. During these trips, six walrus, two bearded seal and several common seal were contributed to the natives' cache of meat. All the Eskimos, with the exception of one old character from Port Harrison, were delighted with their camp location. This one particular native didn't like the idea of having a 1,000-foot mountain directly in back of him, whereas he was accustomed to seeing the wide open spaces of Port Harrison.

All the families, prior to leaving for Grise Fiord, had been given a substantial issue of Government Relief, enough supplies to carry them until the next spring hunting season. The natives were also advised to bring in supplies for the winter months. The caribou feed grounds were 30 miles away. The caribou had not returned and the Eskimos seemed to be getting a little nervous. As there wasn't much shooting of the caribou or the ptarmigan this season. This camping season was to be good as there wasl not much success in shooting.

One native, who had been at Craig Harbour Detachment in the past, advised to obtain the necessary traps and snares, from the natives. He noted in late summer that there was a good run of caribou in the area. He now advised the families at race to be ready for the caribou.

Not Octot had the members of the detachment had to live with the natives. They had a beard, common meat. Allow the traps to be heavy with the materials.
Cutting up caribou at Jones Sound.

The Police were making all possible arrangements to carry them over until they could bring in items to trade. Also to assist the natives, the Police loaned an old trap-boat in serviceable condition.

In the middle of September, another caribou hunt was staged, which included all the native men and detachment members. The hunting was restricted to the shooting of bucks. Ten were killed and the caribou skins and meat were divided evenly among the native families. It seemed to be a peak year for land game, as there were not only large numbers of caribou seen, but also hundreds of ptarmigan and scores of Arctic hare. This concluded the assistance intended to be given by the detachment, so that it was now up to the natives to make a success of their undertaking.

One week after the caribou hunt, several of the Eskimos arrived at Craig Harbour to trade ivory carvings, and to obtain medicinal supplies for several of the natives, who, according to symptoms, had stomach flu. Because of rough seas, the Police power boat had to tow the natives' boat through the roughest stretch of water. Craig Harbour area is noted for strong winds and rough seas in late September and the Eskimos were advised not to make any further attempts at reaching Craig Harbour by boat.

Nothing was seen of the natives until October 16, when four dog teams arrived at the settlement. This group had come to trade and reported everyone at the camp in good health. The Eskimos had added two walrus, six narwhal, three bearded seal, three harp-seal and a dozen common seal to their winter cache of meat. Ivory carvings were traded, Family Allowances issued and approximately 50 traps per hunter were loaned in preparation for open trapping season. With heavily loaded sleds, the natives left on the return trip which, from later information, proved to be a long and delayed one, as the ice had been swept out of the fiords by strong winds.

First results of trapping were brought in on November 9, and fox were reported plentiful. The Port Harrison natives could hardly be recognized as the same ones that had first landed at Craig Harbour. They all looked happier and healthier, having visibly put on weight.

Trapping conditions continued to be good through November and all the natives joined in on spending sprees at the trading store. It would be difficult to find a group of Eskimos anywhere in the North that could claim to be as well off as the Grise Fiord camp. Along with all the luxury items that can be obtained at the native trading store with fox pelts, they have an unequalled variety of fresh meats.

In December, trapping became poorer but the natives were still obtaining enough fox to indulge in extravagant buying. They had also added six bears to their larder by this time. The dark period, in which the sun is not seen above the horizon from the middle of November to the middle of February, hadn't seemed to interfere with their routine, with the exception that all the natives purchased flash-lights so that they could find and tend their trap lines. About half of the camp occupants arrived for the Christmas festivities. A dance and games were staged and enjoyed by everyone.

By the new year, the meat caches were nearly depleted, so that the natives were
spending more time at hunting seal through aglos (breathing-holes of seals). The results of their concerted efforts proved to be better than anyone had expected. There have been over 100 seals obtained in this manner. These natives disproved that Craig Harbour was a poor seal producing area.

On one of the numerous seal hunts in January, a Pond Inlet native bagged six seals in one day, a feat that would be hard to beat in the best of seal hunting districts.

At the time of this writing (February 1954) Eskimo conditions could hardly be better. The Port Harrison natives have adapted themselves well, following the example set by the Pond Inlet group. It was expected of course that the Pond Inlet families would make a good showing, as both hunters had good reputations and conditions at Craig Harbour are similar to those of Pond Inlet. The Port Harrison Eskimos however, had to familiarize themselves with the different types of game and hunting methods. They had to become accustomed to the dark period, more mountainous country, different sled travelling conditions and for heating and cooking they had to depend solely on the blubber lamp instead of their wood-burning stove. Relations between the Port Harrison and Pond Inlet natives are good. Differences in dialect and routine hasn't formed any barriers.

It is expected that the natives will be moving their camp several miles west of the present location. At the proposed spot, they will have better harbor facilities, shelter from the strong seasonal winds and more snow for building igloos.

These natives have spent five of the worst months of the year for living and hunting, and in answer to the query of whether or not they were desirous of remaining at Craig Harbour for another year, all of them, with the exception of the old fogey from Port Harrison who declined to answer, expressed their desire to remain. This one native wanted to see what spring and summer have to offer. The Port Harrison Eskimos with their ability to carve ivory and stone, would never have to go in need even in a poor trapping year, as they have a source of income that would buy the necessities at the trading store. There is no reason why these natives or three times their number, couldn't live and thrive off the abundance of game at Craig Harbour for many years to come.

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**Wage of Sin**

Down in Hopkinsville, the hill-billy country of Kentucky, Harvey McKinney was charged with being drunk. He couldn't pay his fine and was assigned to the workhouse street-cleaning squad. While working out his sentence, he found a $100 bill, paid his fine and that of a friend and away they went off to celebrate on what was left over.

*From: Northern Circuit.*
13. Matters Affecting Canadian Eskimos

(a) This is the policy of the Department of Northern Affairs which other departments of the Government of Canada are asked to observe. It is a necessary regulation to prevent the disruption of the Eskimo economy and to protect a people who are not yet sufficiently advanced to deal with other people on equal terms.

(b) The Department of Northern Affairs asks all military, scientific, transportation and other parties working in Canadian north to avoid contact with primitive Eskimos except in cases of emergency. This principle is applied to Canadians as well as others. It is mainly intended to prevent the spread of disease. Exercise Sun Dog II which was held at Chimo led to a very heavy mortality in Ungava Bay from an epidemic of measles combined with influenza. Between 5% and 10% of the Eskimo population died in this epidemic.

(c) As it is very difficult to police adequately a large number of small stations, it is desirable that personnel do not range afield to any avoidable extent. Objectives of such travel as it is desired to restrict are very frequently in order to visit Eskimo settlements or to hunt. Both are likely to constitute an objection from the point of view of Eskimo welfare. It is observed that there have been many instances of kindly and well-intentioned persons making gifts to the Eskimos of clothing, food and various articles with the intention of benefiting the recipients, whereas the actual effect of such largess has often been injurious. It is therefore desirable to examine the objectives and credentials of persons who propose to take advantage of their appointments for duty in the north, to travel among Eskimos or to visit their hunting grounds.

(d) The way of life of Eskimos in the vicinity of military establishments set up during the war was in some instances seriously disrupted by supplies being made available to them at no cost for periods which inevitably came to an end. It is desirable that this be avoided. It is also undesirable to encourage the Eskimo to hang around the stations in the hope of receiving gifts.

(e) It is most undesirable that Eskimos develop the habit of combing garbage or other waste disposal areas.

(f) It is unlikely that there will be any sites chosen that would encroach on or disturb past or present Eskimo settlements, burial places, hunting grounds, etc., but it seems obvious that this should be avoided. At Thule the airfield site was separate from the Eskimo settlement. Nevertheless there seems little doubt that, owing to the activity at the airfield, the game on which the Eskimo depended became very scarce in the district. The whole settlement has had to be moved to a new region.

(g) In certain cases military installations in the Canadian north abandoned after the war have in fact had an injurious effect upon the Eskimos living in the vicinity in that buildings and considerable quantities of equipment left unused for a period of years inevitably engender false ideas of economy and private property. It also imposes a considerable burden on the R.C.M.P. who are responsible for safeguarding government property.
Ottawa, 8 December, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NORTHERN ADMINISTRATION AND LANDS BRANCH

Attention: Mr. B. G. Sivertz

I have been thinking about the sort of study that is required to assess the possible use of natural resources by the Eskimo to help in planning the Eskimo economy. I think that this study, while it should take into account the changing economic conditions, should be primarily a natural resources study in order to limit the field to comparatively manageable proportions.

I think that we should decide what we want to do first and then determine how it might be done. I have therefore drawn up draft terms of reference for such a study. These are given below. Do let me have any comments on them.

"To examine the past and current policy and practices regarding the use of natural resources by the Eskimo;

To determine the optimum yield which could be obtained from natural resources in each area of Eskimo territory;

To recommend how the current policy and practices should be modified, and what new measures should be introduced to provide,

(a) Conservation of natural resources;
(b) Optimum use;
(c) Integration with the changing conditions of Eskimo life.

To define the subjects on which further research is most urgently required and to draw up the research programme;

To make interim reports recommending specific measures as the need for these becomes established."

G. W. Bowley.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CUNNINGHAM:

I refer to your memorandum of 11 January on your file 1005-7 about the proposed expedition from Greenland to Baffin Island. I agree that we should encourage the Greenlanders' expedition in every way we can without embarrassing them. The record of the Greenland Council indicates that they have a pretty good idea of what they want to do, and I think we should be careful not to interfere with their plans unless we have very good reason.

I agree that we should write to the departments you suggest, and be prepared to offer the expedition some fuel and give them for the summer the same hunting rights as Canadian Eskimo. We have however heard about the expedition so far only from unofficial sources, and we do not yet know if the Greenland Administration has approved it. When we receive the official request from Copenhagen we will know better how we can help and it might be advisable to delay taking official action until then. You might however discuss the possible implications with the other departments concerned.

R. G. Robertson,
Deputy Minister.
### RELIEF ISSUED TO ESKIMOS

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Ottawa, September 7th, 1955.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STUARTZ:

"C. D. HOWE" FILES

When I stripped and re-organized the files on the "C. D. Howe" I put all the extracted papers in a box which will be returned to the Arctic Division in order that I might not have inadvertently thrown out any valuable documents. I put half a dozen miscellaneous papers in my brief case and now attach them with comments.

1. "C. D. Howe" Map

Three letters are attached. Did these tedious negotiations ever reach any conclusion? I have heard that the map is nowhere displayed, which seems a pity. Surely, if the map is as good as reports indicate, someone in the government should make use of it even if the "Howe" does not, though the suggestion of a coloured reproduction for the "Howe" might still be open. Possibly it should be Transport worrying about this more than we but I would be interested to know what has happened and what we might do about it.

2. Use of Eskimos on Exhibitions

Attached is Mr. Cantley's memorandum for the Director, a copy of which I saw on the "Howe" files more than a year after it was written. It seems to me a fair example of the constant omission of which we are all guilty in our neglect to circulate correspondence. As you know, I have had some connection with exhibits as has had the Information Division and in this particular case I had to ask the Acting Chief of Air Staff to drop their proposal to bring out Eskimos from the north for exhibition purposes. I was surprised to learn that we had agreed to this at one stage.

I was also surprised (though not really) that Jim had agreed to make available our C.C.E.A. exhibit to the R.C.A.F. last year. This was also the first I had heard of this and it was fortunate that it was not followed through for, as you know, we needed it ourselves in Toronto.

.... 2.
3. Travelling Expenses

Attached is a copy of my note of May 5th returning a cheque for an unused portion of an air ticket from Yellowknife to Fort Smith. Isn't this a curious sort of thing to file on the "C. D. Howe"?

4. Central Arctic Patrol

I was interested to see your memorandum of February 11th asking three members of the Branch for a memorandum setting forth the administrative functions that I should carry out in the Central Arctic last March. (Again I am not clear why this is filed on the "C. D. Howe") I would be interested to learn what came of your request for, as you know, the memorandum did not reach me.

5. "Canadian Eskimo Art"

You will see my rather intemperate pencilled note on the bottom of the copy of this letter. There were dozens of such letters on the files. I suggest that they are an unhappy form of public relations. If Jim is still replying to requests for "Canadian Eskimo Art" in this way, could a better form letter be substituted.

Please do not take time to send any written reply to this memorandum. We might have a word about it some time.

R. A. J. P.
January 1, 1956.

RECOMMENDATION FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER:

CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN ELLESMORE ISLAND

Ellesmere Island has been part of Canada since 1880, when all British possessions in North America and adjacent islands (except Newfoundland, etc.) were annexed to Canada by Imperial order-in-council.

During Sverdrup's expedition of 1906-1907 Sverdrup claimed part of Ellesmere Island on behalf of Norway, but the Norwegian claim was withdrawn in 1930.

Ellesmere Island was visited by a number of government expeditions, the first apparently being in 1904. The first permanent establishment was the R.C.M.P. detachment and post office established at Craig Harbour in August 1922. A second detachment and post office was established at Bache Peninsula in August 1926. Many long patrols were made by dog sledge from these two detachments. It was not practical to maintain these posts during the Second World War.

In 1947 a weather station and a Canadian post office were opened at Eureka. The weather station was a joint Canadian/U.S. weather station and has always had a Canadian officer in charge. In the past few years there has been a great increase in Canadian activity in Ellesmere Island. A second joint Arctic weather station was opened and there are again two R.C.M.P. detachments. A number of families of Canadian Eskimos now live in the island. Several parties have carried out scientific work in Ellesmere Island. Many of those have been Canadian, a minority have been foreign. In all cases licences have been issued under the Scientists and Explorers Ordinance of the Northwest Territories. A detailed list of Canadian activities in Ellesmere Island since the establishment of the second joint Arctic weather station there in 1950 is attached.

G.W.R.
In April of 1950 a Joint Arctic Weather Station was opened at Alert.

In April, 1950, a Canadian post office was opened at Alert.

In the spring of 1950 a game officer was appointed at Alert.

During the summer of 1950 the Geological Survey representative on the sea supply carried out several short reconnaissances along the east coast from Bath Peninsula to Alert.

The Canadian Wildlife Service carried out a survey in the vicinity of Eureka during the summer of 1951.

A geographical reconnaissance of the Eureka area was conducted by the Geographical Branch during the summer of 1951.

The Dept. of Agriculture conducted an insect survey at Alert during the summer of 1951.

Biological studies were carried out at Alert by the National Museum during the summer of 1951.

The R.C.M.P. detachment at Craig Harbour was reopened during August, 1951.

A post office was opened at Craig Harbour during August, 1951.

A game officer was appointed at Craig Harbour in August, 1951.

In the spring of 1952 the R.C.M.P. made a patrol from Craig Harbour to Resolute via Vikes Fjord.

In the spring of 1952 the R.C.M.P. made a patrol from Craig Harbour to Bath Peninsula.

In the spring of 1952 the R.C.M.P. made a patrol from Craig Harbour to Cape Sparbo.

During the spring of 1953, the R.C.M.P. made a patrol from Craig Harbour to Eureka, Flat Sound and back.

In the spring of 1953 the Defence Research Board party began its study of the ice shelf.

Six families of Eskimo colonists were landed at Craig Harbour in August, 1953.

In August, 1953, an R.C.M.P. detachment was opened at Alexandra Fjord.

A post office was opened in August, 1953, at Alexandra Fjord.

Seven Eskimo took up residence in August, 1953, at Alexandra Fjord.

In November, 1953, the members in charge of the R.C.M.P. detachment at Craig Harbour and Alexandra Fjord and the officer in charge of the meteorological station at Alert were appointed Customs and Immigration officers.

During the spring of 1954, the Defence Research Board party continued its shelf ice studies while the Geological Survey representative continued the study of the geology of the northeast coast.

In the spring of 1954 the R.C.M.P. made a patrol from Alexandra Fjord to Craig Harbour.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

ESKIMO SETTLEMENTS AT RESOLUTE
AND CRAIG HARBOUR

The comments of Bishop Marsh to you and Mr. Robertson as given in your memo of October 16th are all on the subject of our trading arrangements and handling the Eskimos' income.

It should be remembered that we are feeling our way in these projects. So far things have gone well, better than we could properly have hoped. After two years the people seem content to stay on, whereas they only agreed to go in the first place on condition that we promise to return them to their former homes after "two or three years."

The trading was financed by the Eskimos' Loan Fund, and freedom of action under loan fund regulations is circumscribed.

Bishop Marsh is perfectly right in suggesting that the trading should be reviewed and set up on a better basis. My plans for doing so have had to be set aside for lack of staff. We now have a new man in the Projects Section and I have asked Mr. Larmour to assign him to this job. When the new plan is elaborated in a couple of weeks or so, I shall present it to you for approval.

Not all of Bishop Marsh's points are well taken. You ask me what I think of his suggestion that the Eskimos should learn ordering their annual supply of goods the hard way instead of being given guidance by their mentor the R.C.M.P. member. This is rubbish. Bishop Marsh's views as given in your paragraph are in my opinion unsound pedagogically, psychologically and practically. The procedure he suggests is also unkind.

Ottawa, October 22nd, 1956.
On a previous occasion I have expressed to you my reservations with regard to the Eskimo Affairs Committee as advisors on policy. There is so much weight of special interest there. In a separate memo I am proposing a broadening of the committee. In any case, however, I wonder if it would not be preferable to make our own decisions rather than make recommendations to the Committee. The Committee can not be expected to produce forward-looking and soundly-based policy advice, and this particular group cannot even give us immunity from attack by its own members. As an example, you will recall that when we discussed employment of Eskimos on the DEW Line, the weight of opinion in the Committee was against any wage employment. We were forced to carry the main point against the Committee, yielding to the extent of promising to go easy in recruitment on Baffin Island and to have none at all in the Igloolik region. These promises have hampered the work. Last May the Committee agreed that the employment program had gone well. They did not, however, note that this good result was contrary to their advice and expectations. I feel sure that if we had had trouble - which we should expect - we would have heard heavy condemnation from the Committee.

Your memorandum directs me to have a report made on those two resettlement projects, setting out our objectives, our methods and appraising the results to date. In the light of our experience to date, the report would then make specific recommendations for the next few years handling of economic and social problems in these two settlements. I believe that such a report and plan is needed at this time, but I would much prefer not to lay it before the Eskimo Affairs Committee for approval. Could it not go to them as a report and forecast? We could then have the benefit of their advice - and promise to take note of it - but this is a different matter from asking for guidance as one does in a reference to Council for advice.

This is the attitude I have instructed our Northern Service Officers to adopt in their dealings in the field with missionaries and traders, so that we always reserve our position, and our right and duty to act independently of their wishes, and possibly on some occasions against their interests which may not be public or general.

B.G. Sivertz,
Chief, Arctic Division.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W.G. KERR:

Supplies for Resolute Bay.

Due to an unfortunate misunderstanding the supplies intended for Resolute Bay were not ordered in time for shipment by the annual supply vessel. These supplies are vital to the welfare of the Eskimos at that point and it becomes imperative that they be sent in by air transportation. This matter has been discussed with the Department of National Defence to see if they can assist in having the supplies airlifted from Churchill to Resolute Bay on a space available basis. This has not been confirmed but in the meantime arrangements are being made to forward the shipments in care of you at Churchill for storage until such time as they can be moved to Resolute Bay.

An itemized list of the supplies is being prepared and will be forwarded to you within a few days. It may be necessary, in view of the space available basis, to work out some degree of priority. However, we will write you further on this matter.

In the meantime, would you please make arrangements to store any items addressed to Resolute Bay care of you, until such time as they can be moved to that point.

B.G. Siverts,
Chief, Arctic Division.
Ottawa, 27 September, 1956.

Dr. F. Miller, Esq.,
Deputy Minister,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

Dear Dr. Miller:

Due to an unfortunate misunderstanding the supplies intended for Absolute Bay were not ordered in time for shipment by the annual supply vessel. These supplies are vital to the welfare of the Eskimos at that point and it becomes imperative that they be sent in by air transportation. Officers of our Arctic Division have discussed this matter with officers at Airforce headquarters who have indicated that provided they have approval from your office, they are prepared to assist in arranging to have the supplies sent in from Churchill to Absolute Bay on a space available basis.

We are making tentative arrangements to have the shipments forwarded care of our Northern Service Officer at Churchill for storage until such time as they can be moved to Absolute. An itemized list of supplies is being prepared and it will be forwarded within a few days to Airforce headquarters.

I regret exceedingly that it is necessary to request your assistance in this problem but as previously mentioned, the Seal flights appear to be the only practical means of transportation between the two points in question. Therefore, we would be extremely grateful and appreciative of any help your Department can give us in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

J. J. Robertson,
Deputy Minister.

NW7A, N92-023, Alex Stevensen Papers
Ottawa, 6 October, 1950.

F. L. Miller, Esq.,
Deputy Minister,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

Attention: Mr. J. Wallace,

Due to a combination of unforeseen circumstances, the supplies required by the Ekimo trader at Resolute Bay were not included in the shipments forwarded by the annual supply vessel. This trader operates under an Ekimo loan advanced to him by this Department. As these supplies are vital to the welfare of the local Eskimos, it is imperative that they be sent in by air transportation.

Officers of our respective departments have discussed this matter and we are assured that with your concurrence, it would be possible to have some of the supplies sent in to Resolute Bay from Churchill on a space available basis. We are making tentative arrangements to have the shipments, consisting of approximately ten tons of food, clothing and trade store supplies, forwarded care of our Northern Service Officer at Churchill, for storage until such time as they can be moved to Resolute. We have also consulted the Air Transport Board and subject to review, they do not contemplate any objection to the use of RCAF aircraft for this purpose. We made it clear to the Board that the supplies will be forwarded on a space available basis which may require a period of several months before the bulk of them reach their destination. Our respective representatives at Churchill might be authorized to work out an arrangement whereby the supplies may be sent north at times most convenient to the Air Force.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Secretary of the Air Transport Board for reference and with the object of taking action to obtain the necessary clearance.

N.W.T.A., N92-073, Alex Stevenson, P.C.
I regret exceedingly that it is necessary to request your assistance in this problem but as previously mentioned, the RCAF flights appear to be the only means of transportation between the two points in question.

Yours sincerely,

R.O. Robertson,
Deputy Minister.

cc: Mr. J.R. Belcher,
Secretary, Air Transport Board,
Ottawa.
Ottawa, 23 October, 1956.

Mr. John E. Felcher,
Secretary,
Air Transport Board,
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Felcher:

Requirement of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Northern Administration and Lands Branch for airlift Churchill to Resolute Bay, R.M.S.

Reference is made to a conversation yesterday with officers of the Arctic Division relating to the above noted subject. For your information I am forwarding herewith a copy of a letter dated October 11 addressed to our Deputy Minister from the Deputy Minister of National Defence, in reply to our letter dated October 4, a copy of which was referred to the Air Transport Board.

You will note that the RCAF cannot undertake this airlift on a 'space available' basis but possibly could carry it out as an added assignment. They have stated that in addition to the necessary clearance from the Air Transport Board, they should like to have our agreement to the cost recovery action suggested. We realize that it will be necessary for the RCAF to make some charge and we are prepared to accept their accounts in this regard. Furthermore, from our point of view on this particular airlift, they have facilities at both Churchill and Resolute Bay, which I am sure they would be prepared to make available to us. As we did not place money in our estimates to cover this, we would prefer to have the help of the RCAF rather than engage a commercial air carrier from Churchill.

N.W.T.A., N92-023, Alex Stevenson Papers,
Your co-operation in bringing this before the Board for what we hope will be favourable consideration, is greatly appreciated.

Yours very truly,

F.J.C. Cunningham,
Director.
Churchill, Man.
October 28th, 1956

Memorandum to the Chief of the Arctic Division

Re: Supplies for Resolute Bay, N.W.T.

Approximately 16½ Tons of supplies are now at Churchill destined for our Eskimo project at Resolute Bay, N.W.T. As you know, these arrived here too late for transportation by ship.

They were stored at the Harbour Board Terminal but, as there was a danger of pilferage by others who have access to the shed, I have moved the supplies to Camp 20 and have them in one of our buildings.

I have communicated with the R.C.A.F. here, on their advice, and they forwarded my request to their Transport Command at Lachine, P.Q. regarding the airlift of the supplies in question to Resolute Bay. The R.C.A.F. Command at Lachine have replied that the question of moving this freight must be taken up by our Department with R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa.

Constable Gibson of the R.C.I.F. Police, who is stationed at Resolute Bay, passed through here recently and he is concerned about the welfare of the Eskimo at Resolute Bay if these supplies are not forwarded.

I am attaching a copy of a letter I sent to the W.C.O. in charge Air Movements at Churchill for your information as regards the type and weight of the Supplies in question. Sergt. Nadeau, in turn, sent the list through his regular channels to R.C.A.F. Transport Command at Lachine, P.Q.

[N.W.T.A., N92-023, Alex Stevenson Papers]
Ottawa, December 4th, 1956.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER

SUPPLIES - AIRLIFT CHURCHILL TO RESOLUTE BAY, N.W.T.

We have not been successful in our representations to have the Royal Canadian Air Force assist in transporting the supplies at Fort Churchill that are needed by the Eskimo trader at Resolute Bay. This trader is operating under the provisions of the Eskimo Loan Regulations, and as a result of misunderstanding the supplies required in connection with his business were not shipped by the "C.D. Howe". This was not drawn to our attention until it was too late to make other arrangements.

The Air Transport Board advise that this project should be undertaken by a commercial air carrier. Arctic Wings Limited are prepared to handle this shipment, and have given an estimate of the equipment available and the cost of the undertaking.

There are approximately 12 tons of supplies destined for the trader at Resolute Bay, but it has been ascertained that it is not necessary to make the complete shipment by air. It is estimated that a shipment of approximately four tons, comprising the most urgently needed supplies, should meet the trader's requirements until further supplies can be sent in by ship. It seems, however, that it will be necessary to charter a York-type aircraft, which has a capacity of about 8½ tons. Therefore, if an aircraft of the York-type must be chartered, then we may as well take a full load.

The distance between Churchill and Resolute Bay is 2,450 miles and the charter would be at the rate of $2.50 per mile, or an estimated cost of $6,130.00. We have explored the possibility of arranging a joint charter, but this seems to be out of the question.

N.W.T.A., N92-023, Alex Stevenson Papers,
Mr. Sivertz has been in touch with Dan Wallace in D.N.D. to ask if the R.C.A.F. would share a charter with us since they stated in their letter to you that they had a large backlog of freight at Churchill awaiting transportation to Resolute. We would place four tons in a shared plane. We felt that if the stated backlog did, in fact, exist, the Air Force would be interested, especially now that their transport planes have overseas commitments. Mr. Wallace made enquiries and called Mr. Sivertz yesterday to say that while the Air Force are hard pressed at the present time, they have managed to get a plane into Churchill, and at the moment, there is no requirement for them to hire commercial transport. He said that this was the situation at the moment, but that it could change in a few weeks.

I would like to have your approval for a charter, or a shared charter in general terms so that I may take advantage of the best opportunity that arises. Funds are available.

F.J.G. Cunningham,
Director.
F.R. Miller, Esq.,
Deputy Minister,
Department of National Defence,
Building 'A', 125 Elgin Street,
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Miller:

Recently you will recall that we had an exchange of correspondence regarding air transportation for approximately 10 tons of food and supplies for the Eskimo trader at Resolute Bay. When we asked you to carry this tonnage we were not aware that there was no space available at the present time and that an additional 10 tons would simply mean that the RCAF must increase the extra flights already required.

We have now reviewed our requirements and feel that the whole quantity is not in the category of being essential and urgent. We feel, therefore, in the circumstances the quantities have been reduced to the bare minimum, such as ammunition, so that the Eskimos can continue hunting, special foods for the children to ensure good health and several items of clothing. A review of this requirement has resulted in we feel that it is necessary to send just over one ton to Resolute Bay. Mr. Sivertz has been in touch with Mr. D. Wallace, of your Department, and Mr. Wallace indicated with this great reduction in the shipment, it might be possible for the RCAF to carry the minimum requirements at once or gradually over several regular trips. He felt, however, that this cannot be considered unless the Air Transport Board approved. I am sending the Air Transport

Ottawa, 11 December, 1956.

[Signature]
Board a copy of this letter. From informal enquiries we understand from the Air Transport Board that it is reasonable for the RCAF to transport the small quantity of goods for which we consider a charter is out of the question.

I regret exceedingly that it is necessary to request your assistance in this problem but I am wondering if you could see your way to agree to helping us get these essential supplies into Resolute Bay.

Yours sincerely,

R.G. Robertson,
Deputy Minister.

MEMORANDUM FOR R. W. C. GIBSON

Supplies for Resolute Bay
Ammunition for Grise Fiord

Reference is made to previous correspondence on the matter of supplies intended for Resolute Bay. We are sorry that there has been such a delay in making arrangements to get some of these supplies airlifted. We have finally been able to arrange with the Department of National Defence to take in approximately one ton of the most urgent requirements for the trading post. The Air Officer Commanding, Air Transport Command, RCAF, Lecheim, Que., has been instructed to have his representative at Churchill get in touch with you and complete plans for the airlift of this cargo.

Attached for your information is an itemized list of supplies that should be sent. We realize it may be difficult for you to separate and re-pack the total cargo assignment that you are storing at Churchill. If necessary, it is in order for you to hire local labour at the prevailing rates to assist you in this work. Although we would like to get as much of the total cargo in to Resolute Bay as possible, it looks as though we will have to ask you to store the balance until arrangements can be made to have it picked up by the annual supply vessel this coming summer.

Another point of concern is that the Grise Fiord trading establishment is in need of 1,000 rounds of 30-30 cal. soft point ammunition. It would be appreciated if you would take steps to purchase this ammunition at Churchill and address it to the Grise Fiord detachment of the RCAF via Resolute Bay. You should be able to put this in with the Resolute Bay supplies. We are writing to Capt. Gibson on this question of material to be airlifted and also on the ammunition that has to be forwarded by him to Grise Fiord.

... 2

NWTFA, N92-023, Alex Stevenson Papers,
Once again, we regret the extra work this matter has caused you. We greatly appreciate your co-operation in dealing with the situation and in due course, we would like to have a report on the action you have taken in regard to the proposed shipment and what quantities of supplies it will be necessary for you to put in storage.

J. P. Richards,
A/Chief, Arctic Division.

P.S. We have just received your memorandum of January 21st regarding the trade store's supplies for Resolute Bay. We regret we had not notified you as to what arrangements had been made for the future transport of this material. Unfortunately we have just been notified ourselves and apparently the RCAF must have advised their Churchill representative before advising us that they were agreeable to assisting in airlifting a ton of freight. Would you please give us a further report as to the action that has been taken.
c.c. Mr. Stevenson.

Ottawa, 29 January, 1957.

F. G. Miller, Esq.,
Deputy Minister,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Miller:

Thank you for your letter of January 14, in which you advise that the RCAF are prepared to air-lift approximately one ton of supplies that we wish sent from Churchill to Yarolute Bay, N.W.T. It is noted that this material will be lifted on a cost recovery basis at the rate of one cent per cent. per nautical mile, or at $1.96 per ton. This arrangement is satisfactory to us.

We have written to our Northern Service Officer at Churchill, requesting that he work out with your representative as to how a breakdown in this shipment should be made.

We are indeed indebted to the RCAF for the assistance they are giving us in this matter and your help and co-operation have also been greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

R.G. Robertson,
Deputy Minister.

NWT/3, 992-023, Alex Stevenson Papers,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER

EMPLOYMENT OF ESKIMOS

As I mentioned to you last week I believe that we are entering a period of potential over-employment, rather than unemployment, so far as Eskimos are concerned in the Arctic. This is already becoming evident at one or two places, such as Frobisher, and I think it will increase provided there is no marked change in the general economic situation in Canada. It is widespread in Greenland, and much of the labour there now has to be imported from Denmark for the summer.

I believe therefore that we should anticipate a situation where there will be more jobs than there are Eskimos capable and willing to undertake them. If this is the case, there are many advantages in having the Eskimos fill positions in the larger centres in preference to spreading them out in many small ones. If they are together they will support and strengthen one another in what must be, in any event, a difficult time of transition for them. It is the Eskimos who are starting employment who have the most pressing need for education for their children (since they cannot teach them to hunt) and guidance in such matters as hygiene, venereal disease, relation with employers, use of money, etc. These can be provided only at the larger centres.

On the other hand, I believe it would be extremely difficult for small groups of one or two Eskimos and their families employed at a preponderantly white installation ever to improve their position, especially where there is a rapid turn-over of the white personnel.

I suggest therefore that Eskimos who are capable and willing to work in wage employment should be employed in preference in the larger centres, and should normally be employed at small isolated installations only after all positions in the larger settlements have been filled. I also suggest that we should attempt to create positions for Eskimos at these larger centres - such as for example in airport maintenance at Frobisher - rather than at small isolated installations.

G.W.R.

May 23, 1957.
May 23, 1957.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER

MR. FERGUSON'S REPORT

You asked for my comments on your memorandum of 14 May.

I went through Mr. Ferguson's report with him in some detail so I do not have many comments on the report itself.

I agree that the development of two classes among the Eskimo is probable - the wage employed, and the self employed, and that it will have very wide administrative implications. I do not know whether this will encourage those living on the land to become wage employed, or vice versa, but it can scarcely fail to have a destructive effect on Eskimo social organization and culture. For instance any Eskimo who has a supply of food is at present under an obligation to provide for those Eskimos who are short of food. How long will this obligation persist towards a wage earner and his family who happen to be hungry for country food? If it does not persist towards the wage earner will it persist towards the other hunters? The effect of this splitting of the Eskimo community could be limited by centralizing employment as much as possible in the larger centres as I have suggested elsewhere.

The destruction of the present husband-wife relationship is a major problem. The woman becomes less important and has less to do with her time. This again would be particularly serious in small installations where there are fewer possibilities for gossip, guidance, and the establishment of other interests.

Certainly the air transportation arising from the D.E.W. line will make rapid medical treatment possible. Mr. Ferguson's point is that the medical services are not at present organized in
the best way to take advantage of this. It does seem that a good case could be made for more decentralization of authority and that for instance site superintendents, who after all have somebody on their staff with first-aid training, might have authority to evacuate sick Eskimos to the nearest nursing station.

I believe that some use could be made of natural foods. For instance the salt-water fish in the Mackenzie Bay are scarcely used. It is years now since anyone in Banks Island caught a whale, though the same whales are killed at Point Barrow every year. I do not think the seal population has shown any signs of decreasing in the Western Arctic. The Wildlife Service has, in the nature of things, had to spend most of its time studying animals that are decreasing rapidly in order to conserve them. Possibly they might now do more on seeing what animal resources could be exploited. Mr. T. H. Manning, who has himself often to rely on country food, might have some useful suggestions.

Indians and Eskimos do not mix well. There is little or no hostility at Aklavik, Chimo, Churchill, or Great Whale River, but there is no friendliness. The two races keep apart. Possibly a better solution to this problem would be to get more employment for Indians along the Mackenzie Valley. The record, even of government agencies there, is very poor and Crown corporations and private companies are no better.

G. W. R.
Inspector W.J. Fitzsimmons,
I/C "C" Division, C.I.B.,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Ottawa.

Dear Inspector Fitzsimmons:

Attention: 3/Sgt. Abraham

Reference is made to a telephone conversation yesterday between 3/Sgt. Abraham of "C" Division and Mr. A. Stevenson, of our Arctic Division, relating to a wireless message dated June 12 from your Resolute Bay Detachment, which read as follows:

"MR four dash twelve stop Please advise number of fox pelts each native shipped from Resolute during 1956 and 1957 and the amount to be paid for each fox stop Accounts have not been credited here and no records of this information on file."

You will note that Corporal Moodie claims that the individual accounts at Resolute Bay have not been credited with their fur catches for 1956 and 1957 and that he has no records of the transactions on his files. As you know, Constable Gibson, formerly of the Resolute Bay Detachment, was recently in Ottawa and assured us that a complete record of accounts, credit and debit standing, stock on hand, bank accounts, etc., for the trading establishment at that point, had been left with Corporal Moodie.

Although we could make a search of our files for the last two years and advise you what foxes came out of Resolute, the actual procedure here is to deal with the overall loan charged against Sudilvenich 59-1765. The present tariff for white foxes which, incidentally, we advised both Resolute and Grise Fiord Detachments, the past trapping season, is $15.00. When the furs are purchased, Jakimo is credited locally with the number of foxes and he to withdraw merchandise in that amount or leave a credit. The furs are then shipped out and auctioned in Montreal as grade. Any profits or losses from this auction are absorbed...
Loan fund and not the individual Eskimo. Therefore, I feel fairly confident that if Corporal Moodie will make a further search of the Resolute Bay records, he will find some indication as to how the accounts of each Eskimo stand. We will be preparing shortly a complete statement of how Loan No. 3, Sudalaverich, stands. This, of course, as previously mentioned, will be related to the overall Loan and will not indicate each individual transaction.

We certainly want to get Corporal Moodie off to a right start and we should be glad if he would make a further search of his records and let us know if he has been able to clarify this problem and if there are any other matters outstanding, bring them to our attention.

Thank you for the continued co-operation of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in looking after this trading establishment and the welfare of the Eskimos associated with it at Resolute Bay.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. J. Phillips,
Chief of the Arctic Division.

cc: "G" Division, RCMP.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PHILLIPS

Res: Situation at Resolute Bay
Confidential

I have been at Resolute Bay now for one week. Quite a few developments have taken place in that time, which will be the subject of this report. In describing the situation, I have decided to go into some detail because there are important and costly decisions to be made and those finally responsible should have as many facts as possible.

I. Location of Eskimo Camps

There are two separate Eskimo camps here. For medical reasons, there is no communication or contact between the two camps. This restriction may be lifted soon, as both camps are now infected with measles and quarantine is no longer of any value. Dr. Neopherson will decide on this matter.

Camp #1 is, in effect, a permanent Eskimo camp composed of people who have been re-settled here over the past few years from points on Baffin Island and the East coast of Hudson Bay.

Camp #2 is the temporary camp that has been set up to accommodate Eskimos removed from the Howe with the measles. It is about ½ mile from Camp #1.

Both camps are about 2½ miles from the R.C.A.F. base and less than one mile from the D.O.T. station.

Camp #1

I want to mention this camp if for no other reason than to clarify the role it is likely to play in relation to our present predicament.

There are about fifty people in Camp #1. Apart from the fact that the people are now coming down with the measles, conditions there are quite good. The men work for the R.C.A.F. under a system that allows them time for hunting. There is a co-op store in the camp, in the name of Sadlivink - under provision of the Eskimo Loan Fund. Cpl. Moody does not feel that the store can spare any supplies and certainly not in the quantities needed to wholly support Camp #2 for any appreciable time.

As soon as medical conditions permit Camp #1 will absorb twelve and possibly thirteen people from Camp #2.

These people are:

(a) 2 family units (8 people) who are in transit from Port Harrison, en route to Grise Fjord. They have their own funds and equipment. They will live with friends in Camp #1 until they can be moved North. They are the responsibility of our Department and should they be in need of further assistance Cpl. Moody will issue them relief from the Store.

(b) An epileptic woman and her child (2 people) who are in transit from hospital and are merely returning to their home at Camp #1.

(c) A young child Mary B-3100, 5 years of age, who is in transit from hospital and who will be returning to her parents at Grise
Fiord at the earliest opportunity. She will be placed in a foster home in Camp #2 while she is awaiting transfer home. She is the responsibility of J.H. & W. and I trust they will agree to pay the foster mother $55.00 per month. Please check.

(d) An olderly woman, Panapa F.-?, who has a daughter in Camp #1, who is being evacuated for T.B. Panapa may go to look after her daughter's returned child. If she finds this too much she should be returned to Pond which is her home. She herself is in transit from hospital.

To absorb these 13 people and to lend aces to the men in Camp #2 is the only role that Camp #1 can be expected to play in the present predicament.

Camp #2

The people in this camp (52 Eskimos, 2 whites) are now housed in two G.A.R. huts belonging to D.O.T. and recently occupied by the R.C.A.F. They are not in the winter houses belonging to the Eskimos of Camp #1.

One of the huts was previously a kitchen unit. It is now being used as a combined kitchen, laundry and dormitory for men and boys. The other hut is being used as a sick bay and dormitory for women, small children and departmental personnel. Dr. MacPherson is staying at the R.C.A.F. base 2½ miles away.

As previously mentioned twelve or possibly thirteen people will be moving from here to Camp #1 in the near future and our population will drop to 41 or 42.

2. Conference

On August 22 a conference was held at Camp #2 to establish areas of responsibility, to outline a course of action to meet the needs of the present situation and to discuss alternative courses of action for the future. These latter were regarded as suggestions that might be made to Ottawa as to how our present predicament might finally be solved.

Mr. Rudnicki (Chairman) Dr. Sabean, Dr. MacPherson, Cpl. Moody, Mr. J. Merrifield (D.O.T.), Sqm. Ldr. Delmote (O.C. R.C.A.F.), Dr. Hood, Mrs. Mathew, Mrs. Danafy and myself were present.

Areas of responsibility were worked out as follows:

Dr. MacPherson to represent the interests of and carry out the responsibilities of N.S. & W. Mr. Neville to represent the interests of and carry out the responsibilities of Northern Affairs. Cpl. Moody to act as liaison between the government personnel in Camp #2 and the R.C.A.F. - D.O.T. personnel

As regards the course of action to meet the present situation, neither the R.C.A.F. or the D.O.T. would commit themselves publicly to provide the camp with food simply because they did not think they had any authority to do so. In effect however we have been receiving food from them and they have been most helpful in providing water, electricity and oil and in making the camp habitable.

Between the R.C.A.F. and the D.O.T. we could obtain food and fuel to last three or four months if authority was given to them and to us to do so.

Might I suggest that this be done at the proper levels as soon as possible as it is becoming extremely embarrassing to everyone here. An early reply would be appreciated as food is again running low. A scarcity of food was purchased from the Hove and the Hulden but it will not last long. Since there are only about three people in camp (including myself) who are the responsible of Northern Affairs, Health and Welfare would seem to be the ones to take the initiative in securing the necessary authority. Dr. MacPherson has already wired his Department asking for this.
We do not have adequate clothing for the children against the cold weather that is now upon us. After discussing this with Dr. MacPherson and after taking a complete inventory, I wired B.C. in Churchill for clothing. Again this was done under Dr. MacPherson's signature. Only one of our charges is involved and I will keep account of what he receives.

Twenty yards of duffle procured from the hoard as a relief ration is being used to make mits and coats for those that need them. Most of the women are sewing.

Bill Unahak E7-609 is cooking for the camp. Dr. Sabaan on the boat in trying to arrange with Ottawa for Bill to be paid. I have heard nothing more but hope to communicate with the hoard one of these nights.

Three men and three women are working as kitchen help. Several of the women also peel potatoes during the afternoon.

Through Cpl. Hoody I have arranged for some of our men to borrow guns and boats from the Eskimo in Camp #2 with which to hunt. We have begun to eat seal meat quite regularly now and this serves to keep the meat bill down and the morale of the men up.

I have been using the R.C.T. "cat" to draw water. They have agreed to take over this job after I leave, if Eskimos are still here.

Thanks to the Air Force a 1,000 gallon tank has been installed, a discarded bath tub and washing machine have been reclaimed from the base dump and Eskimo children are getting baths.

A 9 p.m. curfew for the children has been established to insure proper rest for these and for the adults. Foster mothers have taken over the care of the younger girls and boys and two dormitory "fathers" have been appointed to watch over the boys.

The people here are beginning to settle into a healthy routine and I am beginning to think that my usefulness is about finished. I have discussed this with Dr. MacPherson, Miss Matthews and Cpl. Hoody and they are in agreement with my thinking on this point. Subject to a difference of opinion on your part or to a substantial change in the situation here I should like to plan on returning to Ottawa on or about September 12th. Would you please reply to this suggestion as it is difficult to arrange transportation out on short notice.

Medically, the situation here is about the same as it was a week or more ago. People are still getting measles and others getting over them although the scabs has tended to modify the illness. It looks though the disease will continue to run for quite a while yet. Miss Mathes is doing an excellent job in this camp and Cpl. Hoody is equally busy in Camp #1. We do not see much of Dr. MacPherson. I believe Miss Mathes is quite able to carry on by herself although I'm sure she would like a replacement or an assistant nurse if the epidemic stretches out over the next few months. I understand Dr. MacPherson plans to leave at the end of September.

A good deal of time was spent during the conference discussing plans for future action that could be offered to Ottawa as suggestions. The following are the main suggestions that came forth:

1. Leave the Eskimos to winter here until ship time next year.
2. Leave the Eskimos here until next spring when they can be flown to their respective destinations.
3. Remove them to Churchill to winter there, as soon as the epidemic has run out (i.e. 3 weeks after the last case.)
4. Remove them to their destinations, as soon as conditions permit, by chartered aircraft.
1, 2 and 3 were felt to be inhuman and more expensive in the long run than 4. 3 was considered inhuman, impractical and merely to re-create the same problems in another place. 4 was the most popular choice and Dr. Subban agreed to put this up as a suggestion to his Department in O town.

In the event that #4 is accepted as the most plausible solution to this situation, it is not going to be possible to move any Eskimos from here before the end of September. This is considered too late in the year for a float plane. Hence it seems more realistic to think of them remaining here until mid-December when a ski plane can land anywhere. So the thinking goes.

Cpl. Moody and Miss Matthews are both acquainted with the respective destinations of these people and would be well able to make the necessary arrangements for their transfer if it comes to this. Quite frankly, I think it would be a waste of my time and the Department's time to stay on for this reason alone. The camp has been organized to the point where things can pretty well run by themselves with some supervision by Cpl. Moody and Miss Matthews.

3. Miscellaneous

A. Freeze Dried Meat - 142-6 Packets

I opened the can given me by Mr. Snowden and allowed it to stand for two days. Portions were then distributed to the cook at the D.O.T. and to the cook in our camp. Instructions were given as to how long to soak it in water (10 minutes) before cooking it and it was requested that it be prepared in as many ways as possible.

D. T. - Fried several portions in butter for about 12 minutes (low heat) and served it with potatoes and corn.

- stewed several portions with onions and carrots, in the usual manner.

(Our camp) - Fried several pieces, using lard over a fairly high flame.

Camp #1 - Boiled several pieces, Eskimo fashion.

Eskimos and whites were asked to be objective about the taste of the meat (insofar as this is possible) and to express opinions freely. All whites expressed the opinion that it tasted excellent and was indistinguishable from fresh meat. All the Eskimos except one responded favourably, but seemed to prefer it boiled. This, I would think, is natural. The one dissenting Eskimo complained that his (fried) piece was too dry.

B. Other Eskimos in transit

Mary Panegaosh has been left here so that she can catch an early flight south. She will be leaving to-day. As far as I know she will only be able to get to Churchill by R.C.A.F. She is the responsibility of Health and Welfare and is on her way back to Hamilton to resume her schooling. Mr. Wilkinson has been notified that she is arriving and may have to stay over in Churchill until she can make further arrangements. Health and Welfare have been notified.

Annie Padlo was also left here. She is on her way to Ottawa to look for work. She is our responsibility but has funds of her own. Welfare Section should know about this case. She is supposed to stay with Mrs. Ruddicki upon arrival in Ottawa. Mrs. Ruddicki should be notified not to expect her until about September 13 or 14 as she now has the measles. I may be travelling on the same plane with her.

Annie Vitaliuk, interpreter, will now be leaving here around the last of September. She has an appointment for an operation in Montreal around that time. Several Eskimo boys and girls speak some English here so that Miss Matthews will not in any sense be in deep water.
I cannot think of anything further to report at this time and will accordingly sign off. It would be appreciated if I could get flight authority from Honolulu to Kinshasa or Montreal.

(Sgd.) F. J. Neville,
Welfare Officer.
Ottawa, October 11, 1957

Mr. Fraser Symington,
Acting Administrator, Eastern Arctic,
Frobisher Bay, N.W.T.

Dear Fraser:

First let me say that your report was excellent and gives us much reassurance not only about the job you are doing, but our wisdom in asking you to do it. I am sure you will leave many monuments of progress and efficiency behind when you depart.

I particularly appreciated your remarks about furnishings for Eskimo houses. This had been the subject of rather a knock down fight at Main Estimates last week. On that occasion I found myself in the embarrassing position of arguing very strongly the case you put up against the Director who felt there should be unity of furnishings regardless of race. My main point was that the distinction is not on the grounds of race, but on the grounds of permanency within a community. Basically, we do not wish to supply any furnishings for anybody. We have to supply furnishings for our people because it is not economical to transport all the furnishings they own from southern Canada to the Arctic on each posting and back. Like the Foreign Service, therefore, our Northern Service, on economical grounds, must buy rental furniture. This argument does not apply to Eskimos or anyone living his entire life in the Arctic, and there is no need, therefore, to buy full scale furnishings. We feel, however, that we should buy a very minimum for Eskimos, just enough to get them started in their homes. I am toying with the idea of offering to let them buy even this on the instalment plan so that they have complete independence.

The Deputy Minister fully accepted our views on this, and instructed me to prepare a policy paper. This I have done, in draft form. When it receives approval we shall send a copy to Frobisher Bay, though this may require awhile yet.

You may have been puzzled by the urgent telegram I sent you on joining the party of contractors. It would be very difficult to give you a blow by blow description of the
three weeks, so that I have to take on his job as well as this just while we are in the crucial stages of both the Arctic University and the Arctic Conference. These last two things are going extremely well.

We look forward to seeing you. Meanwhile, best of luck.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. J. Phillips,
Chief of the Arctic Division.
The "C. D. Howe" arrived at Grise Fiord early in the afternoon of August 27. Thirty-eight Eskimos were surveyed and one case of Tuberculosis was found. Nineteen Eskimos who were moving to Grise Fiord were brought in by the "Howe". At approximately 11:30 p.m. on August 27, the "C. D. Howe" completed its survey and left for Pond Inlet.

INTERVIEWS WITH CORPORAL GLENN SARGENT, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
CONSTABLE H. FLETCHER, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
AND LOCAL ESKIMOS.

1. Handicrafts

There was a much smaller number of carvings at Grise Fiord this year than there had been during the previous two years. Corporal Sargent said that carvings were done only to supplement the Eskimo income after the trapping season ended. Constable Fletcher said that a total of fifty-three carvings had been sold to the store up to July 31 and eighteen more from then until the "C. D. Howe" arrived. In March, one shipment of about fifty local carvings was sent to Resolute Bay. After this shipment was sent to Resolute there were only four carvings made between March and early August. However, approximately three weeks before the ship was due, the carvings began to flood into the post. Some of these had been done at the camps and brought to the post when the Eskimos came over and the others were done while the Eskimos were waiting for the ship to arrive.

All carving stone had to be imported and Corporal Sargent said that the stone brought in last year which I understand was from the Broughton Soapstone Quarries, was hard and unworkable. There was a large amount of this stone (I would estimate close to one ton) which the Eskimos pointed out to me as useless for carving. This might possibly be one of the reasons very little carving was done in the area last year. Shortly before the "Howe" was due to sail I discovered that no soapstone had been unloaded and in rechecking the files I found that two thousand pounds from Broughton Soapstone Quarries were supposed to be unloaded at Grise Fiord. As we were about to sail and there was no weighing equipment on the ship, a quantity of stone which was easily available on deck, estimated to be in the neighborhood of two thousand pounds, was unloaded. It is quite possible that this stone may all have been Lake Harbour and Port Harrison stone rather than the Broughton type.

Corporal Sargent said that a woman's handicraft industry might be developed at Grise if tanning kits could be sent in. Also he said that if wool could be supplied some of the women could also make tques similar to those made at Port Harrison. Another suggestion which he had was that Grise Fiord Eskimos might make sealskin boots to be supplied to non-Eskimos—Arctic employees such as D. E. W. Line workers,

Corporal Sargent said that an interesting experiment had been tried by the Eskimos at Alexandria Fiord. They had tanned sealskins by

1. scraping but not stretching them
2. drying them in the sun until they were hard
3. dampening the skins with a weak solution of Lysol
4. scraping in the same manner that caribou skins were worked.
The reports from Alexandria Fiord claimed that the skins were softer and more pliable than those tanned by the usual method and there was no noticeable colour from them.

I have attached a list of carvings sold locally at Grise Fiord, those which were sent to the Frobisher Bay Rehabilitation Centre and those which were bought for the Department’s collection. There was no detailed list available of those carvings sent to Resolute Bay in March, 1956.

2. Equipment Needed for More Efficient Game Take

a. Fox Traps—Corporal Sargent said that he had not had an opportunity to check the supplies sent in this year but that up until ship time there had been a need for more fox traps. Possibly these were sent in this year but if not, they should be included in next year’s supplies. He said that the Esquimaux on the average had sixty traps but they always lost some each year. He said that if traps did not come in with the supplies this year, the new natives who arrived on the "Howe" would not be able to trap this winter.

b. Seal Nets—Corporal Sargent also said that two or three seal nets would be useful at Grise Fiord.

c. Boat for Eskimos—While the "Howe" was at Grise I was approached by Jootamie, E9-715, who said that next year he would like to purchase a twenty foot "Big Boy" freighter canoe similar to the one owned by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

I discussed this matter with Corporal Sargent and felt that Jootamie would have enough money to pay for this next year but he advised against the "Big Boy" canoe because Jootamie’s outboard motor would be of no value with this type of craft. Corporal Sargent said that with this type of canoe, a 10 h.p. long shaft outboard was necessary because of the long transom on the canoe but Jootamie had only a 7 h.p. short shaft motor. He suggested that it would be wiser for Jootamie to purchase a canoe similar to the one at Pond Inlet which is 19-21 feet in length with a low back transom. This type of canoe would carry approximately three thousand pounds in calm water (equal to the weight which the "Big Boy" canoe could carry) and it cost only three to four hundred dollars.

Corporal Sargent said that it was quite possible that in a year or two, the three Eskimos who had purchased the whale boat this year (Thomasie, E9-1939; Klijah, E9-912; and Samil, E9-913) might wish to purchase a Peterhead-type of boat. He said that he could not recommend a larger boat than a whale boat because of the physical characteristics of the area which would make a Peterhead not only inefficient but dangerous.

3. Game

a. Fur Take—I spoke to Constable Pilot regarding the fur take during the past year and he reported that one polar bear, five arctices, seven seal, eighteen blue fox and six hundred and forty-six white fox skins had been sold to the store during the past year. He said
that this had been the best year for white fox since the community had been established and that next year had been predicted to be another good year but possibly not quite as good as 1958. The credit on the books for the Eskimos up to July 31 was $2,741.60.

Hunting—Corporal Sargent said that most of the walrus hunting done by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was at Frobisher Bay and in one or two hunts all the walrus meat to supply dog food for the following year was taken. After that the area was left alone. Corporal Sargent said that he had encouraged the Eskimos to work the small ice pans and to pick out one or two walrus at a time in order to avoid waste. He had that this year, of the twenty walrus taken, only one had been lost. Corporal Sargent said that each year the walrus came into the Grise Fiord area from Baffin Bay and congregated at the bottom of Frobisher Bay at Jakeman Glacier. He felt that with only one or two hunts each year the walrus would return as they had in the past. He said that at breakup the walruses were in the Craig Harbour area and floated down on the pans past the Eskimo camp. Although their destination was unknown he suggested that they collected around Walrus Fiord at Hall's Gate. Around the end of August or the first of September they came about twenty miles east of the Eskimo camp on their way back and at this time the natives had their best walrus hunting and were able to collect enough dog food to last them for the year. The best walrus hunting lasted until the end of September.

Corporal Sargent said that only one narwhal had been taken at Grise since the post was established and that that was during the first year. Corporal Sargent said that narwhals usually travelled west and probably went down the middle of Jones' Sound. They had never been seen going back east, however. The white whales went past the native camp by the thousands around September 10.

Conservation

Corporal Sargent said that he had taken a number of steps to try to encourage the natives to observe basic conservation practices. He explained to them how beneficial it would be to themselves if they would take only enough walrus to last them until approximately one month after the trapping season ended. This would provide enough dog food until seals again became available.

Last year the Eskimos ran short of seal oil because there had been a surplus amount of fat which had been left on the shore unused and allowed to rot. This year, Corporal Sargent encouraged them to store the surplus fat in 45-gallon drums and he believed that the amount of fat which was now stored in these drums combined with the new fat which they would get later should provide sufficient fuel to last them all winter. Corporal Sargent pointed out that there might be a surplus of land at the store this year because as long as there was sufficient seal fat, the sale of land was low.

Corporal Sargent said that the first year the post was located at Grise Fiord the Eskimos had taken approximately forty bearded seals. These provided more than enough skins for lines, etc., and since then he had encouraged them to take only the number of bearded seal that they needed.
The Eskimos had been using caribou skins to make up their winter pants. However, Corporal Sergeant had been trying to encourage them to make these from polar bear skins because they were much longer (average life approximately three years) and in addition it would aid caribou conservation. He said that last winter some Eskimos from Greenland had come to Grise and these people had been wearing bear-skin pants. He hoped that this had set an example for the Eskimos at Grise. Corporal Sergeant said he had also been trying to encourage the Eskimos to use sealskin as material for pants.

4. Reindeer Skins

I left fifty reindeer skins with Constable Pilot and Constable Moodie for distribution to the Grise Fjord Eskimos. Constable Pilot felt that most families would need them as the store was unable to purchase any sleeping skins this year. Corporal Sargent said that the usual procedure was to pass out skins to each family that needed them immediately and then to hold the balance until they were needed later in the year. He said that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police tried to give proportionately the same amount of skins to all families that needed them.

5. Ask

I was approached by Sammy, E9-913 who said he had gone with Constable Pilot to Resolute Bay to find a wife. He wished to marry a woman by the name of Rynes (Eulli Mangs) E9-1639 who was staying with Johnny Ekalook's (E9-1635) wife. Johnny Ekalook was the "boss" of the Resolute Eskimos and is presently in hospital. Sammy said he had received a letter from Johnny authorizing the marriage and asking Sammy to stay at Resolute and take care of his family until he returned from hospital. In Resolute Bay, Sammy asked Corporal Moodie to arrange for the marriage but he claimed that Corporal Moodie would not do so. He asked whether if he went to Resolute again this Spring, he could marry Rynes at that time as there were no eligible women at Grise Fjord.

I discussed the matter with Constable Pilot who said that he had not known of the letter from Johnny authorizing the marriage and that the only information he had was that Sammy could not marry Rynes without Johnny's authorization. Constable Pilot said that Sammy had asked Corporal Moodie to arrange the marriage but Corporal Moodie felt he could not interfere in Eskimo personal relationships. Constable Pilot said that Johnny's family was not too enthusiastic about Rynes marrying Sammy because of the better economic and community situation at Resolute and the fact that Sammy wished to bring Rynes back to Grise Fjord.

I would suggest that the Welfare Section contact Johnny at Clearwater Lake Sanatorium and discuss with him what he would like done regarding Rynes. Following this wire might be sent to Corporal Moodie and Constable Pilot suggesting the next course of action.

6. Trading Store

a. Store Building—Corporal Sergeant said that last year he had wired out requesting a small building to replace the police warehouse which was being used as the trading store. Unfortunately, it was not completed by last winter and during the winter some of the plywood panels had been broken. He had then wired suggesting that the police building be extended using the good material remaining and had sent out a list of the material broken asking for replacement this year. After these wires had been sent out Corporal
Sargent and Constable Pilot worked out a plan by which they were able to construct a trading store from the remaining materials still in good condition. This building was put up using these materials plus one extra window from one of the Craig Harbour buildings. Also a second doorway was cut in the side of the building. The roof shingles sent in by the Department were not used but instead the surplus aluminum roofing material which was on all the other buildings was used on the trading store.

With the arrival of the replacement materials this year, Constable Pilot and Constable Kuhn will build an archway from the trading store building to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police warehouse bridging the four foot gap between the two buildings. The extra sheets of plywood requested will be laid on the rafters in the trading store in order to make a floor in the attic for hanging furs and for storage. This will free the Royal Canadian Mounted Police warehouse from all trading store supplies.

b. Individual Accounts—Unfortunately, Miss Oneilow and I were unable to look over the individual accounts as we had very little time at Grise Fjord to carry out all the work assigned. However, in discussing the matter with Constable Pilot and Corporal Sargent, we understand the procedure to be as follows:—Coupons were issued to each Eskimo when a credit or debit was made and a record of all transactions was kept in a separate account under the individual Eskimo’s name. A summary of each account is in the mail to Ottawa and also Corporal Sargent will be in Ottawa shortly and will have an opportunity to discuss this matter in detail with Mr. Stevenson.

c. Soapstone—We had no method of weighing the soapstone for accounting purposes and cannot vouch for the fact that two thousand pounds were actually left at Grise Fjord. Constable Pilot said he did not think he could charge the Eskimos when the stone was issued but agreed to mark up each carving on resale in order to cover the cost of the stone. He said that most of the carvings had been marked with the price this year and he would continue to do this. He said he would notify Ottawa as to the amounts which should be credited to the loan fund regarding the sale of carvings to Resolute Bay, the Frobisher Bay Rehbitilitation Centre and Departmental Collection.

d. Selling Prices—Constable Pilot said that in most cases invoices accompanied the shipment of supplies and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had been marking up most articles in order to cover freight costs. Corporal Sargent said that in 1953 the selling prices for all goods had been sent to Craig Harbour but since that time a complete list of selling prices had never arrived. He said that the price list for last year was still not complete. This made the operation of the store most difficult and the only way pricing could be done was to use the 1953 prices as the basis for the pricing system. Essential goods were sold at cost and luxuries were sold at a 10% mark-up.

Corporal Sargent recommended that each year the Department should send in by mail or with the Officer in Charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol, the suggested list of selling prices for the goods ordered for the following year. These prices would be followed until the Christmas air drop arrived and at that time the Royal Canadian Mounted Police could be advised of any alterations in the prices.
He said that if this was done there would be little or no difficulty in rectifying the credits and debits in order to comply with the final pricing of the goods. However, the present system which provided no guide to pricing whatsoever made the accounting procedures at the store most difficult.

6. Tariffs

Miss Osalow and I discussed with Constable Pilot the new tariff list which was the same as the one for Resolute Bay. I gave Constable Pilot a list of the tariffs but not of the selling prices as very few skins were sold locally. However, if you feel it necessary a letter could be sent in the Christmas air drop listing the local selling prices for furs. This would arrive in good time as local sales take place when the ship arrives in the summer and possibly in the odd instance when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Patrol goes to Resolute Bay in the spring.

6. Family Allowances

We discussed with Constable Pilot the suggestion that accumulated Family Allowances belonging to three Eskimos be banked in individual accounts. Constable Pilot said he would ascertain how much money they wished to use for purchases this year and wire Ottawa regarding transfer of funds.

In discussing this matter with Corporal Sargent he said that the main problem involved Kayak, B5-732 who had a good income and wished to purchase clothing and other items not usually stocked by the store. If these were ordered by the store it would mean that the amount of essential supplies which the store could order would be reduced and other Eskimos in the community would suffer. Corporal Sargent, therefore, suggested that Kayak's Family Allowances credit might be deposited in his bank account or in an account opened by his wife. Otherwise, when the trading store requisition was made up possibly a separate one could be sent in for Kayak's personal items and paid for by Family Allowance credits.

6. Food Shortages

Shortly after the "HOME" arrived at Grise Fiord, Thomasie, B9-1969, who ostensibly the operator of the trading store came to see me regarding this problem. He said that the Eskimos had come to Craig Harbour five years before and although the hunting had been good there and at Grise Fiord, there had never been enough tea, coal oil, tobacco, flour, sugar, milk, 30-30 ammunition and duck for their tents at the store. He said that when the store ran out of food, heating and hunting supplies, the Eskimos did not like leaving the camp to go on hunts, because of the hardship caused to their wives and children by the food shortages, and because of the cold in their houses. He said that although the game was good their children still needed white man's food and he pointed out that the Eskimos were obeying the white man's game laws as they had been asked, but because there was not enough white man's food at the store they were going hungry as a result. He said that if the police did not give them more food this winter that they would all wish to leave Grise Fiord next year.
I tried to explain to Thomassie that it was not the police who were at fault but that there was only a limited amount of money available in Ottawa to buy food and when this was used up no more food could be bought. I said that the police had tried to get them more food for this year and I believed there was more and that the situation should be better. I said I would discuss the problem in Ottawa to see whether something could be done for next year so that there would be no danger whatsoever of food shortages.

This problem is a serious one because it not only affects the Eskimos at Grise Fjord but also the reputation of the Mounted Police. When I was in Resolute Bay I was talking with two Eskimos who had been at Grise Fjord and who were going back there on the "HOME". They did not wish to return but as there was no space for them at Resolute and they had been transported on the "HOME" last year from Fort Harrison specifically at their request to go to Grise, we told them that they would have to go. They were most unhappy about this, not because they disliked the situation as far as the community, or the game resources were concerned, but because they could not buy the things they needed at the store. They had told the Resolute Eskimos about this and the blame was directed at the police. If we are going to operate trading stores in the north for the benefit of the Eskimos these should not be set up; if as in the case of Grise Fjord, they cause hardship to the Eskimos and blacken the reputation of the police in the eyes of the Eskimo people.

I discussed the interview with Thomassie with Constable Pilat and Corporal Sargent. Corporal Sargent said that when beat time had come around this year all of the Eskimos had talked to him about leaving Grise Fjord because of the food shortages. He said he had tried to explain the intricacies of the Loan but this was most difficult to explain to a fairly primitive people such as the Eskimos.

One of the factors which complicated the loan was that individual Eskimos ordered large items and this depleted the amount available for purchasing necessities from the Loan Fund.

Corporal Sargent felt the problem of shortage of supplies could not be rectified unless a second loan was taken out for the store. He suggested that the establishment of a cooperative might also provide a solution to this problem.

Corporal Sargent suggested that if a second loan could be taken out, the two most qualified Eskimos would be:

1. AKPULIAKPIX, R5-634, who was the original trader at Alexandra Fjord

2. ELJAN, E9-912.

b. Lack of Materials

1. Licence—Corporal Sargent said that last year no business licence was sent in for the operation of the trading store and he asked whether the licence could be sent in the Christmas air drop.
2. Packing Material—Corporal Sargent said that there were no packing materials available to facilitate the export of carvings and furs. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police now tore up magazines and used empty cardboard boxes for packing carvings. However, he suggested that to avoid breakage, wooden boxes and newspapers should be sent in.

In addition, they had no means of baling their fur. Under the present system they had to roll up the furs and stuff them into jute sacks. One sack was placed inside the other forming a double cover. He asked whether this type of baling was satisfactory and if not he suggested that baling material might be sent in.

3. General Equipment—Constable Pilot suggested that the ledger book now being used was not entirely satisfactory and asked whether we could send in the Christmas air drop ledger sheets and binders similar to those requested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at Resolute Bay.

Corporal Sargent asked whether twelve counter slip books could also be sent on the Christmas air drop.

He suggested also that an adding machine was badly needed by the store.

He asked whether a set of scales could be sent on the Christmas air drop and I would suggest that if scales have not been sent to Resolute Bay, consideration should be given to supplying this item to the Resolute Bay store as they are essential to its efficient operation.

A roll of write-on, sticky tape might also be sent to Grise Fiord for the purpose of marking carvings.

7. Native Houses

Corporal Sargent and Constable Pilot have sent to Ottawa a most interesting and well thought out plan for native housing at Grise Fiord. They have designed a wooden Eskimo house which costs $700.00 and if one loan could be arranged under the Eskimo Loan Fund and the houses were approved, these could be shipped in and constructed for all the Grise Fiord families next year. The cost of the material was worked out from a retail catalogue and, therefore, the estimated cost of $700.00 for material (not including freight) would probably be considerably reduced if a bulk, wholesale purchase was made. Corporal Sargent said that the floor space of these houses was approximately 12' x 16'. From the peak of the roof to the floor the height was 8' and the walls began at 4' high running up to this 8' peak. The houses would have 2' x 4' joists all around and would be fully insulated and lined with 4' x 8' insuboard. Although these were not prefabricated houses they had been designed for a minimum of waste and very little cutting. There was no attic space in them. However, there was a 4' x 4' porch in addition to the basic house outlined above, with a door leading into the porch and a second door leading into the house. There was one window in the gable end of the house facing south or southeast. The design has allowed for ventilation and a place for the stove pipe hole and the roof jack.
The roofing material suggested was the asphalt shingle similar to the type sent in for use on the trading store. An insulation either manufactured or of local moss could be used. The price of $700.00 not only included the cost of the house and porch but also the material for the sleeping platform, 12' long—the full width of the house.

Corporal Sergeant explained that the house had been designed on the same principle as the present Rakimo tent, with the sleeping area under the lower part of the house and the main activity taking place in the high area. He suggested that the stove used in the house might be a small, heavily constructed cast iron one with no grates so that any type of material including oil, moss, etc. could be burned. I suggested to him that possibly the same system of painting houses as was used at Frobisher Bay might be followed, i.e., each house might be painted a different colour.

Corporal Sergeant said that the present Rakimo winter houses were made up from the scrap lumber collected when the post was moved from Craig Harbour to Grise Fiord. These were of a wooden frame construction with a sod covering. They were very damp in the spring and resulted in an epidemic of colds each year. He said that the new houses should solve this problem.

f. Miscellaneous

Constable Pilot suggested that the recommendation regarding the schooner-type boat for the Resolute Rakimos be given careful consideration. He said that a boat of this type was in use at Grise Fiord and that in his opinion it was most unsatisfactory. He found it awkward to operate and, therefore, suggested that further study should be made regarding a more satisfactory type of large boat for the Resolute Rakimos.

9. Population of Grise Fiord

I have attached a list of the population of Grise Fiord including the nineteen people brought in this year by the "O. D. HOME".

R. A. Gould
Officer in Charge
Eastern Arctic Patrol.
## APPENDIX I.
### GRIGE FORD REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PURCHASER</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PRICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Larsen</td>
<td>Igloo Scenes</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hunter with Harpoon</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ask</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Shea</td>
<td>Pipe</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. A. Gould</td>
<td>Tientaste Game</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hunter and Bear</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CARVINGS PURCHASED FOR NORTHERN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENTAL COLLECTION**

- Man with Harpoon and Seal: $10.00
- Man Harpooning Walrus: $12.00
- Man and Seal: $6.00

**TOTAL: $38.00**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARVINGS PURCHASED FOR PUBLISHER REHABILITATION CENTRE</th>
<th>PRICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whale</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seal</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Walrus on base</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus on base</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Walrus</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bird</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wensel</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter and Walrus</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cribbage Board</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cribbage Board</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL: $37.50**

* These carvings were resold to passengers aboard the "G. D. HOME"
Ottawa, April 14, 1959.

The Honourable George Hees,
Minister of Transport,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear George:

Thank you for your letter of April 3. I was of course aware of the importance of the research resulting from data obtained at the arctic weather stations and that a number of scientific activities at the station were directed by scientists from southern Canada, but this did not appear to be relevant to the point at issue. It seemed to me that these activities need not be adversely affected in any way if we were to take over the complete operation of the stations. I should also like to correct any impression or suggestion that we should order or force the United States to withdraw their personnel. I have always understood that U.S. participation in this programme was on the basis of assisting us in operating the stations, presumably until such time as we could assume full responsibility. I imagine therefore that the United States would welcome any move on our part to take over what is so obviously a Canadian responsibility. Indeed if the U.S. participation were on any other basis I believe there would be cause for the most serious concern.

If these weather stations were completely operated by Canada I see no reason why there should be any objection to scientists from the United States or from other countries visiting the stations for extended periods when they wished to carry out research there, or why special data should not be collected on their behalf. Indeed I believe such international scientific co-operation might well prove easier to arrange if the stations were operated by a single country. I find it difficult therefore to escape the conclusion that the actual running of the stations is something that we should do ourselves. So long as we allow the present arrangements to continue I think we are vulnerable to criticism on the grounds that the United States is carrying out a function of government in the north — (and the weather stations are by far the most important government activity in this area) — to some extent at the expense of our effective sovereignty. There are clear signs that the public is becoming increasingly sensitive on this issue.

Up until now the Queen Elizabeth Islands have but rarely been visited, and then usually by government parties. With the interest recently shown by oil exploration companies in the area I am sure we must expect a
great increase in the number of people working in the area and visiting the stations. Many of these will be private individuals and the U.S. participation in the operation of these weather stations, and nowhere else in Canada, is sure to attract comment. The fact that many U.S. companies will be engaged in this oil exploration has also I think an important bearing on the matter and makes it all the more necessary that we take over operation of the stations.

I agree fully with what you say about the importance of our assuming increasing responsibility for airstrip operation, communications operations, etc., in the Canadian north. An important fact is that at each of these joint weather stations there is an airstrip as well as radio communications, and that there are virtually no other facilities of this sort in the whole area. There is sure to be an increasing civilian requirement to make use of these facilities and this presents an additional, and in my opinion convincing, argument for taking over their operation.

In view of these circumstances I believe the matter to have considerable importance. A meeting of officials such as you propose would certainly be necessary to discuss taking over the stations. I feel sure though that it would not get very far without an indication of government policy. The main issue seems clear and I suggest therefore that the next step should be for the two of us to discuss the subject with the Prime Minister and ask his advice.

Yours sincerely,

Alvin Hamilton.
MEMORANDUM TO

Sgt. Coombs:

Re: Eskimo Trading Store,
Grise Fiord, N.W.T.

20th April, 1960.

It has been noticed in a report regarding Eskimo Conditions dated 19-1-60 from Grise Fiord Detachment that there is a considerable difference in the amount of money the Eskimos receive for furs and the re-sale value outside.

For example, during the 1958/59 trapping season the Eskimos received the following prices at the Grise Fiord Trading Store:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Furs</th>
<th>Price per Pelt</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>230 White Fox</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
<td>$3,450.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115 White Fox</td>
<td>$18.00</td>
<td>$2,010.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 White Fox</td>
<td>$20.00</td>
<td>$80.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $6,140.00

Grise Fiord reports that the above furs were sold at auction for $17,953.65, an average of $47.37 per pelt. There is a difference here of $11,813.65 that does not appear to have been refunded to the trappers.

As you are aware the tariff for furs bought at the Trading Stores under R.C.M. Police supervision is set by the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. Our men do not grade the fur and just pay the going rate for every pelt.

The writer knows from personal experience that fur taken at the Trading Store at Herschel Island has been sold to the Hudson's Bay Company at Aklavik by our members. In this way, the trapper received an extra $10.00 to $15.00 per pelt. At present prices the difference would be considerably greater.

No figures on the prices received from auction sales for previous years are available, however, the writer has never heard of the difference being refunded to the trappers.

Ottawa - 20-4-60.

(C.B. Warner) Cst.
Ottawa, Ont. 13th July, 1960.

Mr. E.G. Siwertz,
Director,
Northern Administration Branch,
Dept. of Northern Affairs & Nat. Resources,
Kent-Albert Building,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Sir:

Re: Makimo Trading Stores
Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, NWT

This will acknowledge your letter of July 4th, 1960, dealing with the proposal to transfer the Makimo Trading Stores at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord into co-operative associations.

This will also confirm discussion on June 22nd, with Mr. Paul Godt and Mr. A. Stevenson, at which time the proposals were outlined. The establishment of co-operative associations at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord is concurred with and it is understood that the set-up will be completed in time to change over on January 1st, 1961.

To facilitate the operation of these stores by our members, it will be in order for correspondence to go direct from our Detachments to your Department on all routine matters. We do not wish copies of correspondence on such routine matters because, if necessary, such copies would be available to this Headquarters. We will, of course, receive copy of annual statement.

Yours sincerely,

W. G. Fraser, A/Supt.,
Officer Commanding "G" Division.
Sgt. G. Fraser, A/Spty.
Office Commanding 3rd Division.
INTRODUCTION

Some 6 to 8 years ago, 3 trading stores were established in the high Arctic in communities lacking trading facilities. It is presumed that private enterprise was not interested in establishing a trading post at any of these points due to a rather small population and limited local economy making it impossible to obtain a fair return on invested capital. One other important reason why private enterprise may have had reservations was the fact that many of the people who moved into these new northern communities were not used to the dark period, which is during the trapping season, and this might create an uncertainty as far as permanent settlement was concerned.

To avoid direct governmental retailing and to provide these settlements with food and basic necessities for day to day living a unique form of trading establishment was set up with help of funds obtained from the Eskimo Loan Fund. This was the only possible way to establish trading facilities in these communities. Considerations were given at that time to forming co-operatives but it was found to be impossible due to lack of necessary legislation. In other words, this type of operation was the only alternative.

THE PROBLEM

From the start until the present time, these 3 trading stores have been very successful and provided the Eskimos in these communities with their day to day requirements. One of the stores with an initial loan of $5000 has made exceptionally fine progress under supervision and assistance of the local R.C.M.P. authorities. The loan has been repaid and substantial savings have been realized to provide sufficient working capital for the steady increasing volume of business which now amounts to $30,000 - $35,000 per year. These earnings have been derived from operating profits, with a rather small overhead, and from profits realized from fur sales during a number of good fur years with increasing prices. Under the present system, where the original loan works like a revolving fund, it has not been impossible to pass on to Eskimos any savings realized from fur sales. In view of this it could therefore safely be anticipated that trading profits, even marginal, and fur profits will continue to mount up in the revolving Eskimo Loan Fund. It is my conviction that such a move is not sound business practice, because even a small margin of profit in a store operation is essential and a fair margin on fur is a must due to great fluctuations in prices of this type of business.

With the large accumulations of savings which are now sufficient for operation of the stores, the question of legal complications of such an operation becomes more evident. The Eskimo who has signed the
application form might be considered the owner of the stock and of any money held in his name in the Eskimo Loan Fund. It should be pointed out that the borrowers of the money have only rendered the service of letting their name appear on the application form for technical reasons and have not, under any circumstances, provided any other services or received remunerations for same. Such a type of operation could, of course, have serious complications from a legal point of view should one of the borrowers die.

CO-OPERATIVES

It has long been the desire of the Administration that these trading stores should be turned over to co-operative associations. Co-operative associations would give continuing legal entity which is definitely lacking under the present system of operation and provide a foundation for continued uninterrupted operation.

A number of documents are needed for a change-over from the present type of operation to co-operatives. All aspects of this transaction have been investigated and all necessary documents are now ready for such a transaction.

Transfer of funds held in suspense account in the Eskimo Loan Fund have been discussed a number of times with our Chief Treasury Officer. The necessary documents have been finalized for this transfer.

I have discussed this matter with our legal advisers. The necessary documents have been completed. The documents have been prepared according to the existing federal law, governing outright gifts from one person to another person or persons. In other words, the original borrower donates money and inventory to the newly established co-operative in the community.

I have discussed thoroughly the possibility of turning over inventory and accumulated earnings to a co-operative with senior personnel of the assessment branch of the Department of Revenue. From an income tax point of view they would consider the accumulated earnings as belonging to all the people in the area who have used the service of the trading store. The Eskimos in whose name the loan were taken out are fully cleared. This has been verified by letter which is on file in this Section.

A number of very important advantages would take place under a co-operative set up. (a) The Eskimos will as owner of their enterprise share in the profits on a patronage basis. (b) The Eskimos will benefit further by receiving final payments for the fur sold to the co-operative over and above the set tariffs. This has been impossible in the past. (c) The Eskimos in the communities will, through ownership of a co-operative, play a significant role in the local economy. (d) Eskimos will
gain valuable experiences in business practice when they, at a later date, get more involved and they will also be exposed to the democratic procedures by which co-operatives are operated.

Under a co-operative association a proper accounting system will be set up for the store operation which has been lacking in the past. Under the present system all purchases have been debited to the loan and incoming money from sales and from other sources has been credited to the loan. The co-operative will at least once a year close off their accounts and prepare a complete financial statement with profit and loss and balance sheets.

Communication between the field and this Department has been cumbersome. The RCMP constables at the field have reported on store activities through their respective RCMP division who in turn have advised the Department. However, I believe that there has been a tendency to reply direct to the field on requests for information which was received through the established channels.

Under a co-operative set up I propose to streamline the operation which I feel is essential. To be able to operate sufficiently and to get information back and forth I suggest that communications be between this Division and the Co-operatives with copies to go to all interested parties.

I also propose to introduce a reporting system which will keep this office up-to-date on the operation of the stores. This system will be simple and I believe that it will save the local RCMP constable much time in comparison with the present system.

Mr. A. Stevenson and myself have talked this whole project over with Staff Sergeant Coombs RCMP "G" Division, Ottawa who indicated his approval and also suggested that the RCMP constables communicate direct with the Co-operative Development Section concerning stores.

ACTION RECOMMENDED FOR APPROVAL

1. That action be taken immediately to transfer the stores at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay into co-operative associations.

2. That the Co-operative Development Section communicate direct with the RCMP constables on matters concerning store operation and that copies of such correspondence to go to interested parties.

Paul Godt,
Supervisor of Co-operatives.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STEVENSON

Relocation of Eskimo Groups in the High Arctic

The Director has indicated to me orally that he would like us to give some thought to the possible relocation of small groups of Eskimos in certain areas of the High Arctic. He has been led to wonder about the advisability of this by the fact that the oil companies are now trying to obtain approval from the Air Force for the release of some of the Air Force Eskimo employees for oil exploration work next year.

I pointed out to the Director some of the problems we have had with Grise Fiord in respect of supply and of medical services, and his own feeling is that while Grise Fiord should be continued for sovereignty purposes, it should not be duplicated at other isolated locations. He considers, rather, that any new colonies to be established should be in the vicinity of established weather stations such as Mould Bay, Isachsen and Eureka. He also thinks that a logical development would be to start these colonies as satellites of the Resolute Bay community, since the Resolute Bay people now know the country and many of them have been to these points on labouring jobs.

The Director would like us to give this matter some thought and then send a paper to him outlining the history of the Resolute and Grise Fiord communities and defining the advantages and the problems of establishing additional colonies in the High Arctic. Our paper should ask if it is the wish of the Government to fortify our claims to sovereignty of these islands by establishing Eskimo groups on them and it should contain our best recommendation on

Confidential
Ottawa, October 4, 1960.
what, if anything, should be done along this line. We should also point out that the Resolute Bay people are becoming an important factor in the economic development taking place on Cornwallis Island and the adjacent islands and suggest that other groups at the locations mentioned might develop a similar importance.

Would you either take this on yourself, or have Mr. Parsons undertake the preparation of a draft submission to the Director. The Director gave me no deadline, but to be sure it is done, I suggest that we have something ready by the 1st of December, 1960.

C. M. Bolger,
Administrator of the Arctic.
Recently you discussed with me the possibility of establishing additional groups of Eskimos in the High Arctic, particularly in the vicinity of the joint arctic weather stations at Tuktu, Alert, Inachsen and Wound Bay.

Before defining the advantages and problems of establishing additional colonies in the High Arctic, I thought I would first outline the history of the Resolute and Grise Fiord communities.

As you know, when Resolute Bay was first discovered last century by the British naval expedition under Parry, there were no Eskimos living on Cornwallis Island. The National Museum and the Smithsonian Institute carried out a recent study and investigation of archaeological sites and have revealed that this island was inhabited by Eskimos some 500 years ago. From that time until 1953 there were no Eskimos residing permanently in the region now known as the Queen Elizabeth Islands, with the exception of a few families employed at R.C.M. Police establishments on a rotation basis.

In the early 1950's this Department instituted several projects whereby encouragement and assistance was given to various groups of Eskimos to move from areas where they were finding difficulty in making a satisfactory living from the available resources to areas where hunting and trapping conditions were more favourable or where there were opportunities for other steady employment. One of these projects started in the summer of 1953 when four families, three from Fort Harrison, Quebec, and one from Pond Inlet, N.W.T., voluntarily transferred, with tents, dogs and other equipment, via
the C.S. "C. R. Howe" to the vicinity of the Air Base at Resolute Bay.
Another small group also from Fort Harrison and Pond Inlet were established
at Craig Harbour. Later they were moved to Grise Fiord with the opening
of a new R.C.M. Police detachment at that point.

This movement of Eskimos was regarded more or less as an
experiment to determine how well Eskimos from southern areas would adapt
to conditions and the environment of the High Arctic, together with
filling all the requirements of making a good living for themselves.
It was thought at the time of the move that the Harrison group would
not only find the environment strange, but, as they had never experienced
the dark period, the assumption was that travelling and trapping would
be most difficult. This is one of the reasons why Pond Inlet people
were involved, so as to help the southern group adjust to their new
terrain and related situations.

The project was entirely self-contained and the groups
were the responsibility of the R.C.M. Police detachments. Financial
assistance was obtained through the Eskimo Loan Fund. A small trading
store was set up at each place in the name of a leading Eskimo. These
stores were equipped with essential supplies to provide the groups with
the necessary subsistence.

The outcome of these ventures has been more successful
and satisfactory than had ever been anticipated. The Eskimos have been
able to obtain all the country food they need and sufficient fur and
additional produce to purchase their own other requirements from the
store. They have adapted themselves quickly to the changed conditions
and have been, on the whole, happy in their new environment. So much so,
they requested that arrangements be made to have some of their relatives
transferred north. This was done - in 1955 and subsequent years when
small numbers of Eskimos were moved north. There are now some 82 people
at Resolute and around 61 at Grise Fiord.

It might be well to mention at this time that in the
fall of 1953, after the first move, a meeting was held attended by
representatives of the R.C.A.F., the D.O.T. and this Department for the
purpose of discussing the implications of our Eskimo relocation projects
in the High Arctic. Some trepidation (but no serious opposition) was
felt about the migration, particularly by the R.C.A.F. who thought the
Eskimos would become a burden and responsibility of their station at
Resolute Bay. This assumption was soon dispelled. In fact, at the present time the R.C.A.F. are evidently convinced that the addition of the Eskimo settlement at Resolute, located some six miles from their base, has been to their advantage and now has their full approval and co-operation when necessary. This has been demonstrated by the expressed desire of the R.C.A.F. to employ Eskimos in a number of capacities, especially at the Spring and Fall Airlift and the Summer Sea Supply Mission. They have also engaged several Eskimos in connection with the Arctic Survival School which was moved from Cambridge Bay about two years ago. Furthermore, this summer the R.C.A.F. made representations to us proposing that more Eskimos could be permanently employed if given both training outside in courses of skilled trades which would fit them into the general employment possibilities of Resolute Bay and also on-the-job training in other fields.

I wrote you on this subject by memorandum dated July 21, requesting your comments and a decision on the proposed training program. I regret to say we have had no reply, occasioned possibly by certain changes in the Education Division and lack of Vocational Training specialists. I have, therefore, asked our own Education Section to review and discuss this subject with officers of the Education Division.

Although the Eskimos at Grise Fiord have not had the opportunities of employment, they have, however, obtained a good livelihood from the country and this community also serves as a distinctly useful purpose in confirming, in a tangible manner, Canada's sovereignty over this vast region of the Arctic.

You will recall that part of the history of the migration scheme was one of a greatly increased population over-burdening a depleted game population. Withdrawal of some hunters from the area not only benefited them but relieved Port Harrison of some of its large human population. However, the Canadian Wildlife Service have always showed great concern that this adjustment should not proceed to the point where the population would exceed the known available game resources. At the present time the number of people hunting seem to be able to obtain enough country food, but an increased population living off the country entirely could swing the pendulum in the other direction.
Therefore, no further large scale moves have been made, awaiting surveys which would determine whether the animal population could stand the present amount of killing or whether other resources were available. Because of staff limitations it has never been possible to make the survey required. In 1956 the Deputy Minister requested that action be taken to select two places as possible locations for the settlement of Eskimos in the High Arctic, and that surveys be carried out to determine their suitability from the standpoint of the abundance of wildlife. The Department of Fisheries were also brought into the picture and although some investigations have been made, we have not seen any reports indicating that the project was tackled or completed as originally planned.

Some years ago the D.O.T. gave tentative approval to considering employment of Eskimos at weather stations all over the Arctic, provided of course they had certain qualifications. No further action has been taken in this regard. To doubt the employment of Eskimos, particularly in the High Arctic, within the range of their capabilities would be a distinct advantage to D.O.T. and render a service to weather stations, and again the matter of sovereignty would be another aspect of such employment.

Oil companies now operating in the High Arctic, construction projects at Resolute Bay, seasonal staving operations and transient survey and scientific parties have taxed the available Eskimo labour at Resolute Bay to the limit during the past year. In the light of present day developments, therefore, it is believed that these wage earning opportunities will continue.

In considering any moves north and to meet changing conditions in the Arctic, is our policy still along the lines as follows:

1. To ensure to Eskimos the means of obtaining a reasonable standard of living according to their stage of development.

2. To assist those of the more primitive groups to continue their hunting and trapping way of life by seeing that they are adequately equipped and by encouraging them to make fuller use of the resources that are available. Assistance
is also to be given to members of these groups to transfer, when necessary, to areas where hunting conditions are more favourable. They are also to be encouraged to take up other occupations besides trapping, where feasible, such as handicrafts and small home industries.

3. To assist more advanced groups to combine other occupations with trapping and also take up employment, temporary or permanent, that will enable them to augment their income. Without, however, unifying themselves for the life of a hunter should employment cease and they be thrown back on their own resources. Seasonal employees will spend part of the year working and part trapping. Year-round employees should be allowed reasonable time off for hunting throughout the year. In this way they will retain certain ethnic skills and be more content in their work.

4. The more advanced, younger men of any group will be given opportunities and encouraged to take employment or training for employment in order that they may fill positions available at the weather stations, other military and civilian centres, and with oil companies.

I raise the above policy statements because we have had some problems at Grise Fiord in respect of supply and medical services and I believe we should not duplicate such communities at other isolated locations. My understanding is that you would prefer that any new colonies be established in the vicinity of existing weather stations such as Houde Bay, Iachsen and Eureka. I am in general agreement with this principle. However, I think that many Eskimos will want to make a livelihood from the country for some time to come, provided of course the resources are available. Therefore, I do not think we should eliminate entirely in any study the setting up of communities away from established stations. What would be a more progressive step, during this transition period, is to take advantage of modern technology and improved communications. It might be that by regular inspection flights and using ECO's we could well supervise any isolated community. This is certainly done in Alaska.

I agree the logical development would be to start these colonies as satellites of the Resolute Bay community, since the Resolute
2. Revise the suggestion that proper surveys be carried out to ascertain the wildlife and other resources of the region. We consider this important in the interests of the Eskimo people and the economy of the country. More adequate knowledge of all the resources would be invaluable in planning for the future.

3. We should make a careful survey of the present distribution of population with a view to determining which areas are over-populated and which groups would benefit most by being transferred, provided they are willing to move! Presumably, as a result of any surveys as suggested in Recommendation No. 2, we would decide on the areas to which such groups should be transferred, keeping in mind the resources available and other advantages that may accrue.

4. Pursue, immediately and vigorously, with the RCIF their desire to employ more Eskimos, provided they have training as outlined in my memorandum to you of July 21.

5. Related considerations which will have to be made in any move are numbers, educational facilities, housing, supplies, medical treatment and supervision. There are also other features which will be brought out if we have your approval and direction of the scheme in principle.

May I please have your comments. I should also be glad to discuss this whole subject further at your convenience.

G. M. Bolger,
Administrator of the Arctic.
Northern Administration Branch

Ministère des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien

Direction des régions septentrionales

Sugluk, Quebec.

February 25, 1969.

Regional Administrator,

Arctic Quebec, Ottawa, Ontario.

Relocation Eskimo People from Sugluk, P.Q. to Cape Dorset, N.W.T.

This subject is of importance both to the Regional and District Office. I shall attempt to fully bring up to date all aspects as known in this situation.

The following italisation are the people who are known to have expressed interest in remaining in Cape Dorset NWT where they are at present. In the following please keep in mind this sequence, Family Name, Husband, Wife, Children.

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<tr>
<th>KAYUK</th>
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<td>Jimmy Inarolik E9-1146</td>
<td>Presently in the DGNQ school, Great Whale River</td>
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KAYULIK (Continued from Page 1)
Avingak E9-1125
Noah E9-2731
Adanie E9-2777
Thomstie E9-3164

KAYULIK
Joby Kullu E9-1147
Quaakaluk E9-1185
Tingmilak E9-2739
Gatmilak E9-3164
Mary Kodyulik E9-3404

SATIAKAX
Peter E9-1199
Eva E9-1172
Tingmilak E9-3751

TAYARAK
Johnny Uqitartuq E7-268
Adanie E9-2166
Pietoi E9-2733
George E7-267 Died at Cape Dorset

ANGUSIKUK
Katsuk E9-1115

The following families will possibly relocate to Dorset but are yet in Sugluk. This is pending on money. I understand one house in Dorset now allocated to this group.

TAYARAK
Kopak E9-1167
Imadlak E9-1195 - X
Katsuk E9-1200
Lizzie E9-2420
Amaak E9-2730
Noah E9-3151
Lu RMSIE E9-3151

SATIAKUK
Ituviik E9-1143
Ida E9-1820
Adanie E9-3496
Maggie E9-3516

(Ida E9-1820 is daughter of Imadlak E9-1195 and will relocate with Tayarak family group)
The following people from Sugluk are
"Visiting" Cape Dorset for a period
of two weeks to an indefinite stay.

Qumnu Korak, E9-1186
Pauliste E9-1926
Charlie E9-708
Amie E9-1112 & infant daughter Ida.
Sarah Alaco E7-357 & infant son Akak
Eladitch Kunak E9-1126
Eva Kunak E9-2364

As one can see a shifting of population has definitely taken place. With
the exception of the original group referred to in our note this file dated
October 10, 1963, the shift has been more gradual. It is impossible at this
time to say exactly who will stay in Dorset on a permanent basis and who will return
to Sugluk this spring. There are other people who have expressed interest in
living but circumstances are a mitigating factor, i.e., money, aged relatives
in the household, family ties to strong reasons to return and live in Sugluk. This shift of
population from Sugluk is not confined only to Dorset but also people have moved
to Wapekuj Bay and Iqaluit, P.Q. The hunting being somewhat improved over that
found in Sugluk, P.Q.

The main reasons underlying all these moves are economic, social,
and perhaps to varying degrees political. The first two are the main ones as
promises of good hunting, good job opportunities, good craft sales, supposedly
good housing and political stability are irrefutable reasons.

I have been in contact with the Area Administrator at Cape Dorset and he has
advised that there is absolutely no houses available in Dorset for Sugluk people
beyond those committed to the original migrants. Overcrowding in the Sugluk
people into a few houses has resulted and is of the most serious proportions.
This word of no housing being available has not proven to be a deterrent as 9
people went over on the last Austin Charter flight for a visit. They assume
that either theDept. or Devine help will be offered once at Cape Dorset.

Now needless to say there is an anti-Sugluk feeling in Dorset and rumours
have it that the Dorset people are suggesting the Sugluk people move out of
Dorset and form a camp or settlement of their own. You possibly will have more
information than I on this aspect, then once again in speaking with the Sugluk
Council on this they seem to think that a new town of Sugluk people is what is
needed, possibly around the old Ammujak area between Dorset and Lake Harbour
apparently a search is going on for a site, no one knows by who or where and
how this is to be accomplished. I add this as an aside only without comment.

I would suggest someone possibly on the annual inspection tour visit Dorset
and the Sugluk people to see how they are living and to discuss with the Area
Administrator at Dorset some of his problems with the people, in this
way this region would be of some assistance when called on.

This migration is definitely continuing in a northward direction at
this time. It will doubtlessly reverse back to Sugluk this summer
but for what period of stay or duration is unknown.

Northern Administrator, Billingsley
Department of
Indian Affairs and
Northern Development
Northern Administration Branch.

Ministre des
Affaires indigene et
du Nord canadien
Direction
des régions septentrionales

Page "3/3/"
MEMORANDUM

OTTAWA 4, August 29, 1969
Our file: 1012-13

Acting Chief,
Social and Cultural Development Division

Re: Relocation of Eskimos from Northern Canada

Over the past year there has been a great deal of discussion on the relocation of Eskimo residents from areas of low economic opportunity to areas which are more productive. Mr. D. S. Stevenson published in May, 1968 a preliminary study of the "Problems of Eskimo Relocation for Industrial Employment" based on research in Yellowknife, Lynn Lake and camps of the Great Slave Lake Railway. He is now circulating a draft final report entitled "An Eskimo Relocation Project". Mr. Bowles of the Education Directorate prepared a paper last August entitled "A Program of Relocation of Eskimo Families to Areas of Economic Opportunity". Since the publication of these two papers there have been several meetings to discuss the problem of relocation. Mr. Yates, Acting Director, Territorial Relations Branch, asked for our Director's comments in a memorandum of May 26, 1969. Recently you asked for my comments and these are contained in the attached paper and summarized below.

Economic factors are probably the most important requirement for successful relocation but I assume that economic opportunities are available in the relocation centre and therefore I confine my comments to the social aspect of relocation. In particular, I suggest that relocation is more apt to succeed where there is easy communication and transportation to the home settlement and where a strongly cohesive Eskimo group exists, provided such a group is able to establish some link with the new community. There is a need, first of all, then, for financial assistance to make possible frequent visits home. Secondly, there is a need for a skillful group worker who can both support existing group cohesion while at the same time assisting the Eskimo group to establish ties with the new community.

J. D. Flynn,
Supervisor,
Social Development Section.

FLYNN/n1
MEMORANDUM

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J. D. Flynn,
Supervisor,
Social Development Section.
Mr. Gunther Abrahamson,
Chief, Social Development Division,
Indian & Northern Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Gunther:

Inuit Relocation -- High Arctic

As requested, attached is a brief write up on the Inuit Relocation to the High Arctic. I believe you wanted something on other post war moves but as this is the one on which some questions have been raised recently I have done it first. I spent many days in the Archives reviewing old files in addition to some of the more active ones in the department. I found this very difficult as there are many blanks and a great deal of information in the attachment is based on personal memory. However, I am confident it is an accurate and factual picture.

In the other post war relocation projects, these were mainly in the North and to Southern Canada offering employment opportunities, although not all. I see from the files there have been some extensive studies made of these which took a great deal of time. Therefore, rather than cover all the same ground, if you agree, I will give you a summary and indicate the reports available or on moves which might be written up to complete the record.

Yours sincerely,

A. Stevenson

Encl.
Attachments

Inuit Relocation Summary

1. Appendix "A" - Prehistoric & Historical Background November 1977 by A. Stevenson
2. "B" - Studies Relating to Relocation 1968-75
4. "D" - Photostat of Table of Contents - William Foster Report 1974-75
5. "E" - Write up on High Arctic Relocation - November 1977 by A. Stevenson
6. "F" - Write up on former Cape Smith Inuit relocating back there from Puv. - November 1977 by A. Stevenson
7. "G" - Write up on Port Burwell Inuit Relocation - November 1978 by A. Stevenson

November 30, 1977

A. Stevenson
World War 2 and the rapid development of long range air travel broke down the isolation of the Arctic. The situation of the Inuit became a matter of concern to the Canadian public. They could no longer be treated as an isolated group. The post-war years saw a rapid and increasing effort by Government to extend services northward. Many projects in the interest of the Inuit were developed. One of these was in the early 50's when the predecessors of the present Department of Northern Affairs instituted a scheme of relocation. Encouragement and assistance was given to various groups of Inuit to move voluntarily from areas where they were finding difficulty in making a satisfactory living from the available resources to areas where hunting and trapping were more favourable or where there were opportunities for steady employment. Economic conditions were poor in the Port Harrison area of Arctic Quebec at this time. The local people were experiencing a declining fur take and other resources such as Caribou.

This proposal of relocation was discussed favourably by the Northwest Territories Council of the day and representatives of the Department of Resources and Development and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who were familiar with the High Arctic islands believed that resources were sufficient to support one or two communities in that region. About the same time the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. in reopening their Craig Harbour, Ellesmere Island Detachment in 1951 told the Deputy Minister of this Department that he was considering moving the Detachment to another location which would give better access and allow patrols and supervision or control of Canadian Territory. Greenlanders were visiting Ellesmere Island and were going back and forth on hunting trips. Another point was in the past to support Ellesmere Island Detachments and act as guides. They had employed Greenlanders exclusively under the delusion that Canadian Inuit were incapable or unsuited to live and travel in the High Arctic Islands north of Baffin Island on account of the longer dark period. This was before Bache Peninsula closed in 1933 and Craig Harbour in 1940. Then there were the joint Canadian American Arctic-Weather Stations established in 1947 at Resolute and Eureka; Mould Bay and Isacksen in 1950. At first the support and supply of these stations was heavily dependent upon United States' vessels and aircraft. There is no doubt sovereignty was of concern to some as one Department Director expressed in 1953 "The Canadian Government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the Arctic as possible and it appears that in many areas the Eskimos are the only people capable of doing this".

Arctic Quebec was experiencing an increasing population placing a strain on the rather limited country food resources available. The R.C.M. was asked to canvass its Port Harrison Detachment and discuss with the Eskimos the matter of moving, on a voluntary basis, to two places in the High Arctic. At the same time the R.C.M.P. Detachment at Pond Inlet was also asked to see if one or two Pond Inlet families would be willing to move further north. As the conditions on the east side of Hudson Bay are much less vigorous than in the High Arctic and as the people of Port Harrison had no experience in trapping and hunting during the long period
of winter darkness, it was thought if one family at least from Pond Inlet joined the Harrison groups, it would ease the transition. Even though at one time the R.C.M.P. only engaged Greenlanders at detachments on Ellesmere Island, it was realized that conditions at Pond Inlet are somewhat familiar to those at Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island and Craig Harbour on Ellesmere Island, the destinations of the move. The Pond Inlet people, therefore, would be able to assist the Port Harrison Eskimos greatly in adapting themselves, particularly important during the first winter. (I do not believe this was ever proved as a necessary precaution for the Harrison people adapted rapidly and extremely well to the High Arctic).

The R.C.M.P. who were at this time also acting as Administrators for the Department were asked not only to select the Inuit but were to explain, through interpreters, if necessary, the type of environment and conditions to which they would be going. All families were to be medically cleared (usually done at ship time with the arrival of the C.G.S. C.D. Howe, the annual supply vessel and which would be the means of transportation North for the families who wished to move). The Constable in charge of the Port Harrison Detachment involved in the selection and responsible for them being properly outfitted was transferred to Resolute Bay was familiar and was liked by the Eskimos who moved to that Community that summer. One of the key Department officers associated in the project was Mr. J. Cantley, a veteran fur trader and former Assistant H.B.C. Fur Trade Commissioner. He organized the trade supplies required, purchasing them from funds made available from the Eskimo Loan Fund to a leading Eskimo in the two groups to be moved. He subsequently handled the fur returns when they were sent to the auction house in Montreal. The two projects were designed to be entirely self contained. Each group was to be placed under the direct supervision of the R.C.M.P. Detachment at Resolute and Craig Harbour. Instructions or simple accounting and bookkeeping instructions were issued and as well as how to handle revenues and returns from furs and other produce, wages if any, family allowances and old age assistance where they applied. There was also the subject of advances or relief to individuals and when they might be unable to provide for themselves. Briefly, the operating instructions were similar to that of running a small outpost or trading store.

The philosophy of the time was that the Eskimos selected were essentially hunters and trappers and with assistance and guidance they could make a better living for themselves in the unpopulated High Arctic areas. The possibility of employment was not overlooked for at least some of these people might find even temporary employment at one time or another at the Resolute Weather Station or other Weather Stations in the High Arctic. However, the main purpose of the experiment was to enable the people to live the traditional life of hunters and trappers obtaining all the country food they needed and sufficient fur and other produce to purchase other requirements from the native store. It is interesting to note that same year 1953 other Northern Communities had heard about the proposed relocation projects and enquiries were made on the possibility
of other Inuit going north. The R.C.M.P. Detachment at Fort Chimo reported that a number of local Eskimos would like to move. The Department replied reinstating the original intention of taking people accustomed to hunting in the Barrens and living in snow houses. Many of the Eskimos of Fort Chimo were used to living in areas where firewood was available. Therefore, unless permanent employment and housing could be found for them a move should be discouraged. (A short time later a group from Chimo voluntarily moved to Fort Churchill where they were assisted by the Department in housing and finding employment at the Air Base and the National Defence establishment there).

A number of Port Harrison Eskimos volunteered to move and in the summer of 1953 seven families with the household and hunting equipment and dogs were taken on board the CGS C.D. Howe at Port Harrison. Two Pond Inlet families joined them. It is not clear whether the latter took passage on the C.D. Howe or by CGS D'Iberville which called at Pond Inlet before the C.D. Howe. Veteran Northern Superintendent H. Larsen of the R.C.M.P., was on the D'Iberville and he visited Resolute Bay with that vessel well in advance of the coming of the Harrison Eskimos. He selected the site of camp and communicated this information to the R.C.M.P. Detachment and D.O.T. officers who had agreed to assist in making storage arrangements for the supplies. Again keeping in mind, the traditional way of life, the site selected was near the beach about two miles south west of the D.O.T. quarters and approximately 5 miles by road from the Air Base. Here nearby were Thule Archaeological sites reflecting that Eskimo had lived in this area some time in the past. However, it appears that no natives had occupied the region for at least 300 years. There may have been the odd hunting trip to the area by northern Baffin Islanders over the years, but the establishment of the small Inuit Community in 1953 was the first permanent one in three centuries. Four families - three from Harrison, some twenty people, men, women and children and one family from Pond Inlet set up camp in August 1953 under the guidance of Constable Gibson of the R.C.M.P. That same summer the other four Harrison families together with two families from Pond Inlet were settled at Craig Harbour. The initial plan had been to relocate at the R.C.M.P. Alexandria Fiord Detachment opened that summer and supplied by the D'Iberville. However, ice conditions prevented the C.D. Howe getting in there and it was decided to put the operation of the relocation under the supervision of the R.C.M.P. at Craig Harbour. Here the families and the stores with similar arrangements that had been made at Resolute Bay were put ashore. In 1957, because of the annual difficulties of supply the whole community moved to the more accessible Grise Fiord.

Within two years the people had adapted to their new environment and appeared extremely happy. They were getting plenty of country food and furs. They had no desire to return home and asked that arrangements be made to have some of their relatives from Harrison and Pond Inlet join them. This was done and by 1960 the Inuit population at Resolute was 82 and 61 at Grise Fiord.

Although as already mentioned securing employment was not an important factor in deciding the resettlement of Eskimos in the High Arctic Islands, it was not long before some temporary employment was obtained at Resolute Bay which was intergraded with hunting and trapping. They were engaged in such projects as geological surveys called "Operation Franklin"
The Eskimos with their dog teams were used as guides and helped put up caches of supplies brought in by aircraft. Some also found some employment opportunities in various capacities at the D.O.T. and the Air Base and in connection with the annual sealifts. Although the Craig Harbour later Grise Fiord group did not have the opportunities of employment they continued to obtain a good livelihood from the country and this community also served a distinct purpose in confirming in a tangible manner Canada's Sovereignty over this vast region of the Arctic.

Following a brief period in the 50's tents and igloos were used for shelter but the Resolute Inuit soon built houses from excess material from the Air Base. By 1960 the year the Administration trading stores at the two points became Cooperatives although the R.C.M.P. continued until 1966 to serve as Secretary Treasurer to these and give guidance to the Stores' operations, the Eskimos were well established at both Resolute and Craig Harbour.

The 60's also saw the Federal Government increase all services in Resolute and Craig Harbour: rental housing, medical facilities, schools and an Area Administrator. The Hudson's Bay Company put in a store at Resolute in 1966 but the Cooperative continued to operate. About that time a permanent mission was established.

About 1960 correspondence between the R.C.M.P. and the Department and other Government Departments expressed concern about any extension of the relocation projects. Not because these that occurred had in any way been a failure but as part of history of the original migration was one of greatly increased population overburdening and depleting the wild life. Withdrawal of some hunters from areas not only benefited them but relieved Port Harrison of some of its large human population. Views were that this population adjustment should not proceed to a degree that there might be an unbalance in the opposite direction. Furthermore, it was believed that if many Eskimos who were to depend on a hunting and trapping economy and detailed wild life and other surveys would be required to determine the potential of the High Arctic before any further major relocations should take place. Employment in the North was now getting more attention and there was to be more studies of the wishes and aspirations of the Inuit people.

Some immigration did occur. They were a few Inuit that moved on their own by dog team from the Creswell Bay area. Then there were some additional from Pond Inlet and Grise Fiord to Resolute as well as one or two leaving Resolute for Grise Fiord. The files do not reflect whether any ever moved back to Port Harrison. In the early years as this was an experiment, the understanding was, should it fail or the Harrison people wished to return to their original homes, they could do so. There were rumours from time to time in the first seven years that there were some dissatisfied or were homesick but this was never confirmed or were there any approaches on record having been made to officials of the Federal or Territorial Governments. In this regard, there was also from a Social-logical point of view some expression being made that the Baffin Islanders were not interested or avoided interrelation with the Port Harrison people. Here again, there is nothing on file to confirm this. The Eskimo population at Resolute had risen to 144 by 1967.
Since 1970 the Territorial Government has had full responsibility for the two High Arctic Communities in question. It might require an update report from them to round out the record. I understand that recently there was some question on the background of the initial moves indicating there was coercion or force. This is not so. Also, apparently one or two of the originals or their descendants wish to now go back to Port Harrison. This might have been expected in the first few years of the projects but I do not think anyone could have suspected that some 25 years later people would want to go back to their original homes holding the Government to a promise made so long ago.

On the original moves people in the Department and the R.C.M.P. responsible for organizing these were experienced and knowledgeable officers with a northern background. There were also good interpreters who assisted in order to avoid any misunderstandings. This is not to say misunderstandings were not possible regardless of the precautions and plans. Furthermore, in light of the conditions of the day and the communications, the efforts of relocation were certainly in the interests of the people who moved. They were certainly successful projects and they benefited these Inuit, who indicated to many associated with them their happiness and satisfaction in their new location. Some could say yes, they benefited only materially, for often such moves cause trauma for people in transition. However, many events and factors such as urbanization in a rapidly changing North over the past 25 years since the initial move, have contributed to changes and attitudes in all Canadians both North and South. Looking at the past in today's so called more enlightened society and with hindsight always suggest approaches which might have been better made at any point in time. In 1953 even the most visionary could not see the Arctic of today and the Inuit people with more material possessions, education, increased life expectancy, better health, more help in adversity. Activities of civilization are going on among the Inuit and will continue to effect them. The efforts of the Government in 1953 to ease the transition and ameliorate the impacts of the South were thought to be the best possible at that time. The future of the Canadian Inuit is one which has no easy panacea and the value in human terms cannot be simply expressed.

A. Stevenson
November 1977
Mr. N.J. Macpherson,
Director General,
Ottawa Liaison Bureau,
Government of the N.W.T.,
Room 915, Les Terrasses de la Chaudière,
Hull, Quebec,
Alta. 0H4.

Dear Norman:

Re: Establishment of Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord

Thank you for the copy of the letter dated December 17, 1931 from John Parker, Commissioner of the N.W.T. requesting that you interview me on the move of the Inuit to the High Arctic in 1953.

I do not think it will be necessary to tape this because back in 1977 after I had retired, I was asked if I would do a paper on it. The Department's own files seem to be so mixed up with all the changes that the subject of the move arose with one or two of the original families asking to return to Harrison. Therefore, my paper was based on my memory and association with the events and the period. Attached is a copy which you may wish to pass on to John Parker.

The main point of John's letter is the statement of some of the residents claiming coercion was used in the move north. As I mentioned in the attached write-up, this is absolutely untrue. The people involved in the whole operation were experienced northerners with a good knowledge of the Inuit and their language and that included me. As another note of interest, around 1967 I made a trip north with Stu Hodgson. He had not taken over as Commissioner yet but was Deputy. It was one of his first visits into many points of the Eastern Arctic. Two places we stopped at were Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. Here we had public meetings and Stu asked the people many questions about their living conditions and settlements in the High Arctic. Idlout, the well known Pond Inlet hunter was still living then as were a number of the leading Port Harrison people. They all spoke in glowing and satisfactory terms of the High Arctic giving them a better way of life.

There is only one other suggestion that might be useful. I am not sure where Cst. Gibson is now. No doubt retired, but possibly through "G" Division in Yellowknife, he could be traced for a report or possibly on "U" Division files, archival or otherwise might have copies of his reports on the selection and the original move, because as I mentioned, he was at both Port Harrison and Resolute Bay. I know the
Files of the present Department of Indian and Northern Affairs seem depleted of these details. With all the reorganization, I guess files go astray or are destroyed. It is sad that as we live through an era, so many people are not conscious that it is history in the making no matter how seemingly uneventful the events may be. Someday researchers may wish to fill in the gaps and I hope my small contribution will be useful.

If I can be of any further help to you or John Parker, let me know.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

A. Stevenson

Attach.
Dear Maurice:

I apologize sincerely for not responding to your letter of December 14th, and that of Paul Tellier of August 16th concerning the relocation of Inuit families. This matter seemed to be one of those to which I simply did not get around to turning my attention.

I had anticipated this matter being raised by the people of Resolute and Grise Fiord because it has been discussed with me from time to time, and therefore before his death I had asked Alex Stevenson, former Administrator of the Arctic, for his views on the relocation project. He replied to me through Norm Macpherson on January 13th, 1982 and I enclose a copy of his letter and the report attached to it which he had prepared in November 1977.

Alex makes reference to a Constable Gibson of the RCMP who took part in the relocation. I have just written to Constable Gibson, who is in retirement in Victoria, B.C., and asked him if he would provide me with his recollections on the project, and as soon as I have received them I will forward a copy to you.

In addition, I have discussed this matter with Deputy Commissioner Bob Pilot, who was an RCMP member at the time and was on Ellesmere Island soon after the move of the Inuit people. Bob established the new RCMP post at Grise Fiord and assisted in the move of the Inuit families from Craig Harbour to hunting grounds some 40 miles to the west on Ellesmere Island. He is going to prepare a critique of Alex Stevenson's paper and of comments we hope to receive from Constable Gibson, as well as recording his own impressions and recollections. When this material is available I will also forward it to you.
It seems there is no doubt that the people moved entirely of their own free will, but it also seems likely that promises were made to return them should the scheme not work out. I am sure that no one in government expected that the promise of relocation would be called on more than 25 years after the original move. The people have done reasonably well and I think have received a high level of attention from both the Federal and Territorial governments.

It would be best for me to wait until the other reports are ready before providing you with any further opinion or recommendation in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

John H. Parker, Commissioner.
Cape Herschel, The Post Office That Never Was

by Wilfred Doucette

Although Canada received the Arctic islands as a result of a British Imperial Order-in-Council, Ellesmere Island was not claimed for Canada until 1904. In that year a Canadian Government expedition raised the flag at Cape Herschel and erected a large stone cairn in which they left a copy of the possession document. The first permanent Canadian occupation of Ellesmere Island began in 1922 when a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) detachment was established at Craig Harbour. This was primarily for sovereignty purposes and a post office was included. Under international law territories that were not permanently inhabited could be subject to dispute.

The hammer for the post office was not prepared until after the 1922 Eastern Arctic Patrol had returned because the location of the post office was still uncertain at time of sailing. The RCMP attempted in subsequent years to relocate the Craig Harbour detachment farther north, and finally succeeded in 1926 when Bache Peninsula was opened with its own post office and Craig Harbour closed. No covers or cancellations have been reported for the first Craig Harbour post office (the northernmost post office in Canada) until after the 1922 Eastern Arctic Patrol resupply operations.

The object of the voyage was to establish Canadian sovereignty in the high Arctic. The "d'Iberville" was scheduled to travel about ten thousand miles through Arctic waters, some of which had never seen a Canadian ship. The final goal was Cape Herschel on Ellesmere Island, only 700 miles from the North Pole, to establish the northernmost RCMP post, an Eskimo settlement and a post office (the northernmost post office was at Alert, opened in 1950). As a freelance photographer, my assignment on the "d'Iberville" was to record the voyage for the Department of Transport. The "d'Iberville" had no difficulty as it moved northward along the coast of Devon Island, or crossing Jones Sound to Craig Harbour on the south coast of Ellesmere Island.

There were no Canadian natives on the islands north of Lancaster Sound, with the exception of two families employed by the RCMP at Craig Harbour. The Department of Northern Affairs planned to move a number of Eskimo families north to locations where RCMP detachments existed. A total of ten families would be brought north on the "C.D. Howe", which would rendezvous with the "d'Iberville" later at Craig Harbour where six of the families would be settled. The "d'Iberville" would take two families to each of the two new RCMP detachments at Cape Herschel and Resolute Bay.

No eskimos had lived this far north in Canada for hundreds of years. Seven families were being moved from the badly depleted hunting area at Port Harrison on Hudson Bay where they had been subsisting on government relief. Three families from Pond Inlet were attracted by the prospect of moving into a virgin hunting area, and had been asked to join the new settlements because they were already accustomed to living through the long, dark winters. Their experience would help the families from the more southern area to adjust to this new way of life.

We arrived at Craig Harbour about mid-morning on August 12 and unloaded supplies without stop until nearly midnight. North from Craig Harbour the ship's speed was reduced to a crawl by numerous icebergs, thick
fog and scattered ice. We were unable to see the coast of Ellesmere Island, except on radar.

On August 15th, one month after leaving Montreal with its 90° temperatures, the "d'Iberville" lay hove-to off Cape Herschel in heavy ice and near-freezing temperatures. Although we had arrived at our goal, all we could see was the floating ice surrounding the ship. To the officials in Ottawa, Cape Herschel seemed like a good location. It was at the narrowest point of Smith Sound, within 30 miles of the Greenland settlement of Etah. The RCMP detachment with a permanent eskimo settlement would help establish Canadian sovereignty on Ellesmere Island.

As the visibility improved, RCMP Superintendent Henry Larsen made four flights by helicopter over the area, scouting for a site for the new detachment and settlement. On his return just after midnight, we learned that he thought conditions at the Cape did not look good. There was continual moving ice near the shore and icebergs and growlers would make landing at the poor rocky beach difficult. We left Cape Herschel and steamed slowly southward in loose drifting pan ice.

After another attempt to reach Cape Herschel, Superintendent Larsen decided that the site was to be abandoned. The ship slowly worked its way north again. Our new destination was Bache Peninsula, where we would establish the settlement and reopen the abandoned RCMP post that had been closed for 20 years.

As we approached the site of the old RCMP detachment we could see that there were heavy ice flows and growlers piled up along the shore. Early on the morning of August 13th, Superintendent Larsen flew ashore to survey the area. When he returned, at about 9 AM, I flew ashore to photograph the old buildings. They were in surprisingly good condition. The detachment had been closed for over two decades but the buildings looked as if they needed only some paint.

The same kind of ice conditions along the shore of Bache Peninsula that had often

Front Fig. 1 - "Bache Island... closes to-day forever." Back

Shedding New Light on the Relocation: Summary of the Commission’s Conclusions

In an appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in March 1990, John Amagoalik, then President of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), testified that they had been dealing with the relocation issue for more than 30 years. Since the late 1970s, the Makivik Corporation (Makivik) and the ITC had made repeated representations to ministers and deputy ministers of Indian Affairs and Northern Development concerning relocation. Renewed efforts began in 1982. A brief summary of events since 1982 is set out in Appendix 5. Part 4 of the Supporting Summary contains a fuller description of efforts to resolve the relocatees’ complaints.

Over time the divergence between the position of the relocatees and that of the government has become wider. The government has also backtracked from previously stated positions. Whereas it once stated that it had no knowledge of any promise to return, the government has now acknowledge that such a promise was made and that the promise was not honoured. During 1980s the government made various statements about the role of the relocation in maintaining Canadian sovereignty that appeared to support the relocatees’ contention that sovereignty was a motivation factor. The position of the government now is that the sovereignty was not a consideration. Had the government promptly acknowledged the failure to honour the promise to return and then acted to redress the wrong, the complaints might well have been resolved quickly. The reversal of position on sovereignty only added fuel to fire, and the government’s refusal to adopt the unanimous recommendations of the Standing Committee on the Aboriginal Affairs was incomprehensible to the relocatees.

Each study or report that has been critical of the government has been met with a more extensive study commissioned by the government. The government has subjected each elements of the complains, piece by piece, to extensive analysis. The apparent focus of the government action has been to defend itself against these complaints and to put the government’s actions in the best possible light. In adopting this approach, the government has been seen as an adversary that would argue a point so long as any evidence could be fond to support it and would concede a point only in the face of overwhelming evidence. The government did not step back and begin with a reassessment of the social, political and cultural context in witch the relocation took place and then consider the complaint broadly in that context. Had a different approach been adopted, the government might have been led to a new awareness that would have permitted it to see the validity in the relocatees’ complaints and to move forward resolving them in a more positive way.

In short, the government’s handling of the complaints has served to increase mistrust and deepen the sense of grievance.

The Commission’s hearing and analysis have shed new light on the High Arctic relocation. Reconciliation of the evidence concerning the relocation provides a basis for reassessing the government’s responsibilities concerning the relocation and is a first step in a more fundamental reconciliation between the relocatees and the government.

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The Commission’s conclusions, based on the preceding evidence and analysis, are, in summary, as follow:

**Inuit Dependence and Vulnerability**

1. The High Arctic relocation took place in a cultural context where Inuit typically felt dependent upon non-Inuit and powerless in their dealing with them. The power that non-Inuit held over Inuit was well understood by non-Inuit, and even the wishes of well-intentioned non-Inuit could be taken as orders by Inuit. The government was present in the Arctic in the form of RCMP. Who were held in particular awe by the Inuit.

2. Not all Inuit were equally dependent or vulnerable in their relations with non-Inuit. There were indications that the dependence and vulnerability of the northern Quebec Inuit tended to be much greater than the people of northern Baffin Island.

**Inuit Relationship to Homeland and Kin**

3. The Inuit have a particular attachment to homeland and kin. This attachment was known by non-Inuit at the time of the relocation.

4. The Inukjuak area has been inhabited by large numbers of Inuit for centuries and is a traditional hunting and fishing area.

**Paternalistic Government Decision Making**

5. Government decision making concerning the Inuit into early 1950s typically did not take into account the wishes and aspirations of the Inuit. Instead, government decisions reflected a paternalistic view of what would be good for the Inuit and tended to minimize or disregard Inuit needs and desires.

**Sovereignty as a Factor in the Relocation**

6. The relocation took place at a time when the government was concerned about the facto Canadian sovereignty arising from the presence of the United States in the Arctic. The concern about the facto sovereignty involved a concern that Canada would not be seen to be controlling activities in the North so that, over time, Canada’s de jure sovereignty could be questioned. The weight of the evidence points to sovereignty as a material consideration in the relocation decision, although the primary concerns were social and economic.

**Population Growth or Game Decline Not Factors in the Relocation**

7. The information available to the government in early 1950’s does not indicate that the Inukjuak area was experiencing population growth. Rather, high mortality rates tended to result in a stable population. Nor were there indications of serious decline in food game resources. In fact, the situation had not changed in 30 to 40 years.

**The Preoccupation with ‘Handouts’**

8. There was a concern in the Department about the long-term instability of the fur trade and the capacity of the fur trade to sustain the income levels to which Inukjuak Inuit become accustomed. The government saw little prospect for increases earned income in the Inukjuak area, with the result that periodic reliance on relief would become a permanent feature of life and that other ‘handouts’, such as family allowance and old age pensions, arose periodically as a result of the cyclical nature of the fur trade, with poor years following good years over a four years cycle. It was considered that the Inukjuak Inuit were becoming dependant on ‘handouts’, with a consequent loss of self-reliance and moral decline.

**The Objective of Increased Reliance on Hunting**

9. Officials considered that greater reliance on hunting on the trade store would restore Inuit self-reliance and arrest the perceived moral decline. At the same time, this would resolve the perceived long-term economic concern regarding the instability of the fur trade, since a return to greater reliance on hunting would substitute for the income that fur trading would, in the long term,
be unable to provide. This objective was never communicated to the Inuit.

“Overpopulation in Relation to Available Resources”

10. It was perceived that decreased reliance on the trade store through increased reliance on hunting would not be possible in the Inukjuak area unless Inuit were relocated to other parts of the Quebec coast, to the islands of Hudson Bay off the Quebec coast, or to other parts of the Arctic. In this sense, and in this sense only, The Inukjuak area was considered to be “over-populated in relations to available resources”. This phrase was unfortunately ambiguous and was thought by some to refer a hunting population outstripping available game food resources. In fact, it characterizes an economic concern of the government related to a desire to require Inuit to hunt more and rely less on earned income.

The Goal of ‘Rehabilitation’

11. The goal of restoring Inuit self-reliance and independence through greater reliance on hunting involved restoring the Inuit to what was perceived by non-Inuit to be their proper state. The goal was ‘rehabilitation’, and the High Arctic relocation would be understood at the time—though not by the Inuit—as a rehabilitation project.

Failure to Disclose the Rehabilitation Goal to the Inuit

12. The Inukjuak Inuit were not told that the government considered them to be in need of rehabilitation and that the goal of relocation would be rehabilitation.

Relocation Would Not Relieve the Cycles in Hunting and Trapping

13. At time of the 1953 relocation, the fur cycle was reaching its peak, and no able-bodied Inuit were on relief at Inukjuak. Hunting was good and conditions were much improved over those of 1949-50, when the fur economy collapse and a hard winter made hunting difficult. Such cycles occurred everywhere in the Arctic where Inuit lived by hunting and trapping. White fox trapping everywhere followed a four-year cycle. (Cycles would not necessarily coincide in the same years in different parts of the Arctic; however, the typical cycle was of four years’ duration.) Hunting, even in areas of relative abundance, could be affected by adverse weather or ice conditions or various migratory patterns. Relocating Inuit to other places would not relieve such variability in the conditions of life.

The Institutional Consensus Supporting Relocations

14. There was consensus among all those with an interest in Arctic affairs, including the various government departments concerned, the RCMP, the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches and the Hudson’s Bay Company, that relocation would solve perceived economic and social problems. There were, however, differences of opinion about how relocation should be undertaken, with some, such a Superintendent Larsen of the RCMP, advocating the creation of small communities with wooden houses and schools, so that the adult Inuit could maintain a hunting and trapping lifestyle while children received the education that would be essential in the future.

The Relocation Plan

15. The High Arctic relocation was conceived by the Department as a way to place Inuit in areas believed to have adequate game resources and to require them to live largely by hunting, with some opportunity to trap. A small trade store would be establish but would carry limited and basic stock. The RCMP would be responsible for administering the store and, with the limited and basic stock, would be required to ration items from the store to ensure equitable distribution. It would also be the role of the RCMP to “encourage” the Inuit to hunt.

The Coercive Aspect of the Plan

16. The relocation plan was inherently coercive. It was a plan designed to take people who were accustomed to an income economy, with the
goods that income could purchase, and place them in a situation where they would be made to rely more heavily on game food, with all the hardship such a life naturally involve. The government did not need to use overt force. The imperative of survival the desired objective.

The Coercive Aspects of Life in the New Communities

17. Day-to-day life in the new communities would also have coercive elements. The RCMP were directed by Department not to give credit to trappers, even though giving credit, or grubstaking, was the common practice of trading companies. The RCMP were also directed to exercise a firm hand in the giving of relief. Insufficient supplies in the trade stores established in the new communities would mean the benefit of old age pensions and family allowance often would not reach the intended beneficiaries through goods issues from the store. Instead, these amounts would be recorded as a book entry in a form of forced savings. RCMP ‘encouragement’ of the Inuit in furtherance on the projects objectives would result in the police telling the Inuit what to do and scolding them when they did not do what the police wanted. The Inuit camps were established at a distance from non-Inuit facilities to restrict contact between Inuit and non-Inuit and to prevent the Inuit from becoming a burden on the non-Inuit post base. All there small elements of coercion became additionally coercive when carried out by a police force.

Misplaced Notions of Success

18. The overt signs of success of such a project, namely, self-reliance, would be similar regardless of the state of mind of any of the relocatees. Whether or not the people were unhappy or had desire to return home, they would still have to hunt. Reports by officials stating consistently that the relocatees were doing well reflect the overt state of affairs but do not address the unhappiness that many relocatees experienced and their desire to return home.

‘Rehabilitation’ versus Opportunities for Independent Hunters

19. Not all Inuit relied on income from trapping to the same extent. The relocation scheme might have been entirely satisfactory for people who lived largely from hunting, with income from trapping providing only a supplement, and who did not look to government support in poor fur years. There were Inuit who went to Resolute Bay from Pond Inlet who did find the relocation satisfactory. However, these Pond Inlet Inuit were not typical of all the relocatees, and the relocation scheme, by its own term, sought to relocate people who depended more heavily on an income economy, with government support as the safety net in poor years. Even the Pond Inlet Inuit at Grise Fiord, who were used to the support of a store, found conditions too hard. The recruitment of Inuit for the project was not, therefore, limited to those who had continued to live relatively distant from trading post, with income from trading providing only a supplement to what obtained from hunting.

Relocation A Regressive Step

20. At the time of relocation, Inukjuak was a substantial settlement with Hudson’s Bay Company post, a police post, church mission, a school, a nursing station, a Department of Transport weather station and radio facility, and port facility. The school and nursing station had been established relatively recently as part of a government program to remedy past decades of neglect. The relocation created new communities that would have no schools, no nursing station and no missions. In this respect, the decision would turn the clock back to the era when there were no such facilities.

Further Consequences of the Rehabilitation Objective

21. The highly generalized concern of administrators about Inuit relying too much on government ‘handouts’ was felt by relocatees in various ways. The concern applied both to government support programs, such as family allowance and old age security, which were
available to Canadians on a universal basis, and to relief, which was available only in case of hardship. Thus, the relocation scheme was aimed not only at changing expectations relief, but also at discouraging reliance on the universal programs. This would involve using administrative powers to restrict or withhold the actual benefit of their family universally available to Canadians. As a result, some of relocatees found that the benefit of their family allowance and old age security payments stopped after they left Inukjuak. The generalized concern about reliance on ‘handouts’ was also applied to all Inuit. Yet, not all Inuit, even in the Quebec part of the Arctic, were equally reliant on the combination of earned and unearned income. The relocatees were all not alike. Moreover, by 1953, conditions had improved considerably since the collapse of fur prices in 1949-50, and no able-bodied Inukjuak Inuit were receiving relief, outs’ and the understanding of local officials that this was ‘rehabilitation’ project served only to reinforce stereotypical attitudes that would adversely complicate relations between the relocatees and the local officials responsible for their well-being.

The Deputy Minister Approved Little More than a Concept

22. The government plan included no indication of representations or promises that were to be made to the Inuit. The plan, as approved by the Deputy Minister, was very general in its description of what was to be done and for that purpose. The detail would be worked out as the plan was implementing the decisions. The Deputy Minister approved little more than a concept.

The Promise to Return

23. The decision to extend a promise to return was made initially By Henry Larsen of the RCMP. It appears that the Department accepted this decision and, in fact, a departmental representative, Alex Stevenson, also extended a promise to return in his discussion with some Inukjuak Inuit. These promises were recorded in official memoranda and reports at the time. These documents are still in existence. No plan was developed by the Department to give effect to the promise, and the means to return were not made available to the Inuit. The content of the promise to return was never clearly defined, for example, whether it covered visits back and forth. If the promise was meant to apply only to the whole group, this was not conveyed to the Inuit.

No Special Instructions about Obtaining Consent of Inuit

24. The RCMP detachments in northern Quebec and in Pond Inlet were responsible for recruiting Inukjuak for the relocation. The relocatees were to be volunteers, but the department gave RCMP no special instruction about how to approach the Inuit or how to secure their consent, notwithstanding the well-known difficulty of obtaining genuine consent from Inuit. The RCMP member at Inukjuak responsible for carrying out this information understood that it was his responsibility to sell the Inuit on a project that was for their benefit, and that is what he did.

The Absence of Free and Informed Consent

25. It cannot be said that the Inukjuak Inuit gave free and informed consent to the relocation. The Inukjuak Inuit understood that they were going to a better place where there was an abundance of large land mammals, that they would be looked after, and that they would have the support of the Canadian government. Apart, in some cases, form an understanding that there would be dark period, the Inukjuak relocatees had no understanding of the disadvantages or risks of the project and did not believe that the relocation could change their lives fundamentally and adversely. Nor did they understand the rehabilitative character of the plan. What the Inukjuak Inuit were offered was less than what they had, in the sense that there would be less government income support available in the High Arctic and greater reliance on hunting. As a result, the relocatees, in addition to the many hardships suffered, experienced a sense of abandonment by the government and suffered considerable distress.
when their expectations of a significantly better life in the High Arctic were not met.

26. The Inukjuak Inuit were not told that they would be joined by Pond Inlet Inuit. There are significant differences between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet dialects, as well as differences in the two peoples’ way of living. The Inukjuak and Pond Inlet groups did not get along well in the new communities. The government’s desire was to have Pond Inlet Inuit involved in the relocation to help the Inukjuak Inuit adjust to High Arctic conditions. This idea failed, however, to take into account the disruptive effects of putting the different groups together in an isolated community.

27. The Pond Inlet Inuit found themselves providing a service to the government, giving guidance to the Inukjuak Inuit; they expected to be paid for this service but were not. The government failed to ensure that the conditions under which the Pond Inlet Inuit were participating were made clear to them. The government should accept responsibility for this misunderstanding.

28. The original plan called for Inuit from Fort Chimo to go to Resolute Bay where they would find full-or part time employment. This aspect of the plan fell apart because the government never had any intention of providing housing for the Inuit at Resolute Bay, and the Fort Chimo Inuit were used to living in houses. The initial planning by the Department failed to accommodate the characteristics of the people. As a result, the employment aspect of the relocation to Resolute Bay was downplayed, and it was decided that Inuit from Inukjuak would go to Resolute Bay instead to make their living by hunting and trapping.

29. The Inukjuak Inuit understood that they would be going to the same place: they had not been told they were going to Ellesmere Island. The Inukjuak Inuit would not learn that they were separated until they were already in the High Arctic, when they were separated and sent to different locations. This was painful and distressing for them and, in the circumstances, was clearly a forced separation.

30. The government proceeded with determination to implement the plan once it had been set in motion, without regard to matters that should have been incorporated in the planning process. The relocatees would need caribou skins for bedding and clothing, which are vital for people living on the land. When the required skins were not available, the Department nevertheless proceeded with the relocation, and the relocatees went north with 60 instead of 600 skins needed for clothing and bedding for the coming year. In addition, the relocatees arrived in the High Arctic without all the equipment they would need for life there.

31. The Inuit community at Resolute Bay became infected with tuberculosis which may have been carried from Inukjuak, resulting in additional hardship to the community as many members were transported south to hospital for extended periods.

32. The trade store in the new communities was funded through the Eskimo Loan Fund. There is no evidence that the arrangements for the loan were discussed with the relocatees before departure. The signature of one of the Inuit as the borrower would be obtained by the police after relocatees arrived in the High Arctic. The loan arrangement lacked substance. The reality was that
the Loan Fund was being used for departmental purposes, with an Inuk signing a loan agreement as a formality. The work of running the trade store was handled by the police. An Inuk signature on the loan agreement was a formality, not in the sense of being good legal form, but in the sense of something perfunctory and lacking in substance. In these circumstances, an Inuk’s signature on loan documents does not imply consent to the loan.

Isolation in the High Arctic
33. The environment in the new High Arctic communities was, in addition to the dark period, considerably different from Inukjuak. Climatic conditions and more severe, and varieties of game are significantly more limited. The move to the High Arctic thus involved significant changes for the Inukjuak relocatees. The Inukjuak Inuit also suffered isolation from home and the larger community at Inukjuak as a result of separation from immediate family, extended family, and friends who remained at Inukjuak. There was also isolation from those non-Inuit facilities that did exist in the new communities as a result of the separation of the Inuit settlement from non-Inuit facilities. Finally, isolation was created by the differences between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet groups in very small communities consisting of only a few families.

The Hardship Adjusting to the New Land
34. The Inukjuak Inuit were placed in a situation where to survive they had to adapt to an area that was significantly different from the Inukjuak area in term of climate, terrain and hunting conditions. There were also significant differences in the type and variety of game and fish available: this meant that the Inukjuak relocatees had to adapt their hunting techniques to the new conditions, to learn where and when various types of game could be obtained most readily, and to adjust their equipment to the different terrain, particularly in the Grise Fiord area. Changes in diet were also required. At Grise Fiord, the Inukjuak Inuit would have to learn to obtain water from grounded icebergs. The Inukjuak Inuit were also used to burning wood, and although would could be found in the base dump in Resolute Bay, at Grise Fiord, seal oil lamps were the only means of cooking and providing heat. The more severe weather and the periods of darkness made it more difficult to carry out daily tasks and required psychological adjustment. The Inukjuak Inuit found that adjustment difficult-and certainly much harder than they expected.

Risks to Inuit Health and Life in a Experimental Project and the Inadequacy of Measures to Prevent Hardship
35. The relocation was an experiment to see whether the Inuit could adjust to lie in the High Arctic. There was real risk attached to the project if it turned out that the land could not support the Inuit or if the Inuit had severe difficulty learning how to exploit the resources of the new land. This risk would have become a reality at the Cape Herschel site if that aspect of the relocation had gone ahead. Game failed to materialize in the Cape Herschel area in the winter of 1953-54, and the land would not have been able to support the relocatees.

The supplies sent in for the trade stores at Resolute and Craig Harbour were not sufficient to support the people should they be unable to take sufficient game for food but were intended only to supplement what they could obtain from hunting. There is no evidence that the Department develop a sufficient to meet the communities’ food needs. The inherent riskiness of the project was not discussed with the Inuit. There were simply assured that there was abundant game in the High Arctic and that they would have a better life.

Some of the supplies intended for Resolute Bay did not arrive; eventually the missing supplies were flown in by the RCAF sometime after January 1954, more than five months after they should arrived. At both Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, skins for clothing and bedding arrived late in the winter, in the early months of 1954. By contrast, if a Canadian government post had been established in the High Arctic and
government personnel were missing essential items such as Arctic clothing and bedding, the government certainly would have arranging for these essential supplies to be sent immediately. The fact that the Department had arranged the relocation using the device of a loan limited the Department’s financial ability to respond to contingencies that developed in what was in substance a government-initiated relocation. The project was insufficiently funded, and as contingencies developed over years, as when supplies failed to arrive, cost considerations would outweigh considerations of Inuit welfare. Contingencies were absorbed in the form of increased hardship for the relocatees.

Inadequate Provisions for Necessary Boats
36. Large boats formed an important part of life in Inukjuak and were an important aspect of status in the community. These boats had been left behind in Inukjuak. The relocatees believed that there would be boats available for them in the new land. No arrangement had been made to provide the Inuit relocatees with boats.

Hardship and Suffering the Result of an Inherently Unsound Plan
37. The relocation was not a case of an appropriate plan running into difficulty because of failures in carrying it out. The plan was inherently unsound, and the means necessary to carry it out were equally unsound. The failures in execution served only to aggravate the hardship and suffering inherent in the plan from the outset.

Inadequate Supplies for the Trades Stores
38. The small trade stores were chronically under stocked and, particularly at Grise Fiord, people suffered hardship year after year through the 1950s.

Difficulty in Finding Spouses
39. The small size of the communities made it difficult for young people to find spouses.

Restrictions on Movement
40. Grise Fiord lacked the employment opportunities of Resolute Bay, yet people were effectively prevent from moving from Grise Fiord to Resolute Bay to join relatives or to pursue other opportunities.

The Failure to Honour the Promise to Return
41. The government fails to honour the promise to return, and the resulting hardship is not fully redressed by an offer to pay for a return many years after the return should have been provided. The lost years must be taking into account.

The Relocatees’ Experience were Predictable
42. The experiment of the relocatees was a predictable result of a scheme that was inherently coercive in this objective and coercive in the means chosen to achieve that objective. The other failing in planning and implementation, as well as the failure to honour the promise to return, compounded the hardship suffered by the relocatees.
Appendix B: Official Apology by the Government of Canada for the Inuit High Arctic Relocation (2010)²

On August 18, 2010 in Inukjuak, Nunavik, the Honourable John Duncan, PC, MP, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians apologized on behalf of the Government of Canada for the relocation of Inuit to the High Arctic.

Speaking Notes for the Honourable John Duncan

Elders, Inuit leaders, ladies and gentlemen, and especially those of you who were directly affected by the relocation; thank you for being here.

This is my first trip to the North as Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and I am very honoured to be here for this historic event.

You may recall that my predecessor, Minister Strahl, also had his first trip as Minister to Nunavik when he attended the Katimajiit summit in Kuujjuaq almost exactly three years ago.

I am familiar with the North and I look forward to visiting the North regularly, and to working closely with Inuit communities and organizations during my mandate.

Over half a century has gone by since the relocation of Inuit from this community to the High Arctic. I am here on behalf of the Prime Minister, the Government of Canada, and all Canadians to offer an apology for these events.

Today’s ceremony is an important step towards healing and reconciliation. Please accept the apology I am about to offer on behalf of all Canadians. I hope that it will form the basis of a strengthened relationship with the Government of Canada.

On behalf of the Government of Canada and all Canadians, we would like to offer a full and sincere apology to Inuit for the relocation of families from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay during the 1950s.

We would like to express our deepest sorrow for the extreme hardship and suffering caused by the relocation. The families were separated from their home communities and extended families by more than a thousand kilometres. They were not provided with adequate shelter and supplies. They were not properly informed of how far away and how different from Inukjuak their new homes would be, and they were not aware that they would be separated into two communities once they arrived in the High Arctic. Moreover, the Government failed to act on its promise to return anyone that did not wish to stay in the High Arctic to their old homes.

The Government of Canada deeply regrets the mistakes and broken promises of this dark chapter of our history and apologizes for the High Arctic relocation having taken place. We would like to pay tribute to the relocatees for their perseverance and courage. Despite the suffering and hardship, the relocatees and their descendants were successful in building vibrant communities in Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. The Government of Canada recognizes that these communities have contributed to a strong Canadian presence in the High Arctic.

The relocation of Inuit families to the High Arctic is a tragic chapter in Canada’s history that we should not forget, but that we must acknowledge, learn from and teach our children. Acknowledging our shared history allows us to move forward in partnership and in a spirit of reconciliation. The Government of Canada and Inuit have accomplished many great things together, and all Canadians have benefitted from the contributions of Inuit to our culture and history. We must continue to strengthen our connections and deepen our understanding and respect. We must jointly build a stronger, healthier and more vibrant Inuit Nunangat and, in turn, build a stronger, healthier and more vibrant Canada.

The Government of Canada hopes that this apology will help heal the wounds caused by events that began nearly 60 years ago and turn the page on this sad chapter in Canada’s history. May it strengthen the foundation upon which the Government of Canada and Inuit can build and help keep the True North Strong and Free.
Further Reading on the High Arctic Relocations

Compiled by P. Whitney Lackenbauer


Hammond, Marc M. 1984. Report of findings on an alleged promise of government to finance the return of Inuit in Resolute and Grise Fiord to their original homes at Port Harrison (Inukjuak) and Pond Inlet. DIAND.
Hazell, Stephen. 1991. “High Arctic exiles: No Satisfaction: Why is an apology to a small group of Inuit who suffered for their country such a difficult gesture for the government to make?” *Arctic Circle* November/December: 35-6.


Hickling Corporation. 1990. “Assessment of the factual basis of certain allegations made before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs concerning the relocation of Inukjuak Inuit families in the 1950s.” Report submitted to DIAND.


Makivik Corporation and Inuit Tapirisat of Canada. 1983. “Submission regarding Grise Fiord/Resolute Bay Inuit relocation issue to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs.”

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Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. “Arctic Exile Monument Project.”


About the Editor

SHELAGH GRANT taught history and Canadian Studies at Trent University for seventeen years. After undergraduate studies in nursing science at the University of Western Ontario and time out to raise a young family, she returned to university earning a Hons. BA in History and Canadian Studies in 1981 and a Masters Degree in History in 1983. With further archival research in London and Washington, she expanded her master’s thesis into her first book, Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1939-1950 (UBC Press 1988). Her second book, the award-winning Arctic Justice: On Trial for Murder — Pond Inlet, 1923 (MQUP 2002), required yearly trips to Baffin Island for oral history interviews and follow-up discussions. Later she returned to Pond Inlet to supervise an Inuktitut translation of her manuscript on the history of Mittimatalik, published in 2008 by the Nunavut Department of Education for use in schools and elders centres. She compiled thirty years of research on Arctic sovereignty into a unique comparative history of Alaska, Arctic Canada and Greenland — Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America (Douglas & McIntyre, 2010).

Shelagh was the first historian and first woman to receive the Northern Science Award (1996) and was active on various Inuit policy advisory committees, editorial boards and northern scholarship committees. In November 2011, she was made a Fellow of the Royal Canadian Geographical Society, awarded the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee Medal in June 2012 and the Governor General’s Polar Medal in July 2015, and granted an honorary Doctor of Letters (DLitt) from Trent University in June 2014. Although now retired from regular teaching, Shelagh is still a member of the adjunct faculty in the Canadian Studies Department and a research associate of the Frost Centre for Graduate Studies at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario. Long time partner of Jon K. Grant, they have three children and six grandchildren.
In 1953, the Government of Canada announced plans to resettle Inuit from areas of dwindling food resources to the High Arctic where game and fur animals were reported in abundant supply. That August, seven families from the Inukjuak (Port Harrison) area in northern Quebec and three families from Pond Inlet were resettled in communities at Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island and at Grise Fiord, near the Craig Harbour police post on Ellesmere Island. This volume makes Shelagh Grant’s important interpretations and research on these controversial relocations available to the public and provides essential background to understand the Government of Canada’s 2010 official apology for the Inuit High Arctic relocation. “Passage of time heals most wounds,” Grant notes in the Foreword. “With subsequent government actions, compensation and official apologies, it is hoped that the relocated Inuit can now look back with pride for their contribution in protecting Canadian sovereignty and furthering development of the High Arctic.”